Thursday, June 21, 2012

MEATINGPLACE.COM WAVES MAGIC WAND AND EXPECTS THE USDA MAD COW FOLLIES BSE TO BE GONE

MEATINGPLACE.COM WAVES MAGIC WAND AND EXPECTS THE USDA MAD COW FOLLIES BSE TO BE GONE


bse be gone


TREND LINES


June 2012


Rather than rattle export markets, the fourth case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in the United States confirms the efficacy of safety measures.


By Meatingplace editors


Of the most recent headlines follow- ingthe discovery of a fourth case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in the United States in April, CNN's "USDA quarantines 2 farms in mad cow investigation" might have had the effect of spreading fear, except that it described a routine step the agency takes in a safety protocol that has proven effective in pre- venting the disease from spreading.


What a difference a decade makes. Fast-forward from the beef export-kill- ing discovery in 2003 (the nation's first) of BSE in a cow imported from Canada and processed in the United States, and the latest case hardly inspires a men- tion a month after it's discovery. But however unsexy the topic has become to the mainstream news corps, the event is noteworthy in that it validates a check system that is working.


After BSE was first diagnosed in the UK in 1986, the number of cases peaked in 1992 at 37,311, and has been reduced by 99 percent to just 29 cases worldwide in 2011. The recent case in


10 meatlngplace June 2012


California, which was detected when the to-year-old cow was tested at a rendering facility, was only the fourth ever confirmed in the U.S. The oth- ers occurred in 2006, 2005 and 2003. USDA officials say the global success is directly attributable to feed bans. Other safeguards against BSE in the United States include the USDA ban on specified risk materials (SRMs) from the food supply. USDA also bans all non-ambulatory cattle from entering the human food chain. Meanwhile, the FDA's ban on ruminant material in cattle feed prevents the spread of the disease in the cattle herd.


"Evidence shows that our systems and safeguards to prevent BSE are working, as are similar actions taken by countries around the world," USDA Chief Veterinary Officer John Clifford said when announcing the latest case. Perhaps most encouraging about it was the finding of atypical BSE, a rare form not generally associated with an animal consuming infected feed, long thought to be the primary vector.






Greetings,


well, I was wondering what the official comment would be from meatingplace.com about the 4th _documented_ case of mad cow disease in the USA, and they did not surprise me by their comment. rubber stamped by USDA INC.


let’s analyze their science on atypical L-type BASE BSE mad cow in California, and the myth the USDA et al keep spouting out about FEED, not being a vector for any atypical BSE. this is simply a lie. nothing more, nothing less, much like the rest of the junk science the USDA et al put out.


THE infamous partial and voluntary mad cow feed ban of august 4, 1997, failed from the beginning, still failing as late as 2007, when fda et al decided to cease posting that information for the consumer.


THE SRM removal failed terribly from day one.


THE infamous BSE Surveillance program was proven to be a scam by the GAO and OIG.


all in all, the infamous usda triple BSE mad cow firewall was a joke, and I’m still not laughing.


let’s review a few years, one decade post partial and voluntary mad cow feed ban ;




Subject: Fw: MAD COW FDA FEED WARNING LETTER NO. 2007-NOL-01 October 26, 2006 H.J. Baker & Bro., Inc.


From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." flounder9@VERIZON.NET


Reply-To: Sustainable Agriculture Network Discussion Group SANET-MG@LISTS.IFAS.UFL.EDU


Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2006 20:03:47 –0600




Wednesday, November 17, 2010


MAD COW TESTING FAKED IN USA BY Nebraska INSPECTOR Senator Mike Johanns STATE


Neb. inspector accused of faking mad cow tests


Published November 17, 2010




THE OTHER TEXAS MAD COW THEY DID SUCCEED IN COVERING UP ;


FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Statement May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA


Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.


FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.


FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.


Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).


FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.


To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.


Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry.


FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.


####




ALABAMA MAD COW


Summary: Despite a thorough investigation of two farms that were known to contain the index cow, and 35 other farms that might have supplied the index cow to the farms where the index case was known to have resided, the investigators were unable to locate the herd of origin. The index case did not have unique or permanent identification, plus, the size and color of the cow being traced is very common in the Southern United States. Due to the unremarkable appearance of solid red cows, it is not easy for owners to remember individual animals. In the Southern United States, it is common business practice to buy breeding age cows and keep them for several years while they produce calves. Most calves produced are sold the year they are born, whereas breeding cows are sold when there is a lapse in breeding, which can occur multiple times in cows’ lives. For all of these reasons, USDA was unable to locate the herd of origin.




ALABAMA MAD COW PROTEIN IN COMMERCE


Subject: MAD COW FDA FEED WARNING LETTER NO. 2007-NOL-01 October 26, 2006 H.J. Baker & Bro., Inc. Date: November 7, 2006 at 9:08 am PST Food and Drug Administration


New Orleans District


404 BNA Drive, Building 200, Suite 500


Nashville, TN 37217


Telephone: 615-366-7801


Facsimile: 615-366-7802


October 26, 2006


WARNING LETTER NO. 2007-NOL-01


FEDERAL EXPRESS


OVERNIGHT DELIVERY


Mr. Christopher V. B. Smith


Corporate President, CEO


H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc.


228 Saugatuck Avenue


Westport, Connecticut 06880


Dear Mr. Smith:


On June 6, 8, 12-15, and 23, 2006, a U.S . Food and Drug Administration (FDA) investigator inspected


your animal feed protein supplement manufacturing facility, located at 603 Railroad Avenue,


Albertville, Alabama. The inspection revealed significant deviations from the requirements set forth in


Title 21, Code ofFederal Regulations, Part 589.2000 (21 CFR 589.2000), Animal Proteins Prohibited in


Ruminant Feed. This regulation is intended to prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine


Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). You failed to follow the requirements of this regulation, resulting


in products being manufactured and distributed by your facility because they are adulterated within the


meaning of Section 402(a)(4) [21 USC 342(a)(4)] of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the


Act) and misbranded within the meaning of Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Act.


Our investigation determined adulteration resulted from the failure of your firm to establish and


implement measures sufficient to prevent commingling or cross-contamination . The adulterated feed


was subsequently misbranded because it was not properly labeled. Specifically, we found :


" Your firm failed to establish and use cleanout procedures or other means to prevent carry-over of


products which contain or may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues into animal protein


or feeds which may be used for ruminants, as required by 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1)(iii)(B) .


Specifically, you failed to establish and use such measures for a screw auger installed in February


2005 . This auger is used to convey both prohibited and non-prohibited material to bulk storage bins.


In addition, you failed to follow the cleanout procedure your firm had developed for the receiving


systems. Your feed is, therefore, adulterated under Section 402(a)(4) [21 USC 342(a)(4)] of the Act.


" You failed to label all products which contained or may have contained prohibited materials with the


BSE cautionary statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants," as required by 21 CFR


589.2000(e)(1)(i) . Such products are misbranded under Section 403(3) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the


Act. These misbranded products include the three Pro-Pak products mentioned below, as well as


Page 2 - H. J . Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, Alabama Warning Letter No. 2007-NOL-O 1


those bulk loads of individual feed ingredients processed through this common screw auger and


distributed between the time it was installed in February 2005, and June 9, 2006 .


This letter is not intended to serve as an all-inclusive list of violations at your facility. As a


manufacturer of materials intended for animal feed use, you are responsible for ensuring your overall


operation and the products you manufacture and distribute are in compliance with the law. You should take prompt action to correct these violations, and you should establish a system whereby violations do not recur. Failure to promptly correct these violations may result in regulatory action, such as seizure and/or injunction, without further notice.


