Friday, January 29, 2010

14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases H-type and L-type Atypical BSE January 2010 (special pre-congress edition)

----- Original Message -----
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Sent: Friday, January 29, 2010 3:23 PM
Subject: 14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases H-type and L-type Atypical BSE January 2010 (special pre-congress edition)

18.173 page 189

Experimental Challenge of Cattle with H-type and L-type Atypical BSE

A. Buschmann1, U. Ziegler1, M. Keller1, R. Rogers2, B. Hills3, M.H. Groschup1. 1Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany, 2Health Canada, Bureau of Microbial Hazards, Health Products & Food Branch, Ottawa, Canada, 3Health Canada, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Secretariat, Ottawa, Canada

Background: After the detection of two novel BSE forms designated H-type and L-type atypical BSE the question of the pathogenesis and the agent distribution of these two types in cattle was fully open. From initial studies of the brain pathology, it was already known that the anatomical distribution of L-type BSE differs from that of the classical type where the obex region in the brainstem always displays the highest PrPSc concentrations. In contrast in L-type BSE cases, the thalamus and frontal cortex regions showed the highest levels of the pathological prion protein, while the obex region was only weakly involved.

Methods:We performed intracranial inoculations of cattle (five and six per group) using 10%brainstemhomogenates of the two German H- and L-type atypical BSE isolates. The animals were inoculated under narcosis and then kept in a free-ranging stable under appropriate biosafety conditions.At least one animal per group was killed and sectioned in the preclinical stage and the remaining animals were kept until they developed clinical symptoms. The animals were examined for behavioural changes every four weeks throughout the experiment following a protocol that had been established during earlier BSE pathogenesis studies with classical BSE.

Results and Discussion: All animals of both groups developed clinical symptoms and had to be euthanized within 16 months. The clinical picture differed from that of classical BSE, as the earliest signs of illness were loss of body weight and depression. However, the animals later developed hind limb ataxia and hyperesthesia predominantly and the head. Analysis of brain samples from these animals confirmed the BSE infection and the atypical Western blot profile was maintained in all animals. Samples from these animals are now being examined in order to be able to describe the pathogenesis and agent distribution for these novel BSE types. Conclusions: A pilot study using a commercially avaialble BSE rapid test ELISA revealed an essential restriction of PrPSc to the central nervous system for both atypical BSE forms. A much more detailed analysis for PrPSc and infectivity is still ongoing.

From: xxxx
To: Terry Singeltary
Sent: Saturday, December 05, 2009 9:09 AM
Subject: 14th ICID - abstract accepted for 'International Scientific Exchange'

Your preliminary abstract number: 670

Dear Mr. Singeltary,

On behalf of the Scientific Committee, I am pleased to inform you that your abstract

'Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009'

WAS accepted for inclusion in the INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE (ISE) section of the 14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases. Accordingly, your abstract will be included in the "Intl. Scientific Exchange abstract CD-rom" of the Congress which will be distributed to all participants.

Abstracts accepted for INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE are NOT PRESENTED in the oral OR poster sessions.

Your abstract below was accepted for: INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE

#0670: Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009

Author: T. Singeltary; Bacliff, TX/US

Topic: Emerging Infectious Diseases Preferred type of presentation: International Scientific Exchange

This abstract has been ACCEPTED.

#0670: Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009

Authors: T. Singeltary; Bacliff, TX/US

Title: Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009

Body: Background

An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.


12 years independent research of available data


I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.


I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries.

I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.

Keywords: Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease Prion

see page 114 :

Monday, October 19, 2009

Atypical BSE, BSE, and other human and animal TSE in North America Update October 19, 2009


I ask Professor Kong ;

Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment

''IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....''

Professor Kong reply ;


''As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete.

Thanks for your interest.''

Best regards,

Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA


I look forward to further transmission studies, and a true ENHANCED BSE/atypical BSE surveillance program put forth testing all cattle for human and animal consumption for 5 years. a surveillance program that uses the most sensitive TSE testing, and has the personnel that knows how to use them, and can be trusted. I look forward to a stringent mad cow feed ban being put forth, and then strictly enforced. we need a forced, not voluntary feed ban, an enhanced feed ban at that, especially excluding blood. we need some sort of animal traceability. no more excuses about privacy. if somebody is putting out a product that is killing folks and or has the potential to kill you, then everybody needs to know who they are, and where that product came from. same with hospitals, i think medical incidents in all states should be recorded, and made public, when it comes to something like a potential accidental transmission exposure event. so if someone is out there looking at a place to go have surgery done, if you have several hospitals having these type 'accidental exposure events', than you can go some place else. it only makes sense. somewhere along the road, the consumer lost control, and just had to take whatever they were given, and then charged these astronomical prices. some where along the line the consumer just lost interest, especially on a long incubating disease such as mad cow disease i.e. Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy. like i said before, there is much more to the mad cow story than bovines and eating a hamburger, we must start focusing on all TSE in all species. ...TSS


