Wednesday, May 19, 2010

Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada

Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada

Sandor Dudas1, Jianmin Yang1,2,3, Catherine Graham1, Markus Czub4, Tim A. McAllister2, Michael B. Coulthart5, Stefanie Czub1*

1 Canadian and OIE Reference Laboratories for BSE, Canadian Food Inspection Agency Lethbridge Laboratory, Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada, 2 Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre, Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada, 3 College of Veterinary Medicine, China Agricultural University, Beijing, China, 4 Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, 5 Canadian Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Surveillance System, Public Health Agency of Canada, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada

Abstract

The epidemiology and possibly the etiology of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) have recently been recognized to be heterogeneous. In particular, three types [classical (C) and two atypical (H, L)] have been identified, largely on the basis of characteristics of the proteinase K (PK)-resistant core of the misfolded prion protein associated with the disease (PrPres). The present study was conducted to characterize the 17 Canadian BSE cases which occurred prior to November 2009 based on the molecular and biochemical properties of their PrPres, including immunoreactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profile and relative PK sensitivity. Two cases exhibited molecular weight and glycoform profiles similar to those of previously reported atypical cases, one corresponding to H-type BSE (case 6) and the other to L-type BSE (case 11). All other cases were classified as C-type. PK digestion under mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance in both of these cases compared to the C-type cases. With Western immunoblotting, N-terminal-specific antibodies bound to PrPres from case 6 but not to that from case 11 or C-type cases. C-terminal-specific antibodies revealed a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth protein fragment in case 6, indicative of two PrPres subpopulations in H-type BSE. No mutations suggesting a genetic etiology were found in any of the 17 animals by sequencing the full PrP-coding sequence in exon 3 of the PRNP gene. Thus, each of the three known BSE types have been confirmed in Canadian cattle and show molecular characteristics highly similar to those of classical and atypical BSE cases described from Europe, Japan and the USA. The occurrence of atypical cases of BSE in countries such as Canada with low BSE prevalence and transmission risk argues for the occurrence of sporadic forms of BSE worldwide.

Citation: Dudas S, Yang J, Graham C, Czub M, McAllister TA, et al. (2010) Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada. PLoS ONE 5(5): e10638. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010638

Editor: Carles Lalueza-Fox, Institute of Evolutionary Biology (CSIC-UPF), Spain

Received: February 9, 2010; Accepted: April 21, 2010; Published: May 14, 2010

Copyright: © 2010 Dudas et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

Funding: Funding for this project was provided by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. The funder had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.

Competing interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

* E-mail: stefanie.czub@inspection.gc.ca



http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0010638





Greetings,



>>> The occurrence of atypical cases of BSE in countries such as Canada with low BSE prevalence and transmission risk argues for the occurrence of sporadic forms of BSE worldwide. <<<


In my opinion ;


THE statement above is about as non-scientific as a statement can be. There is no proof what-so-ever that any of the atypical BSE cases or atypical scrapie cases anywhere on the globe was a spontaneous case without any route and source of the TSE agent. This is a myth. The USDA and the OIE are trying to make the atypical BSE cases and they have already made the atypical Scrapie cases a legal trading commodity, without any transmission studies first confirming that in fact these atypical TSE will not transmit via feed. I suppose it is a human transmission study in progress. IT's like what happened in England with c-BSE and the transmission to humans via nvCJD never happened to the OIE and the USDA. Canada does not have a low prevalence of BSE either, they have a high prevalence. WHO knows about North America ? it's just that the U.S.A. try's much harder at concealing cases of mad cow disease. THIS was proven with the first stumbling and staggering mad cow in Texas, that was Wisk away to be rendered without any test at all. Then, you had the second case of mad cow disease that the USDA et al was almost as successful with as the first one, but the O.I.G. stepped in and demanded testing over seas, this after many scientist around the globe spoke out. Finally, after an act of Congress, the second case of mad cow disease in Texas was confirmed. all this was done for a reason, and that reason was the OIE USDA BSE MRR policy. Again, This study reeks of TRADE policy wrangling. There is NO proof that the atypical TSE are spontaneous. please show me these transmission studies ? on the other hand, we now know that the L-type atypical BSE is much more virulent than the typical C-BSE, and we now know that the H-type atypical BSE will transmit to humans. WHY can it not be that these atypical cases are simply from feed that had different strains of TSE ? WHY is it that no one will comment on the studies that was suppose to show infectivity of tissues from atypical BSE ? WHY is it I had to file a FOIA on that issue? L-type atypical BSE (BASE) is more virulent than classical BSE, has a lymphotropic phenotype, and displays a modest transmission barrier in our humanized mice. BSE-H is also transmissible in our humanized Tg mice. SEE Liuting Qing1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5, Qingzhong Kong1 et al 2009 ;



Atypical BSE, BSE, and other human and animal TSE in North America Update October 19, 2009


snip...


I ask Professor Kong ;


Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM
Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment


''IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....''


Professor Kong reply ;


.....snip


''As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete. Thanks for your interest.''


Best regards, Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA



P.4.23 Transmission of atypical BSE in humanized mouse models


Liuting Qing1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5, Qingzhong Kong1 1Case Western Reserve University, USA; 2Instituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Italy; 3Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Germany; 4National Veterinary Research Institute, Poland; 5Kansas State University (Previously at USDA National Animal Disease Center), USA


Background: Classical BSE is a world-wide prion disease in cattle, and the classical BSE strain (BSE-C) has led to over 200 cases of clinical human infection (variant CJD). Atypical BSE cases have been discovered in three continents since 2004; they include the L-type (also named BASE), the H-type, and the first reported case of naturally occurring BSE with mutated bovine PRNP (termed BSE-M). The public health risks posed by atypical BSE were argely undefined.


Objectives: To investigate these atypical BSE types in terms of their transmissibility and phenotypes in humanized mice.


Methods: Transgenic mice expressing human PrP were inoculated with several classical (C-type) and atypical (L-, H-, or Mtype) BSE isolates, and the transmission rate, incubation time, characteristics and distribution of PrPSc, symptoms, and histopathology were or will be examined and compared.


Results: Sixty percent of BASE-inoculated humanized mice became infected with minimal spongiosis and an average incubation time of 20-22 months, whereas only one of the C-type BSE-inoculated mice developed prion disease after more than 2 years. Protease-resistant PrPSc in BASE-infected humanized Tg mouse brains was biochemically different from bovine BASE or sCJD. PrPSc was also detected in the spleen of 22% of BASE-infected humanized mice, but not in those infected with sCJD. Secondary transmission of BASE in the humanized mice led to a small reduction in incubation time. The atypical BSE-H strain is also transmissible with distinct phenotypes in the humanized mice, but no BSE-M transmission has been observed so far.


Discussion: Our results demonstrate that BASE is more virulent than classical BSE, has a lymphotropic phenotype, and displays a modest transmission barrier in our humanized mice. BSE-H is also transmissible in our humanized Tg mice. The possibility of more than two atypical BSE strains will be discussed.


Supported by NINDS NS052319, NIA AG14359, and NIH AI 77774.



http://www.prion2009.com/sites/default/files/Prion2009_Book_of_Abstracts.pdf



see full text ;


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/10/atypical-bse-bse-and-other-human-and.html



14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases H-type and L-type Atypical BSE January 2010 (special pre-congress edition)


18.173 page 189


Experimental Challenge of Cattle with H-type and L-type Atypical BSE


A. Buschmann1, U. Ziegler1, M. Keller1, R. Rogers2, B. Hills3, M.H. Groschup1. 1Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany, 2Health Canada, Bureau of Microbial Hazards, Health Products & Food Branch, Ottawa, Canada, 3Health Canada, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Secretariat, Ottawa, Canada


Background: After the detection of two novel BSE forms designated H-type and L-type atypical BSE the question of the pathogenesis and the agent distribution of these two types in cattle was fully open. From initial studies of the brain pathology, it was already known that the anatomical distribution of L-type BSE differs from that of the classical type where the obex region in the brainstem always displays the highest PrPSc concentrations. In contrast in L-type BSE cases, the thalamus and frontal cortex regions showed the highest levels of the pathological prion protein, while the obex region was only weakly involved.


