Tuesday, September 07, 2021

Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE OIE, FDA 589.2001 FEED REGULATIONS, and Ingestion Therefrom

Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE OIE, FDA 589.2001 FEED REGULATIONS, and Ingestion Therefrom

The myth that all atypical BSE TSE Prion disease are sporadic/spontaneous and are not caused by the ingestion of TSE Prion contaminated feed, is just that, a myth, one never proven, and in fact, is not scientific...terry

REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE AD HOC GROUP ON BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY RISK ASSESSMENT AND SURVEILLANCE

Paris, 18-21 March 2019

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3. Atypical BSE

The Group discussed and endorsed with minor revisions an overview of relevant literature on the risk of atypical BSE being recycled in a cattle population and its zoonotic potential that had been prepared ahead of the meeting by one expert from the Group. This overview is provided as Appendix IV and its main conclusions are outlined below.

With regard to the risk of recycling of atypical BSE, recently published research confirmed that the L-type BSE prion (a type of atypical BSE prion) may be orally transmitted to calves1 . In light of this evidence, and the likelihood that atypical BSE could arise as a spontaneous disease in any country, albeit at a very low incidence, the Group was of the opinion that it would be reasonable to conclude that atypical BSE is potentially capable of being recycled in a cattle population if cattle were to be exposed to contaminated feed. Therefore, the recycling of atypical strains in cattle and broader ruminant populations should be avoided.

The Group acknowledged the challenges in demonstrating the zoonotic transmission of atypical strains of BSE in natural exposure scenarios. Overall, the Group was of the opinion that, at this stage, it would be premature to reach a conclusion other than that atypical BSE poses a potential zoonotic risk that may be different between atypical strains. 

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In contrast, there have not been any substantiated reports of the successful oral transmission of H-BSE in cattle. Initial reports from Dudas et al., 2014 based on RT-QuIC pointed to the possibility of oral transmission following a very high dose (100 grams of brain material), although the individual did not display clinical signs and the findings from standard molecular or immunohistochemical assays were all negative. Investigations are ongoing in an attempt to clarify these findings.

Although significant uncertainty remains regarding the origin of C-BSE, several studies involving the serial passage of H-BSE and L-BSE in transgenic and wild-type mice have revealed their potential to lead to the emergence of a C-BSE-like phenotype (Baron et al., 2011; Torres et al., 2011; Bencsik et al., 2013) or other novel strains (Masujin et al., 2016). Whether or not one or both of these atypical strains led to the emergence of C-BSE remains speculative; however, the similarities between transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME), first reported in the USA in 1947 (Hartsough and Burger, 1965), and L-BSE indicate that TME may have been a surrogate indicator for the presence of L-BSE in cattle populations in those countries such as the USA, Canada, Germany, Finland and Russia where outbreaks of TME had been reported decades before C-BSE was first recognised in the United Kingdom in 1986 (Hadlow and Karstad, 1968; Marsh et al., 1991; McKenzie et al., 1996; Baron et al., 2007; Comoy et al., 2013). Although TME was originally thought to have occurred as a result of feeding mink with scrapie infected sheep carcases, oral challenge studies did not confirm this (Marsh et al., 1991). Importantly, in an outbreak reported in the USA in 1985, mink had never been fed sheep products; instead they had been fed on products derived from dead and sick dairy cattle (March et al., 1991). Similarly, from an outbreak in Canada in 1963, mink had reportedly been fed with products derived from cattle but not sheep (Hadlow and Karstad, 1968).

Although, as discussed above, the passage of H-BSE or L-BSE has been proposed as a possible explanation for the origin of C-BSE, transformation of L-BSE or H-BSE to C-BSE has not been observed so far in transmission studies in cattle. That being said, it is likely that, compared to various rodent models, an insufficient number of passages have been undertaken.

It is worth noting that sheep and goats are susceptible to L-BSE following intracerebral inoculation without lymphoid involvement in most individuals (Simmons et al., 2016; Gielbert et al., 2018; Vallino-Costassa et al., 2018). As discussed by Houston and Andreoletti (2018), C-BSE appears to increase in virulence for humans if it is first passaged in sheep. Whether or not this is the same for atypical strains remains to be determined.

Conclusions on transmissibility of atypical BSE among cattle

Given that cattle have been successfully infected by the oral route, at least for L-BSE, it is reasonable to conclude that atypical BSE is potentially capable of being recycled in a cattle population if cattle are exposed to contaminated feed. In addition, based on reports of atypical BSE from several countries that have not had C-BSE, it appears likely that atypical BSE would arise as a spontaneous disease in any country, albeit at a very low incidence in old cattle. In the presence of livestock industry practices that would allow it to be recycled in the cattle feed chain, it is likely that some level of exposure and transmission may occur. As a result, since atypical BSE can be reasonably considered to pose a potential background level of risk for any country with cattle, the recycling of both classical and atypical strains in the cattle and broader ruminant populations should be avoided. 


***> Consumption of L-BSE–contaminated feed may pose a risk for oral transmission of the disease agent to cattle.

***> As a result, since atypical BSE can be reasonably considered to pose a potential background level of risk for any country with cattle, the recycling of both classical and atypical strains in the cattle and broader ruminant populations should be avoided. 

***> This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route. 

***> These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.

Atypical L-type BSE

Emerg Infect Dis. 2017 Feb; 23(2): 284–287. doi: 10.3201/eid2302.161416 PMCID: PMC5324790 PMID: 28098532

Oral Transmission of L-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Agent among Cattle 

Hiroyuki Okada,corresponding author Yoshifumi Iwamaru, Morikazu Imamura, Kohtaro Miyazawa, Yuichi Matsuura, Kentaro Masujin, Yuichi Murayama, and Takashi Yokoyama Author information Copyright and License information Disclaimer This article has been cited by other articles in PMC. Go to: Abstract To determine oral transmissibility of the L-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) prion, we orally inoculated 16 calves with brain homogenates of the agent. Only 1 animal, given a high dose, showed signs and died at 88 months. These results suggest low risk for oral transmission of the L-BSE agent among cattle.

Keywords: atypical bovine spongiform encephalopathy, cattle, L-type, prion, oral transmission, L-BSE, prions and related diseases, zoonoses The epidemic of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in cattle is thought to be caused by oral infection through consumption of feed containing the BSE agent (prion). Since 2003, different neuropathologic and molecular phenotypes of BSE have been identified as causing ≈110 cases of atypical BSE worldwide, mainly in aged cattle. Although the etiology and pathogenesis of atypical BSE are not yet fully understood, atypical BSE prions possibly cause sporadic cases of BSE (1).

The L-type BSE (L-BSE) prion has been experimentally transmitted to cattle by intracerebral challenge, and the incubation period was is shorter than that for classical BSE (C-BSE) prions (2–6). The origin of transmissible mink encephalopathy in ranch-raised mink is thought to be caused by ingestion of L-BSE–infected material (7). Although L-BSE has been orally transmitted to mouse lemurs (8), it remains to be established whether L-BSE can be transmitted to cattle by oral infection. We therefore investigated the transmissibility of L-BSE by the oral route and tissue distribution of disease-associated prion protein (PrPSc) in cattle. All experiments involving animals were performed with the approval of the Animal Ethical Committee and the Animal Care and Use Committee of the National Institute of Animal Health (approval nos. 07–88 and 08–010).

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The neuroanatomical PrPSc distribution pattern of orally challenged cattle differed somewhat from that described in cattle naturally and intracerebrally challenged with L-BSE (2–6,11,13,14), The conspicuous differences between the case we report and cases of natural and experimental infection are 1) higher amounts of PrPSc in the caudal medulla oblongata and the spinal cord coupled with that in the thalamus and the more rostral brainstem and 2) relatively low amounts of PrPSc in the cerebral cortices and the olfactory bulb. Furthermore, fewer PrPSc deposits in the dorsal motor nucleus of the vagus nerve may indicate that the parasympathetic retrogressive neuroinvasion pathway does not contribute to transport of the L-BSE prion from the gut to the brain, which is in contrast to the vagus-associated transport of the agent in C-BSE (15). PrPSc accumulation in the extracerebral tissues may be a result of centrifugal trafficking of the L-BSE prion from the central nervous system along somatic or autonomic nerve fibers rather than centripetal propagation of the agent (4,6,9). Consumption of L-BSE–contaminated feed may pose a risk for oral transmission of the disease agent to cattle.


Our study clearly confirms, experimentally, the potential risk for interspecies oral transmission of the agent of L-BSE. In our model, this risk appears higher than that for the agent of classical BSE, which could only be transmitted to mouse lemurs after a first passage in macaques (14). We report oral transmission of the L-BSE agent in young and adult primates. Transmission by the IC route has also been reported in young macaques (6,7). A previous study of L-BSE in transgenic mice expressing human PrP suggested an absence of any transmission barrier between cattle and humans for this particular strain of the agent of BSE, in contrast to findings for the agent of classical BSE (9). Thus, it is imperative to maintain measures that prevent the entry of tissues from cattle possibly infected with the agent of L-BSE into the food chain.


Atypical H-type BSE

Research Project: Pathobiology, Genetics, and Detection of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Location: Virus and Prion Research

Title: The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge

Author item Greenlee, Justin item MOORE, S - Orise Fellow item WEST-GREENLEE, M - Iowa State University

Submitted to: Prion

Publication Type: Abstract Only

Publication Acceptance Date: 5/14/2018

Publication Date: 5/22/2018

Citation: Greenlee, J.J., Moore, S.J., West Greenlee, M.H. 2018. 

The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge.

 Prion 2018, May 22-25, 2018, Santiago de Compostela, Spain. Paper No. P98, page 116. Interpretive Summary:

Technical Abstract: In 2006, a case of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) was reported in a cow with a previously unreported prion protein polymorphism (E211K). The E211K polymorphism is heritable and homologous to the E200K mutation in humans that is the most frequent PRNP mutation associated with familial Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Although the prevalence of the E211K polymorphism is low, cattle carrying the K211 allele develop H-type BSE with a rapid onset after experimental inoculation by the intracranial route. 

The purpose of this study was to investigate whether the agents of H-type BSE or H-type BSE associated with the E211K polymorphism transmit to wild type cattle or cattle with the K211 allele after oronasal exposure. 

Wild type (EE211) or heterozygous (EK211) cattle were oronasally inoculated with either H-type BSE from the 2004 US H-type BSE case (n=3) or from the 2006 US H-type case associated with the E211K polymorphism (n=4) using 10% w/v brain homogenates. 

Cattle were observed daily throughout the course of the experiment for the development of clinical signs. 

At approximately 50 months post-inoculation, one steer (EK211 inoculated with E211K associated H-BSE) developed clinical signs including inattentiveness, loss of body condition, weakness, ataxia, and muscle fasciculations and was euthanized. 

Enzyme immunoassay confirmed that abundant misfolded protein was present in the brainstem, and immunohistochemistry demonstrated PrPSc throughout the brain. 

Western blot analysis of brain tissue from the clinically affected steer was consistent with the E211K H-type BSE inoculum. 

With the experiment currently at 55 months post-inoculation, no other cattle in this study have developed clinical signs suggestive of prion disease. 

This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route. 

These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.


P98 The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge 

Greenlee JJ (1), Moore SJ (1), and West Greenlee MH (2) (1) United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, National Animal Disease Center, Virus and Prion Research Unit, Ames, IA, United States (2) Department of Biomedical Sciences, Iowa State University College of Veterinary Medicine, Ames, IA, United States. 

In 2006, a case of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) was reported in a cow with a previously unreported prion protein polymorphism (E211K). 

The E211K polymorphism is heritable and homologous to the E200K mutation in humans that is the most frequent PRNP mutation associated with familial Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. 

Although the prevalence of the E211K polymorphism is low, cattle carrying the K211 allele develop H-type BSE with a rapid onset after experimental inoculation by the intracranial route. 

The purpose of this study was to investigate whether the agents of H-type BSE or H-type BSE associated with the E211K polymorphism transmit to wild type cattle or cattle with the K211 allele after oronasal exposure. 

Wild type (EE211) or heterozygous (EK211) cattle were oronasally inoculated with either H-type BSE from the 2004 US Htype BSE case (n=3) or from the 2006 US H-type case associated with the E211K polymorphism (n=4) using 10% w/v brain homogenates. 

Cattle were observed daily throughout the course of the experiment for the development of clinical signs. 

At approximately 50 months post-inoculation, one steer (EK211 inoculated with E211K associated H-BSE) developed clinical signs including inattentiveness, loss of body condition, weakness, ataxia, and muscle fasciculations and was euthanized. 

Enzyme immunoassay confirmed that abundant misfolded protein was present in the brainstem, and immunohistochemistry demonstrated PrPSc throughout the brain. 

Western blot analysis of brain tissue from the clinically affected steer was consistent with the E211K H-type BSE inoculum. 

With the experiment currently at 55 months post-inoculation, no other cattle in this study have developed clinical signs suggestive of prion disease. This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route. 

These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains. 

PRION CONFERENCE 2018 CONFERENCE ABSTRACT

Published: 23 June 2011

Experimental H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy characterized by plaques and glial- and stellate-type prion protein deposits

Hiroyuki Okada, Yoshifumi Iwamaru, Morikazu Imamura, Kentaro Masujin, Yuichi Matsuura, Yoshihisa Shimizu, Kazuo Kasai, Shirou Mohri, Takashi Yokoyama & Stefanie Czub 

Abstract

Atypical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) has recently been identified in Europe, North America, and Japan. It is classified as H-type and L-type BSE according to the molecular mass of the disease-associated prion protein (PrPSc). To investigate the topographical distribution and deposition patterns of immunolabeled PrPSc, H-type BSE isolate was inoculated intracerebrally into cattle. H-type BSE was successfully transmitted to 3 calves, with incubation periods between 500 and 600 days. Moderate to severe spongiform changes were detected in the cerebral and cerebellar cortices, basal ganglia, thalamus, and brainstem. H-type BSE was characterized by the presence of PrP-immunopositive amyloid plaques in the white matter of the cerebrum, basal ganglia, and thalamus. Moreover, intraglial-type immunolabeled PrPSc was prominent throughout the brain. Stellate-type immunolabeled PrPSc was conspicuous in the gray matter of the cerebral cortex, basal ganglia, and thalamus, but not in the brainstem. In addition, PrPSc accumulation was detected in the peripheral nervous tissues, such as trigeminal ganglia, dorsal root ganglia, optic nerve, retina, and neurohypophysis. Cattle are susceptible to H-type BSE with a shorter incubation period, showing distinct and distinguishable phenotypes of PrPSc accumulation.

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Discussion This study demonstrated successful intraspecies transmission of H-type BSE characterized by a shorter incubation period as compared with C-type BSE [19]. To the best of our knowledge, thus far, neuropathological and immunohistochemical data for H-type BSE have only been reported from the medulla oblongata at the obex in German, United States, and Swedish field cases [10, 13, 24]. This is related to the fact that only the obex region is sampled for BSE rapid tests and other brain regions are often unavailable due to marked autolysis, limitations in collection infrastructure, or freezing artifacts [10, 13, 24, 25]. This is the first presentation of H-type lesion profiles involving the whole CNS and additional nervous tissues, although of experimentally infected animals.

Incubation periods in the cattle challenged with the Canadian H-type BSE (mean period, 18 months) were two months longer than those reported in cattle challenged with German H-type BSE [20]. This difference in incubation periods has several potential explanations, which include differences in agents tested, inoculum titers, and breeding conditions. Infectivity titer issues might be resolved by comparing second-passage infection experiment results.

Spongy changes were generally present in the gray matter throughout the brain and spinal cord, but were more conspicuous in the cerebral cortices, thalamus, hypothalamus, and midbrain. In most brain areas, vacuoles were generally detected in the neuropil and only occasionally in the neurons. The spatial distribution pattern of spongiform changes and immunolabeled PrPSc in the brain of an H-type BSE-infected Zebu, analyzed with N-terminal-specific mAb P4 and C-terminal-specific mAb F99/97.6.1, was similar to that in C-type BSE cases [38]. In natural and experimental C-type BSE cases, spongiform lesions are consistently distributed throughout the brain, but overall, the lesions in the thalamus and brainstem including the midbrain and medulla oblongata at the obex are more severe than those in the cerebral cortices [29, 39]. The results of the present study indicate that the vacuolar lesion score of the H-type BSE-challenged cattle was higher than that of C-type BSE-affected cattle [19, 29, 40, 41]. Moreover, the topographical distribution of PrPSc in the brain of BSE-infected sheep is similar irrespective of the different challenge routes such as intracerebral, intravascular, or intraperitoneal route [42], suggesting common patterns of neuroinvasion and CNS spread [43]. On the contrary, the minor differences detected in the distribution of PrPSc in the brain between deer that are orally and intracerebrally infected with BSE may be due to differences in the routes of infection [44].