MARCH 26, 2003

Send Post-Publication Peer Review to journal:

Re: RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob

disease in the United States

Email Terry S. Singeltary:

Newsdesk The Lancet Infectious Diseases, Volume 3, Issue 8, Page 463, August 2003 doi:10.1016/S1473-3099(03)00715-1Cite or Link Using DOI

Tracking spongiform encephalopathies in North America

Xavier Bosch

“My name is Terry S Singeltary Sr, and I live in Bacliff, Texas. I lost my mom to hvCJD (Heidenhain variant CJD) and have been searching for answers ever since. What I have found is that we have not been told the truth. CWD in deer and elk is a small portion of a much bigger problem.” 49-year-old Singeltary is one of a number of people who have remained largely unsatisfied after being told that a close relative died from a rapidly progressive dementia compatible with spontaneous Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD). So he decided to gather hundreds of documents on transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) and realised that if Britons could get variant CJD from bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), Americans might get a similar disorder from chronic wasting disease (CWD)—the relative of mad cow disease seen among deer and elk in the USA. Although his feverish…

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14, 2001 JAMA

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

To the Editor: In their Research Letter, Dr Gibbons and colleagues1 reported that the annual US death rate due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has been stable since 1985. These estimates, however, are based only on reported cases, and do not include misdiagnosed or preclinical cases. It seems to me that misdiagnosis alone would drastically change these figures. An unknown number of persons with a diagnosis of Alzheimer disease in fact may have CJD, although only a small number of these patients receive the postmortem examination necessary to make this diagnosis. Furthermore, only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies should be reportable nationwide and internationally.

Terry S. Singeltary, Sr Bacliff, Tex

1. Gibbons RV, Holman RC, Belay ED, Schonberger LB. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States: 1979-1998. JAMA. 2000;284:2322-2323. FREE FULL TEXT

2 January 2000

British Medical Journal

U.S. Scientist should be concerned with a CJD epidemic in the U.S., as well

15 November 1999

British Medical Journal

vCJD in the USA * BSE in U.S.


BY Philip Yam

Yam Philip Yam News Editor Scientific American

Answering critics like Terry Singeltary, who feels that the U.S. under- counts CJD, Schonberger conceded that the current surveillance system has errors but stated that most of the errors will be confined to the older population.


Laying Odds

Are prion diseases more prevalent than we thought?

Researchers and government officials badly underestimated the threat that mad cow disease posed when it first appeared in Britain. They didn’t think bovine spongiform encephalopathy was a zoonosis—an animal disease that can sicken people. The 1996 news that BSE could infect humans with a new form of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease stunned the world. It also got some biomedical researchers wondering whether sporadic CJD may really be a manifestation of a zoonotic sickness. Might it be caused by the ingestion of prions, as variant CJD is?

Revisiting Sporadic CJD

It’s not hard to get Terry Singeltary going. “I have my conspiracy theories,” admitted the 49-year-old Texan.1 Singeltary is probably the nation’s most relentless consumer advocate when it comes to issues in prion diseases. He has helped families learn about the sickness and coordinated efforts with support groups such as CJD Voice and the CJD Foundation. He has also connected with others who are critical of the American way of handling the threat of prion diseases. Such critics include Consumers Union’s Michael Hansen, journalist John Stauber, and Thomas Pringle, who used to run the voluminous www.madcow. org Web site. These three lend their expertise to newspaper and magazine stories about prion diseases, and they usually argue that prions represent more of a threat than people realize, and that the government has responded poorly to the dangers because it is more concerned about protecting the beef industry than people's health.

Singeltary has similar inclinations. ...

DER SPIEGEL (9/2001) - 24.02.2001 (9397 Zeichen) USA: Loch in der Mauer Die BSE-Angst erreicht Amerika: Trotz strikter Auflagen gelangte in Texas verbotenes Tiermehl ins Rinderfutter - die Kontrollen der Aufsichtsbehördensind lax.Link auf diesen Artikel im Archiv:

"Löcher wie in einem Schweizer Käse" hat auch Terry Singeltary im Regelwerk der FDA ausgemacht. Der Texaner kam auf einem tragischen Umweg zu dem Thema: Nachdem seine Mutter 1997 binnen weniger Wochen an der Creutzfeldt-Jakob-Krankheit gestorben war, versuchte er, die Ursachen der Infektion aufzuspüren. Er klagte auf die Herausgabe von Regierungsdokumenten und arbeitete sich durch Fachliteratur; heute ist er überzeugt, dass seine Mutter durch die stetige Einnahme von angeblich kräftigenden Mitteln erkrankte, in denen - völlig legal - Anteile aus Rinderprodukten enthalten sind.