We acknowledge your June 16, 2006, voluntary recall of three products you manufactured from


February 2005 to June 2006. The three products recalled were: Pro-Lak Protein Concentrate for


Lactating Dairy Animals; Pro-Amino II for PreFresh and Lactating Cows; and, Pro-Pak Marine & Animal Protein Concentrate for Use in Animal Feed. Recall effectiveness checks and other measures


will determine the merit of this recall . We recognize you now label all products with the required BSE


cautionary statement and we also acknowledge your intent, given verbally to New Orleans District


management of the FDA, to discontinue the production of supplements which do not contain prohibited


materials. In your written response to this letter, please confirm in writing you have taken these steps.


You should notify this office in writing within 15 working days of receiving this letter, outlining the specific steps you have taken to bring your firm into compliance with the law, including the steps we acknowledge above and any additional steps you have taken. Your response should include an


explanation of each step taken to correct the violations and prevent their recurrence. If corrective action cannot be completed within 15 working days, state the reason for the delay and the date by which the corrections will be completed. Include copies of any available documentation demonstrating corrections have been made.


Your reply should be directed to Kari L. Batey, Compliance Officer, at the address above. If you have


questions regarding any issue in this letter, please contact Ms. Batey at (615) 366-7808.


Sincerely,


,


Carol S . Sanchez


Acting District Director


New Orleans District


Enclosure: Form FDA 483


cc: Craig R. Waterhouse


Plant Manager


H.J. Baker & Bros., Inc.


603 Railroad Avenue


Albertville, Alabama 35951-3419




MORE 2006 FEED BAN VIOLATIONS BELOW, ''IN COMMERCE'' ;


Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA


SEPT 6, 2006


1961.72 TONS


IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST


PRODUCT a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6; b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6; c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6; d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6. CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons


DISTRIBUTION AL


______________________________


PRODUCT a) Dairy feed, custom, Recall # V-134-6; b) Custom Dairy Feed with Monensin, Recall # V-135-6. CODE None. Bulk product RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Burkmann Feed, Greeneville, TN, by Telephone beginning on June 28, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON Possible contamination of dairy feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 1,484 tons


DISTRIBUTION TN and WV




Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALLS ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006 KY, LA, MS, AL, GA, AND TN 11,000+ TONS


Date: August 16, 2006 at 9:19 am PST


RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE - CLASS II


______________________________


PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-115-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Hiseville Feed & Seed Co., Hiseville, KY, by telephone and letter on or about July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.


REASON Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE Approximately 2,223 tons


DISTRIBUTION KY


______________________________


PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-116-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Rips Farm Center, Tollesboro, KY, by telephone and letter on July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.


REASON Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 1,220 tons


DISTRIBUTION KY


______________________________


PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-117-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Kentwood Co-op, Kentwood, LA, by telephone on June 27, 2006. FDA initiated recall is completed.


REASON Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 40 tons


DISTRIBUTION LA and MS


______________________________


PRODUCT Bulk Dairy Feed, Recall V-118-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Cal Maine Foods, Inc., Edwards, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.


REASON Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,150 tons


DISTRIBUTION MS


______________________________


PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-119-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Walthall County Co-op, Tylertown, MS, by telephone on June 26, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 87 tons


DISTRIBUTION MS


______________________________


PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-120-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tons


DISTRIBUTION AL and MS


______________________________


PRODUCT a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6; b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6; c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6; d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6; e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6; f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6; g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6 CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.


REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags


DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN


END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006


###




Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL MI MAMMALIAN PROTEIN VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 27,694,240 lbs


Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:14 pm PST


PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy feds manufactured from concentrates, Recall # V-113-6 CODE All dairy feeds produced between 2/1/05 and 6/16/06 and containing H. J. Baker recalled feed products.


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Vita Plus Corp., Gagetown, MI, by visit beginning on June 21, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON The feed was manufactured from materials that may have been contaminated with mammalian protein.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 27,694,240 lbs


DISTRIBUTION MI


END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006


###




Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006


Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST


PRODUCT


a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;


b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;


c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;


d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;


e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;


f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;


g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;


h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6;


i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;


j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;


k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;


l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;


m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6


CODE Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.


REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons


DISTRIBUTION AL and FL


END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006


###




Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL KY VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ?????


Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:19 pm PST


PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-114-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Burkmann Feeds LLC, Glasgow, KY, by letter on July 14, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.


REASON Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak, which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ?????


DISTRIBUTION KY


END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006


###




CJD WATCH MESSAGE BOARD TSS MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE


Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67


RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II


______________________________


PRODUCT


a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6;


b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6;


c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6;


d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE a) Bulk b) None c) Bulk d) Bulk


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006.


Firm initiated recall is ongoing.


REASON Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons


DISTRIBUTION Nationwide


END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006


###




Subject: MAD COW FEED BAN WARNING LETTER ISSUED MAY 17, 2006


Date: June 27, 2006 at 7:42 am PST


Public Health Service Food and Drug Administration


New Orleans District 297 Plus Park Blvd. Nashville, TN 37217


Telephone: 615-781-5380 Fax: 615-781-5391


May 17, 2006


WARNING LETTER NO. 2006-NOL-06


FEDERAL EXPRESS OVERNIGHT DELIVERY


Mr. William Shirley, Jr., Owner Louisiana.DBA Riegel By-Products 2621 State Street Dallas, Texas 75204


Dear Mr. Shirley:


On February 12, 17, 21, and 22, 2006, a U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) investigator inspected your rendering plant, located at 509 Fortson Street, Shreveport, Louisiana. The inspection revealed significant deviations from the requirements set forth in Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 589.2000 [21 CFR 589.2000], Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed. This regulation is intended to prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). You failed to follow the requirements of this regulation; products being manufactured and distributed by your facility are misbranded within the meaning of Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act).


Our investigation found you failed to provide measures, including sufficient written procedures, to prevent commingling or cross-contamination and to maintain sufficient written procedures [21 CFR 589.2000(e)] because:


You failed to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into animal protein or feeds which may be used for ruminants. For example, your facility uses the same equipment to process mammalian and poultry tissues. However, you use only hot water to clean the cookers between processing tissues from each species. You do not clean the auger, hammer mill, grinder, and spouts after processing mammalian tissues.


You failed to maintain written procedures specifying the clean-out procedures or other means to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into feeds which may be used for ruminants.


As a result . the poultry meal you manufacture may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues prohibited in ruminant feed. Pursuant to 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1)(i), any products containing or may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues must be labeled, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Since you failed to label a product which may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues with the required cautionary statement. the poultry meal is misbranded under Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Act.


This letter is not intended as an all-inclusive list of violations at your facility. As a manufacturer of materials intended for animal feed use, you are responsible for ensuring your overall operation and the products you manufacture and distribute are in compliance with the law. You should take prompt action to correct these violations, and you should establish a system whereby violations do not recur. Failure to promptly correct these violations may result in regulatory action, such as seizure and/or injunction, without further notice.


You should notify this office in writing within 15 working days of receiving this letter, outlining the specific steps you have taken to bring your firm into compliance with the law. Your response should include an explanation of each step taken to correct the violations and prevent their recurrence. If corrective action cannot be completed within 15 working days, state the reason for the delay and the date by which the corrections will be completed. Include copies of any available documentation demonstrating corrections have been made.


Your reply should be directed to Mark W. Rivero, Compliance Officer, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2424 Edenborn Avenue, Suite 410, Metairie, Louisiana 70001. If you have questions regarding any issue in this letter, please contact Mr. Rivero at (504) 219-8818, extension 103.