The immunolabeling patterns of PrPSc in the cattle affected with H-type BSE were characterized by the presence of both PrPSc-positive plaques and intraglial- and stellate-type PrPSc accumulations in the brain. Severe intraneuronal- and intraglial-type PrPSc accumulations as well as plaque-like PrPSc aggregates with the absence of stellate-type PrPSc deposition have been reported in the obex region of H-type BSE-affected animals [10, 13]. These immunohistochemical features were detected in the obex region and coincided with those observed in the present study. However, neither amyloid plaques nor stellate-type PrPSc depositions have been reported in H-type BSE-affected cattle, most likely due to their limitation to the medulla oblongata at the obex [8, 10, 13, 24].

Two different types of plaques were found in this study: unicentric and multicentric PrP plaques. Most of these plaques were uniformly immunopositive for PrP, with a dense non-Congophilic core. The plaques that had a pale central core with a Congophilic reaction were less frequent. It has been suggested that Congophilic plaques may correspond with the late stage of plaque formation, whereas non-Congophilic plaques coincide with the early stage of CJD and Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker syndrome [45]. The 2 types of PrPSc-positive plaques--unicentric and multicentric--have been described in L-type BSE [5, 19, 46]. Our results indicate that the presence of PrPSc plaques in the forebrain but not in the brainstem is one of the neuropathological features in cattle affected with atypical BSE. In addition, glial-type PrPSc deposition in the white matter throughout the brain seems to be a characteristic feature of H-type BSE in cattle, as supported by identical findings in German and Swedish H-type BSE field cases [10, 13].

Extracellular PrPSc was immunolabeled with N-terminal-, core-, and C-terminal-specific antibodies, but intracellular PrPSc did not show immunoreactivity to the N-terminal-specific anti-PrP antibodies [47, 48]. Intracellular PrPSc has markedly diminished immunoreactivity to N-terminal-specific anti-PrP antibodies [47]. However, N-terminal-specific mAb P4, which recognizes an epitope at bovine PrP residues 101-107, showed intraneuronal PrPSc immunolabeling in sheep affected with C-type BSE [47] and in Zebu affected with H-type BSE [38]. These results indicate that the epitope region for either mAb P4 or core-specific anti-PrP antibodies is located upstream of an intracellular truncation site [38, 48]. The differences in intracellular PrPSc truncation sites between sheep scrapie and ovine BSE [47] as well as between C-type BSE and H-type BSE [38] most probably depend on the strain and the tissues and cells [47]. The intensity and patterns of PrPSc immunolabeling varied with the different anti-PrP antibodies used, and the difference in the PrPSc immunohistochemical labeling results might be related to the application of different technical protocols, especially antigen retrieval methods [49–51].

The western blot profiles of PrPres for the H-type BSE-challenged cattle and the Canadian H-type BSE-infected brain homogenate used as inoculum were indistinguishable. Results of previous studies prove that H-type BSE isolates have distinct biological and biochemical properties compared with C-type and L-type BSE isolates [3, 52, 53]. The PrPres in H-type BSE, as detected by mAb SAF84 recognizing the C-terminus of PrP, was thought to be composed of 2 fragments with molecular masses of 19 kDa and 10-12 kDa, possessing a different cleavage site in the N-terminal region with PK digestion [53]. The higher molecular mass of the unglycosylated PrPres molecules, which included an additional 10-12 kDa fragment, in the Canadian H-type BSE case was maintained in the challenged animals. These unique molecular features of PrP in H-type BSE are also well preserved in transgenic and wild type mice [16, 53]. In addition, a distinct 10-12 kDa fragment detected with C-terminal-specific antibodies in H-type BSE might be associated with the presence of PrP plaques [53].

Although PrPC glycosylation seems to play a critical role in the maintenance of strain-dependent prion neurotropism [54, 55], a recent study has demonstrated that PrPSc glycosylation is not required for the maintenance of strain-specific neurotropisms [56]. Strain-dependent prion neurotropism is currently unknown, but several possibilities have been indicated [56]. Moreover, a local difference in the PrPSc replication rate may be attributed to a high degree of neurotropism in H-type BSE similar to that observed in C-type BSE [57].

Since 2003, sporadic and discontinuous occurrence of atypical BSE has been detected in Europe, North America, and Japan. Although, till date, the origin and frequency of atypical BSE is unknown, a high prevalence is found in older cattle over the age of eight years. This is the result of the active surveillance programs using rapid screening tests, with the exception of a Zebu case [38]. It has been reported that H-type BSE can be the result of a naturally occurring, heritable variant caused by glutamic acid/lysine polymorphism at codon 211 of the bovine PRNP gene (E211K) [11, 58]. However, our cases, although experimentally challenged via the intracranial route, and the original Canadian H-type BSE field case [11, 58] developed the disease without the novel mutation E211K within PRNP. Therefore, atypical BSE seemed to be sporadic rather than inherited with a higher risk in fallen stock than in healthy slaughtered cattle [8, 13, 25], suggesting that young adult cattle affected with atypical BSE might be dormant carriers. Further studies are required to determine the epidemiological significance and origin of atypical BSE.

The present study demonstrated successful intraspecies transmission of H-type BSE to cattle and the distribution and immunolabeling patterns of PrPSc in the brain of the H-type BSE-challenged cattle. TSE agent virulence can be minimally defined by oral transmission of different TSE agents (C-type, L-type, and H-type BSE agents) [59]. Oral transmission studies with H-type BSE-infected cattle have been initiated and are underway to provide information regarding the extent of similarity in the immunohistochemical and molecular features before and after transmission. In addition, the present data will support risk assessments in some peripheral tissues derived from cattle affected with H-type BSE.

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2.3.2. New evidence on the zoonotic potential of atypical BSE and atypical scrapie prion strains

PLEASE NOTE;

2.3.2. New evidence on the zoonotic potential of atypical BSE and atypical scrapie prion strainsNo

Olivier Andreoletti, INRA Research Director, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA) – École Nationale Vétérinaire de Toulouse (ENVT), invited speaker, presented the results of two recently published scientific articles of interest, of which he is co-author: ‘Radical Change in Zoonotic Abilities of Atypical BSE Prion Strains as Evidenced by Crossing of Sheep Species Barrier in Transgenic Mice’ (MarinMoreno et al., 2020) and ‘The emergence of classical BSE from atypical/Nor98 scrapie’ (Huor et al., 2019).

In the first experimental study, H-type and L-type BSE were inoculated into transgenic mice expressing all three genotypes of the human PRNP at codon 129 and into adapted into ARQ and VRQ transgenic sheep mice. The results showed the alterations of the capacities to cross the human barrier species (mouse model) and emergence of sporadic CJD agents in Hu PrP expressing mice: type 2 sCJD in homozygous TgVal129 VRQ-passaged L-BSE, and type 1 sCJD in homozygous TgVal 129 and TgMet129 VRQ-passaged H-BSE. 


>This information gives insight into the genesis of new prion strains. It also supports the hypothesis that TME can originate from feeding mink protein from cattle afflicted with L-BSE providing evidence to support regulatory decisions for non-food animal species.<

Research Project: Pathobiology, Genetics, and Detection of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies2020 Annual Report
Objectives
Objective 1: Investigate the mechanisms of protein misfolding in prion disease, including the genetic determinants of misfolding of the prion protein, environmental influences on abnormal prion conversion, and environmental influences on protein misfolding as it relates to prion diseases. Objective 2: Investigate the pathobiology of prion strains in natural hosts, including the influence of prion source genotype on interspecies transmission and the pathobiology of atypical transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) and the presence of CWD prion strains in natural hosts by processing field samples through a strain identification program. Subobjective 2.A: Investigate the pathobiology of atypical TSEs. Subobjective 2.B: Investigate the influence of prion source genotype on interspecies transmission. Objective 3: Investigate sampling methodologies for antemortem detection of prion disease, including the utility of blood sampling as a means to assess prion disease status of affected animals and the utility of environmental sampling for monitoring herd prion disease status. Subobjective 3.A: Investigate the utility of blood sampling as a means to assess prion disease status of affected animals. Subobjective 3.B: Investigate the utility of environmental sampling for monitoring herd prion disease status. Objective 4: Determine the association of disease susceptibility or resistance with naturally occurring prion protein genotypes not yet associated with positive cases on infected premises, including genotype associated differences in prion accumulation and excretion, and develop a logic-based decision tree for CWD strain determination. Objective 5: Develop improved live animal test for the detection of CWD-affected cervids, including a sensitive live animal test to detect CWD prions in individual animals, a sensitive live animal screening test for the purpose of determining a herd’s CWD status, and a sensitive deployable CWD test for use by State diagnostic labs.
Approach
The studies will focus on three animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) agents found in the United States: bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE); scrapie of sheep and goats; and chronic wasting disease (CWD) of deer, elk, and moose. The research will address sites of protein folding and misfolding as it relates to prion disease, accumulation of misfolded protein in the host, routes of infection, and ante mortem diagnostics with an emphasis on controlled conditions and natural routes of infection. Techniques used will include spectroscopic monitoring of protein folding/misfolding, clinical exams, histopathology, immunohistochemistry, and biochemical analysis of proteins. The enhanced knowledge gained from this work will help understand the underlying mechanisms of prion disease and mitigate the potential for unrecognized epidemic expansions of these diseases in populations of animals that could either directly or indirectly affect food animals.
Progress Report
Five of the seven project plan milestones for FY20 were fully met with the remaining two substantially met. Research efforts directed toward meeting Objective 1 of our project plan originally centered around the production of recombinant prion protein from either bacteria or mammalian tissue culture systems and collection of data on the folding and misfolding of the recombinant prion protein produced. The amount of expressed protein from mammalian expression systems was inherently too low to fully accomplish all aspects of the proposed work. Due to this we have altered our research plan but are still able to accomplish the end goal of understanding the influence of metal ions on prion disease using a mutagenesis based approach altering the metal ion binding sites. Due to the long-term nature of Objective 2, the progress status of the objective has not changed. All studies have been initiated and animals are under observation for the development of clinical signs. The animal studies for this objective are long term and will continue until onset of clinical signs. In vitro studies planned in parallel to the animal's studies have similarly been initiated and are ongoing. Objective 3 of the project plan focuses on the detection of disease associated prion protein in body fluids and feces collected from a time course study of chronic wasting disease inoculated animals. At this time sample collection is complete and preliminary methods have been established. Optimization of those methods is nearing completion and the feasibility of using pooled samples to assess overall herd status is being investigated. Objectives 4 and 5 were recently added to the project and work on both is in the preliminary stages.
Accomplishments
1. Differing genetic backgrounds of prion disease sources do not affect likelihood of disease progression. Prion diseases are fatal neurodegenerative diseases that affect a wide range of livestock and wildlife. The disease process occurs through the misfolding of a normally occurring protein. A recently developed approach for the detection of this misfolded protein uses a technique referred to as Real-time quaking induced conversion (RT-QulC). RT-QulC amplifies the amount of misfolded protein for detection and has been used to differentiate prion diseases through differences in the rate of misfolding. ARS scientists in Ames, Iowa, completed a study comparing the relative rates of misfolding in RT-QulC from different sources of chronic wasting disease using both human and bank vole prion protein as the substrate for amplification. Regardless of the chronic wasting disease source and genotype, the bank vole substrate was equivalently sensitive indicating the utility of this substrate for the detection of CWD regardless of host or genotype. Similarly, with human prion protein substrate no differences were found indicating that at the level of conversion of the human prion protein to the fibril form conformation all tested CWD isolates are equivalent. From a diagnostic perspective this further justifies the use of bank vole prion protein as a universal substrate and indicates that regardless of genotype of the CWD source the risk to humans is likely the same. Both results provide important information for knowledge based regulatory decisions by state and federal agencies.
2. Developed an improved enrichment method for amplification-based prion detection. Prion diseases are fatal neurodegenerative diseases that affect a wide range of livestock and wildlife. The disease process occurs through the misfolding of a normally occurring protein. Detection of this misfolded protein is the only known means by which a prion disease can be diagnosed. A recently developed approach for the detection of this misfolded protein uses a technique referred to as Real-time quaking induced conversion (RT-QulC). RT-QulC amplifies the amount of misfolded protein available for detection but can be inhibited by naturally occurring contaminants in the tissue samples used for the technique. ARS scientists in Ames, Iowa, developed a method to clean the samples prior to analysis and demonstrated the sample cleanup technique enhanced the detection and reduced the time required to assess the results providing additional tools for diagnostic laboratories.
3. Improved understanding of cross-species transmission of the prion disease transmissible mink encephalopathy. This work specifically evaluated susceptibility of sheep to bovine adapted transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) and evaluated pathobiology of disease. Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), or prion diseases, are fatal brain diseases that affect livestock species. Prion diseases have been shown to jump species as exhibited when classical bovine spongiform encephalitis (BSE) infected cattle products were consumed by humans resulting in variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Another example of cross-species transmission results in a disease of farmed mink known as TME. The present study was designed to determine the effect of cross-species transmission of TSEs in livestock on the ability to infect mice expressing the cattle prion protein. ARS scientists in Ames, Iowa, found that passing cattle adapted TME prions from cattle to sheep changed the ability of the prions to infect mice. These results were compared to atypical BSE (L-BSE type) and Classical BSE (C-BSE type). Depending on the genotype of sheep used, the disease in mice appeared similar to either L-BSE or C-BSE. These results indicate a shift in the disease outcome based on transmission through sheep with different genotypes. This information gives insight into the genesis of new prion strains. It also supports the hypothesis that TME can originate from feeding mink protein from cattle afflicted with L-BSE providing evidence to support regulatory decisions for non-food animal species.
4. Discovery of a novel strain of chronic wasting disease is present in experimentally inoculated LL132 elk. Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a fatal disease of deer and elk that causes damaging changes in the brain. The infectious agent is an abnormal protein called a prion that has misfolded from its normal state. Whether or not an elk will get CWD is affected by their genetics. This study evaluated transmission of abnormal prion protein from elk of 3 different genotypes that were infected with CWD to transgenic mice expressing the elk prion protein. Previous work by ARS scientists in Ames, Iowa, demonstrated that there are differences in incubation periods, patterns of abnormal prion accumulation in the brain, and fibril stability features in these different genotypes of elk. This study demonstrates that elk donor genotype-associated differences in relative incubation periods, fibril stability, and lesions in the brain were maintained across first and second passages to mice suggesting that they are different CWD strains that may require different approaches for prevention and eradication. This information is useful to wildlife managers and captive wildlife owners that are selectively breeding animals and could impact future regulations for the control of CWD in the U.S.
5. Development of in vitro modelling system for chronic wasting disease. Prion diseases are invariably fatal neurologic diseases for which there is no known prevention or cure. Because of long incubation times and knowledge gaps in how the disease progresses, there is not a well-defined model for testing potential cures or preventative measures. ARS scientists in Ames, Iowa, developed an ultrasensitive in vitro modeling system for chronic wasting disease (CWD) infectivity of samples from deer or elk. In the first step, prion agents are cultured on a brain slice derived from a prion-susceptible mouse. In the second step, an in vitro prion amplification technique (Real-Time Quaking Induced Conversion or RT-QuIC) is used to test for infectivity of the slices. This work demonstrated that the slice cultures are able to accumulate CWD prions that could be detected by RT-QuIC and more traditional laboratory methods, such as mouse bioassay and immunohistochemistry. In addition, three compounds with potential anti-prion properties were screened using slice culture and RT-QuIC indicating that this model may be useful in developing potential treatment schemes for prion disease. Because mechanisms of neurodegeneration in prion disease are similar to other protein misfolding diseases such as Alzheimer’s disease and Parkinson’s disease, use of this model could have a major impact on improving treatments for other neurodegenerative diseases.
Review Publications
we now know that cwd and scrapie, both tse prion disease, transmit to pigs by oral routes, so then we feed pigs back to other livestock animals. wonder where the new camel Prion disease outbreak came from?...terry

Open Access

Published: 31 August 2021

Classical BSE prions emerge from asymptomatic pigs challenged with atypical/Nor98 scrapie

Belén Marín, Alicia Otero, Séverine Lugan, Juan Carlos Espinosa, Alba Marín-Moreno, Enric Vidal, Carlos Hedman, Antonio Romero, Martí Pumarola, Juan J. Badiola, Juan María Torres, Olivier Andréoletti & Rosa Bolea 

Scientific Reports volume 11, Article number: 17428 (2021) Cite this article

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Abstract

Pigs are susceptible to infection with the classical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (C-BSE) agent following experimental inoculation, and PrPSc accumulation was detected in porcine tissues after the inoculation of certain scrapie and chronic wasting disease isolates. However, a robust transmission barrier has been described in this species and, although they were exposed to C-BSE agent in many European countries, no cases of natural transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) infections have been reported in pigs. Transmission of atypical scrapie to bovinized mice resulted in the emergence of C-BSE prions. Here, we conducted a study to determine if pigs are susceptible to atypical scrapie. To this end, 12, 8–9-month-old minipigs were intracerebrally inoculated with two atypical scrapie sources. Animals were euthanized between 22- and 72-months post inoculation without clinical signs of TSE. All pigs tested negative for PrPSc accumulation by enzyme immunoassay, immunohistochemistry, western blotting and bioassay in porcine PrP mice. Surprisingly, in vitro protein misfolding cyclic amplification demonstrated the presence of C-BSE prions in different brain areas from seven pigs inoculated with both atypical scrapie isolates. Our results suggest that pigs exposed to atypical scrapie prions could become a reservoir for C-BSE and corroborate that C-BSE prions emerge during interspecies passage of atypical scrapie.

snip...