Von der Fachwelt wurde Singeltary lange als versponnener Außenseiter belächelt. Doch mittlerweile sorgen sich auch Experten, dass ausgerechnet diese verschreibungsfreien Wundercocktails zur Stärkung von Intelligenz, Immunsystem oder Libido von den Importbeschränkungen ausgenommen sind. Dabei enthalten die Pillen und Ampullen, die in Supermärkten verkauft werden, exotische Mixturen aus Rinderaugen; dazu Extrakte von Hypophyse oder Kälberföten, Prostata, Lymphknoten und gefriergetrocknetem Schweinemagen. In die USA hereingelassen werden auch Blut, Fett, Gelatine und Samen. Diese Stoffe tauchen noch immer in US-Produkten auf, inklusive Medizin und Kosmetika. Selbst in Impfstoffen waren möglicherweise gefährliche Rinderprodukte enthalten. Zwar fordert die FDA schon seit acht Jahren die US-Pharmaindustrie auf, keine Stoffe aus Ländern zu benutzen, in denen die Gefahr einer BSE-Infizierung besteht. Aber erst kürzlich verpflichteten sich fünf Unternehmen, darunter Branchenführer wie GlaxoSmithKline, Aventis und American Home Products, ihre Seren nur noch aus unverdächtigem Material herzustellen.

"Its as full of holes as Swiss Cheese" says Terry Singeltary of the FDA regulations. ...

Suspect symptoms

What if you can catch old-fashioned CJD by eating meat from a sheep infected with scrapie?

28 Mar 01

Like lambs to the slaughter 31 March 2001 by Debora MacKenzie Magazine issue 2284. Subscribe and get 4 free issues. FOUR years ago, Terry Singeltary watched his mother die horribly from a degenerative brain disease. Doctors told him it was Alzheimer's, but Singeltary was suspicious. The diagnosis didn't fit her violent symptoms, and he demanded an autopsy. It showed she had died of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.

Most doctors believe that sCJD is caused by a prion protein deforming by chance into a killer. But Singeltary thinks otherwise. He is one of a number of campaigners who say that some sCJD, like the variant CJD related to BSE, is caused by eating meat from infected animals. Their suspicions have focused on sheep carrying scrapie, a BSE-like disease that is widespread in flocks across Europe and North America.

Now scientists in France have stumbled across new evidence that adds weight to the campaigners' fears. To their complete surprise, the researchers found that one strain of scrapie causes the same brain damage in mice as sCJD.

"This means we cannot rule out that at least some sCJD may be caused by some strains of scrapie," says team member Jean-Philippe Deslys of the French Atomic Energy Commission's medical research laboratory in Fontenay-aux-Roses, south-west of Paris. Hans Kretschmar of the University of Göttingen, who coordinates CJD surveillance in Germany, is so concerned by the findings that he now wants to trawl back through past sCJD cases to see if any might have been caused by eating infected mutton or lamb.

Scrapie has been around for centuries and until now there has been no evidence that it poses a risk to human health. But if the French finding means that scrapie can cause sCJD in people, countries around the world may have overlooked a CJD crisis to rival that caused by BSE.

Deslys and colleagues were originally studying vCJD, not sCJD. They injected the brains of macaque monkeys with brain from BSE cattle, and from French and British vCJD patients. The brain damage and clinical symptoms in the monkeys were the same for all three. Mice injected with the original sets of brain tissue or with infected monkey brain also developed the same symptoms.

As a control experiment, the team also injected mice with brain tissue from people and animals with other prion diseases: a French case of sCJD; a French patient who caught sCJD from human-derived growth hormone; sheep with a French strain of scrapie; and mice carrying a prion derived from an American scrapie strain. As expected, they all affected the brain in a different way from BSE and vCJD. But while the American strain of scrapie caused different damage from sCJD, the French strain produced exactly the same pathology.

"The main evidence that scrapie does not affect humans has been epidemiology," says Moira Bruce of the neuropathogenesis unit of the Institute for Animal Health in Edinburgh, who was a member of the same team as Deslys. "You see about the same incidence of the disease everywhere, whether or not there are many sheep, and in countries such as New Zealand with no scrapie." In the only previous comparisons of sCJD and scrapie in mice, Bruce found they were dissimilar.