Methods:We performed intracranial inoculations of cattle (five and six per group) using 10%brainstemhomogenates of the two German H- and L-type atypical BSE isolates. The animals were inoculated under narcosis and then kept in a free-ranging stable under appropriate biosafety conditions. At least one animal per group was killed and sectioned in the preclinical stage and the remaining animals were kept until they developed clinical symptoms. The animals were examined for behavioural changes every four weeks throughout the experiment following a protocol that had been established during earlier BSE pathogenesis studies with classical BSE.


Results and Discussion: All animals of both groups developed clinical symptoms and had to be euthanized within 16 months. The clinical picture differed from that of classical BSE, as the earliest signs of illness were loss of body weight and depression. However, the animals later developed hind limb ataxia and hyperesthesia predominantly and the head. Analysis of brain samples from these animals confirmed the BSE infection and the atypical Western blot profile was maintained in all animals. Samples from these animals are now being examined in order to be able to describe the pathoge esis and agent distribution for these novel BSE types.


Conclusions: A pilot study using a commercially avaialble BSE rapid test ELISA revealed an essential restriction of PrPSc to the central nervous system for both atypical BSE forms. A much more detailed analysis for PrPSc and infectivity is still ongoing.


http://www.isid.org/14th_icid/


http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/IMED2009_AbstrAuth.pdf


http://www.isid.org/publications/ICID_Archive.shtml



14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure - Final Abstract Number: ISE.114

Session: International Scientific Exchange


Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009


T. Singeltary Bacliff, TX, USA



Background: An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.


Methods: 12 years independent research of available data


Results: I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.


Conclusion: I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.


http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/14th_ICID_ISE_Abstracts.pdf


Wednesday, February 24, 2010


Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America 14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -


http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2010/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html



TSE


http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/



URGENT DATA ON ATYPICAL BSE RISK FACTORS TO HUMANS AND ANIMALS OIE REFUSE TO ACKNOWLEDGE $



position: Post Doctoral Fellow


Atypical BSE in Cattle


Closing date: December 24, 2009


Anticipated start date: January/February 2010


Employer: Canadian and OIE Reference Laboratories for BSE CFIA Lethbridge Laboratory, Lethbridge/Alberta


snip...



To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-t pe and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.


http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2




Sunday, April 4, 2010


USDA AND OIE OUT OF TOUCH WITH RISK FACTOR ON ATYPICAL TSE


http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/04/usda-and-oie-out-of-touch-with-risk.html




IN FACT, the fumbling and bumbling the USDA and FDA et al did with the infamous 2004 enhanced BSE surveillance program was so BAD, one of the leading scientist for the NIH/CDC et al on prions, Dr. Paul Brown was quoted as saying ;


"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that." Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive. USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general. "Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...


snip...end


http://www.upi.com/



CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...


http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm


PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE


Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM



"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."




OR, what the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG found ;



Audit Report Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program ­ Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006 Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle Still Remain



http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf




Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.


snip...


The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...




http://web.archive.org/web/20030516051623/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf



Sent: Friday, April 16, 2010 11:38 AM

Subject: PRO-MED ATYPICAL SCRAPIE

Background ----------- "Retrospective studies have identified cases predating the initial identification of this form of scrapie, and epidemiological studies have indicated that it does not conform to the behaviour of an infectious disease, giving rise to the hypothesis that it represents spontaneous disease. However, atypical scrapie isolates have been shown to be infectious experimentally, through intracerebral inoculation in transgenic mice and sheep. [Many of the neurological diseases can be transmitted by intracerebral inoculation, which causes this moderator to approach intracerebral studies as a tool for study, but not necessarily as a direct indication of transmissibility of natural diseases. - Mod.TG]

"The 1st successful challenge of a sheep with 'field' atypical scrapie from an homologous donor sheep was reported in 2007.

"Results -------- "This study demonstrates that atypical scrapie has distinct clinical, pathological, and biochemical characteristics which are maintained on transmission and sub-passage, and which are distinct from other strains of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies in the same host genotype.

"Conclusions ------------ Atypical scrapie is consistently transmissible within AHQ homozygous sheep, and the disease phenotype is preserved on sub-passage."

Lastly, this moderator wishes to thank Terry Singletary for some of his behind the scenes work of providing citations and references for this posting. - Mod.TG]

The HealthMap/ProMED-mail interactive map of Australia is available at . - Sr.Tech.Ed.MJ]


http://www.promedmail.org/pls/otn/f?p=2400:1001:962575216785367::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,81729


Sunday, April 18, 2010

SCRAPIE AND ATYPICAL SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION STUDIES A REVIEW 2010

SCRAPIE TRANSMITS TO NON-HUMAN PRIMATES BY THEIR NON-FORCED ORAL CONSUMPTION...and the many other transmission studies that the OIE and the USDA refuse to acknowledge as a risk factor. ...


http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2010/04/scrapie-and-atypical-scrapie.html



IN CONFIDENCE

TRANSMISSION TO CHIMPANZEES

WE CANNOT SAY THAT SCRAPIE WILL NOT TRANSMIT TO CHIMPANZEES.

snip...

4. In view of Dr. Gibbs' probable use of chimpanzees Mr Wells' comments (enclosed) are pertinent.

snip...

5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severely would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough. Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might be best TO RETAIN THAT HYPOTHESIS.

A negative result would take a lifetime to determine but that would be a shorter period than might be available for human exposure and it would still not answer the question regarding mans' susceptibility. In the meantime no doubt the negativity would be used defensively. It would however be counterproductive if the experiment finally became positive. We may learn more about public reactions following next Monday's meeting.

R. Bradley 23 September 1990

CVO (+ Mr Wells' comments) Dr T W A Little Dr B J Shreeve

90/9.23/1.1


http://web.archive.org/web/20040904150533/www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/09/23001001.pdf



If the scrapie agent is generated from ovine DNA and thence causes disedase in other species, then perhaps, bearing in mind the possible role of scrpaie in CJD of humans (Davinpour et al, 1985), scrapie and not BSE should be the notifiable disease. ...


http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20090505194948/http://bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1988/06/08004001.pdf



1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8

Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to nonhuman primates.

Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC.

Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of known infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey exposed to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months, respectively. Careful physical examination of the buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under observation.

snip...

The successful transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie by natural feeding to squirrel monkeys that we have reported provides further grounds for concern that scrapie-infected meat may occasionally give rise in humans to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.

PMID: 6997404



http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=6997404&dopt=Abstract



Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether scrapie is transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the disease has been transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid speculation (Gajdusek 1977) conjectures that the agents of scrapie, kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and transmissible encephalopathy of mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S. Department of Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed for human or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)" The problem is emphasised by the finding that some strains of scrapie produce lesions identical to the once which characterise the human dementias"

Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety of laboratory personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action such as the "scorched meat" policy of USDA makes the solution of the acrapie problem urgent if the sheep industry is not to suffer grievously.

snip...

76/10.12/4.6


http://web.archive.org/web/20010305223125/www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1976/10/12004001.pdf



Nature. 1972 Mar 10;236(5341):73-4.

Transmission of scrapie to the cynomolgus monkey (Macaca fascicularis). Gibbs CJ Jr, Gajdusek DC.