Sincerely,


/S


Carol S. Sanchez Acting District Director New Orleans District




2007


10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007


Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST


RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II


PRODUCT


Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007


CODE


Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.


Firm initiated recall is ongoing.


REASON


Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


42,090 lbs.


DISTRIBUTION


WI


___________________________________


PRODUCT


Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007


CODE


The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


9,997,976 lbs.


DISTRIBUTION


ID and NV


END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007




look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;




P04.27


Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route


Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3; Ingrosso, L3; Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6; Löwer, J1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique, France; 3Instituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate Center, Germany


Background:


In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.


Aims:


The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose (MID50) for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to assess the risk for humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the disease to identify possible biomarkers.


Methods:


Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study, animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).


Results:


In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the onset of the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical course between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the detection of biomarkers.


Conclusions:


Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the incubation period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus 4 years). However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that develop simian vCJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.


The work referenced was performed in partial fulfilment of the study “BSE in primates“ supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).




look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;


Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates


Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog, Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe Deslys Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.


snip...


BSE bovine brain inoculum


100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg


Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)


Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%) 1/15 (7%)


RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)


PrPres biochemical detection


The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar PrPres concentration that was


inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of


bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.


Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected orally with similar BSE brain inocula


Published online January 27, 2005




Calves were challenged by mouth with homogenised brain from confirmed cases of BSE. Some received 300g (3 doses of 100g), some 100g, 10g or 1g. They were then left to develop BSE, but were not subjected to the normal stresses that they might have encountered in a dairy herd. Animals in all four groups developed BSE. There has been a considerable spread of incubation period in some of the groups, but it appears as if those in the 1 and 10g challenge groups most closely fit the picture of incubation periods seen in the epidemic. Experiments in progress indicate that oral infection can occur in some animals with doses as low as 0.01g and 0.001g. .........




It is clear that the designing scientists must also have shared Mr Bradley's surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.




6. It also appears to me that Mr Bradley's answer (that it would take less than say 100 grams) was probably given with the benefit of hindsight; particularly if one considers that later in the same answer Mr Bradley expresses his surprise that it could take as little of 1 gram of brain to cause BSE by the oral route within the same species. This information did not become available until the "attack rate" experiment had been completed in 1995/96. This was a titration experiment designed to ascertain the infective dose. A range of dosages was used to ensure that the actual result was within both a lower and an upper limit within the study and the designing scientists would not have expected all the dose levels to trigger infection. The dose ranges chosen by the most informed scientists at that time ranged from 1 gram to three times one hundred grams. It is clear that the designing scientists must have also shared Mr Bradley's surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.




Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates


SNIP...SEE ;


Subject: Fw: MAD COW FDA FEED WARNING LETTER NO. 2007-NOL-01 October 26, 2006 H.J. Baker & Bro., Inc.


From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." flounder9@VERIZON.NET


Reply-To: Sustainable Agriculture Network Discussion Group SANET-MG@LISTS.IFAS.UFL.EDU


Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2006 20:03:47 -0600




NOW, what about those pesky prions and SRM removal in the USA ???


Saturday, July 23, 2011


CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS, BEEF TONGUES, SPINAL CORD, SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS (SRM's) AND PRIONS, AKA MAD COW DISEASE


Greetings,


I have put a few of these recalls together from previous SRM recalls. Probably missed some, but i am a bit disturbed that the FSIS has apparently chosen not to list this recall from July 14, 2011 due to SRM spinal cord contamination, that i could find. The state of Ohio made a statement about a voluntary recall of an unknown amount of beef products that may contain the spinal cord and vertebral column, which are considered specified risk materials (SRMs) {see below} ;


Thursday, July 14, 2011


Valley Farm Meats (DBA Strasburg Provision, Inc) Issues Precautionary Recall for Beef Products Due to Possible Contamination with Prohibited Materials SRM Ohio Department of Agriculture and Ohio Department of Health




YET, FSIS seems to find it important enough to list this recall from Ohio ;


Ohio Firm Recalls Various Beef Jerky Products due to Misbranding and Undeclared Allergens


Recall Release CLASS II RECALL FSIS-RC-053-2011 HEALTH RISK: LOW


Congressional and Public Affairs (202) 720-9113 Adam Tarr


WASHINGTON, July 22, 2011 –




HOWEVER, look at the recalls of the past (see below), the first two were other voluntary recalls from other Companies, which i am using as an example (and see others that follow), but my question, WHY has the FSIS et al apparently chosen NOT to announce this recall on their website here ;


Valley Farm Meats (DBA Strasburg Provision, Inc) Issues Precautionary Recall for Beef Products Due to Possible Contamination with Prohibited Materials SRM Ohio Department of Agriculture and Ohio Department of Health




I have written both the FSIS and MEATINGPLACE.COM/, both of which have failed to report this important, life long exposure and human health risk factor for TSE from this voluntary recall, and all it got me was being banned from meatingplace.com/ again, and this time i did not even post anything, just sent them a kind note ;


----- Original Message -----


From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. To: AgRepublicanPress@mail.house.gov


Sent: Friday, July 22, 2011 4:23 PM


Subject: Fw: Valley Farm Meats (DBA Strasburg Provision, Inc) Issues Precautionary Recall for Beef Products Due to Possible Contamination with Prohibited Materials SRM


Greetings USDA et al,


I have not seen this on the USDA site yet ???


have i missed it ???


thank you, kind regards, terry


Ohio Department of Agriculture and Ohio Department of Health


Governor


John R. Kasich


Lieutenant Governor


Mary Taylor


ODA Director


James Zehringer


ODH Director


Theodore E. Wymyslo, M.D.


DT: July 14, 2011


TO: Health Commissioners, Directors of Environmental Health and Interested Parties


RE: Recall Announcement (ODA/ODH) 2011-076


Valley Farm Meats (DBA Strasburg Provision, Inc) Issues Precautionary Recall for Beef Products Due to Possible Contamination with Prohibited Materials


snip...end...TSS


=========================================


----- Original Message -----


From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.


To: tjohnston@meatingplace.com


Sent: Thursday, July 21, 2011 2:17 PM


Subject: Valley Farm Meats (DBA Strasburg Provision, Inc) Issues Precautionary Recall for Beef Products Due to Possible Contamination with Prohibited Materials SRM


Hello Mr. Johnston !


i have not seen this posted on meatingplace ???


I have stopped commenting on the forum at meatingplace, because everytime i comment or leave some science, i get blocked.


but i thought this important enought to send you you directly.


kind regards, terry


Ohio Department of Agriculture and Ohio Department of Health


Governor


John R. Kasich


Lieutenant Governor


Mary Taylor


ODA Director


James Zehringer


ODH Director


Theodore E. Wymyslo, M.D.


DT: July 14, 2011


TO: Health Commissioners, Directors of Environmental Health and Interested Parties


RE: Recall Announcement (ODA/ODH) 2011-076


Valley Farm Meats (DBA Strasburg Provision, Inc) Issues Precautionary Recall for Beef Products Due to Possible Contamination with Prohibited Materials


[STRASBURG, Ohio] – Valley Farm Meats (DBA Strasburg Provision, Inc) of Strasburg, OH announces a voluntary recall of an unknown amount of beef products that may contain the spinal cord and vertebral column, which are considered specified risk materials (SRMs). SRMs must be removed from cattle over 30 months of age in accordance with federal and state regulations. SRMs are tissues that are known to contain the infective agent in cattle infected with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), as well as materials that are closely associated with these potentially infective tissues. Therefore, federal and state regulations prohibit SRMs from use as human food to minimize potential human exposure to the BSE agent.