But there are more than 20 strains of scrapie, and six of sCJD. "You would not necessarily see a relationship between the two with epidemiology if only some strains affect only some people," says Deslys. Bruce is cautious about the mouse results, but agrees they require further investigation. Other trials of scrapie and sCJD in mice, she says, are in progress.

People can have three different genetic variations of the human prion protein, and each type of protein can fold up two different ways. Kretschmar has found that these six combinations correspond to six clinical types of sCJD: each type of normal prion produces a particular pathology when it spontaneously deforms to produce sCJD.

But if these proteins deform because of infection with a disease-causing prion, the relationship between pathology and prion type should be different, as it is in vCJD. "If we look at brain samples from sporadic CJD cases and find some that do not fit the pattern," says Kretschmar, "that could mean they were caused by infection."

There are 250 deaths per year from sCJD in the US, and a similar incidence elsewhere. Singeltary and other US activists think that some of these people died after eating contaminated meat or "nutritional" pills containing dried animal brain. Governments will have a hard time facing activists like Singeltary if it turns out that some sCJD isn't as spontaneous as doctors have insisted.

Deslys's work on macaques also provides further proof that the human disease vCJD is caused by BSE. And the experiments showed that vCJD is much more virulent to primates than BSE, even when injected into the bloodstream rather than the brain. This, says Deslys, means that there is an even bigger risk than we thought that vCJD can be passed from one patient to another through contaminated blood transfusions and surgical instruments.

Sunday, August 09, 2009

CJD...Straight talk with...James Ironside...and...Terry Singeltary... 2009

Tuesday, August 18, 2009

BSE-The Untold Story - joe gibbs and singeltary 1999 - 2009

Subject: BSE--U.S. 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2001 16:49:00 -0800
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

Greetings List Members,

I was lucky enough to sit in on this BSE conference call today and even managed to ask a question. that is when the trouble started.

I submitted a version of my notes to Sandra Blakeslee of the New York Times, whom seemed very upset, and rightly so.

"They tell me it is a closed meeting and they will release whatever information they deem fit. Rather infuriating."

and i would have been doing just fine, until i asked my question. i was surprised my time to ask a question so quick.

(understand, these are taken from my notes for now. the spelling of names and such could be off.)

[host Richard Barns] and now a question from Terry S. Singeltary of CJD Watch.

[TSS] yes, thank you, U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you give for serum or tissue donor herds?

[no answer, you could hear in the back ground, mumbling and 'we can't. have him ask the question again.]

[host Richard] could you repeat the question?

[TSS] U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you give for serum or tissue donor herds?

[not sure whom ask this] what group are you with?

[TSS] CJD Watch, my Mom died from hvCJD and we are tracking CJD world-wide.

[not sure who is speaking] could you please disconnect Mr. Singeltary

[TSS] you are not going to answer my question?

[not sure whom speaking] NO

from this point, i was still connected, got to listen and tape the whole conference. at one point someone came on, a woman, and ask again;

[unknown woman] what group are you with?

[TSS] CJD Watch and my Mom died from hvCJD we are trying to tract down CJD and other human TSE's world wide. i was invited to sit in on this from someone inside the USDA/APHIS and that is why i am here. do you intend on banning me from this conference now?

at this point the conference was turned back up, and i got to finish listening. They never answered or even addressed my one question, or even addressed the issue. BUT, i will try and give you a run-down for now, of the conference.

IF i were another Country, I would take heed to my notes, BUT PLEASE do not depend on them. ask for transcript from;

RBARNS@ORA.FDA.GOV 301-827-6906

he would be glad to give you one ;-)

Rockville Maryland, Richard Barns Host

BSE issues in the U.S., How they were labelling ruminant feed? Revising issues.

The conference opened up with the explaining of the U.K. BSE epidemic winding down with about 30 cases a week.

although new cases in other countries were now appearing.

Look at Germany whom said NO BSE and now have BSE.

BSE increasing across Europe.

Because of Temporary Ban on certain rendered product, heightened interest in U.S.

A recent statement in Washington Post, said the New Administration (old GW) has a list of issues. BSE is one of the issues.

BSE Risk is still low, minimal in U.S. with a greater interest in MBM not to enter U.S.

HOWEVER, if BSE were to enter the U.S. it would be economically disastrous to the render, feed, cattle, industries, and for human health.

(human health-they just threw that in cause i was listening. I will now jot down some figures in which they told you, 'no need to write them down'. just hope i have them correct. hmmm, maybe i hope i don't ???)