Nature 236, 73 - 74 (10 March 1972); doi:10.1038/236073a0

Transmission of Scrapie to the Cynomolgus Monkey (Macaca fascicularis)

C. J. GIBBS jun. & D. C. GAJDUSEK

National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland

SCRAPIE has been transmitted to the cynomolgus, or crab-eating, monkey (Macaca fascicularis) with an incubation period of more than 5 yr from the time of intracerebral inoculation of scrapie-infected mouse brain. The animal developed a chronic central nervous system degeneration, with ataxia, tremor and myoclonus with associated severe scrapie-like pathology of intensive astroglial hypertrophy and proliferation, neuronal vacuolation and status spongiosus of grey matter. The strain of scrapie virus used was the eighth passage in Swiss mice (NIH) of a Compton strain of scrapie obtained as ninth intracerebral passage of the agent in goat brain, from Dr R. L. Chandler (ARC, Compton, Berkshire).


http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v236/n5341/abs/236073a0.html



EMBO reports 4, 5, 530–533 (2003) doi:10.1038/sj.embor.embor827 AOP Published online: 11 April 2003

Widespread PrPSc accumulation in muscles of hamsters orally infected with scrapie

Achim Thomzig, Christine Kratzel, Gudrun Lenz, Dominique Krüger & Michael Beekes

Robert Koch-Institut, P26, Nordufer 20, D-13353 Berlin, Germany

To whom correspondence should be addressed Michael Beekes Tel: +49 30 4547 2396; Fax: +49 30 4547 2609; BeekesM@rki.de

Received 13 February 2003; Accepted 13 March 2003; Published online 11 April 2003.

Abstract

Scrapie, bovine spongiform encephalopathy and chronic wasting disease are orally communicable, transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs). As zoonotic transmissions of TSE agents may pose a risk to human health, the identification of reservoirs for infectivity in animal tissues and their exclusion from human consumption has become a matter of great importance for consumer protection. In this study, a variety of muscles from hamsters that were orally challenged with scrapie was screened for the presence of a molecular marker for TSE infection, PrPSc (the pathological isoform of the prion protein PrP). Sensitive western blotting revealed consistent PrPSc accumulation in skeletal muscles from forelimb and hindlimb, head, back and shoulder, and in tongue. Previously, our animal model has provided substantial baseline information about the peripheral routing of infection in naturally occurring and orally acquired ruminant TSEs. Therefore, the findings described here highlight further the necessity to investigate thoroughly whether muscles of TSE-infected sheep, cattle, elk and deer contain infectious agents.

EMBO reports 4, 5, 530–533 (2003) doi:10.1038/sj.embor.embor827 AOP Published online: 11 April 2003


http://www.nature.com/embor/journal/v4/n5/full/embor827.html



Sunday, April 18, 2010

SCRAPIE AND ATYPICAL SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION STUDIES A REVIEW 2010


http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2010/04/scrapie-and-atypical-scrapie.html



ODD how when c-BSE was linked with nvCJD of humans with pathology that is very similar to each other, they confirmed a link between humans. HOWEVER, with typical scrapie and the atypical Nor-98 scrapie being very similar to some sub-types of sporadic CJD, and GSS, it's just the opposite, its all spontaneous $$$ will the corruption ever end ?



SCRAPIE The United States is unable to support the proposed new draft Code Chapter on Scrapie. The draft chapter, as written, departs significantly from the existing chapter, is confusing and is difficult to understand. This version of the scrapie chapter uses much of the same wording as the BSE chapter and is written as if the predominance of evidence revealed that scrapie was a food-borne disease similar to BSE in cattle which is inappropriate. Moreover, several of the new changes are not supported by current scientific evidence. As a result, detailed comments on individual articles would not meaningful at this time. The United States is not supportive of the proposed draft chapter for the following reasons: 1. Inclusion of “atypical” scrapie: The scientific evidence indicates that “atypical” scrapie, also referred to as Nor-98, Nor-98-like, or non-classical scrapie, is not the same disease as classical scrapie. Further, “atypical” scrapie does not meet the criteria for listing diseases of trade concern by the OIE, as described in Chapter 2.1.1 of the Code. The United States recommends that the scope of this chapter be limited to classical scrapie in sheep and goats. Further, the United States recommends that OIE clearly adopt the position that “atypical” scrapie represents a distinct disease entity from classical scrapie and that it not be a listed disease. • There is no evidence that “atypical” scrapie is a contagious disease. If it is contagious, available evidence suggests that it has a much lower transmission efficiency. (Hopp, et al, 2006; Green, et al, 2007; Benestad, et al 2008; McIntyre, et al, 2008) • The disease appears to be ubiquitous in that it has been found wherever sufficient surveillance has been conducted. (Buschmann et al, 2004; De Bosschere et al, 2004; Orge, et al, 2004; Everest et al, 2006; Arsac, 2007; Benestad, et al 2008; Fediaevsky, et al, 2008) • The disease does not appear to be economically significant in that the prevalence of clinical disease is low and it typically occurs in older animals. (Luhken, et al., 2007; Benestad, et al 2008). • The disease is as likely as not to be the result of a spontaneous conversion of normal prion protein. (Benestad, et al 2008, De Bosschere et al 2007) • Removal of exposed sheep is unlikely to reduce the prevalence of “atypical” scrapie infection and removing only those exposed sheep that are phenylalanine (F) at codon 141 is scientifically unsound since the disease is known to affect sheep of most other genotypes. Further, sheep with AHQ alleles have a similar risk of infection with “atypical” strains as sheep with F at codon 141. (Luhken, et al., 2007). • If “atypical” scrapie is included as a listed disease, the surveillance and diagnostic requirements which are needed to identify these cases should be described in detail in both this Chapter and the Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial 2 Animals. Data from Europe illustrates that using the proper test(s) is essential for the identification of atypical scrapie (Fediaevsky et al., 2008).

SNIP...

6. Overemphasis on importation and use of bovine meat and bone meal as a route of scrapie transmission: Given that the draft Chapter is not intended to address risk mitigation for BSE in small ruminants, we believe there is an over-emphasis on this potential route of transmission in the current draft. The United States recommends that the requirements in this chapter be limited to the inclusion of products from sheep and goats (instead of from all ruminants) in feed or feed ingredients intended for consumption by animals • The use of products from sheep and goats as feed or feed ingredients for ruminant or non-ruminant animals represent one possible route of transmission (Philippe, et al, 2005) and a source of environmental contamination with the classical scrapie agent. However, this is not the primary route of transmission for the scrapie agent. • The need for the exclusion of cattle-derived protein or other animal protein to mitigate BSE risk should be based on a country’s BSE risk status and should be addressed in Chapter 2.3.13 of the Code.

SNIP...

14. Failure to provide scientific justification for the list of permitted commodities in Item 1 of Article 2.4.8.1. . We recommend that the list be re-evaluated and those items that have not been substantiated as presenting no risk be excluded or those with some risk but where the intended use mitigates the risk the use be specified. • There is no known human health risk associated with scrapie. As such, if meat and meat products for human consumption are included in this list, sheep and/or goat milk intended for human consumption should also be added to the list of permitted commodities in Item 1 of Article 2.4.8.1. • In the vast majority of sheep infected with classical scrapie, actual infectivity or PrPres has been identified in most tissues including the lymphoreticular system (tonsils, spleen, lymph nodes), the gastrointestinal tract, brain, and spinal cord (Hadlow et. al. 1979; Hadlow et al., 1980; van Kuelen et al., 1996; van Kuelen et al., 1999, Andreoletti et al., 2000; Heggebø et al., 2002; Caplazi et al., 2004). Infectivity and/or PrPres has also been identified in the placenta (see Hourrigan et al., 1979; Onodera et al., 1993; Pattison et al., 1972; Pattison et al., 1974; Race et al., 1998), blood (Hunter et al., 2002; Houston et al. 2008); peripheral nerves (Groschup et al., 1996), muscle (Pattison and Millson, 1962; Andreoletti et al., 2004; Casalone et al., 2005), salivary gland (Hadlow et al., 1980; Vascellari et al., 2007), kidney (Siso et al., 2006), and skin ( Thomzig et al., 2007). In addition, recent work has shown milk and/or colostrum from scrapie infected ewes transmitted the disease to 17 of 18 lambs (Konold et al., 2008). • The data on the risk of low protein tallow made from scrapie infected tissues particularly for use in milk replacer is limited and some epidemiologic studies suggest an association of milk replacer use with scrapie risk. Taylor et al., 1997 examined the inactivation capacity of different rendering system in regards to scrapie. The presence of infectivity was determined by bioassay into mice. From the onset of this study, it was assumed that tallow was not the vehicle for the transmission of TSE. Hence only 2 tallow samples were examined.


http://www.aphis.usda.gov/import_export/animals/oie/downloads/tahc_mar-sep08/tahc-scrapie-77-mar08_cmt.pdf



Monday, November 30, 2009

USDA AND OIE COLLABORATE TO EXCLUDE ATYPICAL SCRAPIE NOR-98 ANIMAL HEALTH CODE


http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/11/usda-and-oie-collaborate-to-exclude.html



Monday, December 14, 2009

Similarities between Forms of Sheep Scrapie and Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Are Encoded by Distinct Prion Types


http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/12/similarities-between-forms-of-sheep.html



Monday, December 14, 2009

Similarities between Forms of Sheep Scrapie and Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Are Encoded by Distinct Prion Types


hmmm, this is getting interesting now...