The products subject to recall include all beef products slaughtered and processed by or purchased from Valley Farm Meats retail store, 1317 N. Wooster Ave NW, Strasburg, OH 44680 or purchased from Ed Lind Livestock and Poultry, 3333 Church Rd B, Medina, Ohio 44256. These products were produced between 01/28/2011 and 07/05/2011 and offered for sale from 01/28/2011 through 07/11/2011.


The package labels or beef carcasses may bear the Ohio mark of inspection and “Est. 80”, however products processed through Ed Lind Livestock and Poultry may not contain such markings. The problem was discovered through routine inspection activities by the Ohio Department of Agriculture’s Division of Meat Inspection. The Department has received no reports of illnesses associated with consumption of this product.


The United States Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service classifies this type of potential contamination as a low health risk, however individuals concerned about an illness should contact a health care provider.


Because of potential product contamination, Valley Farm Meats urges its customers who have purchased the suspect product(s) not to eat them and to return them to the company. Customers may bring those designated packages to Valley Farm Meats, 1317 N Wooster Avenue NW, Strasburg, OH 44680 during regular business hours or call the company’s owner, Paul Berry at 330-878-5557.




Valley Farm Meats issues beef recall


TimesReporter.com staff report


Posted Jul 13, 2011 @ 03:18 PM




=========================================


has there been another change in protocol to help cover-up more needless expossure to the TSE in the USA ???


or did i just miss this recall ???


see old FSIS example of SRM recalls from the past ;


North Dakota Firm Recalls Whole Beef Head Products That Contain Prohibited Materials


Recall Release CLASS II RECALL FSIS-RC-023-2010 HEALTH RISK: LOW


Congressional and Public Affairs (202) 720-9113 Catherine Cochran


WASHINGTON, April 5, 2010 - North American Bison Co-Op, a New Rockford, N.D., establishment is recalling approximately 25,000 pounds of whole beef heads containing tongues that may not have had the tonsils completely removed, which is not compliant with regulations that require the removal of tonsils from cattle of all ages, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) announced today.


Tonsils are considered a specified risk material (SRM) and must be removed from cattle of all ages in accordance with FSIS regulations. SRMs are tissues that are known to contain the infective agent in cattle infected with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), as well as materials that are closely associated with these potentially infective tissues. Therefore, FSIS prohibits SRMs from use as human food to minimize potential human exposure to the BSE agent.


The product subject to recall includes: Various weight cases of "Beef Heads KEEP FROZEN." Each case bears the establishment number "EST. 18859" inside the USDA mark of inspection and a case code number "16999." "North Dakota Natural Beef" is printed in the bottom left-hand corner of each label.


The recalled products were produced between June 25, 2009, and February 19, 2010. These products were shipped to distribution centers in Md., Mich., and Minn. for further sale.


The problem was discovered during FSIS inspection activities at the establishment. FSIS routinely conducts recall effectiveness checks to verify recalling firms notify their customers of the recall and that steps are taken to make certain that the product is no longer available to consumers.


Media with questions about the recall should contact Philip Wicke, Vice President of Operations, at (701) 356-7723. Consumers with questions about the recall should contact Jeremy Anderson, Director of Customer Service, at (952) 545-2495.


Consumers with food safety questions can "Ask Karen," the FSIS virtual representative available 24 hours a day at AskKaren.gov. The toll-free USDA Meat and Poultry Hotline 1-888-MPHotline (1-888-674-6854) is available in English and Spanish and can be reached from l0 a.m. to 4 p.m. (Eastern Time) Monday through Friday. Recorded food safety messages are available 24 hours a day. #




Missouri Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials


Recall Release CLASS II RECALL FSIS-RC-021-2008 HEALTH RISK: LOW


Congressional and Public Affairs (202) 720-9113 Amanda Eamich


WASHINGTON, June 26, 2008 – Paradise Locker Meats, a Trimble, Mo., establishment, is voluntarily recalling approximately 120 pounds of fresh cattle heads with tonsils not completely removed, which is not compliant with regulations that require the removal of tonsils from cattle of all ages, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service announced today.


Tonsils are considered a specified risk material (SRM) and must be removed from cattle of all ages in accordance with FSIS regulations. SRMs are tissues that are known to contain the infective agent in cattle infected with BSE, as well as materials that are closely associated with these potentially infective tissues. Therefore, FSIS prohibits SRMs from use as human food to minimize potential human exposure to the BSE agent.


The products subject to recall include: Boxes of “BEEF HEAD, PARADISE LOCKER MEATS.” Each shipping package bears the establishment numbers “EST. 31865” inside the USDA mark of inspection.


These products were sent to retail establishments and restaurants in the Kansas City, Kansas, area.


The problem was discovered through routine FSIS inspection that verified there had been incomplete removal of the tonsils by the recalling establishment.


Media and consumers with questions about the recall should contact company Production Supervisor Louis Fantasma at (816) 370-6328.


Consumers with food safety questions can “Ask Karen,” the FSIS virtual representative available 24 hours a day at AskKaren.gov. The toll-free USDA Meat and Poultry Hotline 1-888-MPHotline (1-888-674-6854) is available in English and Spanish and can be reached from l0 a.m. to 4 p.m. (Eastern Time) Monday through Friday. Recorded food safety messages are available 24 hours a day. #




HAS the greed and money gotten so bad that the FSIS, USDA, APHIS, OIE et al, just decided that not only to exempt the atypical Scrapies and apparently now the BSE's, exempt them all, and just agreed to choose to not even speak about it anymore. i mean...really, the USDA and OIE have systematically covered up mad cow disease i.e. they call it SSS policy. where is USA burying them all at ? i do not accept the star trek like cloaking device that appears to be the only thing left that could be protecting the USA from mad cow disease....really. sadly, Canada has now taken the same low road as the USA in regards to discussing and making public documents on there mad cow cases. all this, 2011, with the science mounting, still follow the global myth of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory, and that all the sporadic CJDs (85%+ of all human TSE) are a mear happenstance of bad luck, when North America is plum full of different strains of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy in different species, all of which over a period of time, decades, were rendered and fed to food producing animals for human and animal food...really. i really just don't buy it...tss


some history on SRM's IN COMMERCE ;


SEE FULL TEXT HERE ;


Tuesday, July 1, 2008


Missouri Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs




Sunday, October 18, 2009


Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, October 17, 2009




Thursday, October 15, 2009


Nebraska Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, Oct 15, 2009




Thursday, June 26, 2008


Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials




Friday, August 8, 2008


Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs 941,271 pounds with tonsils not completely removed




Saturday, April 5, 2008


SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS KANSAS




Wednesday, April 30, 2008


Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings




Wednesday, April 30, 2008


Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings




Friday, October 15, 2010


BSE infectivity in the absence of detectable PrPSc accumulation in the tongue and nasal mucosa of terminally diseased cattle




SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS SRMs








SEE WHERE ONE OF THE BIGGEST BLUNDERS OF THE USDA ET AL WERE THE USDA NSLP DEAD STOCK DOWNER COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM, WHERE CHILDREN ALL ACROSS THE UNITED STATES WERE FED THE MOST HIGH RISK CATTLE FOR BSE I.E. DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, FOR OVER 4 YEARS THAT COULD BE DOCUMENTED. who will watch these children for the next 50 years for CJD prion disease ???


FINAL !