In conclusion, our findings suggest that, although pigs present a strong transmission barrier against the propagation of atypical scrapie, they can propagate low levels of C-BSE prions. The prevalence of atypical scrapie and the presence of infectivity in tissues from atypical scrapie infected sheep are underestimated24,25. Given that pigs have demonstrated being susceptible to other prion diseases, and to propagate prions without showing signs of disease, the measures implemented to ban the inclusion of ruminant proteins in livestock feed must not be interrupted.


Research Project: Pathobiology, Genetics, and Detection of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Location: Virus and Prion Research

Title: Experimental transmission of the chronic wasting disease agent to swine after oral or intracranial inoculation

Author item MOORE, SARAH - Orise Fellow item WEST GREENLEE, M - Iowa State University item KONDRU, NAVEEN - Iowa State University item MANNE, SIREESHA - Iowa State University item Smith, Jodi item Kunkle, Robert item KANTHASAMY, ANUMANTHA - Iowa State University item Greenlee, Justin Submitted to: Journal of Virology Publication Type: Peer Reviewed Journal Publication Acceptance Date: 7/6/2017 Publication Date: 9/12/2017

Citation: Moore, S.J., West Greenlee, M.H., Kondru, N., Manne, S., Smith, J.D., Kunkle, R.A., Kanthasamy, A., Greenlee, J.J. 2017. Experimental transmission of the chronic wasting disease agent to swine after oral or intracranial inoculation. Journal of Virology. 91(19):e00926-17. https://doi.org/10.1128/JVI.00926-17.

Interpretive Summary: Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a fatal disease of wild and captive deer and elk that causes damaging changes in the brain. The infectious agent is an abnormal protein called a prion that has misfolded from its normal state. Whether CWD can transmit to swine is unknown. This study evaluated the potential of pigs to develop CWD after either intracranial or oral inoculation. Our data indicates that swine do accumulate the abnormal prion protein associated with CWD after intracranial or oral inoculation. Further, there was evidence of abnormal prion protein accumulation in lymph nodes. Currently, swine rations in the U.S. could contain animal derived components including materials from deer or elk. In addition, feral swine could be exposed to infected carcasses in areas where CWD is present in wildlife populations. This information is useful to wildlife managers and individuals in the swine and captive cervid industries. These findings could impact future regulations for the disposal of offal from deer and elk slaughtered in commercial operations. U.S. regulators should carefully consider the new information from this study before relaxing feed ban standards designed to control potentially feed borne prion diseases.

Technical Abstract: Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a naturally occurring, fatal neurodegenerative disease of cervids. The potential for swine to serve as a host for the agent of chronic wasting disease is unknown. The purpose of this study was to investigate the susceptibility of swine to the CWD agent following oral or intracranial experimental inoculation. Crossbred piglets were assigned to one of three groups: intracranially inoculated (n=20), orally inoculated (n=19), or non-inoculated (n=9). At approximately the age at which commercial pigs reach market weight, half of the pigs in each group were culled ('market weight' groups). The remaining pigs ('aged' groups) were allowed to incubate for up to 73 months post inoculation (MPI). Tissues collected at necropsy were examined for disease-associated prion protein (PrPSc) by western blotting (WB), antigen-capture immunoassay (EIA), immunohistochemistry (IHC) and in vitro real-time quaking induced conversion (RT-QuIC). Brain samples from selected pigs were also bioassayed in mice expressing porcine prion protein. Four intracranially inoculated aged pigs and one orally inoculated aged pig were positive by EIA, IHC and/or WB. Using RT-QuIC, PrPSc was detected in lymphoid and/or brain tissue from pigs in all inoculated groups. Bioassay was positive in 4 out of 5 pigs assayed. This study demonstrates that pigs can serve as hosts for CWD, though with scant PrPSc accumulation requiring sensitive detection methods. Detection of infectivity in orally inoculated pigs using mouse bioassay raises the possibility that naturally exposed pigs could act as a reservoir of CWD infectivity.


12 September 2017

Experimental Transmission of the Chronic Wasting Disease Agent to Swine after Oral or Intracranial Inoculation

Authors: S. Jo Moore, M. Heather West Greenlee, Naveen Kondru, Sireesha Manne, Jodi D. Smith, Robert A. Kunkle, Anumantha Kanthasamy, and Justin J. Greenlee 


AUTHORS INFO & AFFILIATIONS


Volume 91, Number 19

1 October 2017

ABSTRACT

Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a naturally occurring, fatal neurodegenerative disease of cervids. The potential for swine to serve as hosts for the agent of CWD is unknown. The purpose of this study was to investigate the susceptibility of swine to the CWD agent following experimental oral or intracranial inoculation. Crossbred piglets were assigned to three groups, intracranially inoculated (n = 20), orally inoculated (n = 19), and noninoculated (n = 9). At approximately the age at which commercial pigs reach market weight, half of the pigs in each group were culled (“market weight” groups). The remaining pigs (“aged” groups) were allowed to incubate for up to 73 months post inoculation (mpi). Tissues collected at necropsy were examined for disease-associated prion protein (PrPSc) by Western blotting (WB), antigen capture enzyme immunoassay (EIA), immunohistochemistry (IHC), and in vitro real-time quaking-induced conversion (RT-QuIC). Brain samples from selected pigs were also bioassayed in mice expressing porcine prion protein. Four intracranially inoculated aged pigs and one orally inoculated aged pig were positive by EIA, IHC, and/or WB. By RT-QuIC, PrPSc was detected in lymphoid and/or brain tissue from one or more pigs in each inoculated group. The bioassay was positive in four out of five pigs assayed. This study demonstrates that pigs can support low-level amplification of CWD prions, although the species barrier to CWD infection is relatively high. However, detection of infectivity in orally inoculated pigs with a mouse bioassay raises the possibility that naturally exposed pigs could act as a reservoir of CWD infectivity. IMPORTANCE We challenged domestic swine with the chronic wasting disease agent by inoculation directly into the brain (intracranially) or by oral gavage (orally). Disease-associated prion protein (PrPSc) was detected in brain and lymphoid tissues from intracranially and orally inoculated pigs as early as 8 months of age (6 months post inoculation). Only one pig developed clinical neurologic signs suggestive of prion disease. The amount of PrPSc in the brains and lymphoid tissues of positive pigs was small, especially in orally inoculated pigs. Regardless, positive results obtained with orally inoculated pigs suggest that it may be possible for swine to serve as a reservoir for prion disease under natural conditions.


Research Project: TRANSMISSION, DIFFERENTIATION, AND PATHOBIOLOGY OF TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES Location: Virus and Prion Research

Title: Disease-associated prion protein detected in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged with the agent of chronic wasting disease 

Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease. Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains.



Research Project: Pathobiology, Genetics, and Detection of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Location: Virus and Prion Research

Title: The agent of chronic wasting disease from pigs is infectious in transgenic mice expressing human PRNP 

Author item MOORE, S - Orise Fellow item Kokemuller, Robyn item WEST-GREENLEE, M - Iowa State University item BALKEMA-BUSCHMANN, ANNE - Friedrich-Loeffler-institut item GROSCHUP, MARTIN - Friedrich-Loeffler-institut item Greenlee, Justin Submitted to: Prion Publication Type: Abstract Only Publication Acceptance Date: 5/10/2018 Publication Date: 5/22/2018 Citation: Moore, S.J., Kokemuller, R.D., West-Greenlee, M.H., Balkema-Buschmann, A., Groschup, M.H., Greenlee, J.J. 2018. The agent of chronic wasting disease from pigs is infectious in transgenic mice expressing human PRNP. Prion 2018, Santiago de Compostela, Spain, May 22-25, 2018. Paper No. WA15, page 44.

Interpretive Summary:

 The successful transmission of pig-passaged CWD to Tg40 mice reported here suggests that passage of the CWD agent through pigs results in a change of the transmission characteristics which reduces the transmission barrier of Tg40 mice to the CWD agent. If this biological behavior is recapitulated in the original host species, passage of the CWD agent through pigs could potentially lead to increased pathogenicity of the CWD agent in humans.


cwd scrapie pigs oral routes 

***> However, at 51 months of incubation or greater, 5 animals were positive by one or more diagnostic methods. Furthermore, positive bioassay results were obtained from all inoculated groups (oral and intracranial; market weight and end of study) suggesting that swine are potential hosts for the agent of scrapie. <*** 

>*** Although the current U.S. feed ban is based on keeping tissues from TSE infected cattle from contaminating animal feed, swine rations in the U.S. could contain animal derived components including materials from scrapie infected sheep and goats. These results indicating the susceptibility of pigs to sheep scrapie, coupled with the limitations of the current feed ban, indicates that a revision of the feed ban may be necessary to protect swine production and potentially human health. <*** 

***> Results: PrPSc was not detected by EIA and IHC in any RPLNs. All tonsils and MLNs were negative by IHC, though the MLN from one pig in the oral <6 month group was positive by EIA. PrPSc was detected by QuIC in at least one of the lymphoid tissues examined in 5/6 pigs in the intracranial <6 months group, 6/7 intracranial >6 months group, 5/6 pigs in the oral <6 months group, and 4/6 oral >6 months group. Overall, the MLN was positive in 14/19 (74%) of samples examined, the RPLN in 8/18 (44%), and the tonsil in 10/25 (40%). 

***> Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease. Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains. 




Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease. Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains.


CONFIDENTIAL

EXPERIMENTAL PORCINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY

LINE TO TAKE

3. If questions on pharmaceuticals are raised at the Press conference, the suggested line to take is as follows:- 

 "There are no medicinal products licensed for use on the market which make use of UK-derived porcine tissues with which any hypothetical “high risk" ‘might be associated. The results of the recent experimental work at the CSM will be carefully examined by the CSM‘s Working Group on spongiform encephalopathy at its next meeting.

DO Hagger RM 1533 MT Ext 3201


While this clearly is a cause for concern we should not jump to the conclusion that this means that pigs will necessarily be infected by bone and meat meal fed by the oral route as is the case with cattle. ...


we cannot rule out the possibility that unrecognised subclinical spongiform encephalopathy could be present in British pigs though there is no evidence for this: only with parenteral/implantable pharmaceuticals/devices is the theoretical risk to humans of sufficient concern to consider any action.


May I, at the outset, reiterate that we should avoid dissemination of papers relating to this experimental finding to prevent premature release of the information. ...


3. It is particularly important that this information is not passed outside the Department, until Ministers have decided how they wish it to be handled. ...


But it would be easier for us if pharmaceuticals/devices are not directly mentioned at all. ...


Our records show that while some use is made of porcine materials in medicinal products, the only products which would appear to be in a hypothetically ''higher risk'' area are the adrenocorticotrophic hormone for which the source material comes from outside the United Kingdom, namely America China Sweden France and Germany. The products are manufactured by Ferring and Armour. A further product, ''Zenoderm Corium implant'' manufactured by Ethicon, makes use of porcine skin - which is not considered to be a ''high risk'' tissue, but one of its uses is described in the data sheet as ''in dural replacement''. This product is sourced from the United Kingdom.....

***Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.***

Even if the prevailing view is that sporadic CJD is due to the spontaneous formation of CJD prions, it remains possible that its apparent sporadic nature may, at least in part, result from our limited capacity to identify an environmental origin.

https://www.nature.com/articles/srep11573 

O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations 
Emmanuel Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Valerie Durand, Sophie Luccantoni, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra, Capucine Dehen, and Jean-Philippe Deslys Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France 

Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD summing 80% of human prion cases). 

Non-human primate models provided the first evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid origins even after very long silent incubation periods. 

*** We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period, 

***with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold long incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014), 

***is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE), 

***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases. 

We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health. 

=============== 

***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases*** 

=============== 

***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals. 

============== 

https://prion2015.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/prion2015abstracts.pdf 

***Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice. 

***Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion. 

***These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions. 

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19336896.2016.1163048?journalCode=kprn20 

PRION 2016 TOKYO

Saturday, April 23, 2016

SCRAPIE WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential 2016

Prion. 10:S15-S21. 2016 ISSN: 1933-6896 printl 1933-690X online

Taylor & Francis

Prion 2016 Animal Prion Disease Workshop Abstracts

WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential

Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion. 

These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions. 

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19336896.2016.1163048?journalCode=kprn20

Title: Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period) 

*** In complement to the recent demonstration that humanized mice are susceptible to scrapie, we report here the first observation of direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to a macaque after a 10-year incubation period. Neuropathologic examination revealed all of the features of a prion disease: spongiform change, neuronal loss, and accumulation of PrPres throughout the CNS. 

*** This observation strengthens the questioning of the harmlessness of scrapie to humans, at a time when protective measures for human and animal health are being dismantled and reduced as c-BSE is considered controlled and being eradicated. 

*** Our results underscore the importance of precautionary and protective measures and the necessity for long-term experimental transmission studies to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains. 

http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publications.htm?SEQ_NO_115=313160

234. The European Union Summary Report On Surveillance For The Presence Of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSE): The Situation In 2017

Angel Ortiz Pelaeza, Valentina Rizzia, Giuseppe Rub, Francesco Ingravalleb and Yves Van der Stedea

aUnit on Biological Hazards and Contaminants, Department of Risk Assessment & Scientific Assistance, European Food Safety Authority (EFSA); bBiostatistics, Epidemiology and Risk Analysis (BEAR) Unit. Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale di Piemonte, Liguria e Valle d ’Aosta, Torino (Italia)

CONTACT Angel Ortiz Pelaez angel.ortizpelaez@efsa.europa.eu

ABSTRACT

The European Food Safety Authority publishes a yearly summary of the surveillance activities on transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) in bovine animals, sheep, goats, cervids, and other species, in the European Union (EU), and in Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. Target groups include: animals clinically suspected of being infected by TSE; animals culled under TSE eradication measures; animals with clinical signs at ante-mortem; emergency slaughtered; fallen stock/not slaughtered for human consumption and healthy slaughtered animals for human consumption, for cervids also hunted and road or predator-injured or killed.

For the first time since bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) had been reported, no cases of classical BSE were reported world-wide in 2017 [1]. Six atypical BSE cases were reported by Spain (1 H /2 L), France (1 H/1 L) and Ireland (1 L), out of the 1,312,714 cattle tested by 28 EU Member States (MS) and 18,526 tested by three non-MS.

In total 431,815 small ruminants were tested in 2017 in the EU. Compared with 2016, there was a 36.2% increase in the number of cases of classical scrapie (CS) in sheep (933), mostly reported by Greece, Spain, Italy and Romania, although over 75% of the cases were sourced in infected flocks. Atypical scrapie (AS) was confirmed in 94 animals. In goats, a decrease of 10% in the number of cases of classical scrapie (567) were reported, 84% in Cyprus. Atypical scrapie was confirmed in nine animals.

Ten-year trend analysis showed a statistically significant decrease in the sheep proportion of CS cases per 10,000 tested animals and an increase in goats. For AS, 10-year data did not detect any statistically significant trend in both species.

After the discovery of chronic wasting disease (CWD) in Norway in 2016, TSE testing in cervids increased in the EU: 10 MS tested 3,585 cervids (75% in Romania, 98.5% from wildlife), all negative. Norway tested 25,736 deer in 2017, leading to the detection of the first case of CWD in a red deer, nine cases in wild reindeer and one in a wild moose. Following EFSA recommendations, the European Commission introduced a 3-year mandatory surveillance programme for six member states starting on 1 January 2018.

By the time of submitting this abstract, CS/AS cases were not yet available, but one new classical BSE case was confirmed in Scotland (2018), one L-type BSE case in Poland (2019) and one case of CWD in a wild moose in Finland in March 2018.

KEYWORDS: BSE; scrapie; CWD; EU; surveillance

=====

134. The transmissible spongiform encephalopathies surveillance in small ruminants in Romania for a period of 10 years Florica Bărbuceanua, Ioana Neghirlab, Theodora Chesnoiub, Cristina Diaconua, Stefania-Felicia Barbuceanuc and G. Predoid

aInstitute for Diagnosis and Animal Health Bucharest, București, Romania; bNational Sanitary Veterinary and Food Safety Authority, București, Romania; cFaculty of Pharmacy, Carol Davila University of Medicine and Pharmacy, București, Romania; dFaculty of Veterinary Medicine Bucharest, București, Romania

CONTACT Florica Bărbuceanu barbuceanu.florica@idah.ro

ABSTRACT

The scarpie belongs to the TSE group and is a fatal degenerative disease, affecting the central nervous system of ovine and caprine. There are two types of scrapie: classical and atypical. The classical scrapie affects the animals aged from 2 to 5 years and is very contageous, while the atypical scrapie affects the animals older than 5 years and is considered to have a low degree of infectivity. The aim of this study is to present information on the Romanian TSE Surveillance Program, performed in compliance with the EU Commission and OIE requirements, as well as the TSE test results in small ruminants (animals of the category clinical suspicions, dead animals and animals slaughtered normally) performed in the national net for transmissible spongiform encephalopathies, between 2007 and 2017. Between 2007 and 2017 were tested in Romania approximatively 339,643 small ruminants. All the 787 cases of scrapie were confirmed by the TSE NRL (National Reference Laboratory) by immunoblotting and immunohistochemical tests, with the performance of the discriminatory and genotyping testing. All animals diagnosed with scrapie were affected by the classical form. For all suspicion cases, a differential diagnosis was performed against rabies, Aujeszky disease and listeriosis.