Sporadic CJD type 1 and atypical/ Nor98 scrapie are characterized by fine (reticular) deposits,

see also ;

All of the Heidenhain variants were of the methionine/ methionine type 1 molecular subtype.



http://cjdusa.blogspot.com/2009/09/co-existence-of-scrapie-prion-protein.html



see full text ;

Monday, December 14, 2009

Similarities between Forms of Sheep Scrapie and Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Are Encoded by Distinct Prion Types


http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/12/similarities-between-forms-of-sheep.html



Epidemiology of Scrapie in the United States 1977


http://web.archive.org/web/20030513212324/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m08b/tab64.pdf



Tuesday, April 28, 2009

Nor98-like Scrapie in the United States of America


http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/04/nor98-like-scrapie-in-united-states-of.html




P03.141

Aspects of the Cerebellar Neuropathology in Nor98

Gavier-Widén, D1; Benestad, SL2; Ottander, L1; Westergren, E1 1National Veterinary Insitute, Sweden; 2National Veterinary Institute,

Norway Nor98 is a prion disease of old sheep and goats. This atypical form of scrapie was first described in Norway in 1998. Several features of Nor98 were shown to be different from classical scrapie including the distribution of disease associated prion protein (PrPd) accumulation in the brain. The cerebellum is generally the most affected brain area in Nor98. The study here presented aimed at adding information on the neuropathology in the cerebellum of Nor98 naturally affected sheep of various genotypes in Sweden and Norway. A panel of histochemical and immunohistochemical (IHC) stainings such as IHC for PrPd, synaptophysin, glial fibrillary acidic protein, amyloid, and cell markers for phagocytic cells were conducted. The type of histological lesions and tissue reactions were evaluated. The types of PrPd deposition were characterized. The cerebellar cortex was regularly affected, even though there was a variation in the severity of the lesions from case to case. Neuropil vacuolation was more marked in the molecular layer, but affected also the granular cell layer. There was a loss of granule cells. Punctate deposition of PrPd was characteristic. It was morphologically and in distribution identical with that of synaptophysin, suggesting that PrPd accumulates in the synaptic structures. PrPd was also observed in the granule cell layer and in the white matter. The pathology features of Nor98 in the cerebellum of the affected sheep showed similarities with those of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.

***The pathology features of Nor98 in the cerebellum of the affected sheep showed similarities with those of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.


http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf



PR-26

NOR98 SHOWS MOLECULAR FEATURES REMINISCENT OF GSS

R. Nonno1, E. Esposito1, G. Vaccari1, E. Bandino2, M. Conte1, B. Chiappini1, S. Marcon1, M. Di Bari1, S.L. Benestad3, U. Agrimi1 1 Istituto Superiore di Sanità, Department of Food Safety and Veterinary Public Health, Rome, Italy (romolo.nonno@iss.it); 2 Istituto Zooprofilattico della Sardegna, Sassari, Italy; 3 National Veterinary Institute, Department of Pathology, Oslo, Norway

Molecular variants of PrPSc are being increasingly investigated in sheep scrapie and are generally referred to as "atypical" scrapie, as opposed to "classical scrapie". Among the atypical group, Nor98 seems to be the best identified. We studied the molecular properties of Italian and Norwegian Nor98 samples by WB analysis of brain homogenates, either untreated, digested with different concentrations of proteinase K, or subjected to enzymatic deglycosylation. The identity of PrP fragments was inferred by means of antibodies spanning the full PrP sequence. We found that undigested brain homogenates contain a Nor98-specific PrP fragment migrating at 11 kDa (PrP11), truncated at both the C-terminus and the N-terminus, and not N-glycosylated. After mild PK digestion, Nor98 displayed full-length PrP (FL-PrP) and N-glycosylated C-terminal fragments (CTF), along with increased levels of PrP11. Proteinase K digestion curves (0,006-6,4 mg/ml) showed that FL-PrP and CTF are mainly digested above 0,01 mg/ml, while PrP11 is not entirely digested even at the highest concentrations, similarly to PrP27-30 associated with classical scrapie. Above 0,2 mg/ml PK, most Nor98 samples showed only PrP11 and a fragment of 17 kDa with the same properties of PrP11, that was tentatively identified as a dimer of PrP11. Detergent solubility studies showed that PrP11 is insoluble in 2% sodium laurylsorcosine and is mainly produced from detergentsoluble, full-length PrPSc. Furthermore, among Italian scrapie isolates, we found that a sample with molecular and pathological properties consistent with Nor98 showed plaque-like deposits of PrPSc in the thalamus when the brain was analysed by PrPSc immunohistochemistry. Taken together, our results show that the distinctive pathological feature of Nor98 is a PrP fragment spanning amino acids ~ 90-155. This fragment is produced by successive N-terminal and C-terminal cleavages from a full-length and largely detergent-soluble PrPSc, is produced in vivo and is extremely resistant to PK digestion.

*** Intriguingly, these conclusions suggest that some pathological features of Nor98 are reminiscent of Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker disease.

119


http://www.neuroprion.com/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2006/abstract_book.pdf



A newly identified type of scrapie agent can naturally infect sheep with resistant PrP genotypes

Annick Le Dur*,?, Vincent Béringue*,?, Olivier Andréoletti?, Fabienne Reine*, Thanh Lan Laï*, Thierry Baron§, Bjørn Bratberg¶, Jean-Luc Vilotte?, Pierre Sarradin**, Sylvie L. Benestad¶, and Hubert Laude*,?? +Author Affiliations

*Virologie Immunologie Moléculaires and ?Génétique Biochimique et Cytogénétique, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, 78350 Jouy-en-Josas, France; ?Unité Mixte de Recherche, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique-Ecole Nationale Vétérinaire de Toulouse, Interactions Hôte Agent Pathogène, 31066 Toulouse, France; §Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments, Unité Agents Transmissibles Non Conventionnels, 69364 Lyon, France; **Pathologie Infectieuse et Immunologie, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, 37380 Nouzilly, France; and ¶Department of Pathology, National Veterinary Institute, 0033 Oslo, Norway

***Edited by Stanley B. Prusiner, University of California, San Francisco, CA (received for review March 21, 2005)

Abstract Scrapie in small ruminants belongs to transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), or prion diseases, a family of fatal neurodegenerative disorders that affect humans and animals and can transmit within and between species by ingestion or inoculation. Conversion of the host-encoded prion protein (PrP), normal cellular PrP (PrPc), into a misfolded form, abnormal PrP (PrPSc), plays a key role in TSE transmission and pathogenesis. The intensified surveillance of scrapie in the European Union, together with the improvement of PrPSc detection techniques, has led to the discovery of a growing number of so-called atypical scrapie cases. These include clinical Nor98 cases first identified in Norwegian sheep on the basis of unusual pathological and PrPSc molecular features and "cases" that produced discordant responses in the rapid tests currently applied to the large-scale random screening of slaughtered or fallen animals. Worryingly, a substantial proportion of such cases involved sheep with PrP genotypes known until now to confer natural resistance to conventional scrapie. Here we report that both Nor98 and discordant cases, including three sheep homozygous for the resistant PrPARR allele (A136R154R171), efficiently transmitted the disease to transgenic mice expressing ovine PrP, and that they shared unique biological and biochemical features upon propagation in mice. *** These observations support the view that a truly infectious TSE agent, unrecognized until recently, infects sheep and goat flocks and may have important implications in terms of scrapie control and public health.



http://www.pnas.org/content/102/44/16031.abstract



Monday, December 1, 2008

When Atypical Scrapie cross species barriers

Authors

Andreoletti O., Herva M. H., Cassard H., Espinosa J. C., Lacroux C., Simon S., Padilla D., Benestad S. L., Lantier F., Schelcher F., Grassi J., Torres, J. M., UMR INRA ENVT 1225, Ecole Nationale Veterinaire de Toulouse.France; ICISA-INlA, Madrid, Spain; CEA, IBiTec-5, DSV, CEA/Saclay, Gif sur Yvette cedex, France; National Veterinary Institute, Postboks 750 Sentrum, 0106 Oslo, Norway, INRA IASP, Centre INRA de Tours, 3738O Nouzilly, France.