80% inspection of rendering

*Problem-Complete coverage of rendering HAS NOT occurred.

sizeable number of 1st time FAILED INITIAL INSPECTION, have not been reinspected (70% to 80%).

Compliance critical, Compliance poor in U.K. and other European Firms.

Gloria Dunason Major Assignment 1998 goal TOTAL compliance. This _did not_ occur. Mixed level of compliance, depending on firm.

Rendering FDA license and NON FDA license

system in place for home rendering & feed 76% in compliance 79% cross contamination 21% DID NOT have system 92% record keeping less than 60% total compliance

279 inspectors 185 handling prohibited materials

Renderer at top of pyramid, significant part of compliance. 84% compliance

failed to have caution statement render 72% compliance & cross contamination caution statement on feed, 'DO NOT FEED TO CATTLE'


1240 FDA license feed mills 846 inspected

"close to 400 feed mills have not been inspected"

80% compliance for feed.

10% don't have system.

NON-FDA licensed mills There is NO inventory on non licensed mills. approximately 6000 to 8000 Firms ??? 4,344 ever inspected. "FDA does not have a lot of experience with"

40% do NOT have caution statement 'DO NOT FEED'.

74% Commingling compliance

"This industry needs a lot of work and only half gotten to"

"700 Firms that were falitive, and need to be re-inspected, in addition to the 8,000 Firms."

Quote to do BSE inspection in 19 states by end of January or 30 days, and other states 60 days. to change feed status??? Contract check and ask questions and pass info.

At this time, we will take questions.

[I was about the third or fourth to ask question. then all B.S.eee broke loose, and i lost my train of thought for a few minutes. picked back up here]

someone asking about nutritional supplements and sourcing, did not get name. something about inspectors not knowing of BSE risk??? the conference person assuring that Steve Follum? and the TSE advisory Committee were handling that.

Some other Dr. Vet, whom were asking questions that did not know what to do???

[Dennis Wilson] California Food Agr. Imports, are they looking at imports?

[Conference person] they are looking at imports, FDA issued imports Bulletin.

[Linda Singeltary ??? this was a another phone in question, not related i don't think] Why do we have non-licensed facilities?

(conference person) other feed mills do not handle as potent drugs???

Dennis Blank, Ken Jackson licensed 400 non FDA 4400 inspected of a total of 6000 to 8000,

(they really don't know how many non licensed Firms in U.S. they guess 6000 to 8000??? TSS)

Linda Detwiler asking everyone (me) not to use emergency BSE number, unless last resort. (i thought of calling them today, and reporting the whole damn U.S. cattle herd ;-) 'not'

Warren-Maryland Dept. Agr. Prudent to re-inspect after 3 years. concerned of Firms that have changed owners.



############ ############


Subject: Re: BSE 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL thread from BSE List and FDA Posting of cut version...
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2001 22:02:47 -0700
From: "Sandy Blakeslee"
To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." References: 1

Hi terry -- thanks for all your help. I know it made a difference with the FDA getting out that release.

----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: Sent: Thursday, January 11, 2001 2:06 PM
Subject: BSE 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL thread from BSE List and FDA Posting of cut version...

hi sandy,

From the New York Times, January 11, 2001

Many Makers of Feed Fail to Heed Rules on Mad Cow Disease By SANDRA BLAKESLEE

Large numbers of companies involved in manufacturing animal feed are not complying with regulations meant to prevent the emergence and spread of mad cow disease in the United States, the Food and Drug Administration said yesterday.

The widespread failure of companies to follow the regulations, adopted in August 1997, does not mean that the American food supply is unsafe, Dr. Stephen Sundlof, director of the Center for Veterinary Medicine at the F.D.A., said in an interview.

But much more needs to be done to ensure that mad cow disease does not arise in this country, Dr. Sundlof said.

The regulations state that feed manufacturers and companies that render slaughtered animals into useful products generally may not feed mammals to cud-chewing animals, or ruminants, which can carry mad cow disease.

All products that contain rendered cattle or sheep must have a label that says, "Do not feed to ruminants," Dr. Sundlof said. Manufacturers must also have a system to prevent ruminant products from being commingled with other rendered material like that from chicken, fish or pork. Finally, all companies must keep records of where their products originated and where they were sold.

Under the regulations, F.D.A. district offices and state veterinary offices were required to inspect all rendering plants and feed mills to make sure companies complied. But results issued yesterday demonstrate that more than three years later, different segments of the feed industry show varying levels of compliance.