KEYWORDS: Classical scrapie; Romanian TSE surveillance program; NRL-TSE

=====

SOURCE REFERENCE PRION CONFERENCE 2019


1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8

Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to nonhuman primates.

Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC.

Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of known infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey exposed to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months, respectively. Careful physical examination of the buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed to reveal signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru has remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under observation.

snip...

The successful transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie by natural feeding to squirrel monkeys that we have reported provides further grounds for concern that scrapie-infected meat may occasionally give rise in humans to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.

PMID: 6997404


Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether scrapie is transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the disease has been transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid speculation (Gajdusek 1977) conjectures that the agents of scrapie, kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and transmissible encephalopathy of mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S. Department of Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed for human or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)" The problem is emphasised by the finding that some strains of scrapie produce lesions identical to the once which characterise the human dementias"

Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety of laboratory personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action such as the "scorched meat" policy of USDA makes the solution of the scrapie problem urgent if the sheep industry is not to suffer grievously.

snip...

76/10.12/4.6


Nature. 1972 Mar 10;236(5341):73-4.

Transmission of scrapie to the cynomolgus monkey (Macaca fascicularis).

Gibbs CJ Jr, Gajdusek DC.

Nature 236, 73 - 74 (10 March 1972); doi:10.1038/236073a0

Transmission of Scrapie to the Cynomolgus Monkey (Macaca fascicularis)

C. J. GIBBS jun. & D. C. GAJDUSEK

National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland

SCRAPIE has been transmitted to the cynomolgus, or crab-eating, monkey (Macaca fascicularis) with an incubation period of more than 5 yr from the time of intracerebral inoculation of scrapie-infected mouse brain. The animal developed a chronic central nervous system degeneration, with ataxia, tremor and myoclonus with associated severe scrapie-like pathology of intensive astroglial hypertrophy and proliferation, neuronal vacuolation and status spongiosus of grey matter. The strain of scrapie virus used was the eighth passage in Swiss mice (NIH) of a Compton strain of scrapie obtained as ninth intracerebral passage of the agent in goat brain, from Dr R. L. Chandler (ARC, Compton, Berkshire).



Wednesday, February 16, 2011

IN CONFIDENCE

SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION TO CHIMPANZEES

IN CONFIDENCE

reference...

RB3.20

TRANSMISSION TO CHIMPANZEES

1. Kuru and CJD have been successfully transmitted to chimpanzees but scrapie and TME have not.

2. We cannot say that scrapie will not transmit to chimpanzees. There are several scrapie strains and I am not aware that all have been tried (that would have to be from mouse passaged material). Nor has a wide enough range of field isolates subsequently strain typed in mice been inoculated by the appropriate routes (i/c, ilp and i/v) :

3. I believe the proposed experiment to determine transmissibility, if conducted, would only show the susceptibility or resistance of the chimpanzee to infection/disease by the routes used and the result could not be interpreted for the predictability of the susceptibility for man. Proposals for prolonged oral exposure of chimpanzees to milk from cattle were suggested a long while ago and rejected.

4. In view of Dr Gibbs' probable use of chimpazees Mr Wells' comments (enclosed) are pertinent. I have yet to receive a direct communication from Dr Schellekers but before any collaboration or provision of material we should identify the Gibbs' proposals and objectives.

5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severely would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough. Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might be best to retain that hypothesis.

6. A negative result would take a lifetime to determine but that would be a shorter period than might be available for human exposure and it would still not answer the question regarding mans' susceptibility. In the meantime no doubt the negativity would be used defensively. It would however be counterproductive if the experiment finally became positive. We may learn more about public reactions following next Monday' s meeting.

R. Bradley

23 September 1990

CVO (+Mr Wells' comments)

Dr T W A Little

Dr B J Shreeve

90/9.23/1.1.


IN CONFIDENCE CHIMPANZEES

CODE 18-77 Reference RB3.46

Some further information that may assist in decision making has been gained by discussion with Dr Rosalind Ridley.

She says that careful study of Gajdusek's work shows no increased susceptibility of chimpanzees over New World Monkeys such as Squirrel Monkeys. She does not think it would tell you anything about the susceptibility to man. Also Gajdusek did not, she believes, challenge chimpanzees with scrapie as severely as we did pigs and we know little of that source of scrapie. Comparisons would be difficult. She also would not expect the Home Office to sanction such experiments here unless there was a very clear and important objective that would be important for human health protection. She doubted such a case could be made. If this is the case she thought it would be unethical to do an experiment abroad because we could not do it in our own country.

Retrospectively she feels they should have put up more marmosets than they did. They all remain healthy. They would normally regard the transmission as negative if no disease resulted in five years.

We are not being asked for a decision but I think that before we made one we should gain as much knowledge as we can. If we decided to proceed we would have to bear any criticisms for many years if there was an adverse view by scientists or­media. This should not be undertaken lightly. There is already some adverse comment here, I gather, on the pig experiment though that will subside.

The Gibbs' (as' distinct from Schellekers') study is somewhat different. We are merely supplying material for comparative studies in a laboratory with the greatest experience of human SEs in the world and it has been sanctioned by USDA (though we do not know for certain yet if chimpanzees specifically will be used). This would keep it at a lower profile than if we conducted such an experiment in the UK or Europe.

I consider we must have very powerful and defendable objectives to go beyond Gibbs' proposed experiments and should not initiate others just because an offer has been made.

Scientists have a responsibility to seek other methods of investigative research other than animal experimentation. At present no objective has convinced me we need to do research using Chimpanzees - a species in need of protection. Resisting such proposals would enable us to communicate that information to the scientist and the public should the need arise. A line would have been drawn.

CVO cc Dr T Dr B W A Little Dr B J Shreeve

R Bradley

26 September 1990

90/9.26/3.2


this is tse prion political theater here, i.e. what i call TSE PRION POKER...tss



3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to accord it a very low profile indeed. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical incident to be avoided in the US at all costs.

snip...

PAGE 26

Transmission Studies

Mule deer transmissions of CWD were by intracerebral inoculation and compared with natural cases {the following was written but with a single line marked through it ''first passage (by this route)}....TSS

resulted in a more rapidly progressive clinical disease with repeated episodes of synocopy ending in coma. One control animal became affected, it is believed through contamination of inoculum (?saline). Further CWD transmissions were carried out by Dick Marsh into ferret, mink and squirrel monkey. Transmission occurred in ALL of these species with the shortest incubation period in the ferret.

The occurrence of CWD must be viewed against the contest of the locations in which it occurred. It was an incidental and unwelcome complication of the respective wildlife research programmes. Despite its subsequent recognition as a new disease of cervids, therefore justifying direct investigation, no specific research funding was forthcoming. The USDA veiwed it as a wildlife problem and consequently not their province! ...page 26. 

snip...see;

IN CONFIDENCE

PERCEPTIONS OF UNCONVENTIONAL SLOW VIRUS DISEASE OF ANIMALS IN THE USA

GAH WELLS

REPORT OF A VISIT TO THE USA

APRIL-MAY 1989


Evidence That Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy Results from Feeding Infected Cattle Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME. 

snip... 

The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle... 




Pathologist: Carol Richardson

85/9.19/1.1





---------------extract 1. of the DFAL "Early days"----------------



31

Appendix I VISIT TO USA - OR A E WRATHALL — INFO ON BSE AND SCRAPIE

Dr Clark lately of the scrapie Research Unit, Mission Texas has

successfully transmitted ovine and caprine scrapie to cattle. The

experimental results have not been published but there are plans to do

this. This work was initiated in 1978. A summary of it is:-

Expt A 6 Her x Jer calves born in 1978 were inoculated as follows with

a 2nd Suffolk scrapie passage:-

i/c 1ml; i/m, 5ml; s/c 5ml; oral 30ml.

1/6 went down after 48 months with a scrapie/BSE-like disease.

Expt B 6 Her or Jer or HxJ calves were inoculated with angora Goat

virus 2/6 went down similarly after 36 months.

Expt C Mice inoculated from brains of calves/cattle in expts A & B were resistant, only 1/20 going down with scrapie and this was the reason given for not publishing.

Diagnosis in A, B, C was by histopath. No reports on SAF were given.

Dr Warren Foote indicated success so far in eliminating scrapie in offspring from experimentally— (and naturally) infected sheep by ET. He had found difficulty in obtaining embryos from naturally infected sheep (cf SPA).

Prof. A Robertson gave a brief accout of BSE. The us approach was to

32

accord it a very low profile indeed. Dr A Thiermann showed the picture in the "Independent" with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical incident to be avoided in the US at all costs.

BSE was not reported in USA.

4. Scrapie incidents (ie affected flocks) have shown a dramatic increase since 1978. In 1953 when the National Control scheme was started there were 10-14 incidents, in 1978 - 1 and in 1988 so far 60.

5. Scrapie agent was reported to have been isolated from a solitary fetus.

6. A western blotting diagnostic technique (? on PrP) shows some promise.

7. Results of a questionnaire sent to 33 states on the subject of the national sheep scrapie programme survey indicated

17/33 wished to drop it

6/33 wished to develop it

8/33 had few sheep and were neutral

Information obtained from Dr Wrathall‘s notes of a meeting of the u.s.

Animal Health Association at Little Rock, Arkansas Nov. 1988.

33

In Confidence - Perceptions of unconventional slow virus diseases of animals in the USA - APRIL-MAY 1989 - G A H Wells

3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to accord it a very low profile indeed. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical incident to be avoided in the US at all costs. ...


VISIT TO USA - DR AE WRATHALL - INFO ON BSE AND SCRAPIE

1. Dr. Clark lately of the Scrapie Research Unit, Mission Texas has successfully transmitted ovine & caprine Scrapie to cattle. The experimental results have not been published but there are plans to do this. This work was initiated in 1978. A summary of it is;

snip...see handwritten notes from this here;



IN CONFIDENCE

Perceptions of an unconventional slow virus diseases of animals in the U.S.A. G A H Wells

Report of a Visit to the USA April-May 1989

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20080102193705/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf

THURSDAY, JUNE 25, 2020 

First Report of the Potential Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)-Related Somatic Mutation E211K of the Prion Protein Gene (PRNP) in Cattle


Bovine spongiform encephalopathy: the effect of oral exposure dose on attack rate and incubation period in cattle

G. A. H. Wells,1 T. Konold,1 M. E. Arnold,1 A. R. Austin,1 3 S. A. C. Hawkins,1 M. Stack,1 M. M. Simmons,1 Y. H. Lee,2 D. Gavier-Wide´n,3 M. Dawson1 4 and J. W. Wilesmith1 1 Correspondence G. A. H. Wells


1 Veterinary Laboratories Agency, Woodham Lane, New Haw, Addlestone, Surrey KT15 3NB, UK

2 National Veterinary Research and Quarantine Service, Anyang, Republic of Korea

3 National Veterinary Institute (SVA), SE-75189 Uppsala, Sweden

Received 27 July 2006

Accepted 18 November 2006

The dose–response of cattle exposed to the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) agent is an important component of modelling exposure risks for animals and humans and thereby, the modulation of surveillance and control strategies for BSE. In two experiments calves were dosed orally with a range of amounts of a pool of brainstems from BSE-affected cattle. Infectivity in the pool was determined by end-point titration in mice. Recipient cattle were monitored for clinical disease and, from the incidence of pathologically confirmed cases and their incubation periods (IPs), the attack rate and IP distribution according to dose were estimated. The dose at which 50 % of cattle would be clinically affected was estimated at 0.20 g brain material used in the experiment, with 95 % confidence intervals of 0.04–1.00 g. The IP was highly variable across all dose groups and followed a log-normal distribution, with decreasing mean as dose increased. There was no evidence of a threshold dose at which the probability of infection became vanishingly small, with 1/15 (7 %) of animals affected at the lowest dose (1 mg).

snip...

DISCUSSION

The study has demonstrated that disease in cattle can be produced by oral exposure to as little as 1 mg brain homogenate (¡100.4 RIII mouse i.c./i.p. ID50 units) from clinically affected field cases of BSE and that the limiting dose for infection of calves is lower than this exposure...

snip...end



P04.27

Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route

Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasm�zas, C2; Pocchiari, M3; Ingrosso, L3; Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6; L�wer, J1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat � l�Energie Atomique, France; 3Instituto Superiore di Sanit�, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate Center, Germany

Background:

In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.

Aims:

The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose (MID50) for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to assess the risk for humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the disease to identify possible biomarkers.

Methods:

Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study, animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).

Results:

In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the onset of the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical course between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the detection of biomarkers.

Conclusions:

Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the incubation period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus 4 years). However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that develop simian vCJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.

The work referenced was performed in partial fulfilment of the study �BSE in primates� supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).



look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;

Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates

Corinne Ida Lasm�zas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog, Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Fr�d�ric Auvr�, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Sal�s, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe Deslys Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.

snip...

BSE bovine brain inoculum

100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0�1 mg 0�01 mg

Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)

Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%) 1/15 (7%)

RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)

PrPres biochemical detection

The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar PrPres concentration that was

inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of

bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic ip=intracerebral and int****ritoneal.

Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected orally with similar BSE brain inocula

Published online January 27, 2005


It is clear that the designing scientists must

also have shared Mr Bradley's surprise at the results because all the dose

levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.


6. It also appears to me that Mr Bradley's answer (that it would take less than say 100 grams) was probably given with the benefit of hindsight; particularly if one considers that later in the same answer Mr Bradley expresses his surprise that it could take as little of 1 gram of brain to cause BSE by the oral route within the same species. This information did not become available until the "attack rate" experiment had been completed in 1995/96. This was a titration experiment designed to ascertain the infective dose. A range of dosages was used to ensure that the actual result was within both a lower and an upper limit within the study and the designing scientists would not have expected all the dose levels to trigger infection. The dose ranges chosen by the most informed scientists at that time ranged from 1 gram to three times one hundred grams. It is clear that the designing scientists must have also shared Mr Bradley's surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.


RESEARCH ARTICLE

Very low oral exposure to prions of brain or saliva origin can transmit chronic wasting disease

Nathaniel D. Denkers1☯, Clare E. Hoover2☯, Kristen A. DavenportID3, Davin M. Henderson1, Erin E. McNultyID1, Amy V. Nalls1, Candace K. Mathiason1, Edward A. HooverID1*

1 Department of Microbiology, Immunology, and Pathology, Prion Research Center, College of Veterinary Medicine and Biomedical Sciences, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado, United States of America, 2 AstraZeneca Inc., Waltham, Massachusetts, United States of America, 3 Department of Biochemistry, School of Medicine, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, United States of America ☯ These authors contributed equally to this work. * Edward.hoover@colostate.edu

Abstract

The minimum infectious dose required to induce CWD infection in cervids remains unknown, as does whether peripherally shed prions and/or multiple low dose exposures are important factors in CWD transmission. With the goal of better understand CWD infection in nature, we studied oral exposures of deer to very low doses of CWD prions and also examined whether the frequency of exposure or prion source may influence infection and pathogene- sis. We orally inoculated white-tailed deer with either single or multiple divided doses of pri- ons of brain or saliva origin and monitored infection by serial longitudinal tissue biopsies spanning over two years. We report that oral exposure to as little as 300 nanograms (ng) of CWD-positive brain or to saliva containing seeding activity equivalent to 300 ng of CWD- positive brain, were sufficient to transmit CWD disease. This was true whether the inoculum was administered as a single bolus or divided as three weekly 100 ng exposures. However, when the 300 ng total dose was apportioned as 10, 30 ng doses delivered over 12 weeks, no infection occurred. While low-dose exposures to prions of brain or saliva origin prolonged the time from inoculation to first detection of infection, once infection was established, we observed no differences in disease pathogenesis. These studies suggest that the CWD min- imum infectious dose approximates 100 to 300 ng CWD-positive brain (or saliva equivalent), and that CWD infection appears to conform more with a threshold than a cumulative dose dynamic.

Snip...