Content

Atypical scrapie is a TSE occurring in small ruminants and harbouring peculiar clinical, epidemiological and biochemical properties. Currently this form of disease is identified in a large number of countries. In this study we report the transmission of an atypical scrapie isolate through different species barriers as modeled by transgenic mice (Tg) expressing different species PRP sequence.

The donor isolate was collected in 1995 in a French commercial sheep flock. inoculation into AHQ/AHQ sheep induced a disease which had all neuro-pathological and biochemical characteristics of atypical scrapie. Transmitted into Transgenic mice expressing either ovine or PrPc, the isolate retained all the described characteristics of atypical scrapie.

Surprisingly the TSE agent characteristics were dramatically different v/hen passaged into Tg bovine mice. The recovered TSE agent had biological and biochemical characteristics similar to those of atypical BSE L in the same mouse model. Moreover, whereas no other TSE agent than BSE were shown to transmit into Tg porcine mice, atypical scrapie was able to develop into this model, albeit with low attack rate on first passage.

Furthermore, after adaptation in the porcine mouse model this prion showed similar biological and biochemical characteristics than BSE adapted to this porcine mouse model. Altogether these data indicate.

(i) the unsuspected potential abilities of atypical scrapie to cross species barriers

(ii) the possible capacity of this agent to acquire new characteristics when crossing species barrier

These findings raise some interrogation on the concept of TSE strain and on the origin of the diversity of the TSE agents and could have consequences on field TSE control measures.


http://www.neuroprion.org/resources/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2008/abstract-book-prion2008.pdf



CJD TEXAS 38 YEAR OLD FEMALE WORKED SLAUGHTERING CATTLE EXPOSED TO BRAIN AND SPINAL CORD MATTER


>>> Up until about 6 years ago, the pt worked at Tyson foods where she worked on the assembly line, slaughtering cattle and preparing them for packaging. She was exposed to brain and spinal cord matter when she would euthanize the cattle. <<<



Prion disease update 1010 (04)


snip...


[Terry S. Singeltary Sr. has added the following comment: "According to the World Health Organisation, the future public health threat of vCJD in the UK and Europe and potentially the rest of the world is of concern and currently unquantifiable. However, the possibility of a significant and geographically diverse vCJD epidemic occurring over the next few decades cannot be dismissed .

The key word here is diverse. What does diverse mean? If USA scrapie transmitted to USA bovine does not produce pathology as the UK c-BSE, then why would CJD from there look like UK vCJD?"


http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:568933508083034::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,82101



KEY WORK HERE IS 'DIVERSE'.

what does diverse mean ?

adjective

1.of a different kind, form, character, etc.; unlike: a wide range of diverse opinions.

2. of various kinds or forms; multiform.

1 : differing from one another : unlike

2 : composed of distinct or unlike elements or qualities




USA sporadic CJD cases rising ;

There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance collection.

He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm


http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf



CJD USA RISING, with UNKNOWN PHENOTYPE ;

5 Includes 41 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 17 inconclusive cases; 6 Includes 46 cases with type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded.


http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf




Friday, February 05, 2010

New Variant Creutzfelt Jakob Disease case reports United States 2010 A Review


http://vcjd.blogspot.com/2010/02/new-variant-creutzfelt-jakob-disease.html



Saturday, January 2, 2010

Human Prion Diseases in the United States January 1, 2010 ***FINAL***


http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/01/human-prion-diseases-in-united-states.html




2010 see mad cow feed ban violations ;




Monday, March 8, 2010


UPDATE 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009 Greetings,

I got a follow on this in the mail this past Saturday in the mail. thought some might be interested in the following ;

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES Public Health Service Food and Drug Administration Rockville MD 20857

Terry Singeltary P.O. box 42. Bacliff, TX USA 77518

Dear Requestor

In reply refer to: F2009-7430


http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/update-429128-lbs-feed-for-ruminant.html




Tuesday, March 2, 2010

Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed/Adulterated/Misbranded Rangen Inc 2/11/10 USA


http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-proteins-prohibited-in-ruminant.html




Monday, March 1, 2010

ANIMAL PROTEIN I.E. MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE A REVIEW 2010


http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-protien-ie-mad-cow-feed-in.html




Monday, April 5, 2010

Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE April 5, 2010


http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/04/update-on-feed-enforcement-activities.html




BSE cases Canada 16 or 17 cases to date ? (i don't guess the USA or Canada claims the 2003 mad cow in Washington, that was claimed to have been imported from Canada) ?


http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/bseesb/surv/surve.shtml#num




AGAIN, this study reeks of propaganda and should be viewed as such. THIS study in my opinion, was for nothing but TRADE issues. ...TSS


Wednesday, April 28, 2010

BSE, Scrapie, CWD, REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS COMMISSION Paris, 8-12 February 2010

REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL


http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/04/bse-scrapie-cwd-report-of-meeting-of.html



Saturday, April 10, 2010

TOYOTA VS MAD COW DISEASE USA OIE BSE MRR IMPORT AND EXPORT TRADE WARS


http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/04/toyota-vs-mad-cow-disease-usa-oie-bse.html



Wednesday, February 10, 2010

NAIS MAD COW TRACEABILITY DUMPED BY USDA APHIS 2010


http://naiscoolyes.blogspot.com/2010/02/nais-mad-cow-traceability-dumped-by.html



Audit Report

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program – Phase II

and

Food Safety and Inspection Service

Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III

Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006

Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle Still Remain


http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf



"These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC."

THIS WAS DONE FOR A REASON!

THE IHC test has been proven to be the LEAST LIKELY to detect BSE/TSE in the bovine, and these were probably from the most high risk cattle pool, the ones the USDA et al, SHOULD have been testing. ...TSS

USDA 2003

We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They've recently gone back. Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an 'official' test result as recognized by APHIS.

Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to one area.

snip.............

Dr. Detwiler: It seems a good idea, but I'm not aware of it. Another important thing to get across to the public is that the negatives do not guarantee absence of infectivity. The animal could be early in the disease and the incubation period. Even sample collection is so important. If you're not collecting the right area of the brain in sheep, or if collecting lymphoreticular tissue, and you don't get a good biopsy, you could miss the area with the PRP in it and come up with a negative test. There's a new, unusual form of Scrapie that's been detected in Norway. We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They've recently gone back.

Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an 'official' test result as recognized by APHIS .

Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to one area.

snip...

FULL TEXT;

Completely Edited Version PRION ROUNDTABLE

Accomplished this day, Wednesday, December 11, 2003, Denver, Colorado

2005


http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/02/report-on-testing-ruminants-for-tses-in.html



Subject: USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half (bogus BSE sampling FROM HEALTHY USDA CATTLE)

Date: June 21, 2007 at 2:49 pm PST

Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program

An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.

snip...

Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1 include:

soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),

implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),

snip...