Among 180 large companies that render cattle and another ruminant, sheep, nearly a quarter were not properly labeling their products and did not have a system to prevent commingling, the F.D.A. said. And among 347 F.D.A.-licensed feed mills that handle ruminant materials - these tend to be large operators that mix drugs into their products - 20 percent were not using labels with the required caution statement, and 25 percent did not have a system to prevent commingling.

Then there are some 6,000 to 8,000 feed mills so small they do not require F.D.A. licenses. They are nonetheless subject to the regulations, and of 1,593 small feed producers that handle ruminant material and have been inspected, 40 percent were not using approved labels and 25 percent had no system in place to prevent commingling.

On the other hand, fewer than 10 percent of companies, big and small, were failing to comply with the record-keeping regulations.

The American Feed Industry Association in Arlington, Va., did not return phone calls seeking comment.

Subject: USDA/APHIS response to BSE-L--U.S. 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2001 14:04:21 -0500
From: "Gomez, Thomas M."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy To:

######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

USDA/APHIS would like to provide clarification on the following point from Mr. Singeltary's 9 Jan posting regarding the 50 state conference call.

[Linda Detwiler asking everyone (me) not to use emergency BSE number, unless last resort. (i thought of calling them today, and reporting the whole damn U.S. cattle herd ;-) 'not']

Dr. Detwiler was responding to an announcement made during the call to use the FDA emergency number if anyone wanted to report a cow with signs suspect for BSE. Mr. Singeltary is correct that Dr. Detwiler asked participants to use the FDA emergency number as a last resort to report cattle suspect for BSE. What Mr. Singeltary failed to do was provide the List with Dr. Detwiler's entire statement. Surveillance for BSE in the United States is a cooperative effort between states, producers, private veterinarians, veterinary hospitals and the USDA. The system has been in place for over 10 years. Each state has a system in place wherein cases are reported to either the State Veterinarian, the federal Veterinarian in Charge or through the veterinary diagnostic laboratory system. The states also have provisions with emergency numbers. Dr. Detwiler asked participants to use the systems currently in place to avoid the possibility of a BSE-suspect report falling through the cracks. Use of the FDA emergency number has not been established as a means to report diseased cattle of any nature.

############ ############

Subject: Re: USDA/APHIS response to BSE-L--U.S. 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL Jan.9, 2001
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2001 13:44:49 -0800
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
To: References: 1

######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

Hello Mr. Thomas,

> What Mr. Singeltary failed to do was provide the List with Dr. Detwiler's entire statement.

would you and the USDA/APHIS be so kind as to supply this list with a full text version of the conference call and or post on your web-site? if so when, and thank you. if not, why not?

The system has been in place for over 10 years.

that seems to be a very long time for a system to be in place, and only test 10,700 cattle from some 1.5 BILLION head (including calf crop). Especially since French are testing some 20,000 weekly and the E.U. as a whole, are testing many many more than the U.S., with less cattle, same risk of BSE/TSEs.

Why does the U.S. insist on not doing massive testing with the tests which the E.U. are using? Why is this, please explain?

Please tell me why my question was not answered?

U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you give for serum or tissue donor herds?

It was a very simple question, a very important question, one that pertained to the topic of BSE/feed, and asked in a very diplomatic way. why was it not answered?

If all these years, we have been hearing that pharmaceutical grade bovines were raised for pharmaceuticals vaccines etc. But yet the USA cannot comply with feed regulations of the ruminant feed ban, PLUS cannot even comply with the proper labelling of the feed, cross contamination etc. Then how in the world can you Guarantee the feed fed to pharmaceutical grade bovine, were actually non ruminant feed?

Before i was ask to be 'disconnected', i did hear someone in the background say 'we can't'-- have him ask the question again.

could you please be so kind, as to answer these questions?

thank you, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Bacliff, Texas USA

P.S. if you will also notice, i did not post that emergency phone number and do not intend on passing it on to anyone. I was joking when i said i should call and report the whole damn U.S. Herd. So please pass that on to Dr. Detwiler, so she can rest easily.

BUT, they should be reported, some are infected with TSE. The U.S. is just acting as stupid as Germany and other Countries that insist they are free of BSE.


Subject: Report on the assessment of the Georgraphical BSE-risk of the USA July 2000 (not good)
Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2001 21:23:51 -0800
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy To:

######### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

Greetings List Members and ALL EU Countries,

Because of this report, and the recent findings of the 50-state BSE Conference call, I respectfully seriously suggest that these Countries and the SSC re-evaluate the U.S.A. G.B.R. to a risk factor of #3.