Discussion

As CWD expands across North America and Scandinavia, how this disease is transmitted so efficiently remains unclear, given the low concentrations of prions shed in secretions and excretions [13, 14]. The present studies demonstrated that a single oral exposure to as little as 300nmg of CWD-positive brain or equivalent saliva can initiate infection in 100% of exposed white-tailed deer. However, distributing this dose as 10, 30 ng exposures failed to induce infec- tion. Overall, these results suggest that the minimum oral infectious exposure approaches 100 to 300 ng of CWD-positive brain equivalent. These dynamics also invite speculation as to whether potential infection co-factors, such as particle binding [46, 47] or compromises in mucosal integrity may influence infection susceptibility, as suggested from two studies in rodent models [48, 49].

Few studies in rodent models have explored oral infection with murine or hamster adapted scrapie by assessing the same total dose administered as a single bolus vs. the same bolus divided into fractional, sequential exposures [50–52]. The results reported by Diringer et al. [50] and Jacquemot et al. [52] have indicated that divided-dose exposures were as effective as a single bolus only if the interval between doses was short (1–2 days). In deer, we likewise found that when a total dose of 300 ng of brain was administered as 10 doses divided doses over 12 weeks this exposure failed to induce CWD infection, whereas three weekly 100 ng doses (300 ng total) induced infection. While this latter outcome may have involved an additive dynamic, we cannot exclude that a dose 100 ng alone also may have been sufficient to establish infection. Our conclusions here are unfortunately limited by the absence of a single 100 ng dose group. Additional experiments are needed to further directly compare single vs. divided exposures to strengthen the tenet that establishment of CWD infection is more a threshold than cumulative dose phenomenon.

We also sought to examine a relatively unexamined possibility that prions emanating from different tissues and/or cells may possess different capacities to establish infections by mucosal routes. Our results indicated that brain and saliva inocula containing similar levels of prion seeding activity, also had similar infectivity, which did not support our hypothesis that saliva prions may be more infectious by mucosal routes. There are of course, several caveats bearing on this conclusion. These could include: the inherent limits in using an in vitro seeding assay as a surrogate to equate in vivo infectivity, the likelihood that small differences in prion suscep- tibility among deer may be more significant at very low exposure doses, and the greater varia- tion of inoculum uptake and routing through mucosal surfaces associated with the oral route of exposure.

The chief correlate we observed between magnitude of infectious dose and disease course was in time from exposure to first detected amplification of prions in tonsil, an event which is closely followed by or concurrent with detection in pharyngeal lymph nodes [41]. Once a threshold dose was established, the subsequent pathogenesis of infection and disease appeared to vary little.

In addition to potential cofactors that could influence CWD infectivity, such as particle binding [47] and compromised mucosal integrity [48, 53], there is PRNP genotype, in which polymorphisms at codon 96 of the white-tailed deer are known to affect the temporal dynam- ics of CWD infections [23, 41, 45]. In the present studies, most cohorts of 96GG deer became CWD-positive before 96GS animals in the same exposure group [cohorts 1, 2, 4, 6]. Thus, the low dose studies are consistent with the current concept of delayed conversion rate in PRNP 96GS vs. 96GG white-tailed deer [44].

In conclusion, we have attempted to model and better understand CWD infection relative to natural exposure. The results demonstrate: (a) that the minimum CWD oral infectious dose is vastly lower than historical studies used to establish infection; (b) that a direct relationship exists between dose and incubation time to first prion replication detection in tonsils, irrespec- tive of genotype; (c) that a difference was not discernible between brain vs. saliva source prions in ability to establish infection or in resultant disease course; and (d) that the CWD infection process appears to conform more to a threshold dose than an accumulative dose dynamic.


America BSE 589.2001 FEED REGULATIONS, BSE SURVEILLANCE, BSE TESTING, and CJD TSE Prion

so far, we have been lucky. to date, with the science at hand, no cwd transmitted to cattle, that has been documented, TO DATE, WITH THE SCIENCE AT HAND, it's not to say it has not already happened, just like with zoonosis of cwd i.e. molecular transmission studies have shown that cwd transmission to humans would look like sporadic cjd, NOT nvCJD or what they call now vCJD. the other thing is virulence and or horizontal transmission. this is very concerning with the recent fact of what seems to be a large outbreak of a new tse prion disease in camels in Africa. there is much concern now with hay, straw, grains, and such, with the cwd tse prion endemic countries USA, Canada. what is of greatest concern is the different strains of cwd, and the virulence there from? this thing (cwd) keeps mutating to different strains, and to different species, the bigger the chance of one of these strains that WILL TRANSMIT TO CATTLE OR HUMANS, and that it is documented (i believe both has already occured imo with scienct to date). with that said, a few things to ponder, and i am still very concerned with, the animal feed. we now know from transmission studies that cwd and scrapie will transmit to pigs by oral routes. the atypical bse strains will transmit by oral routes. i don't mean to keep kicking a mad cow, just look at the science; 

***> cattle, pigs, sheep, cwd, tse, prion, oh my! 

***> In contrast, cattle are highly susceptible to white-tailed deer CWD and mule deer CWD in experimental conditions but no natural CWD infections in cattle have been reported (Sigurdson, 2008; Hamir et al., 2006). 

Sheep and cattle may be exposed to CWD via common grazing areas with affected deer but so far, appear to be poorly susceptible to mule deer CWD (Sigurdson, 2008). In contrast, cattle are highly susceptible to white-tailed deer CWD and mule deer CWD in experimental conditions but no natural CWD infections in cattle have been reported (Sigurdson, 2008; Hamir et al., 2006). It is not known how susceptible humans are to CWD but given that the prion can be present in muscle, it is likely that humans have been exposed to the agent via consumption of venison (Sigurdson, 2008). Initial experimental research suggests that human susceptibility to CWD is low and there may be a robust species barrier for CWD transmission to humans (Sigurdson, 2008), however the risk appetite for a public health threat may still find this level unacceptable. 



Research Project: TRANSMISSION, DIFFERENTIATION, AND PATHOBIOLOGY OF TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES Location: Virus and Prion Research

Title: Limited amplification of chronic wasting disease prions in the peripheral tissues of intracerebrally inoculated cattle

Author item HALEY, NICHOLAS - Kansas State University item SIEPKER, CHRISTOPHER - Kansas State University item Greenlee, Justin item RICHT, JÜRGEN - Kansas State University Submitted to: Journal of General Virology Publication Type: Peer Reviewed Journal Publication Acceptance Date: 3/30/2016 Publication Date: 1/7/2016

Citation: Haley, N.J., Siepker, C., Greenlee, J.J., Richt, J.A. 2016. Limited amplification of chronic wasting disease prions in the peripheral tissues of intracerebrally inoculated cattle. Journal of General Virology. 97:1720-1724.

Interpretive Summary: Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD), a fatal neurodegenerative disease that occurs in farmed and wild cervids (deer and elk) of North America, is a transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE). TSEs are caused by infectious proteins called prions that are resistant to various methods of decontamination and environmental degradation. Cattle could be exposed to chronic wasting disease (CWD) by contact with infected farmed or free-ranging cervids. The purpose of this study was to use an in vitro amplification method called real time quaking induced conversion (RT-QuIC) to assess tissues from cattle inoculated with CWD for low levels of prions not detected by traditional diagnostic methods such as western blot and immunohistochemistry. This study reports that prions were identified by RT-QuIC only in cattle that were confirmed positive by traditional methods. However, prions were rarely identified in some peripheral tissues such as mesenteric lymph node, tonsil, or nasal turbinate that were not considered positive by traditional methods. These results suggest that cattle experimentally inoculated with CWD may have some limited amount of prion infectivity outside of the brain and spinal cord that may represent a previously unrecognized risk for transmission. This information could have an impact on regulatory officials developing plans to reduce or eliminate TSEs and farmers with concerns about ranging cattle on areas where CWD may be present.

Technical Abstract: Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a fatal neurodegenerative disease, classified as a prion disease or transmissible spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) similar to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). Cervids affected by CWD accumulate an abnormal protease resistant prion protein throughout the central nervous system (CNS), as well as in both lymphatic and excretory tissues – an aspect of prion disease pathogenesis not observed in cattle with BSE. Using seeded amplification through real time quaking induced conversion (RT-QuIC), we investigated whether the bovine host or prion agent was responsible for this aspect of TSE pathogenesis. We blindly examined numerous central and peripheral tissues from cattle inoculated with CWD for prion seeding activity. Seeded amplification was readily detected in the CNS, though rarely observed in peripheral tissues, with a limited distribution similar to that of BSE prions in cattle. This seems to indicate that prion peripheralization in cattle is a host-driven characteristic of TSE infection. 


Title: Experimental transmission of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (scrapie, chronic wasting disease, transmissible mink encephalopathy) to cattle and their differentiation from bovine spongiform encephalopathy

Author item Hamir, Amirali item CUTLIP, RANDALL item MILLER, JANICE item Kunkle, Robert item Richt, Juergen item Greenlee, Justin item Nicholson, Eric item Kehrli Jr, Marcus Submitted to: World Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians Publication Type: Proceedings

Publication Acceptance Date: 8/10/2007 Publication Date: 11/11/2007

Citation: Hamir, A.N., Cutlip, R.C., Miller, J.M., Kunkle, R.A., Richt, J.A., Greenlee, J.J., Nicholson, E.M., Kehrli, Jr., M.E. 2007. Experimental transmission of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (scrapie, chronic wasting disease, transmissible mink encephalopathy) to cattle and their differentiation from bovine spongiform encephalopathy. In: Proceedings of the World Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians 13th International Symposium, November 11-14, 2007, Melbourne, Australia. p. 29. Interpretive Summary:

Technical Abstract: Introduction: Experimental cross-species transmission of TSE agents provides valuable information for identification of potential host ranges of known TSEs. This report provides a synopsis of TSE (scrapie, CWD, TME) transmission studies that have been conducted in cattle and compares these findings to those seen in animals with BSE. Materials & Methods: Generally 6-month-old bull calves were obtained and assigned to inoculated and control groups. Inoculated calves were housed in a Biosafety Level 2 isolation barn at the National Animal Disease Center (NADC), Ames, Iowa. Calves were inoculated intracerebrally with 1 ml of a 10% TSE brain inoculum. Results: Results of various TSE cattle experiments with intracerebral inoculation of scrapie, CWD and TME are shown in tabular form (Table 1). Table 1. Comparison of experimental scrapie, chronic wasting disease (CWD) and transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) in cattle inoculated by the intracerebral route during first passage of the inocula. Abnormal CNS signs: Scrapie. Anorexia, weight loss, leg and back stiffness. Some showed incoordination and posterior weakness. Eventual severe lethargy. CWD. Anorexia, weight loss, occasional aimless circling, listlessness and excited by loud noises. TME. Variable hyperexcitability with occasional falling to the ground. Some showing circling and aggressive behavior. Incubation (survival) time: Scrapie. 14 – 18 months. CWD. 23 – 63 months. TME. 13 – 16 months. Attack rate: Scrapie. 100%. CWD. CWD from mule deer: 38%. CWD from elk: 86%. TME. 100% Histopatholgic lesions: Scrapie. Some vacuolation and central of chromatolysis of neurons. CWD. Isolated vacuolated neurons, a few degenerate axons, and a mild astrocytosis. TME. Extensive vacuolation of neuronal perikarya and neuropil. Presence of mild multifocal gliosis. Western blot (brainstem): Scrapie. All three isoforms of PrP**res present. CWD. All three isoforms of PrP**res seen. TME. All three isoforms of PrP**res seen. Immunohistochemistry: PrP**res in lymphoreticular tissues: Scrapie. Not present. CWD. Not present. TME. Not present. PrP**res in CNS: Scrapie. Present within perikaryon and processes of neurons. CWD. Multifocal distribution with labeling primarily in glial cells (astrocytes). TME. Diffusely present and usually evenly distributed in neuropil. Conclusions: 1. All three TSEs agents (scrapie, CWD and TME) are capable of propagating in cattle tissues when administered intracerebrally. 2. All three TSEs can be distinguished from each other and from BSE when inoculated intracerebrally by histopathology, immunohistochemistry and Western blot techniques.


Title: EXPERIMENTAL SECOND PASSAGE OF CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE (CWD(MULE DEER)) AGENT TO CATTLE

Author item Hamir, Amirali item Kunkle, Robert item MILLER, JANICE item Greenlee, Justin item Richt, Juergen

Submitted to: Journal of Comparative Pathology Publication Type: Peer Reviewed Journal Publication Acceptance Date: 7/25/2005 Publication Date: 1/1/2006

Citation: Hamir, A.N., Kunkle, R.A., Miller, J.M., Greenlee, J.J., Richt, J.A. 2006. Experimental second passage of chronic wasting disease (CWD(mule deer)) agent to cattle. Journal of Comparative Pathology. 134(1):63-69.

Interpretive Summary: To compare the findings of experimental first and second passage of chronic wasting disease (CWD) in cattle, 6 calves were inoculated into the brain with CWD-mule deer agent previously (first) passaged in cattle. Two other uninoculated calves served as controls. Beginning 10-12 months post inoculation (PI), all inoculates lost appetite and weight. Five animals subsequently developed clinical signs of central nervous system (CNS) abnormality. By 16.5 months PI, all cattle had been euthanized because of poor prognosis. None of the animals showed microscopic lesions of spongiform encephalopathy (SE) but the CWD agent was detected in their CNS tissues by 2 laboratory techniques (IHC and WB). These findings demonstrate that inoculated cattle amplify CWD agent but also develop clinical CNS signs without manifestation of microscopic lesions of SE. This situation has also been shown to occur following inoculation of cattle with another TSE agent, namely, sheep scrapie. The current study confirms previous work that indicates that the diagnostic tests currently used for confirmation of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in the U.S. would detect CWD in cattle, should it occur naturally. Furthermore, it raises the possibility of distinguishing CWD from BSE in cattle due to the absence of microscopic lesions and a unique multifocal distribution of PrPres, as demonstrated by IHC, which in this study, appears to be more sensitive than the WB.

Technical Abstract: To compare clinicopathological findings of first and second passage of chronic wasting disease (CWD) in cattle, a group of calves (n=6) were intracerebrally inoculated with CWD-mule deer agent previously (first) passaged in cattle. Two other uninoculated calves served as controls. Beginning 10-12 months post inoculation (PI), all inoculates lost appetite and lost weight. Five animals subsequently developed clinical signs of central nervous system (CNS) abnormality. By 16.5 months PI, all cattle had been euthanized because of poor prognosis. None of the animals showed microscopic lesions of spongiform encephalopathy (SE) but PrPres was detected in their CNS tissues by immunohistochemistry (IHC) and Western blot (WB) techniques. These findings demonstrate that intracerebrally inoculated cattle not only amplify CWD PrPres but also develop clinical CNS signs without manifestation of morphologic lesions of SE. This situation has also been shown to occur following inoculation of cattle with another TSE agent, scrapie. The current study confirms previous work that indicates the diagnostic techniques currently used for confirmation of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in the U.S. would detect CWD in cattle, should it occur naturally. Furthermore, it raises the possibility of distinguishing CWD from BSE in cattle due to the absence of neuropathologic lesions and a unique multifocal distribution of PrPres, as demonstrated by IHC, which in this study, appears to be more sensitive than the WB.


FRIDAY, AUGUST 27, 2021 

Cattle are highly susceptible to white-tailed deer CWD and mule deer CWD in experimental conditions


Friday, December 14, 2012 

DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012 

snip..... 

In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administration's BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed system. However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law. Animals considered at high risk for CWD include: 

1) animals from areas declared to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones and 

2) deer and elk that at some time during the 60-month period prior to slaughter were in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal. 

Therefore, in the USA, materials from cervids other than CWD positive animals may be used in animal feed and feed ingredients for non-ruminants. 

The amount of animal PAP that is of deer and/or elk origin imported from the USA to GB can not be determined, however, as it is not specified in TRACES. 

It may constitute a small percentage of the 8412 kilos of non-fish origin processed animal proteins that were imported from US into GB in 2011. 

Overall, therefore, it is considered there is a __greater than negligible risk___ that (nonruminant) animal feed and pet food containing deer and/or elk protein is imported into GB. 

There is uncertainty associated with this estimate given the lack of data on the amount of deer and/or elk protein possibly being imported in these products. 

snip..... 

36% in 2007 (Almberg et al., 2011). In such areas, population declines of deer of up to 30 to 50% have been observed (Almberg et al., 2011). In areas of Colorado, the prevalence can be as high as 30% (EFSA, 2011). The clinical signs of CWD in affected adults are weight loss and behavioural changes that can span weeks or months (Williams, 2005). In addition, signs might include excessive salivation, behavioural alterations including a fixed stare and changes in interaction with other animals in the herd, and an altered stance (Williams, 2005). These signs are indistinguishable from cervids experimentally infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). Given this, if CWD was to be introduced into countries with BSE such as GB, for example, infected deer populations would need to be tested to differentiate if they were infected with CWD or BSE to minimise the risk of BSE entering the human food-chain via affected venison. snip..... The rate of transmission of CWD has been reported to be as high as 30% and can approach 100% among captive animals in endemic areas (Safar et al., 2008). 

snip..... 