The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are completed.

4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half


http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf



-MORE Office of the United States Attorney District of Arizona FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE For Information Contact Public Affairs February 16, 2007 WYN HORNBUCKLE Telephone: (602) 514-7625 Cell: (602) 525-2681

CORPORATION AND ITS PRESIDENT PLEAD GUILTY TO DEFRAUDING GOVERNMENT’S MAD COW DISEASE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM

PHOENIX -- Farm Fresh Meats, Inc. and Roland Emerson Farabee, 55, of Maricopa, Arizona, pleaded guilty to stealing $390,000 in government funds, mail fraud and wire fraud, in federal district court in Phoenix. U.S. Attorney Daniel Knauss stated, “The integrity of the system that tests for mad cow disease relies upon the honest cooperation of enterprises like Farm Fresh Meats. Without that honest cooperation, consumers both in the U.S. and internationally are at risk. We want to thank the USDA’s Office of Inspector General for their continuing efforts to safeguard the public health and enforce the law.” Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee were charged by Information with theft of government funds, mail fraud and wire fraud. According to the Information, on June 7, 2004, Farabee, on behalf of Farm Fresh Meats, signed a contract with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (the “USDA Agreement”) to collect obex samples from cattle at high risk of mad cow disease (the “Targeted Cattle Population”). The Targeted Cattle Population consisted of the following cattle: cattle over thirty months of age; nonambulatory cattle; cattle exhibiting signs of central nervous system disorders; cattle exhibiting signs of mad cow disease; and dead cattle. Pursuant to the USDA Agreement, the USDA agreed to pay Farm Fresh Meats $150 per obex sample for collecting obex samples from cattle within the Targeted Cattle Population, and submitting the obex samples to a USDA laboratory for mad cow disease testing. Farm Fresh Meats further agreed to maintain in cold storage the sampled cattle carcasses and heads until the test results were received by Farm Fresh Meats.

Evidence uncovered during the government’s investigation established that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population. Specifically, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted, or caused to be submitted, obex samples from healthy, USDA inspected cattle, in order to steal government moneys.

Evidence collected also demonstrated that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee failed to maintain cattle carcasses and heads pending test results and falsified corporate books and records to conceal their malfeasance. Such actions, to the extent an obex sample tested positive (fortunately, none did), could have jeopardized the USDA’s ability to identify the diseased animal and pinpoint its place of origin. On Wednesday, February 14, 2007, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee pleaded guilty to stealing government funds and using the mails and wires to effect the scheme. According to their guilty pleas:

(a) Farm Fresh Meats collected, and Farabee directed others to collect, obex samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population, which were not subject to payment by the USDA;

(b) Farm Fresh Meats 2 and Farabee caused to be submitted payment requests to the USDA knowing that the requests were based on obex samples that were not subject to payment under the USDA Agreement;

(c) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms to the USDA’s testing laboratory that were false and misleading;

(d) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Submission Forms filed with the USDA that were false and misleading;

(e) Farm Fresh Meats falsified, and Farabee directed others to falsify, internal Farm Fresh Meats documents to conceal the fact that Farm Fresh Meats was seeking and obtaining payment from the USDA for obex samples obtained from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population; and

(f) Farm Fresh Meats failed to comply with, and Farabee directed others to fail to comply with, the USDA Agreement by discarding cattle carcasses and heads prior to receiving BSE test results. A conviction for theft of government funds carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. Mail fraud and wire fraud convictions carry a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. Convictions for the above referenced violations also carry a maximum fine of $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for organizations. In determining an actual sentence, Judge Earl H. Carroll will consult the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which provide appropriate sentencing ranges. The judge, however, is not bound by those guidelines in determining a sentence.

Sentencing is set before Judge Earl H. Carroll on May 14, 2007. The investigation in this case was conducted by Assistant Special Agent in Charge Alejandro Quintero, United States Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General. The prosecution is being handled by Robert Long, Assistant U.S. Attorney, District of Arizona, Phoenix. CASE NUMBER: CR-07-00160-PHX-EHC RELEASE NUMBER: 2007-051(Farabee) # # #


http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/az/press_releases/2007/2007-051(Farabee).pdf



The beef import forecast for the second quarter was unchanged from last month’s, despite pressure from higher-than-expected domestic cow slaughter that has remained high through most of this period. Beef imports into the United States from Australia, New Zealand, and Uruguay provide additional processing beef that, along with domestic cow and bull beef, is mixed with 50-percent trim from fed cattle to make ground beef. Forecast beef exports were raised slightly, mainly on continued (though gradual) improvements in sales to major Asian markets. In late May the World Animal Health Organization – known by its French acronym, OIE – designated the United States as having “controlled risk status” for bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or BSE. This designation reflects the OIE’s view that beef produced in the United States is safe for export, since BSE control measures such as feed bans and removal of specified risk materials result in negligible risk to consumers. However, the OIE standards are only guidelines. Individual countries may adopt differing standards, and those countries that do accept OIE standards must still undertake the bureaucratic processes to revise their rules and procedures.


http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/ldp/2007/06Jun/ldpm156.pdf



(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)

11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries. The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to then Central Bureau............


http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf



The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.


http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf



Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-17 on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk of USA

please see full text ;


http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/scdocs/doc/3rax1.pdf



http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1211902594180.htm



Saturday, August 16, 2008

Qualitative Analysis of BSE Risk Factors in the United States February 13, 2000 at 3:37 pm PST (BSE red book)


http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2008/08/qualitative-analysis-of-bse-risk.html



48 hour traceback for BSE mad cow disease in the USA ???


NOT in your lifetime !


8 YEARS IN REVIEW OF THE MAD COW DEBACLE IN THE USA ;


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html



Tuesday, December 15, 2009

NAIS, COOL, FROM FARM TO FORK, MAD COW DISEASE


http://naiscoolyes.blogspot.com/2009/12/nais-cool-from-farm-to-fork-mad-cow.html



Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0006 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary Sr Views Add Comments How To Comment

snip...

MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???

go figure....

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518


http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&d=APHIS-2006-0041-0006



THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species. MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ??? go figure. ...


http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#documentDetail?R=09000064801f8151



Manuscript Draft Manuscript Number: Title: HUMAN and ANIMAL TSE Classifications i.e. mad cow disease and the UKBSEnvCJD only theory Article Type: Personal View Corresponding Author: Mr. Terry S. Singeltary, Corresponding Author's Institution: na First Author: Terry S Singeltary, none Order of Authors: Terry S Singeltary, none; Terry S. Singeltary Abstract: TSEs have been rampant in the USA for decades in many species, and they all have been rendered and fed back to animals for human/animal consumption. I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2007.


http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=090000648027c28e&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf



Subject: Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION

Date: August 24, 2005 at 2:47 pm PST

August 24, 2005

Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION

Greetings APHIS ET AL,

My name is Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

I would kindly like to comment on [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 ;

PROPOSED RULES

Exportation and importation of animals and animal products:

Whole cuts of boneless beef from-

Japan,

48494-48500 [05-16422]


http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=0900006480086ebc&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw6



Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL IMPORTS FROM CANADA


https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/BSEcom.nsf/0/b78ba677e2b0c12185256dd300649f9d?OpenDocument&AutoFramed



PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT HERE ;


Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL IMPORTS FROM CANADA


http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/07/docket-no-03-080-1-usda-issues-proposed.html



I find it appauling that in 2010, the O.I.E. is still going by science on Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy that is decades old. New emerging strains of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy have emerged, in different species, along with new science that shows these new strains of T.S.E. are more virulent than the c-B.S.E. MOST every Country that went by the O.I.E. B.S.E. guidelines, most all came down with B.S.E. THE O.I.E. has now shown they are nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal T.S.E. AS i said before, O.I.E. should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. ...



http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#documentDetail?R=09000064801e47e1





January 28, 2007

Greetings APHIS,

I would kindly like to submit the following to ;

BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01

[Federal Register: January 9, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 5)] [Proposed Rules] [Page 1101-1129] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr09ja07-21]

snip...