Subject: deadstock downer cows NSLP


> > > Ackerman says downed cattle are 50 times more likely to have mad cow disease (also known as Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, or BSE) than ambulatory cattle that are suspected of having BSE. Of the 20 confirmed cases of mad cow disease in North America since 1993, at least 16 have involved downer cattle, he said. < < <


don’t forget the children...


PLEASE be aware, for 4 years, the USDA fed our children all across the Nation (including TEXAS) dead stock downer cows, the most high risk cattle for BSE aka mad cow disease and other dangerous pathogens.


who will watch our children for CJD for the next 5+ decades ???


WAS your child exposed to mad cow disease via the NSLP ???


SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM FROM DOWNER CATTLE UPDATE






DID YOUR CHILD CONSUME SOME OF THESE DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, THE MOST HIGH RISK FOR MAD COW DISEASE ???


you can check and see here ;




TEXAS MAD COW


THEY DID FINALLY TEST AFTER SITTING 7+ MONTHS ON A SHELF WHILE GW BORE THE BSE MRR POLICY, i.e. legal trading of all strains of TSE. now understand, i confirmed this case 7 months earlier to the TAHC, and then, only after i contacted the Honorable Phyllis Fong and after an act of Congress, this animal was finally confirmed ;


During the course of the investigation, USDA removed and tested a total of 67 animals of interest from the farm where the index animal's herd originated. All of these animals tested negative for BSE. 200 adult animals of interest were determined to have left the index farm. Of these 200, APHIS officials determined that 143 had gone to slaughter, two were found alive (one was determined not to be of interest because of its age and the other tested negative), 34 are presumed dead, one is known dead and 20 have been classified as untraceable. In addition to the adult animals, APHIS was looking for two calves born to the index animal. Due to record keeping and identification issues, APHIS had to trace 213 calves. Of these 213 calves, 208 entered feeding and slaughter channels, four are presumed to have entered feeding and slaughter channels and one calf was untraceable.




Executive Summary In June 2005, an inconclusive bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) sample from November 2004, that had originally been classified as negative on the immunohistochemistry test, was confirmed positive on SAF immunoblot (Western blot). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) identified the herd of origin for the index cow in Texas; that identification was confirmed by DNA analysis. USDA, in close cooperation with the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), established an incident command post (ICP) and began response activities according to USDA’s BSE Response Plan of September 2004. Response personnel removed at-risk cattle and cattle of interest (COI) from the index herd, euthanized them, and tested them for BSE; all were negative. USDA and the State extensively traced all at-risk cattle and COI that left the index herd. The majority of these animals entered rendering and/or slaughter channels well before the investigation began. USDA’s response to the Texas finding was thorough and effective.


snip...


Trace Herd 3 The owner of Trace Herd 3 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest. The herd was placed under hold order on 7/27/05. The herd inventory was conducted on 7/28/05. The animal of interest was not present within the herd, and the hold order was released on 7/28/05. The person who thought he sold the animal to the owner of Trace Herd 3 had no records and could not remember who else he might have sold the cow to. Additionally, a search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable because all leads were exhausted.


Trace Herd 4 The owner of Trace Herd 4 was identified as having received one of the COI through an order buyer. Trace Herd 4 was placed under hold order on 7/29/05. A complete herd inventory was conducted on 8/22/05 and 8/23/05. There were 233 head of cattle that were examined individually by both State and Federal personnel for all man-made identification and brands. The animal of interest was not present within the herd. Several animals were reported to have died in the herd sometime after they arrived on the premises in April 2005. A final search of GDB records yielded no further results on the eartag of interest at either subsequent market sale or slaughter. With all leads having been exhausted, this animal of interest has been classified as untraceable. The hold order on Trace Herd 4 was released on 8/23/05.


Trace Herd 5 The owner of Trace Herd 5 was identified as having received two COI and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 5 is made up of 67 head of cattle in multiple pastures. During the course of the herd inventory, the owner located records that indicated that one of the COI, a known birth cohort, had been sold to Trace Herd 8 where she was subsequently found alive. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the other animal of interest was not found within the herd. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 5 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest and she was subsequently classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 5 was released on 8/8/05.


Trace Herd 6 The owner of Trace Herd 6 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. This herd is made up of 58 head of cattle on two pastures. A herd inventory was conducted and the animal of interest was not present within the herd. The owner of Trace Herd 6 had very limited records and was unable to provide further information on where the cow might have gone after he purchased her from the livestock market. A search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. Additionally, many of the animals presented for sale by the owner of the herd had been re-tagged at the market effectually losing the traceability of the history of that animal prior to re-tagging. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 6 was released on 8/3/05.


Trace Herd 7 The owner of Trace Herd 7 was identified as having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 7 contains 487 head of cattle on multiple pastures in multiple parts of the State, including a unit kept on an island. The island location is a particularly rough place to keep cattle and the owner claimed to have lost 22 head on the island in 2004 due to liver flukes. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the animal of interest was not found present within Trace Herd 7. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 7 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest. The cow was subsequently classified as untraceable. It is quite possible though that she may have died within the herd, especially if she belonged to the island unit. The hold order on Trace Herd 7 was released on 8/8/05.




THE OTHER TEXAS MAD COW THEY DID SUCCEED IN COVERING UP ;


FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Statement May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA


Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.


FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.


FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.


Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).


FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.


To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.


Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry.


FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.


####




ALABAMA MAD COW


Summary: Despite a thorough investigation of two farms that were known to contain the index cow, and 35 other farms that might have supplied the index cow to the farms where the index case was known to have resided, the investigators were unable to locate the herd of origin. The index case did not have unique or permanent identification, plus, the size and color of the cow being traced is very common in the Southern United States. Due to the unremarkable appearance of solid red cows, it is not easy for owners to remember individual animals. In the Southern United States, it is common business practice to buy breeding age cows and keep them for several years while they produce calves. Most calves produced are sold the year they are born, whereas breeding cows are sold when there is a lapse in breeding, which can occur multiple times in cows’ lives. For all of these reasons, USDA was unable to locate the herd of origin.






2012




***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.


Second threat


snip...






MAD COW USDA ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE, the rest of the story...


***Oral Transmission of L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Primate Model






***Infectivity in skeletal muscle of BASE-infected cattle






***feedstuffs- It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.






***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.






The present study demonstrated successful intraspecies transmission of H-type BSE to cattle and the distribution and immunolabeling patterns of PrPSc in the brain of the H-type BSE-challenged cattle. TSE agent virulence can be minimally defined by oral transmission of different TSE agents (C-type, L-type, and H-type BSE agents) [59]. Oral transmission studies with H-type BSEinfected cattle have been initiated and are underway to provide information regarding the extent of similarity in the immunohistochemical and molecular features before and after transmission.


In addition, the present data will support risk assessments in some peripheral tissues derived from cattle affected with H-type BSE.