In summary, in endemic areas, there is a medium probability that the soil and surrounding environment is contaminated with CWD prions and in a bioavailable form. In rural areas where CWD has not been reported and deer are present, there is a greater than negligible risk the soil is contaminated with CWD prion. snip..... In summary, given the volume of tourists, hunters and servicemen moving between GB and North America, the probability of at least one person travelling to/from a CWD affected area and, in doing so, contaminating their clothing, footwear and/or equipment prior to arriving in GB is greater than negligible... For deer hunters, specifically, the risk is likely to be greater given the increased contact with deer and their environment. However, there is significant uncertainty associated with these estimates. 

snip..... 

Therefore, it is considered that farmed and park deer may have a higher probability of exposure to CWD transferred to the environment than wild deer given the restricted habitat range and higher frequency of contact with tourists and returning GB residents. 

snip..... 


***> READ THIS VERY, VERY, CAREFULLY, AUGUST 1997 MAD COW FEED BAN WAS A SHAM, AS I HAVE STATED SINCE 1997! 3 FAILSAFES THE FDA ET AL PREACHED AS IF IT WERE THE GOSPEL, IN TERMS OF MAD COW BSE DISEASE IN USA, AND WHY IT IS/WAS/NOT A PROBLEM FOR THE USA, and those are; 

BSE TESTING (failed terribly and proven to be a sham) 

BSE SURVEILLANCE (failed terribly and proven to be a sham) 

BSE 589.2001 FEED REGULATIONS (another colossal failure, and proven to be a sham) 

these are facts folks. trump et al just admitted it with the feed ban. 

see; 

FDA Reports on VFD Compliance 

John Maday 

August 30, 2019 09:46 AM VFD-Form 007 (640x427) 

Before and after the current Veterinary Feed Directive rules took full effect in January, 2017, the FDA focused primarily on education and outreach. ( John Maday ) Before and after the current Veterinary Feed Directive (VFD) rules took full effect in January, 2017, the FDA focused primarily on education and outreach to help feed mills, veterinarians and producers understand and comply with the requirements. Since then, FDA has gradually increased the number of VFD inspections and initiated enforcement actions when necessary. On August 29, FDA released its first report on inspection and compliance activities. The report, titled “Summary Assessment of Veterinary Feed Directive Compliance Activities Conducted in Fiscal Years 2016 – 2018,” is available online.


FDA Reports on VFD Compliance

John Maday

August 30, 2019 09:46 AM VFD-Form 007 (640x427)

Before and after the current Veterinary Feed Directive rules took full effect in January, 2017, the FDA focused primarily on education and outreach. ( John Maday )

Before and after the current Veterinary Feed Directive (VFD) rules took full effect in January, 2017, the FDA focused primarily on education and outreach to help feed mills, veterinarians and producers understand and comply with the requirements. Since then, FDA has gradually increased the number of VFD inspections and initiated enforcement actions when necessary.

On August 29, FDA released its first report on inspection and compliance activities. The report, titled “Summary Assessment of Veterinary Feed Directive Compliance Activities Conducted in Fiscal Years 2016 – 2018,” is available online.


Overall, the FDA reports a high level of compliance across the affected livestock-industry sectors.

In fiscal year 2016, FDA began a small, three-part pilot inspection program that began with inspectors visiting feed distributors to review randomly selected VFD documents. The inspectors then selected one VFD at the distributor and conducted further inspections of the veterinarian and producer (client) named on that VFD.

In fiscal years 2017 and 2018, FDA continued those three-part inspections and expanded the program to include state feed regulatory partners. In fiscal year 2017, state personnel inspected VFD distributors and reviewed selected VFDs for compliance with the requirements. In 2018, those state inspectors began conducting three-part inspections, similar to those conducted by the FDA investigators. With state inspectors contributing, the number of VFD inspections increased from 57 in 2016 to 130 in 2017 and 269 during 2018.

Of the 269 inspections during 2018, 230 required no action, 38 indicated voluntary action and just one indicated official enforcement action.

Key findings in the report include:

Distributors (2018)

Distributor had notified FDA of their intent to distribute VFD feeds -- 94.8%

Distributors who distributed a VFD feed that complied with the terms of the VFD -- 91.5%

Distributors who manufacture VFD feed: Drug inventory or production records showed the correct amount of drug was added to the feed for the VFD reviewed -- 96.7%

Distributors who manufacture VFD feed: Labels and formulas matched the VFD reviewed -- 91.0%

Distributor’s VFD feed labels contained the VFD caution statement -- 77.2%

Veterinarians

Veterinarians had an active license in the state where the VFD feed authorized on the VFD order(s) is being fed -- 100%

VFDs included veterinarians’ electronic or written signature -- 98.6%

VFDs included the withdrawal time, special instructions, and/or cautionary statements -- 95.3%

Producers

Client did not feed VFD feed beyond the expiration date on the VFD -- 100%

Client fed VFD feed to the animals authorized on the VFD (number, species, and/or production class) -- 100%

Client fed VFD feed for the duration identified on the VFD -- 100%

Client complied with the special instructions on the VFD -- 100%

FDA issued just one warning letter following inspections during fiscal year 2018, for a feed mill that “adulterated and misbranded VFD feed by distributing VFD feed to other distributors without first receiving an acknowledgment letter, in addition to adulterating and misbranding medicated and non-medicated feed for other reasons.”

In its report, FDA reminds stakeholders that VFD medicated feeds must be used in according to the approved conditions of use and must be under the oversight of a licensed veterinarian and consistent with a lawful VFD order. The agency intends to continue monitoring compliance, and to provide education, but FDA will also use enforcement strategies when voluntary compliance with the VFD final rule requirements is not achieved.

See the full summary report from FDA.


For more on the VFD rules and compliance, see these articles from BovineVetOnline.com.

VFD Audits: What to Expect


VFD Audits: Start with the Feed Distributor


FDA Draft Guidance Updates VFD Q&A







SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 2019 

***> FDA Reports on VFD Compliance 


TUESDAY, APRIL 18, 2017 

***> EXTREME USA FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED LOOP HOLE STILL EXIST, AND PRICE OF POKER GOES UP *** 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 2019 

Veterinary Biologics Guideline 3.32E: Guideline for minimising the risk of introducing transmissible spongiform encephalopathy prions and other infectious agents through veterinary biologics


U.S.A. 50 STATE BSE MAD COW CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001

Subject: BSE--U.S. 50 STATE CONFERENCE CALL Jan. 9, 2001

Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2001 16:49:00 -0800

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy


snip...

[host Richard Barns] and now a question from Terry S. Singeltary of CJD Watch.

[TSS] yes, thank you, U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you give for serum or tissue donor herds?

[no answer, you could hear in the back ground, mumbling and 'we can't. have him ask the question again.]

[host Richard] could you repeat the question?

[TSS] U.S. cattle, what kind of guarantee can you give for serum or tissue donor herds?

[not sure whom ask this] what group are you with?

[TSS] CJD Watch, my Mom died from hvCJD and we are tracking CJD world-wide.

[not sure who is speaking] could you please disconnect Mr. Singeltary

[TSS] you are not going to answer my question?

[not sure whom speaking] NO

snip...see full archive and more of this;


3.2.1.2 Non‐cervid domestic species

The remarkably high rate of natural CWD transmission in the ongoing NA epidemics raises the question of the risk to livestock grazing on CWD‐contaminated shared rangeland and subsequently developing a novel CWD‐related prion disease. This issue has been investigated by transmitting CWD via experimental challenge to cattle, sheep and pigs and to tg mouse lines expressing the relevant species PrP.

For cattle challenged with CWD, PrPSc was detected in approximately 40% of intracerebrally inoculated animals (Hamir et al., 2005, 2006a, 2007). Tg mice expressing bovine PrP have also been challenged with CWD and while published studies have negative outcomes (Tamguney et al., 2009b), unpublished data provided for the purposes of this Opinion indicate that some transmission of individual isolates to bovinised mice is possible (Table 1).

In small ruminant recipients, a low rate of transmission was reported between 35 and 72 months post‐infection (mpi) in ARQ/ARQ and ARQ/VRQ sheep intracerebrally challenged with mule deer CWD (Hamir et al., 2006b), while two out of two ARQ/ARQ sheep intracerebrally inoculated with elk CWD developed clinical disease after 28 mpi (Madsen‐Bouterse et al., 2016). However, tg mice expressing ARQ sheep PrP were resistant (Tamguney et al., 2006) and tg mice expressing the VRQ PrP allele were poorly susceptible to clinical disease (Beringue et al., 2012; Madsen‐Bouterse et al., 2016). In contrast, tg mice expressing VRQ sheep PrP challenged with CWD have resulted in highly efficient, life‐long asymptomatic replication of these prions in the spleen tissue (Beringue et al., 2012).

A recent study investigated the potential for swine to serve as hosts of the CWD agent(s) by intracerebral or oral challenge of crossbred piglets (Moore et al., 2016b, 2017). Pigs sacrificed at 6 mpi, approximately the age at which pigs reach market weight, were clinically healthy and negative by diagnostic tests, although low‐level CWD agent replication could be detected in the CNS by bioassay in tg cervinised mice. Among pigs that were incubated for up to 73 mpi, some gave diagnostic evidence of CWD replication in the brain between 42 and 72 mpi. Importantly, this was observed also in one orally challenged pig at 64 mpi and the presence of low‐level CWD replication was confirmed by mouse bioassay. The authors of this study argued that pigs can support low‐level amplification of CWD prions, although the species barrier to CWD infection is relatively high and that the detection of infectivity in orally inoculated pigs with a mouse bioassay raises the possibility that naturally exposed pigs could act as a reservoir of CWD infectivity.




Inspection conclusions are reported as Official Action Indicated (OAI), Voluntary Action Indicated (VAI), or No Action Indicated (NAI).

An OAI inspection classification occurs when significant objectionable conditions or practices were found and regulatory sanctions are warranted in order to address the establishment's lack of compliance with the regulation. An example of an OAI inspection classification would be findings of manufacturing procedures insufficient to ensure that ruminant feed is not contaminated with prohibited material. Inspections classified as OAI will be promptly re‐ inspected following the regulatory sanctions, in order to determine whether adequate corrective actions have been implemented.

A VAI inspection classification occurs when objectionable conditions or practices were found that do not meet the threshold of regulatory significance, but do warrant advisory actions to inform the establishment of findings that should be voluntarily corrected. Inspections classified as VAI usually occur as a result of more technical violations of the Ruminant Feed Ban. Examples could include things such as minor recordkeeping lapses and conditions involving non‐ruminant feeds.

FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory Report Official Action Indicated OAI

Data reported as of: 10/30/2021 Search by: Firm Type = AF; Decision = OAI; Sort by: HOME_DISTRICT, STATE, NAME Perform new search

Displaying records 1 to 1 of 1 records

FDA District Firm Id (FEI) Firm Name Street Address City State Zip Code Opr. Status Firm Type(s) Prgm Risk Last BSE Insp Date Last BSE Dist. Dcsn** Handles Feed for Rum. Animals?

CIN-DO 3010039727 Magnus International Group 679 Hardy Rd Painesville OH 44077-4574 OPR AF, DR, OT, RE HP 04/23/2018 OAI Y

https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/BSEInspect/view/bse_results.cfm

=====

FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory Report

Data reported as of: 10/30/2021 Search by: Firm Type = DR; Decision = OAI; Sort by: HOME_DISTRICT, STATE, NAME Perform new search

Displaying records 1 to 3 of 3 records

FDA District Firm Id (FEI) Firm Name Street Address City State Zip Code Opr. Status Firm Type(s) Prgm Risk Last BSE Insp Date Last BSE Dist. Dcsn** Handles Feed for Rum. Animals?

CIN-DO 3010039727 Magnus International Group 679 Hardy Rd Painesville OH 44077-4574 OPR AF, DR, OT, RE HP 04/23/2018 OAI Y

PHI-DO 2516585 Erie Crawford Coop Assn 515 Erie Street Saegertown PA 16433 OPR DR, NL, TH DP 11/08/2018 OAI Y

PHI-DO 2520300 Musguire Milling & Feed Company 101 Colfax Street Enon Valley PA 16120 OPR DR, NL, TH DP 08/19/2016 OAI Y

https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/BSEInspect/view/bse_results.cfm

=====

FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory Report

Data reported as of: 10/30/2021 Search by: Firm Type = NL; Decision = OAI; Sort by: HOME_DISTRICT, STATE, NAME Perform new search

Displaying records 1 to 2 of 2 records

FDA District Firm Id (FEI) Firm Name Street Address City State Zip Code Opr. Status Firm Type(s) Prgm Risk Last BSE Insp Date Last BSE Dist. Dcsn** Handles Feed for Rum. Animals?

PHI-DO 2516585 Erie Crawford Coop Assn 515 Erie Street Saegertown PA 16433 OPR DR, NL, TH DP 11/08/2018 OAI Y

PHI-DO 2520300 Musguire Milling & Feed Company 101 Colfax Street Enon Valley PA 16120 OPR DR, NL, TH DP 08/19/2016 OAI Y

https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/BSEInspect/view/bse_results.cfm

=====

FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory Report

Data reported as of: 10/30/2021 Search by: Firm Type = OT; Decision = OAI; Sort by: HOME_DISTRICT, STATE, NAME Perform new search

Displaying records 1 to 1 of 1 records

FDA District Firm Id (FEI) Firm Name Street Address City State Zip Code Opr. Status Firm Type(s) Prgm Risk Last BSE Insp Date Last BSE Dist. Dcsn** Handles Feed for Rum. Animals?

CIN-DO 3010039727 Magnus International Group 679 Hardy Rd Painesville OH 44077-4574 OPR AF, DR, OT, RE HP 04/23/2018 OAI Y

https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/BSEInspect/view/bse_results.cfm

=====

FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory Report

Data reported as of: 10/30/2021 Search by: Firm Type = RE; Decision = OAI; Sort by: HOME_DISTRICT, STATE, NAME Perform new search

Displaying records 1 to 1 of 1 records

FDA District Firm Id (FEI) Firm Name Street Address City State Zip Code Opr. Status Firm Type(s) Prgm Risk Last BSE Insp Date Last BSE Dist. Dcsn** Handles Feed for Rum. Animals?

CIN-DO 3010039727 Magnus International Group 679 Hardy Rd Painesville OH 44077-4574 OPR AF, DR, OT, RE HP 04/23/2018 OAI Y

https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/BSEInspect/view/bse_results.cfm

===== 

FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory Report

Data reported as of: 10/30/2021 Search by: Firm Type = TH; Decision = OAI; Sort by: HOME_DISTRICT, STATE, NAME Perform new search

Displaying records 1 to 2 of 2 records

FDA District Firm Id (FEI) Firm Name Street Address City State Zip Code Opr. Status Firm Type(s) Prgm Risk Last BSE Insp Date Last BSE Dist. Dcsn** Handles Feed for Rum. Animals?

PHI-DO 2516585 Erie Crawford Coop Assn 515 Erie Street Saegertown PA 16433 OPR DR, NL, TH DP 11/08/2018 OAI Y

PHI-DO 2520300 Musguire Milling & Feed Company 101 Colfax Street Enon Valley PA 16120 OPR DR, NL, TH DP 08/19/2016 OAI Y

https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/BSEInspect/view/bse_results.cfm

===== 


VOLUNTARY ACTION INDICATED VAI

there are to many BSE VAI to list, from my count, there were 359 VAI, so for anyone interested, go to excel;


ONE DECADE POST MAD COW FEED BAN OF AUGUST 1997...2007

2007
 
10,000,000 POUNDS REASON Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
 
2007
 
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
 
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II PRODUCT
 
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007 CODE Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush,
WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
 
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
 
REASON Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
 
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI
 
___________________________________
 
PRODUCT Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007
 
CODE The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.
 
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007.
 
Firm initiated recall is complete.
 
REASON Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
 
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976 lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV
 
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

PAGE NOT FOUND
 

ALABAMA MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE 2006


RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II

______________________________ 

PRODUCT

a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;

b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;

c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;

d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;

e) "Big Jim’s" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;

f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;

g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;

h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6;

i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;

j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;

k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;

l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;

m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6

CODE

Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

125 tons

DISTRIBUTION

AL and FL 

______________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk custom dairy feds manufactured from concentrates, Recall # V-113-6

CODE

All dairy feeds produced between 2/1/05 and 6/16/06 and containing H. J. Baker recalled feed products.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Vita Plus Corp., Gagetown, MI, by visit beginning on June 21, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

The feed was manufactured from materials that may have been contaminated with mammalian protein.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

27,694,240 lbs

DISTRIBUTION

MI 

______________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-114-6

CODE

None

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Burkmann Feeds LLC, Glasgow, KY, by letter on July 14, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak, which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

?????

DISTRIBUTION

KY

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###


=====

PRODUCT 

Bulk Whole Barley, Recall # V-256-2009

CODE

No code or lot number.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Mars Petcare US, Clinton, OK, by telephone on May 21, 2009. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Product may have contained prohibited materials without cautionary statement on the label.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

208,820 pounds

DISTRIBUTION

TX

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 26, 2009

###


Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL KY VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ????? 

Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:19 pm PST 

PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-114-6 

CODE None 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Burkmann Feeds LLC, Glasgow, KY, by letter on July 14, 2006. 

Firm initiated recall is ongoing. REASON Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak, which may contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal. 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ????? 

DISTRIBUTION KY 

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

### 


MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67 

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II 

______________________________ 


PRODUCT a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6; 

b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6; 

c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6; 

d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 

CODE a) Bulk b) None c) Bulk d) Bulk 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. 

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

 REASON Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.. 

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons 

DISTRIBUTION Nationwide

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006

###


Subject: MAD COW FEED BAN WARNING LETTER ISSUED MAY 17, 2006 

Date: June 27, 2006 at 7:42 am PST Public Health Service Food and Drug Administration

New Orleans District 297 Plus Park Blvd. Nashville, TN 37217

Telephone: 615-781-5380 Fax: 615-781-5391

May 17, 2006

WARNING LETTER NO.. 2006-NOL-06

FEDERAL EXPRESS OVERNIGHT DELIVERY

Mr. William Shirley, Jr., Owner Louisiana.DBA Riegel By-Products 2621 State Street Dallas, Texas 75204

Dear Mr. Shirley:

On February 12, 17, 21, and 22, 2006, a U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) investigator inspected your rendering plant, located at 509 Fortson Street, Shreveport, Louisiana. The inspection revealed significant deviations from the requirements set forth in Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 589.2000 [21 CFR 589.2000], Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed. This regulation is intended to prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). You failed to follow the requirements of this regulation; products being manufactured and distributed by your facility are misbranded within the meaning of Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act).

Our investigation found you failed to provide measures, including sufficient written procedures, to prevent commingling or cross-contamination and to maintain sufficient written procedures [21 CFR 589.2000(e)] because:

You failed to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into animal protein or feeds which may be used for ruminants. For example, your facility uses the same equipment to process mammalian and poultry tissues. However, you use only hot water to clean the cookers between processing tissues from each species. You do not clean the auger, hammer mill, grinder, and spouts after processing mammalian tissues.

You failed to maintain written procedures specifying the clean-out procedures or other means to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into feeds which may be used for ruminants.

As a result . the poultry meal you manufacture may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues prohibited in ruminant feed. Pursuant to 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1)(i), any products containing or may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues must be labeled, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Since you failed to label a product which may contain protein derived from mammalian tissues with the required cautionary statement. the poultry meal is misbranded under Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Act.

This letter is not intended as an all-inclusive list of violations at your facility. As a manufacturer of materials intended for animal feed use, you are responsible for ensuring your overall operation and the products you manufacture and distribute are in compliance with the law. You should take prompt action to correct these violations, and you should establish a system whereby violations do not recur. Failure to promptly correct these violations may result in regulatory action, such as seizure and/or injunction, without further notice.

You should notify this office in writing within 15 working days of receiving this letter, outlining the specific steps you have taken to bring your firm into compliance with the law. Your response should include an explanation of each step taken to correct the violations and prevent their recurrence. If corrective action cannot be completed within 15 working days, state the reason for the delay and the date by which the corrections will be completed. Include copies of any available documentation demonstrating corrections have been made.

Your reply should be directed to Mark W. Rivero, Compliance Officer, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2424 Edenborn Avenue, Suite 410, Metairie, Louisiana 70001. If you have questions regarding any issue in this letter, please contact Mr. Rivero at (504) 219-8818, extension 103.

Sincerely,

/S

Carol S. Sanchez Acting District Director New Orleans District 


PLEASE NOTE, THE FDA URLS FOR OLD WARNING LETTERS ARE OBSOLETE AND DO NOT WORK IN MOST CASES.. I LOOKED UP THE OLD ONE ABOVE AND FOUND IT, BUT HAVE NOT DONE THAT FOR THE OTHERS TO FOLLOW. THE DATA IS VALID THOUGH! 

Subject: MAD COW PROTEIN IN COMMERCE USA 2006 RECALL UPDATE 

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <[log in to unmask]> 

Reply-To: SAFETY <[log in to unmask]> 

Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2006 14:10:37 -0500 

Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS 

IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV 

Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST

PRODUCT a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6; b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6; c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6; d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6. CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. 

Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons 

DISTRIBUTION AL

______________________________

snip...


 Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALLS ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006 KY, LA, MS, AL, GA, AND TN 11,000+ TONS 

Date: August 16, 2006 at 9:19 am PST RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE - CLASS II

______________________________

snip...

______________________________

PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-120-6 

CODE None 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal..

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tons DISTRIBUTION AL and MS

______________________________

PRODUCT 

a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6; 

b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6; 

c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6; 

d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6; 

e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6; 

f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6; 

g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6 

CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags

DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006

###


 Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS

Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006 

Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST 

PRODUCT 

a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6; 

b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6; 

c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6; d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6; 

e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6; 

f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6; 

g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6; 

h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6; 

i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6; 

j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6; 

k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6; 

l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6; 

m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 

CODE 

Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.

REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons DISTRIBUTION AL and FL

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###


 MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248..128.67

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II

______________________________

PRODUCT 

a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6; 

b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6; 

c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6; 

d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 

CODE a) Bulk b) None c) Bulk d) Bulk 

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. 

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons

DISTRIBUTION Nationwide

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006

###


Product Details

Product Description:

CalDensity Black Label, CalDensity White Label with HA, packaged in white plastic 5, 15, 25, 40, 60 lb pails with plastic liner and white plastic lid. Reason for Recall:

During an FDA inspection it was found that the CalDensity Black label and CalDensity White Label with HA product containers did not include the precautionary statement DO NOT FEED TO CATTLE OR OTHER RUMINANTS

Product Quantity: 50,935 lbs

Recall Number: V-209-2012

Code Information: 042009, 051009, 061209, 071509, 091009, 011510, 030310, 031610, 052610, 092410, 120110, 011211, 020111, 030911, 050111, 071111 & 090111. Classification: Class II Event Details

Event ID: 61880

Voluntary / Mandated:

Voluntary: Firm Initiated

Product Type:

Veterinary

Initial Firm Notification of Consignee or Public:

E-Mail

Status:

Terminated

Distribution Pattern:

Nationwide distribution: AL, AR, AZ, CA, CO, FL, GA, IA, ID, IL, KY, LA, MD, MI, MN, MO, MS, NC, NE, NJ, NM, NY, OH, OK, PA, SC, TX, UT, VA, WA & WV. No shipments were made to foreign countries including Canada.

Recalling Firm:

Process Managers LLC

485 Gawthrope Dr 

Winchester, KY 40391-8910

United States

Recall Initiation Date:

1/6/2012

Center Classification Date:

9/7/2012

Date Terminated:

1/24/2014


Product Details

Product Description:

Regular Chicken 50# Ingredients: Corn, Wheat, Oats, Oyster shells, Medium Grit, CCC, ADS, Plant Protein Products, Animal Protein Products, Processed Grain By-Products, Roughage Products, Animal Fat procession with DHA, etc

Reason for Recall:

During an FDA sample collection, the firms 50# Regular Chicken Feed was found to contain mammalian protein. The label does not contain the warning statement.

Product Quantity:

5400lbs (50lb bags)

Recall Number:

V-137-2013

Code Information:

8/6/2012

Classification:

Class III

Event Details

Event ID:

63743

Voluntary / Mandated:

Voluntary: Firm Initiated

Product Type:

Veterinary

Initial Firm Notification of Consignee or Public:

Other

Status:

Terminated

Distribution Pattern:

Midland MI area only.

Recalling Firm:

Cohoons Elevator Inc.

802 Townsend St 

Midland, MI 48640-5362

United States

Recall Initiation Date:

11/21/2012

Center Classification Date:

2/8/2013

Date Terminated:

2/12/2013


V. Use in animal feed of material from deer and elk NOT considered at high risk for CWD 

FDA continues to consider materials from deer and elk NOT considered at high risk for CWD to be acceptable for use in NON-RUMINANT animal feeds in accordance with current agency regulations, 21 CFR 589.2000. 

Deer and elk not considered at high risk include: 

(1) deer and elk from areas not declared by State officials to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones; and 

(2) deer and elk that were not at some time during the 60-month period immediately before the time of slaughter in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.



2017 Section 21 C.F.R. 589.2000, Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed

Subject: MICHIGAN FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE BREACH APRIL 4, 2017


MICHIGAN FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEEDVIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE BREACH APRIL 4, 2017


FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory 


11998 DET-DO MI 48846-847 OPR 4/4/2017 OAI 



http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/BSEInspect/bseinspections.csv 



NAI = NO ACTION INDICATED


OAI = OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED


VAI = VOLUNTARY ACTION INDICATED


RTS = REFERRED TO STATE


OAI (Official Action Indicated) when inspectors find significant objectionable conditions or practices and believe that regulatory sanctions are warranted to address the establishment’s lack of compliance with the regulation. An example of an OAI classification would be findings of manufacturing procedures insufficient to ensure that ruminant feed is not contaminated with prohibited material. Inspectors will promptly re-inspect facilities classified OAI after regulatory sanctions have been applied to determine whether the corrective actions are adequate to address the objectionable conditions...end...TSS


TUESDAY, APRIL 18, 2017 

*** EXTREME USA FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED LOOP HOLE STILL EXIST, AND PRICE OF POKER GOES UP ***


TUESDAY, JANUARY 17, 2017 

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEEDVIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE 2016 to 2017 BSE TSE PRION


FY 2016 Inspectional Observation Summaries

4132 21 CFR 589.2000(d)(1) Protein blenders, feed manufacturers, distributors Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, *** 2

4131 21 CFR 589.2000(c)(1)(i) Renderers Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear a label containing the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, *** 1


FY 2015 Inspectional Observation Summaries

4132 21 CFR 589.2000(d)(1) Protein blenders, feed manufacturers, distributors Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, *** 2


FY 2014 Inspectional Observation Summaries

4146 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) Written clean-out procedures Failure to maintain written clean-out procedures to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, *** 2

4131 21 CFR 589.2000(c)(1)(i) Renderers Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear a label containing the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, *** 1

4132 21 CFR 589.2000(d)(1) Protein blenders, feed manufacturers, distributors Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, *** 1

4145 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) Use of clean-out procedures Failure to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, *** 1


FY 2013 Inspectional Observation Summaries

4131 21 CFR 589.2000(c)(1)(i) 5 Renderers Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear a label containing the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, ***

4132 21 CFR 589.2000(d)(1) 5 Protein blenders, feed manufacturers, distributors Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, ***

4145 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) 1 Use of clean-out procedures Failure to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, ***

4146 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) 1 Written clean-out procedures Failure to maintain written clean-out procedures to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, ***

FY 2012 Inspectional Observation Summaries

4131 21 CFR 589.2000(c)(1)(i) 5 Renderers Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear a label containing the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, ***

4132 21 CFR 589.2000(d)(1) 4 Protein blenders, feed manufacturers, distributors Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, ***


FY 2011 Inspectional Observation Summaries

4132 21 CFR 589.2000(d)(1) 5 Protein blenders, feed manufacturers, distributors Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants."Specifically, ***

4131 21 CFR 589.2000(c)(1)(i) 4 Renderers Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear a label containing the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants."Specifically, ***

4146 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) 1 Written clean-out procedures Failure to maintain written clean-out procedures to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, ***


FY 2010 Inspectional Observation Summaries

4131 21 CFR 589.2000(c)(1)(i) 3 Renderers Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear a label containing the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, *** 4132 21 CFR 589.2000(d)(1) 3 Protein blenders, feed manufacturers, distributors Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, ***

4146 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) 1 Written clean-out procedures Failure to maintain written clean-out procedures to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, ***


FY 2009 Inspectional Observation Summaries

4132 21 CFR 589.2000(d)(1) 10 Protein blenders, feed manufacturers, distributors Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, ***

4146 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) 4 Written clean-out procedures Failure to maintain written clean-out procedures to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, ***

4145 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) 3 Use of clean-out procedures Failure to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, ***


FY 2008 Inspectional Observation Summaries

4132 21 CFR 589.2000(d)(1) 7 Protein blenders, feed manufacturers, distributors Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, ***

4145 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) 1 Use of clean-out procedures Failure to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, *** 4146 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) 1 Written clean-out procedures Failure to maintain written clean-out procedures to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, ***


FY 2007 Inspectional Observation Summaries

4132 21 CFR 589.2000(d)(1) 3 Protein blenders, feed manufacturers, distributors Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, ***

4146 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) 3 Written clean-out procedures Failure to maintain written clean-out procedures to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, ***

4131 21 CFR 589.2000(c)(1)(i) 2 Renderers Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear a label containing the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, ***

4145 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) 1 Use of clean-out procedures Failure to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, ***


FY 2006 Inspectional Observation Summaries

4132 21 CFR 589.2000(d)(1) 6 Protein blenders, feed manufacturers, distributors Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants."Specifically, ***

4146 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) 5 Written clean-out procedures Failure to maintain written clean-out procedures to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, ***

4145 21 CFR 589.2000(e)(1) 4 Use of clean-out procedures Failure to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues to animal protein or feeds that may be used for ruminants. Specifically, ***

4131 21 CFR 589.2000(c)(1)(i) 2 Renderers Products that contain or may contain prohibited material fail to bear a label containing the caution statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants." Specifically, ***


*** PLEASE SEE THIS URGENT UPDATE ON CWD AND FEED ANIMAL PROTEIN ***

Sunday, March 20, 2016

Docket No. FDA-2003-D-0432 (formerly 03D-0186) Use of Material from Deer and Elk in Animal Feed ***UPDATED MARCH 2016*** Singeltary Submission


SEE MAD COW FEED VIOLATIONS AFER MAD COW FEED VIOLATIONS ;


Saturday, July 23, 2016

BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY BSE TSE PRION SURVEILLANCE, TESTING, AND SRM REMOVAL UNITED STATE OF AMERICA UPDATE JULY 2016


Tuesday, July 26, 2016

Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE Prion UPDATE JULY 2016


Monday, June 20, 2016

Specified Risk Materials SRMs BSE TSE Prion Program


WEDNESDAY, APRIL 24, 2019 

USDA Announces Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Detection Aug 29, 2018 A Review of Science 2019


Tuesday, April 19, 2016

Docket No. FDA-2013-N-0764 for Animal Feed Regulatory Program Standards Singeltary Comment Submission


17 years post mad cow feed ban August 1997 

Monday, October 26, 2015 

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE October 2015 


Tuesday, December 23, 2014 

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEEDVIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OAI UPDATE DECEMBER 2014 BSE TSE PRION 


16 years post mad cow feed ban August 1997 2013 

Sunday, December 15, 2013 

FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE 


Saturday, August 29, 2009

FOIA REQUEST FEED RECALL 2009 Product may have contained prohibited materials Bulk Whole Barley, Recall # V-256-2009


 Friday, September 4, 2009

FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009


Thursday, March 19, 2009

MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA WITH ONGOING 12 YEARS OF DENIAL NOW, WHY IN THE WORLD DO WE TO TALK ABOUT THIS ANYMORE $$$



MONDAY, OCTOBER 25, 2021 

Prion Infectivity and PrPBSE in the Peripheral and Central Nervous System of Cattle 8 Months Post Oral BSE Challenge


Working Document on Camel Prion Disease (CPrD) 14/09/2020

Content: I. Introduction II. Camel prion disease III. Case definition IV. Epidemiological surveillance V. Biosafety VI. Capacity building VII. Early warning and response VIII. Risk factors IX. Knowledge Gaps X. References

I. Introduction

Camel prion disease (CPrD) is the last disease described in the family of prion diseases [1]. To date, it has been recognized only in Middle East of Algeria and in the neighboring region of Tunisia [2]. However, there are no known other initiatives of prion diseases surveillance in camels worldwide. CPrD might actually be limited to the already known geographic area in North Africa or spread undetected in other Countries, as a consequence of the movements of dromedaries along trans-Saharan commercial routes, the import/export trade flows of living animals and the traditional extensive and nomadic rearing systems.

According to the discussions in recent meetings of REMESA and OIE which indicated the need to extend the knowledge on CPrD spread in Countries where camels are extensively reared and considered as a part of the domestic livestock [3], and according to the initiative from CAMENET member countries to assess the risk in the CAMENET region, this working document aims to provide countries with the main technical and scientific knowledge necessary to implement surveillance programs on camel prion disease in its own territory. Basic information contained in this document may also be helpful for the possible design of contingency plans.

The present working document is an 'alive' document. It should be regularly reviewed and updated as further information becomes available.

II. Camel prion disease1

Camel prion disease (CPrD) was diagnosed in 2018 in three adult camels showing clinical signs at the ante-mortem inspection at an abattoir in the region of Ouargla (Algeria) [1]. According to the published report symptoms suggesting prion disease occurred in 3.1% of dromedaries brought for slaughter to the Ouargla abattoir in 2015–2016. More recently, in 2019, the same disease was reported in the region of Tataouine (Tunisia) [2]. CPrD adds to the group of animal prion diseases, 



including scrapie in sheep and goats, chronic wasting disease (CWD) in cervids and Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in cattle. As of today, very limited epidemiological information is available about the prevalence, geographical distribution and mode of transmission of the disease.