THE last time a country decided it was o.k. to poison the rest of the world, I thought we had learned something from it, I suppose we have not. that is all in the world the BSE MRR policy is, a legal tool to poison the globe, just for commodities and futures. THIS time however, we are dealing with a more virulent strain of mad cow disease i.e. BASE, and it's been here in the USA for some time if you go back and look at the studies of Mission, Texas from the Scrapie transmission studies there. So I failed to see the logic of this BSE MRR policy, there is nothing science based about it. ...



CONFIDENTIAL BSE POLICY


http://web.archive.org/web/20030513061639/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1994/05/20002001.pdf





RESTRICTED

MINISTER'S MEETING ON BSE (EXPORTS AND TRIPE) AND ANTHRAX, 14, JULY 1989


http://tna.europarchive.org/20080103011231/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1989/07/14006001.pdf





England worried briefly about infecting other countries


27 Aug 00


confidential correspondence obtained by Terry S. Singeltary Sr.


BSE11/2 020;

SC1337p

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY Richmond House, 79 Whitehall, London SWIA 2NS Telephone 01-210 3000 From the Chief Medical Officer Sir Donald Achson KBE DM DSc FRCP FFCM FFOM

Mr K C Meldrum Chief Veterinary Officer Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Government Buildings Hook Rise South Tolworth Surbiton Surrey KT6 7NG 3 January 1990

Dear Mr Meldrum

BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY

You will recall that we have previously discussed the potential risks of BSE occurring in other countries as a result of the continuing export from the UK of meat and bone that may be contaminated by scrapie or possibly BSE.

I remain concerned that we are not being consistent in our attempts to contain the risks of BSE. Having banned the feeding of meat and bone meal to ruminamts in 1988, we should take steps to prevent these UK products being fed to ruminants in other countries. This could be achieved either through a ban on the export of meat and bone meal, or at least by the proper labelling of these products to make it absolutely clear they should not be fed to ruminants [or zoo animals, including rare and endangered primates -- webmaster]. Unless some such action is taken the difficult problems we have faced with BSE may well occur in other countries who import UK meat and bone meal. Surely it is short sighted for us to risk being seen in future as having been responsible for the introduction of BSE to the food chain in other countries.

I would be very interested to hear how you feel this gap in the present precautionary measures to eliminate BSE should be closed. We should be aiming at the global elimination of this new bovine disense. The export of our meat and bone meal is a continuing risk to other countries.

Yours Sincerely Donald Acheson

Copy: Dr Metters Dr Pickles

90/1.03/1.1 ============ BSE13/3 0083

Dr Pickles From: Dr J S Metters DCM0 International, Prevention and Community Services 7 June 1990 Copies to: Dr McInnes Miss Pease Mr Otley

BSE

1. I spoke to Mr Capstick yesterday. Among other things, he told me that MAFF are now considering the labelling of animal foodstuffs, and in particular what detail would be required if such labelling was made compulsory. Apparently our freedom of action is constrained by EC Directives [total garbage, MAFF wants to keep exporting -- webmaster], and there is also concern about the level of detail that should be included in any foodstuff labels.

2. Mr Capstick suggested that this was not an area that DH had a particular interest. I countered by saying that we supported the principle of labelling of animal foodstuffs, particularly when these were going for export.

3. I also thanked him for keeping us informed, in a way that I hope encourage further communication of MAFF's internal deliberations.

J S METTERS Room 509 Richmond House Ext. 5591 92/YdeS 90/6.7/5.1




http://www.mad-cow.org/00/aug00_last_news.html#fff





Unless some such action is taken the difficult problems we have faced with BSE may well occur in other countries who import UK meat and bone meal. Surely it is short sighted for us to risk being seen in future as having been responsible for the introduction of BSE to the food chain in other countries.


http://web.archive.org/web/20030822024045/www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/01/03001001.pdf




(and that is why the BSE MRR policy was born, the legal trading of all strains of TSE globally $$$)

see ;


http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8




your only fooling yourselves with this stupid ukbsenvcjd only theory, and the BSE methology of the OIE. most any coutnry that went by those same OIE BSE guidelines all went down with BSE. THE OIE has now shown they are nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE. AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. ...


http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf




HERE, they just seemed to ignore another atypical BSE, and just hope for the best, but this atypical BSE has also been around for a long time ;


Tuesday, November 17, 2009

SEAC NEW RESULTS ON IDIOPATHIC BRAINSTEM NEURONAL CHROMATOLYSIS (IBNC) FROM THE VETERINARY LABORATORIES AGENCY (VLA) SEAC 103/1


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/11/seac-new-results-on-idiopathic.html




31 March 2009 - A summary of the 102nd SEAC meeting (35 KB) held on 4th March 2009

snip...

SEAC noted that IBNC appeared to be a rare disease that occurred in older cattle, predominantly as single cases, although it is possible that surveillance may not detect all cases. Biochemical studies suggested that the prion protein may play a role in the disease. However, it is unclear whether the normal form of the protein or an abnormal form is involved. Studies are required to determine whether IBNC is transmissible or not. SEAC concluded, noting that specified risk material controls are in place to prevent cattle brain from entering the food supply, that current data on IBNC do not suggest it presents a risk to human health.


http://www.seac.gov.uk/summaries/seac102_summary.pdf




>>> All of the 15 cattle tested showed that the brains had abnormally accumulated prion protein. <<<


Saturday, February 28, 2009

NEW RESULTS ON IDIOPATHIC BRAINSTEM NEURONAL CHROMATOLYSIS


"All of the 15 cattle tested showed that the brains had abnormally accumulated PrP"


2009 SEAC 102/2


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/new-results-on-idiopathic-brainstem.html


Wednesday, October 08, 2008

Idiopathic Brainstem Neuronal Chromatolysis (IBNC): a novel prion protein related disorder of cattle?


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/10/idiopathic-brainstem-neuronal.html


Saturday, February 28, 2009 NEW RESULTS ON IDIOPATHIC BRAINSTEM NEURONAL CHROMATOLYSIS TYPE BSE


"All of the 15 cattle tested showed that the brains had abnormally accumulated PrP"


2009 SEAC 102/2


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/new-results-on-idiopathic-brainstem.html





''THE LINE TO TAKE'' ON IBNC $$$ 1995 $$$ 1995 page 9 of 14 ;30. The Committee noted that the results were unusual. the questioned whether there could be coincidental BSE infection or contamination with scrapie. Dr. Tyrell noted that the feeling of the committee was that this did not represent a new agent but it was important to be prepared to say something publicly about these findings. A suggested line to take was that these were scientifically unpublishable results but in line with the policy of openness they would be made publicly available and further work done to test their validity. Since the BSE precautions were applied to IBNC cases, human health was protected. Further investigations should be carried out on isolations from brains of IBNC cases with removal of the brain and subsequent handling under strict conditions to avoid the risk of any contamination.31. Mr. Bradley informed the Committee that the CVO had informed the CMO about the IBNC results and the transmission from retina and he, like the Committee was satisfied that the controls already in place or proposed were adequate. ...


snip... see full text



http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20090114154722/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/06/21005001.pdf



Wednesday, August 20, 2008


Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Mad Cow Disease typical and atypical strains, was there a cover-up ?


snip...


another question, just how long have these atypical BSE TSEs been around in the bovine ???


let's look at another case of atypical BSE in Germany way back in 1992 ;



Subject: atypical BSE reported in 1992 and conviently slaughterd and incinerated and then swept under rug for about 12 years