I attempted to post this to list in full text, but would not accept...

thank you, kind regards, Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA

Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of the USA July 2000



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Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of the USA July 2000



The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is II, i.e. it is unlikely but cannot be excluded that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent.

Stability: Before 1990 the system was extremely unstable because feeding of MBM to cattle happened, rendering was inappropriate with regard to deactivation of the BSE-agent and SRM and fallen stock were rendered for feed. From 1990 to 1997 it improved to very unstable, thanks to efforts undertaken to trace imported animals and exclude them from the feed chain and intensive surveillance. In 1998 the system became neutrally stable after the RMBM-ban of 1997.

External challenges: A moderate external challenge occurred in the period before 1990 because of importation of live animals from BSE-affected countries, in particular from the UK and Ireland. It cannot be excluded that some BSE-infected animals have been imported by this route and did enter the US rendering and feed production system. The efforts undertaken since 1990 to trace back UK-imported cattle and to exclude them from the feed chain reduced the impact of the external challenge significantly.

Interaction of external challenges and stability: While extremely unstable, the US system was exposed to a moderate external challenge, mainly resulting from cattle imports from the UK. It can not be excluded that BSE-infectivity entered the country by this route and has been recycled to domestic cattle. The resulting domestic cases would have been processed while the system was still very unstable or unstable and would hence have initiated a number of second or third generation cases. However, the level of the possible domestic prevalence must be below the low detection level of the surveillance in place.

As long as there are no changes in stability or challenge the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent will remain at the current level.



The available information was suitable to carry out the GBR risk assessment.

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Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of the USA July 2000


2.1 Overall appreciation of the ability to identify BSE-cases and to eliminate animals at risk of being infected before they are processed

· Before 1989, the ability of the system to identify (and eliminate) BSE cases was limited. · Since 1990 this ability is significantly improved, thanks to a good BSE-surveillance and culling system (contingency plan). · Today the surveillance should be able to detect clinical BSE-cases within the limits set by an essential passive surveillance system, i.e. some cases might remain undetected.

2.2 Overall appreciation of the ability to avoid recycling BSE-infectivity, should it enter processing

· Before 1997 the US rendering and feed producing system would not have been able to avoid recycling of the BSE agent to any measurable extent. If the BSE-agent was introduced the feed chain, it could probably have reached cattle. · After the introduction of the RMBM-to-ruminants-ban in August 1997 the ability of the system to avoid recycling of BSE-infectivity was somewhat increased. It is still rather low due to the rendering system of ruminant material (including SRM and fallen stock) and the persisting potential for cross-contamination of cattle feed with other feeds and hence RMBM.

2.3 Overall assessment of the Stability

· Until 1990 the US BSE/cattle system was extremely unstable as RMBM was commonly fed to cattle, the rendering system was not able to reduce BSE-infectivity and SRM were rendered. This means that incoming BSE infectivity would have been most probably recycled to cattle and amplified and the disease propagated. · Between 1990 and 1995 improvements in the BSE surveillance and the efforts to trace back and remove imported cattle gradually improved the stability but the system remained very unstable. In 1998 the system became unstable because of an RMBM-ban introduced in 1997. After 1998 the ban was fully implemented and the system is regarded to be neutrally stable since 1998. The US system is therefore seen to neither be able to amplify nor to reduce circulating or incoming BSE-infectivity.


A moderate external challenge occurred in the period 1980-1989 because of importation of live animals from the UK. imports from other countries are regarded to have been negligible challenges. · As a consequence of this external challenge, infectivity could have entered the feed cycle and domestic animals could have been exposed to the agent. These domestic BSE-incubating animals might have again entered processing, leading to an internal challenge since 1991. · This internal challenge could have produced domestic cases of BSE, yet prevalence levels could have been below the detection limits of the surveillance system until now. (According to US calculations, the current surveillance

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Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of the USA July 2000

system could detect clinical incidence of 1-3 cases per year per million adult cattle, i.e. in absolute numbers 43-129 cases per year). Between 1990 und 1995, with the exclusion of the imported animals from Europe from the feed chain, the effect of the external challenges decreased.


4.1 Interaction of stability and challenqe

· In the late 80s, early 90s a moderate external challenges met an extremely unstable system. This would have amplified the incoming BSE-infectivity and propagated the disease. · With the exclusion of the imported animals from Europe from the feed chain between 1990 and 1995 the effect of the external challenge decreased. · Before 1998 an internal challenge, if it developed, would have met a still unstable system (inappropriate rendering, no SRM ban, RMBM ban only after 1997) and the BSE-infectivity could have been recycled and amplified. · After 1998 the neutrally stable system could still recycle the BSE-agent but due to the RMBM-ban of 1997 the BSE-infectivity circulating in the system would probably not be amplified.