Thursday, June 21, 2012


Clinical and Pathologic Features of H-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Associated with E211K Prion Protein Polymorphism


Justin J. Greenlee1*, Jodi D. Smith1, M. Heather West Greenlee2, Eric M. Nicholson1


1 National Animal Disease Center, United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, Ames, Iowa, United States of America, 2 Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, United States of America


Abstract


The majority of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) cases have been ascribed to the classical form of the disease. Htype and L-type BSE cases have atypical molecular profiles compared to classical BSE and are thought to arise spontaneously. However, one case of H-type BSE was associated with a heritable E211K mutation in the prion protein gene. The purpose of this study was to describe transmission of this unique isolate of H-type BSE when inoculated into a calf of the same genotype by the intracranial route. Electroretinograms were used to demonstrate preclinical deficits in retinal function, and optical coherence tomography was used to demonstrate an antemortem decrease in retinal thickness. The calf rapidly progressed to clinical disease (9.4 months) and was necropsied. Widespread distribution of abnormal prion protein was demonstrated within neural tissues by western blot and immunohistochemistry. While this isolate is categorized as BSE-H due to a higher molecular mass of the unglycosylated PrPSc isoform, a strong labeling of all 3 PrPSc bands with monoclonal antibodies 6H4 and P4, and a second unglycosylated band at approximately 14 kDa when developed with antibodies that bind in the C-terminal region, it is unique from other described cases of BSE-H because of an additional band 23 kDa demonstrated on western blots of the cerebellum. This work demonstrates that this isolate is transmissible, has a BSE-H phenotype when transmitted to cattle with the K211 polymorphism, and has molecular features that distinguish it from other cases of BSE-H described in the literature.


snip...


Most significantly it must be determined if the molecular phenotype of this cattle TSE remains stable when transmitted to cattle without the E211K polymorphism as several other isolates of atypical BSE have been shown to adopt a molecular profile consistent with classical BSE after passage in transgenic mice expressing bovine PrPC [40] or multiple passages in wild type mice [23]. Results of ongoing studies, namely passage of the E211K Htype isolate into wild-type cattle, will lend further insight into what role, if any, genetic and sporadic forms of BSE may have played in the origins of classical BSE. Atypical cases presumably of spontaneous or, in the case of E211K BSE-H, genetic origins highlight that it may not be possible to eradicate BSE entirely and that it would be hazardous to remove disease control measures such as prohibiting the feeding of meat and bone meal to ruminants.






Saturday, May 26, 2012


Are USDA assurances on mad cow case 'gross oversimplification'?


SNIP...


What irks many scientists is the USDA’s April 25 statement that the rare disease is “not generally associated with an animal consuming infected feed.”


The USDA’s conclusion is a “gross oversimplification,” said Dr. Paul Brown, one of the world’s experts on this type of disease who retired recently from the National Institutes of Health. "(The agency) has no foundation on which to base that statement.”


“We can’t say it’s not feed related,” agreed Dr. Linda Detwiler, an official with the USDA during the Clinton Administration now at Mississippi State.


In the May 1 email to me, USDA’s Cole backed off a bit. “No one knows the origins of atypical cases of BSE,” she said


The argument about feed is critical because if feed is the cause, not a spontaneous mutation, the California cow could be part of a larger outbreak.


SNIP...






P.9.21


Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada


Jianmin Yang1, Sandor Dudas2, Catherine Graham2, Markus Czub3, Tim McAllister1, Stefanie Czub1 1Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre, Canada; 2National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3University of Calgary, Canada


Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been detected in Canadian cattle.


Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16 Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated PrPres. Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis.


Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal- specific antibodies bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth band in the Canadian H-type BSE.


Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada.


*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.




Monday, June 18, 2012


Johanns Introduces Legislation Banning EPA Aerial Surveillance on feedlots just more BSe




PO-028: Oral transmission of L-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy (L-BSE) in primate model Microcebus murinus


Nadine Mestre-Frances,1 Simon Nicot,2 Sylvie Rouland,1 Anne-Gaëlle Biacabe,2 Isabelle Quadrio,3 Armand Perret-Liaudet,3 Thierry Baron,2 Jean-Michel Verdier1 1IN SER M UM2; Montpellier, France; 2Anses; Lyon, France; 3Hopitaux Civils de Lyon; Lyon, France


An atypical form of bovine spongiform encephalopathy has been identified in cattle in Europe, North America and Japan and was designed as L-type BSE (L-BSE) due to the lower apparent molecular mass of the unglycosylated, protease-resistant prion protein (PrPres) detected by western blot compared with classical BSE. Experimental evidences from studies in transgenic mice expressing human PrP and in primate models suggest a higher risk of transmission to humans of the L-BSE form than for classical BSE agent. However, a major unresolved issue concerns the potential transmissibility of the L-BSE agent by oral route. To address this question, we infected mouse lemurs (Microcebus murinus), a non-human primate model, with L-BSE by intracerebral or oral route.


Four adult lemurs were intracerebrally (IC) inoculated with 5mg of L-BSE infected brain homogenate of an atypical French BSE case (02-2528). Four young and four adult animals were fed with 5 mg or 50 mg of infected brain. After sacrifice, the brain tissues were biochemically and immunocytochemically investigated for PrPres.


The 4 animals IC inoculated died at 19 and 22 months postinoculation (mpi). They developed blindness, tremor, abnormal posture, incoordinated movements, balance loss. Symptoms get worse according to the disease progression, until severe ataxia. Severe spongiosis was evidenced into the thalamus, the striatum, the mesencephalon, and the brainstem, whereas into the cortex the vacuolisation was weaker. Strong deposits of PrPres were detected into the thalamus, the striatum, and the hippocampus whereas in the cerebral cortex, PrPres was prominently accumulated in plaques.


The orally inoculated animals showed similar clinical symptoms occurring between 27 and 34 mpi. Disease was characterized by progressive prostration, loss of appetite and poor appearance of the fur. Only one adult animal showed disequilibrium. PrPres was strongly accumulated only in the striatum and thalamus and weakly into the cortex. No plaques were evidenced. Two animals that were orally challenged at the age of two years are still alive and healthy 34 months after inoculation. The western blot analysis showed uniform molecular profiles, irrespective of the route or dose of infection, and included notably a PrPres form with low apparent molecular mass (~19 kDa) similar to the PrPres in the original cattle brain. However, the PrPres profile in lemurs was characterized by a higher proportion of di- and mono-glycosylated species (up to 95% of the total signal) than in the bovine L-BSE inoculum (~80%). In addition, small amounts of PrPres were detected by western blotting in the spleen of three animals (one intra-cerebrally inoculated and two fed with 5 mg of cattle brain).


Here, we demonstrate that the L-BSE agent can be transmitted by oral route from cattle to young and adult mouse lemurs. In comparison to IC inoculated animals, orally challenged lemurs were characterized by longer survival periods as expected with this route of infection.




Wednesday, May 2, 2012


ARS FLIP FLOPS ON SRM REMOVAL FOR ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE RISK HUMAN AND ANIMAL HEALTH




CDC 2012


Oral Transmission of L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Primate Model


Nadine Mestre-Francés, Simon Nicot, Sylvie Rouland, Anne-Gaëlle Biacabe, Isabelle Quadrio, Armand Perret-Liaudet, Thierry Baron, and Jean-Michel Verdier


We report transmission of atypical L-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy to mouse lemurs after oral or intracerebral inoculation with infected bovine brain tissue. After neurologic symptoms appeared, transmissibility of the disease by both inoculation routes was confirmed by detection of disease-associated prion protein in samples of brain tissue.


snip...


Conclusions


We demonstrated that the agent of L-BSE can be transmitted by the oral route from cattle to mouse lemurs. As expected, orally inoculated animals survived longer than IC-inoculated animals. Orally inoculated lemurs had less severe clinical signs and symptoms, with no evidence of motor dysfunction. It was previously suggested that the agent of L-BSE might be involved in the foodborne transmission of a prion disease in mink (11,12), a species in which several outbreaks of transmissible mink encephalopathy had been identified, notably in the United States (13).