Date: April 26, 2007 at 1:08 pm PST


1992 NEW BRAIN DISORDER


3. WHAT ABOUT REPORTS OF NEW FORM OF BSE? THE VETERINARY RECORD HAS PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE ON A NEW BRAIN DISORDER OF CATTLE DISCOVERED THROUGH OUR CONTROL MEASURES FOR BSE. ALTHOUGH IT PRESENTS SIMILAR CLINICAL SIGNS TO BSE THERE ARE MAJOR DIFFERENCES IN THE HISTOPATHOLOGY AND INCUBATION PERIODS BETWEEN THE TWO. MUST EMPHASISE THAT THIS IS NOT BSE. 4. IS THIS NEW BRAIN DISORDER A THREAT? WE DO NOT EVEN KNOW WHETHER THE AGENT OF THIS DISEASE IS TRANSMISSIBLE. IN ANY CASE, CASES SO FAR IDENTIFIED HAD SHOWN SIMILAR SYMPTOMS TO THOSE OF BSE, AND THEREFORE HAVE BEEN SLAUGHTERED AND INCINERATED, SO THAT IF A TRANSMISSIBLE AGENT WERE INVOLVED IT WOULD HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED. .......


http://web.archive.org/web/20030714222309/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1992/10/26001001.pdf



2. The Collinge/Will dispute appears to rumble on. Dr. Collinge had told Dr. Tyrrell that Dr. Will's response to his criticism about sharing material had been ''quite unacceptable'' (in spite of it's apparently conciliatory tone). Apparently Professor Allen was now going to try and arrange a meeting to resolve the dispute. No action here for MAFF, although Mr. Murray may be interested. 3. Dr. Tyrrell regretted that the Committee had not seen the article on BBD. However he felt that for the time being NO specific action was called for. The most important need was to consider the possibility that the condition might be transmissible. As we have discussed, I suggested that we might circulate a paper to the members of the committee giving our appreciation of this condition (and perhaps of other non-BSE neurological conditions that had been identified in negative cases) and of any necessary follow up action. IF any Committee member felt strongly about this, or if the issue CAME TO A HEAD, we would call an interim meeting. He was happy with this approach. I would be grateful if Mr. Maslin could, in discussion with CVL and veterinary colleagues draft such a note, which will presumably very largely follow what Mr. Bradley's briefing paper has already said, taking account of DOH comments, We can then clear a final version with DOH before circulating it to Committee members.


http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080102200804/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1992/10/29005001.pdf



IN CONFIDENCE


This is a highly competitive field and it really will be a pity if we allow many of the key findings to be published by overseas groups while we are unable to pursue our research findings because of this disagreement, which I hope we can make every effort to solve.


http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080102230326/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1992/10/26002001.pdf



COLLINGE THREATENS TO GO TO MEDIA



http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080102232225/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1992/12/16005001.pdf



2. The discovery might indicate the existence of a different strain of BSE from that present in the general epidemic or an unusual response by an individual host.


3. If further atypical lesion distribution cases are revealed in this herd then implications of misdiagnosis of 'negative' cases in other herds may not be insignificant. snip... This minute is re-issued with a wider distribution. The information contained herein should NOT be disseminated further except on the basis of ''NEED TO KNOW''. R Bradley



http://web.archive.org/web/20030728095157/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1993/02/17001001.pdf



IN CONFIDENCE BSE ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION



http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080103035125/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1993/03/14001001.pdf



full text ;


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/08/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-mad.html




REMEMBER, and do not forget what the Honorable Nobel Peace Prize winner of the PRION i.e. Stanley Prusiner said ;


THEY DON'T WANT TO KNOW !

ABSOLUTE IGNORANCE, ALL THAT MATTERS IS TRADE...

AFTER THE COW IN CANADA...

LEVEL OF ABSOLUTE IGNORANCE, OF WHAT HE WAS TRYING TO CONTAIN...

THE ENTIRE POLICY WAS DRIVEN BY WHAT THE USA WAS TELLING HIM TO DO...

SO NOW AFTER SOME TIME HAS PASSED...

SO NOW AFTER TIME HAS PASSED IT'S O.K. FOR BONELESS BEEF PRODUCTS FROM UNDER 30 MONTHS TO BE EXPORTED FROM CANADA TO THE UNITED STATES, THAT'S ALL THAT MATTERED...

YES, I THINK THAT PRIONS ARE BAD TO EAT, AND YOU CAN DIE FROM THEM...


http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/prusinerclip.html



With Regards to Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy and thanks to the O.I.E. and the U.S.D.A., HUMANS and ANIMALS have become expendable. TSE, and any death there from, have become a legal trading commodity. Sadly, human cases will continue and they will be termed sporadic CJD and they will go unaccounted for because of the USDA and the OIE and their junk science. ...



still disgusted in Bacliff, Texas USA 77518


Terry S. Singeltary Sr.




----- Original Message -----

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

To: REEFOIA@ars.usda.gov

Sent: Monday, May 10, 2010 9:23 PM

Subject: F.O.I.A. re-Publication Request Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Study of Atypical Bse F.O.I.A.


re-Publication Request Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Study of Atypical Bse


Greetings USDA FOIA et al;


I have made numerous attempts at finding the results of the following study with absolutely no luck or reply. So I suppose I must make a F.O.I.A. request on the following ;


re-F.O.I.A. re-Publication Request Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Study of Atypical Bse the study below said that the end date was Sep 14, 2009.


can you now tell me please what those results were, and if it will be necessary to change SRM removal due to any different tissue infectivity distribution ?


could you please supply me with the results of this study ?


Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse Location: Virus and Prion Research Unit

Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05

Project Type: Specific Cooperative Agreement

Start Date: Sep 15, 2004

End Date: Sep 14, 2009

Objective: The objective of this cooperative research project with Dr. Maria Caramelli from the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory in Turin, Italy, is to conduct comparative studies with the U.S. bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) isolate and the atypical BSE isolates identified in Italy.

The studies will cover the following areas:

1. Evaluation of present diagnostics tools used in the U.S. for the detection of atypical BSE cases.

2. Molecular comparison of the U.S. BSE isolate and other typical BSE isolates with atypical BSE cases.

3. Studies on transmissibility and tissue distribution of atypical BSE isolates in cattle and other species.

Approach: This project will be done as a Specific Cooperative Agreement with the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, in Turin, Italy. It is essential for the U.S. BSE surveillance program to analyze the effectiveness of the U.S diagnostic tools for detection of atypical cases of BSE. Molecular comparisons of the U.S. BSE isolate with atypical BSE isolates will provide further characterization of the U.S. BSE isolate. Transmission studies are already underway using brain homogenates from atypical BSE cases into mice, cattle and sheep. It will be critical to see whether the atypical BSE isolates behave similarly to typical BSE isolates in terms of transmissibility and disease pathogenesis. If transmission occurs, tissue distribution comparisons will be made between cattle infected with the atypical BSE isolate and the U.S. BSE isolate. Differences in tissue distribution could require new regulations regarding specific risk material (SRM) removal.


http://www.ushrl.saa.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?accn_no=408490




I find it disturbing that we are still floundering with public health in 2010 on this issue, especially since we know that ;


>>> non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures. <<<



http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2




BUT yet the USDA et al is still floundering on these results, and still base trade on these OIE standards that in all reality, put the cart before the horse in regards to the legal trading of these atypical BSE and scrapie strains, before any transmission studies were done that would prove the same thing that happened in the U.K. with c-BSE and nvCJD, would not happen again.



SNIP...END...TSS



----- Original Message -----
From: Williams, Monica
To: flounder9@verizon.net
Cc: Williams, Monica
Sent: Wednesday, May 12, 2010 7:21 AM Subject: Freedom of Information Act Request

Terry Singeltary Sr.:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your May 10, 2010, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request concerning the results for Research Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05, Study of Atypical BSE at the Virus and Prion Research Unit. Your request was received in this office on May 11, 2010, and assigned FOIA No. 10-93, with a response date of June 9, 2010.

If you have any questions, concerning the status of your request, please contact this office at 301-504-1640 or by e-mail at reefoia@ars.usda.gov.

Monica Williams

FOIA Office, REE USDA

5601 Sunnyside Avenue

Room 1-2226C, Mail Stop 5128

Beltsville, MD 20705-5128

reefoia@ars.usda.gov

Telephone: 301-504-1640

Facsimile: 301-504-1647

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