4.2 Risk that BSE-infectivity enters processing

· A very low processing risk developed in the late 80s when the UK-imports were slaughtered or died. It increased until 1990 because of the higher risk to be infected with BSE of cattle imported from the UK in 1988/89, as these animals could have been processed prior to the back-tracing of the UK-imports in 1990. · From 1990 to 1995 a combination of surviving non-traced UK imports and some domestic (pre-)clinical cases could have arrived at processing resulting in an assumed constant low but non-negligible processing risk. · After 1995 any processing risk relates to assumed domestic cases arriving at processing. · The fact that no domestic cases have been shown-up in the BSE-surveillance is reassuring - it indicates that BSE is in fact not present in the country at levels above the detection limits of the country's surveillance system. This detection level has been calculated according to US-experts to be between 1 & 3 clinical cases per million adult cattle per year.

Note: The high turnover in parts of the dairy cattle population with a young age at slaughter makes it unlikely that fully developed clinical cases would occur (and could be detected) or enter processing. However, the theoretical infective load of the pre-clinical BSE-cases that under this scenario could be processed, can be assumed to remain relatively low.

4.3 Risk that BSE-infectivity is recycled and propagated

· During the period covered by this assessment (1980-1999) the US-system was not able to prevent propagation of BSE should it have entered, even if this ability was significantly improved with the MBM-ban of 1997. · However, since the likelihood that BSE-infectivity entered the system is regarded to be small but non-negligible, the risk that propagation of the disease took place is also small but not negligible.

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Report on the assessment of the Geographical BSE-risk of the USA July 2000


5.1 The current GBR

The current geographical BSE-risk (GBR) level is II, i.e. it is unlikely but cannot be excluded that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent.

5.2 The expected development of the GBR

As long as there are no changes in stability or challenge the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent remains at the current level.

5.3 Recommendations for influencin.q the future GBR

· As long as the stability of the US system is not significantly enbanced above neutral levels it remains critically important to avoid any new external challenges. · All measures that would improve the stability of the system, in particular with regard to its ability to avoid recycling of the BSE-agent should it be present in the cattle population, would reduce, over time, the probability that cattle could be infected with the BSE-agent. Possible actions include: removal of SRMs and/or fallen stock from rendering, better rendering processes, improved compliance with the MBM-ban including control and reduction of cross-contamination. · Results from an improved intensive surveillance programme, targeting at risk sub-populations such as adult cattle in fallen stock or in emergency slaughter, could verify the current assessment.


The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.


Tuesday, January 26, 2010

Establishing a Fully Integrated National Food Safety System with Strengthened Inspection, Laboratory and Response Capacity Draft 09/24/09

2009-2010 ***

Monday, December 14, 2009 R.I.P. MOM DOD

Similarities between Forms of Sheep Scrapie and Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Are Encoded by Distinct Prion Types

> Sporadic CJD type 1 and atypical/ Nor98 scrapie are characterized by fine (reticular) deposits,

see also ;

> All of the Heidenhain variants were of the methionine/ methionine type 1 molecular subtype.

Thursday, January 07, 2010

Scrapie and Nor-98 Scrapie November 2009 Monthly Report Fiscal Year 2010 and FISCAL YEAR 2008

Monday, September 1, 2008


Monday, October 19, 2009

Atypical BSE, BSE, and other human and animal TSE in North America Update October 19, 2009


Monday, November 23, 2009


Tuesday, August 11, 2009

Characteristics of Established and Proposed Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Variants

Brian S. Appleby, MD; Kristin K. Appleby, MD; Barbara J. Crain, MD, PhD; Chiadi U. Onyike, MD, MHS; Mitchell T. Wallin, MD, MPH; Peter V. Rabins, MD, MPH

Sunday, May 10, 2009

Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Committee On June 12, 2009 (Singeltary submission) TO :

May 8, 2009

Greetings again Dr. Freas, TSEAC et al,



Page 1. J Freas, William From: Sent: To: Subject: Terry S. Singeltary

Sr. [] Monday, January 08,200l 3:03 PM freas ...

Thursday, January 28, 2010

Multiorgan Detection and Characterization of Protease-Resistant Prion Protein in a Case of Variant CJD Examined in the United States

Saturday, June 13, 2009

Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States 2003 revisited 2009


5 Includes 41 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 17 inconclusive cases; 6 Includes 46 cases with type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded.

Saturday, January 2, 2010

Human Prion Diseases in the United States January 1, 2010 ***FINAL***

my comments to PLosone here ;

Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

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