Our study clearly confirms, experimentally, the potential risk for interspecies oral transmission of the agent of L-BSE. In our model, this risk appears higher than that for the agent of classical BSE, which could only be transmitted to mouse lemurs after a first passage in macaques (14). We report oral transmission of the L-BSE agent in young and adult primates. Transmission by the IC route has also been reported in young macaques (6,7). A previous study of L-BSE in transgenic mice expressing human PrP suggested an absence of any transmission barrier between cattle and humans for this particular strain of the agent of BSE, in contrast to findings for the agent of classical BSE (9). Thus, it is imperative to maintain measures that prevent the entry of tissues from cattle possibly infected with the agent of L-BSE into the food chain.






Saturday, November 6, 2010


TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU Berne, 2010 TAFS


INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation




in the url that follows, I have posted


SRM breaches first, as late as 2011.


then


MAD COW FEED BAN BREACHES AND TONNAGES OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE up until 2007, when they ceased posting them.


then,


MAD COW SURVEILLANCE BREACHES.


Friday, May 18, 2012


Update from APHIS Regarding a Detection of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in the United States Friday May 18, 2012




Wednesday, May 30, 2012


PO-028: Oral transmission of L-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy (L-BSE) in primate model Microcebus murinus




Owens, Julie


From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]


Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM


To: FSIS RegulationsComments


Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)


Page 1 of 98




Response to Public Comments on the Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Update


October 31, 2005


INTRODUCTION


The United States Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) held a public meeting on July 25, 2006 in Washington, D.C. to present findings from the Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Update, October 31, 2005 (report and model located on the FSIS website: http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Science/Risk_Assessments/index.asp). Comments on technical aspects of the risk assessment were then submitted to FSIS. Comments were received from Food and Water Watch, Food Animal Concerns Trust (FACT), Farm Sanctuary, R-CALF USA, Linda A Detwiler, and Terry S. Singeltary. This document provides itemized replies to the public comments received on the 2005 updated Harvard BSE risk assessment. Please bear the following points in mind:




03-025IFA 03-025IFA-2 Terry S. Singeltary


From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]


Sent: Thursday,


September 08, 2005 6:17 PM


To: fsis.regulationscomments@fsis.usda.gov


Subject: [Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified


Risk Materials for Human Food and Requirements for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle




THE SEVEN SCIENTIST REPORT ***




USDA/OIG-A/50601-10-KC












Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL


IMPORTS FROM CANADA




PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT HERE ;


Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL


IMPORTS FROM CANADA




Sunday, May 27, 2012


CANADA PLANS TO IMPRISON ANYONE SPEAKING ABOUT MAD COW or ANY OTHER DISEASE OUTBREAK


CENSORSHIP IS A TERRIBLE THING




Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93


Subject: Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION


Date: August 24, 2005 at 2:47 pm PST August 24, 2005


Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION


Greetings APHIS ET AL,




Docket APHIS-2006-0026 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy;


Animal Identification and Importation of Commodities Docket Type


Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0026-0001 Document Title Bovine


Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions, Identification of Ruminants and Processing and Importation of Commodities Public Submission


APHIS-2006-0026-0012 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary




Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy;


Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary


Comment 2006-2007 USA AND OIE POISONING GLOBE WITH BSE MRR POLICY


THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.


MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. go figure. ...






Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy;


Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document


APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived


From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singletary comment


January 28, 2007


Greetings APHIS,


I would kindly like to submit the following to ;


BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01




Sent: Friday, December 01, 2006 2:59 PM


Subject: Re: TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, 2006 [TSS SUBMISSION


snip...


ONE FINAL COMMENT PLEASE, (i know this is long Dr. Freas but please bear with me)


THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted blood from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone.


These are the facts as i have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species. ...


Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518


snip... 48 pages...






Friday, May 25, 2012


R-CALF USDA’s New BSE Rule Eliminates Important Protections Needed to Prevent BSE Spread




Monday, June 18, 2012


R-CALF Submits Incomplete Comments Under Protest in Bizarre Rulemaking “Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products”




Subject: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products APHIS-2008-0010-0008 RIN:0579-AC68


Comment from Terry Singeltary Document ID: APHIS-2008-0010-0008 Document Type: Public Submission This is comment on Proposed Rule: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products Docket ID: APHIS-2008-0010 RIN:0579-AC68


Topics: No Topics associated with this document


View Document: More Document Subtype: Public Comment Status: Posted Received Date: March 22 2012, at 12:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time Date Posted: March 22 2012, at 12:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time Comment Start Date: March 16 2012, at 12:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time Comment Due Date: May 15 2012, at 11:59 PM Eastern Daylight Time


Tracking Number: 80fdd617


First Name: Terry Middle Name: S. Last Name: Singeltary


City: Bacliff


Country: United States


State or Province: TX Organization


Name: CJD TSE PRION


Submitter's Representative: CONSUMERS


Comment: comment submission Document ID APHIS-2008-0010-0001


Greetings USDA,


OIE et al, what a difference it makes with science, from one day to the next. i.e. that mad cow gold card the USA once held. up until that fateful day in December of 2003, the science of BSE was NO IMPORTS TO USA FROM BSE COUNTRY. what a difference a day makes$ now that the shoe is on the other foot, the USDA via the OIE, wants to change science again, just for trade $ I implore the OIE decision and policy makers, for the sake of the world, to refuse any status quo of the USA BSE risk assessment. if at al, the USA BSE GBR should be raise to BSE GBR IV, for the following reasons. North America is awash with many different TSE Prion strains, in many different species, and they are mutating and spreading. IF the OIE, and whatever policy makers, do anything but raise the risk factor for BSE in North America, they I would regard that to be highly suspicious. IN fact, it would be criminal in my opinion, because the OIE knows this, and to knowingly expose the rest of the world to this dangerous pathogen, would be ‘knowingly’ and ‘willfully’, just for the almighty dollar, once again. I warned the OIE about all this, including the risk factors for CWD, and the fact that the zoonosis potential was great, way back in 2002. THE OIE in collaboration with the USDA, made the legal trading of the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie a legal global commodity. yes, thanks to the OIE and the USDA et al, it’s now legal to trade the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie strain all around the globe. IF you let them, they will do the same thing with atypical BSE and CWD (both strains to date). This with science showing that indeed these TSE prion strains are transmissible. I strenuously urge the OIE et al to refuse any weakening to the USA trade protocols for the BSE TSE prion disease (all strains), and urge them to reclassify the USA with BSE GBR IV risk factor.


SEE REFERENCE SOURCES IN ATTACHMENTS


PLEASE SEE Terry S. Singeltary Sr. _Attachment_ WORD FILE ;






Identification of a second bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy: Molecular similarities with sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease


Cristina Casalone*†, Gianluigi Zanusso†‡, Pierluigi Acutis*, Sergio Ferrari‡, Lorenzo Capucci§, Fabrizio Tagliavini¶, Salvatore Monaco‡ , and Maria Caramelli* *Centro di Referenza Nazionale per le Encefalopatie Animali, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, Liguria e Valle d’Aosta, Via Bologna, 148, 10195 Turin, Italy; ‡Department of Neurological and Visual Science, Section of Clinical Neurology, Policlinico G.B. Rossi, Piazzale L.A. Scuro, 10, 37134 Verona, Italy; §Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale della Lombardia ed Emilia Romagna, Via Bianchi, 9, 25124 Brescia, Italy; and ¶Istituto Nazionale Neurologico ‘‘Carlo Besta,’’ Via Celoria 11, 20133 Milan, Italy


Edited by Stanley B. Prusiner, University of California, San Francisco, CA, and approved December 23, 2003 (received for review September 9, 2003)


Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), or prion diseases, are mammalian neurodegenerative disorders characterized by a posttranslational conversion and brain accumulation of an insoluble, protease-resistant isoform (PrPSc) of the host-encoded cellular prion protein (PrPC). Human and animal TSE agents exist as different phenotypes that can be biochemically differentiated on the basis of the molecular mass of the protease-resistant PrPSc fragments and the degree of glycosylation. Epidemiological, molecular, and transmission studies strongly suggest that the single strain of agent responsible for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) has infected humans, causing variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease. The unprecedented biological properties of the BSE agent, which circumvents the so-called ‘‘species barrier’’ between cattle and humans and adapts to different mammalian species, has raised considerable concern for human health. To date, it is unknown whether more than one strain might be responsible for cattle TSE or whether the BSE agent undergoes phenotypic variation after natural transmission. Here we provide evidence of a second cattle TSE. The disorder was pathologically characterized by the presence of PrP-immunopositive amyloid plaques, as opposed to the lack of amyloid deposition in typical BSE cases, and by a different pattern of regional distribution and topology of brain PrPSc accumulation. In addition, Western blot analysis showed a PrPSc type with predominance of the low molecular mass glycoform and a protease- resistant fragment of lower molecular mass than BSE-PrPSc. Strikingly, the molecular signature of this previously undescribed bovine PrPSc was similar to that encountered in a distinct subtype of sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease.


Phenotypic Similarities Between BASE and sCJD. The transmissibility of CJD brains was initially demonstrated in primates (27), and classification of atypical cases as CJD was based on this property (28). To date, no systematic studies of strain typing in sCJD have been provided, and classification of different subtypes is based on clinical, neuropathological, and molecular features (the polymorphic PRNP codon 129 and the PrPSc glycotype) (8, 9, 15, 19). The importance of molecular PrPSc characterization in assessing the identity of TSE strains is underscored by several studies, showing that the stability of given disease-specific PrPSc types is maintained upon experimental propagation of sCJD, familial CJD, and vCJD isolates in transgenic PrP-humanized mice (8, 29). Similarly, biochemical properties of BSE- and vCJDassociated PrPSc molecules remain stable after passage to mice expressing bovine PrP (30). Recently, however, it has been reported that PrP-humanized mice inoculated with BSE tissues may also propagate a distinctive PrPSc type, with a ‘‘monoglycosylated- dominant’’ pattern and electrophoretic mobility of the unglycosylated fragment slower than that of vCJD and BSE (31). Strikingly, this PrPSc type shares its molecular properties with the a PrPSc molecule found in classical sCJD. This observation is at variance with the PrPSc type found in M V2 sCJD cases and in cattle BASE, showing a monoglycosylated-dominant pattern but faster electrophoretic mobility of the protease-resistant fragment as compared with BSE. In addition to molecular properties of PrPSc, BASE and M V2 sCJD share a distinctive pattern of intracerebral PrP deposition, which occurs as plaque-like and amyloid-kuru plaques. Differences were, however, observed in the regional distribution of PrPSc. While inM V2 sCJD cases the largest amounts of PrPSc were detected in the cerebellum, brainstem, and striatum, in cattle BASE these areas were less involved and the highest levels of PrPSc were recovered from the thalamus and olfactory regions.


In conclusion, decoding the biochemical PrPSc signature of individual human and animal TSE strains may allow the identification of potential risk factors for human disorders with unknown etiology, such as sCJD. However, although BASE and sCJD share several characteristics, caution is dictated in assessing a link between conditions affecting two different mammalian species, based on convergent biochemical properties of diseaseassociated PrPSc types. Strains of TSE agents may be better characterized upon passage to transgenic mice. In the interim until this is accomplished, our present findings suggest a strict epidemiological surveillance of cattle TSE and sCJD based on molecular criteria.




Employment Listings position: Post Doctoral Fellow | Atypical BSE in Cattle


Closing date: December 24, 2009


Anticipated start date: January/February 2010


Employer: Canadian and OIE Reference Laboratories for BSE CFIA Lethbridge Laboratory, Lethbridge/Alberta


The Canadian and OIE reference laboratories for BSE are extensively involved in prion diseases diagnosis and research. With a recent increase in research activities and funding, the laboratory is looking to fill two post doctoral fellow positions. Both positions will be located at the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) Lethbridge Laboratory which offers biosaftey level 3 (BSL3) and BSL2 laboratory space and is well equipped for molecular and morphologic prion research. The facility also has a BSL3 large animal housing wing and a state of the art post mortem room certified for prion work. Successful candidates will have the opportunity to visit other laboratories to cooperate in various aspects of the projects and to be trained in new techniques and acquire new skills. With a recent increase in prion disease expertise and research in Alberta and Canada, these positions will offer significant exposure to cutting edge prion science via videoconferencing, meetings, workshops and conferences. These interactions will also provide a valuable opportunity to present research findings and discuss potential future work opportunities and collaborations with other Canadian and international research groups.


Atypical BSE in Cattle


BSE has been linked to the human disease variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (vCJD). The known exposure pathways for humans contracting vCJD are through the consumption of beef and beef products contaminated by the BSE agent and through blood transfusions. However, recent scientific evidence suggests that the BSE agent may play a role in the development of other forms of human prion diseases as well. These studies suggest that classical type of BSE may cause type 2 sporadic CJD and that H-type atypical BSE is connected with a familial form of CJD.


To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.


This study will contribute to a correct definition of specified risk material (SRM) in atypical BSE. The incumbent of this position will develop new and transfer existing, ultra-sensitive methods for the detection of atypical BSE in tissue of experimentally infected cattle.


Responsibilities include:


Driving research at the National and OIE BSE reference lab to ensure project milestones are met successfully. Contributing to the preparation of project progress reports. Directing technical staff working on the project. Communicating and discussing results, progress and future direction with project principle investigator(s). Communicating with collaborative project partners.


Qualifications:


Successful completion of a PhD degree in an area focusing on or related to prion diseases. Extensive experience with molecular and/or morphologic techniques used in studying prion diseases and/or other protein misfolding disorders. Ability to think independently and contribute new ideas. Excellent written and oral communication skills. Ability to multitask, prioritize, and meet challenges in a timely manner. Proficiency with Microsoft Office, especially Word, PowerPoint and Excel.


How to apply:


Please send your application and/or inquiry to: Dr. Stefanie Czub, DVM, Ph.D. Head, National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory Canadian Food Inspection Agency Lethbridge Laboratory P.O. Box 640, Township Road 9-1 Lethbridge, AB, T1J 3Z4 Canada


phone: +1-403-382-5500 +1-403-382-5500 ext. 5549 email: mailto:stefanie.czub%40inspection.gc.ca


Contact Info:


Last Updated: 12/10/2009 1:35:18 PM




Thursday, August 12, 2010


Seven main threats for the future linked to prions


First threat


The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a sporadic origin is confirmed.


***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European approach to prion diseases.


Second threat


snip...




Sunday, June 3, 2012


A new neurological disease in primates inoculated with prion-infected blood or blood components






Sunday, February 12, 2012


National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined1 (August 19, 2011) including Texas




Terry S. Singeltary Sr. on the Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Public Health Crisis








full text with source references ;






price of prion poker goes up again $$$


Monday, June 11, 2012


Guidance for Industry Draft Guidance for Industry: Amendment to “Guidance for Industry: Revised Preventive Measures to Reduce the Possible Risk of Transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease and Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease by Blood and Blood Products”






bse be gone. I wish it was as easy as waving a magic wand. but some of us know that’s not the case $$$




layperson


Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 flounder9@verizon.net

posted by Terry S. Singeltary Sr. at 12:55 PM

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