The involvement of lymphoid tissue in prion replication, observed both in the Algerian and Tunisian cases [1,2], is suggestive of a peripheral pathogenesis, which is thought to be a prerequisite for prion shedding into the environment. As with other animal prion diseases, such as scrapie and CWD, in which lymphoid tissues are extensively involved and horizontal transmission occurs efficiently under natural conditions, the detection of prion proteins in lymph nodes is suggestive of the infectious nature of CPrD and concurs to hypothesize the potential impact of CPrD on animal health. No evidence is currently available with which to argue for the relevance of CPrD for human health. However, no absolute species barrier exists in prion diseases and minimizing the exposure of humans to prion-infected animal products is an essential aspect of public health protection.

The worldwide camel population is ~35 million head, 88% of which is found in Africa [4]. The camel farming system is evolving rapidly, and these animals represent vital sources of meat, milk and transportation for millions of people living in the most arid regions of the world. This makes it necessary to assess the risk for animal and human health and to develop evidence-based policies to control and limit the spread of the disease in animals, and to minimize human exposure. As a first step, the awareness of Veterinary Services about CPrD and its diagnostic capacity needs to be improved in all countries where dromedaries are part of the domestic livestock.

Since the first description of CPrD, the OIE promoted discussions on the impact of this new disease through the OIE Scientific Commission for Animal Diseases (Scientific Commission). It evaluated if CPrD should be considered an ‘emerging disease’ based on the criteria listed in the Terrestrial Animal Health Code. The OIE Scientific Commission noted that limited surveillance data were available on the prevalence of CPrD and that the evidence was not enough to measure, at that time, the impact of the disease on animal or public health. Therefore, it was concluded that, with the current knowledge, CPrD did not currently meet the criteria to be considered an emerging disease.

Nonetheless, it was emphasized that CPrD should be considered as a new disease not to be overlooked and called for the collection of further scientific evidence through research and surveillance in the affected countries and in countries with dromedary camel populations to measure the impact of the disease. As new scientific evidence becomes available, the OIE Scientific Commission will reassess whether this disease should be considered as an emerging disease. At the regional level, CPrD was first discussed in the 18th Joint Permanent Committee of the Mediterranean Animal Health Network (REMESA) held in Cairo, Egypt, in June 2019 and at the 15th Conference of the OIE Regional Commission for the Middle East in November. During this conference, the CAMENET launched a wide-ranging proposal for training, coordinated surveillance and research on CPrD. In addition, the ERFAN (Enhancing Research for Africa Network), a platform aimed at enhancing scientific cooperation between Africa and Italy, during its 2nd ERFAN meeting for North Africa, presented a project on CPrD with the objective of increasing CPrD coordinated surveillance in North Africa.

The OIE, through its Reference Laboratories for prion diseases, and by involving the above scientific initiatives, is keeping a close watch on the evolution of the disease to gather scientific evidence and to allow a proper and more thorough assessment of the risk associated with this novel disease.

III. Case definition

snip...see;

Tuesday, April 27, 2021 

Working Document on Camel Prion Disease (CPrD) 14/09/2020


TUESDAY, JUNE 8, 2021 

***> Bovine spongiform encephalopathy: the effect of oral exposure dose on attack rate and incubation period in cattle


***> AS is considered more likely (subjective probability range 50–66%) that AS is a non-contagious, rather than a contagious, disease.

ATYPICAL SCRAPIE ROUGHLY HAS 50 50 CHANCE ATYPICAL SCRAPIE IS CONTAGIOUS, AS NON-CONTAGIOUS, TAKE YOUR PICK, BUT I SAID IT LONG AGO WHEN USDA OIE ET AL MADE ATYPICAL SCRAPIE A LEGAL TRADING COMODITY, I SAID YOUR PUTTING THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE, AND THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT THEY DID, and it's called in Texas, TEXAS TSE PRION HOLDEM POKER, WHO'S ALL IN $$$

THURSDAY, JULY 8, 2021

EFSA Scientific report on the analysis of the 2‐year compulsory intensified monitoring of atypical scrapie


MONDAY, JUNE 28, 2021 

BSE can propagate in sheep co‑infected or pre‑infected with scrapie


THURSDAY, DECEMBER 31, 2020 

Autoclave treatment of the classical scrapie agent US No. 13-7 and experimental inoculation to susceptible VRQ/ARQ sheep via the oral route results in decreased transmission efficiency


WEDNESDAY, MAY 29, 2019 

***> Incomplete inactivation of atypical scrapie following recommended autoclave decontamination procedures 

USDA HERE'S YOUR SIGN!


SATURDAY, AUGUST 16, 2008

Qualitative Analysis of BSE Risk Factors in the United States February 13, 2000 at 3:37 pm PST (BSE red book)


Sunday, January 10, 2021 
APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087] Singeltary Submission June 17, 2019

APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087] Singeltary Submission

Greetings APHIS et al, 

I would kindly like to comment on APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087], and my comments are as follows, with the latest peer review and transmission studies as references of evidence.

THE OIE/USDA BSE Minimal Risk Region MRR is nothing more than free pass to import and export the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion disease. December 2003, when the USDA et al lost it's supposedly 'GOLD CARD' ie BSE FREE STATUS (that was based on nothing more than not looking and not finding BSE), once the USA lost it's gold card BSE Free status, the USDA OIE et al worked hard and fast to change the BSE Geographical Risk Statuses i.e. the BSE GBR's, and replaced it with the BSE MRR policy, the legal tool to trade mad cow type disease TSE Prion Globally. The USA is doing just what the UK did, when they shipped mad cow disease around the world, except with the BSE MRR policy, it's now legal. 

Also, the whole concept of the BSE MRR policy is based on a false pretense, that atypical BSE is not transmissible, and that only typical c-BSE is transmissible via feed. This notion that atypical BSE TSE Prion is an old age cow disease that is not infectious is absolutely false, there is NO science to show this, and on the contrary, we now know that atypical BSE will transmit by ORAL ROUTES, but even much more concerning now, recent science has shown that Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion in deer and elk which is rampant with no stopping is sight in the USA, and Scrapie TSE Prion in sheep and goat, will transmit to PIGS by oral routes, this is our worst nightmare, showing even more risk factors for the USA FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED ban. 

The FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED ban has failed terribly bad, and is still failing, since August 1997. there is tonnage and tonnage of banned potential mad cow feed that went into commerce, and still is, with one decade, 10 YEARS, post August 1997 FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED ban, 2007, with 10,000,000 POUNDS, with REASON, Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. you can see all these feed ban warning letters and tonnage of mad cow feed in commerce, year after year, that is not accessible on the internet anymore like it use to be, you can see history of the FDA failure August 1997 FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED ban here, but remember this, we have a new outbreak of TSE Prion disease in a new livestock species, the camel, and this too is very worrisome.

WITH the OIE and the USDA et al weakening the global TSE prion surveillance, by not classifying the atypical Scrapie as TSE Prion disease, and the notion that they want to do the same thing with typical scrapie and atypical BSE, it's just not scientific.

WE MUST abolish the BSE MRR policy, go back to the BSE GBR risk assessments by country, and enhance them to include all strains of TSE Prion disease in all species. With Chronic Wasting CWD TSE Prion disease spreading in Europe, now including, Norway, Finland, Sweden, also in Korea, Canada and the USA, and the TSE Prion in Camels, the fact the the USA is feeding potentially CWD, Scrapie, BSE, typical and atypical, to other animals, and shipping both this feed and or live animals or even grains around the globe, potentially exposed or infected with the TSE Prion. this APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087], under it's present definition, does NOT show the true risk of the TSE Prion in any country. as i said, it's nothing more than a legal tool to trade the TSE Prion around the globe, nothing but ink on paper.

AS long as the BSE MRR policy stays in effect, TSE Prion disease will continued to be bought and sold as food for both humans and animals around the globe, and the future ramifications from friendly fire there from, i.e. iatrogenic exposure and transmission there from from all of the above, should not be underestimated. ... 



Sunday, January 10, 2021 

APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087] Singeltary Submission June 17, 2019

Owens, Julie 

From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net

Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM To: FSIS RegulationsComments 

Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Page 1 of 98 8/3/2006 

Greetings FSIS, I would kindly like to comment on the following ;


APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018- 0087] Singeltary Submission [Federal Register Volume 84, Number 116 (Monday, June 17, 2019)] [Notices] [Pages 28001-28002] From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov] [FR Doc No: 2019-12654] 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087] Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy AGENCY: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA. ACTION: Notice. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
SUMMARY: We are advising the public of our preliminary concurrence with the World Organization for Animal Health's (OIE) bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) risk designation for Nicaragua. The OIE recognizes this region as being of negligible risk for BSE. We are taking this action based on our review of information supporting the OIE's risk designation for this region.


Jan 13, 2015 — Page 1 of 2 regulations.gov. Comment from Terry Singeltary Sr. ... overtook the BSE GBR risk assessments for each country, and then.


$$$***> Why is USDA "only" BSE TSE Prion testing 25,000 samples a year? <***$$$ 

THURSDAY, AUGUST 20, 2020 

Why is USDA "only" BSE TSE Prion testing 25,000 samples a year?


WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 2021 

USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 2020 IMPACT REPORT BSE TSE Prion Testing and Surveillance MIA


WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 2020

EFSA Evaluation of public and animal health risks in case of a delayed post-mortem inspection in ungulates EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) ADOPTED: 21 October 2020

i wonder if a 7 month delay on a suspect BSE case in Texas is too long, on a 48 hour turnaround, asking for a friend???


MONDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2020 

***> REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR ANIMAL DISEASES Paris, 9–13 September 2019 BSE, TSE, PRION

see updated concerns with atypical BSE from feed and zoonosis...terry


WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 23, 2020


BSE research project final report 2005 to 2008 SE1796 SID5

***>As a result, using more sensitive diagnostic assays, we were able to diagnose BSE positive cattle from the years 1997-1999 inclusive that were originally negative by vacuolation.  From these data we have estimated that approximately 3% of the total suspect cases submitted up until the year 1999 were mis-diagnosed. 

YOU know, Confucius is confused again LOL, i seem to have remembered something in line with this here in the USA...

BSE research project final report 2005 to 2008 SE1796 SID5



RE-Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada

Posted by flounder on 19 May 2010 at 21:21 GMT

Greetings,

>>> The occurrence of atypical cases of BSE in countries such as Canada with low BSE prevalence and transmission risk argues for the occurrence of sporadic forms of BSE worldwide. <<<

In my opinion ;

THE statement above is about as non-scientific as a statement can be. There is no proof what-so-ever that any of the atypical BSE cases or atypical scrapie cases anywhere on the globe was a spontaneous case without any route and source of the TSE agent. This is a myth. The USDA and the OIE are trying to make the atypical BSE cases and they have already made the atypical Scrapie cases a legal trading commodity, without any transmission studies first confirming that in fact these atypical TSE will not transmit via feed. I suppose it is a human transmission study in progress. IT's like what happened in England with c-BSE and the transmission to humans via nvCJD never happened to the OIE and the USDA. Canada does not have a low prevalence of BSE either, they have a high prevalence. WHO knows about North America ? it's just that the U.S.A. try's much harder at concealing cases of mad cow disease. THIS was proven with the first stumbling and staggering mad cow in Texas, that was Wisk away to be rendered without any test at all. Then, you had the second case of mad cow disease that the USDA et al was almost as successful with as the first one, but the O.I.G. stepped in and demanded testing over seas, this after many scientist around the globe spoke out. Finally, after an act of Congress, the second case of mad cow disease in Texas was confirmed. all this was done for a reason, and that reason was the OIE USDA BSE MRR policy. Again, This study reeks of TRADE policy wrangling. There is NO proof that the atypical TSE are spontaneous. please show me these transmission studies ? on the other hand, we now know that the L-type atypical BSE is much more virulent than the typical C-BSE, and we now know that the H-type atypical BSE will transmit to humans. WHY can it not be that these atypical cases are simply from feed that had different strains of TSE ? WHY is it that no one will comment on the studies that was suppose to show infectivity of tissues from atypical BSE ? WHY is it I had to file a FOIA on that issue? L-type atypical BSE (BASE) is more virulent than classical BSE, has a lymphotropic phenotype, and displays a modest transmission barrier in our humanized mice. BSE-H is also transmissible in our humanized Tg mice. SEE Liuting Qing1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5, Qingzhong Kong1 et al 2009 ;

Atypical BSE, BSE, and other human and animal TSE in North America Update October 19, 2009

snip...

I ask Professor Kong ;

Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM

Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment

IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....

Professor Kong reply ;

.....snip

As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete. Thanks for your interest.

Best regards, Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA 

P.4.23 Transmission of atypical BSE in humanized mouse models

Liuting Qing1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5, Qingzhong Kong1 1Case Western Reserve University, USA; 2Instituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Italy; 3Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Germany; 4National Veterinary Research Institute, Poland; 5Kansas State University (Previously at USDA National Animal Disease Center), USA

Background: Classical BSE is a world-wide prion disease in cattle, and the classical BSE strain (BSE-C) has led to over 200 cases of clinical human infection (variant CJD). Atypical BSE cases have been discovered in three continents since 2004; they include the L-type (also named BASE), the H-type, and the first reported case of naturally occurring BSE with mutated bovine PRNP (termed BSE-M). The public health risks posed by atypical BSE were argely undefined.

Objectives: To investigate these atypical BSE types in terms of their transmissibility and phenotypes in humanized mice.

Methods: Transgenic mice expressing human PrP were inoculated with several classical (C-type) and atypical (L-, H-, or Mtype) BSE isolates, and the transmission rate, incubation time, characteristics and distribution of PrPSc, symptoms, and histopathology were or will be examined and compared.

Results: Sixty percent of BASE-inoculated humanized mice became infected with minimal spongiosis and an average incubation time of 20-22 months, whereas only one of the C-type BSE-inoculated mice developed prion disease after more than 2 years. Protease-resistant PrPSc in BASE-infected humanized Tg mouse brains was biochemically different from bovine BASE or sCJD. PrPSc was also detected in the spleen of 22% of BASE-infected humanized mice, but not in those infected with sCJD. Secondary transmission of BASE in the humanized mice led to a small reduction in incubation time. The atypical BSE-H strain is also transmissible with distinct phenotypes in the humanized mice, but no BSE-M transmission has been observed so far.

Discussion: Our results demonstrate that BASE is more virulent than classical BSE, has a lymphotropic phenotype, and displays a modest transmission barrier in our humanized mice. BSE-H is also transmissible in our humanized Tg mice. The possibility of more than two atypical BSE strains will be discussed.

Supported by NINDS NS052319, NIA AG14359, and NIH AI 77774. 


see full text ;


14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases H-type and L-type Atypical BSE January 2010 (special pre-congress edition)

18.173 page 189

Experimental Challenge of Cattle with H-type and L-type Atypical BSE

A. Buschmann1, U. Ziegler1, M. Keller1, R. Rogers2, B. Hills3, M.H. Groschup1. 1Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany, 2Health Canada, Bureau of Microbial Hazards, Health Products & Food Branch, Ottawa, Canada, 3Health Canada, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Secretariat, Ottawa, Canada

Background: After the detection of two novel BSE forms designated H-type and L-type atypical BSE the question of the pathogenesis and the agent distribution of these two types in cattle was fully open. From initial studies of the brain pathology, it was already known that the anatomical distribution of L-type BSE differs from that of the classical type where the obex region in the brainstem always displays the highest PrPSc concentrations. In contrast in L-type BSE cases, the thalamus and frontal cortex regions showed the highest levels of the pathological prion protein, while the obex region was only weakly involved.

Methods:We performed intracranial inoculations of cattle (five and six per group) using 10%brainstemhomogenates of the two German H- and L-type atypical BSE isolates. The animals were inoculated under narcosis and then kept in a free-ranging stable under appropriate biosafety conditions. At least one animal per group was killed and sectioned in the preclinical stage and the remaining animals were kept until they developed clinical symptoms. The animals were examined for behavioural changes every four weeks throughout the experiment following a protocol that had been established during earlier BSE pathogenesis studies with classical BSE.

Results and Discussion: All animals of both groups developed clinical symptoms and had to be euthanized within 16 months. The clinical picture differed from that of classical BSE, as the earliest signs of illness were loss of body weight and depression. However, the animals later developed hind limb ataxia and hyperesthesia predominantly and the head. Analysis of brain samples from these animals confirmed the BSE infection and the atypical Western blot profile was maintained in all animals. Samples from these animals are now being examined in order to be able to describe the pathoge esis and agent distribution for these novel BSE types.

Conclusions: A pilot study using a commercially avaialble BSE rapid test ELISA revealed an essential restriction of PrPSc to the central nervous system for both atypical BSE forms. A much more detailed analysis for PrPSc and infectivity is still ongoing.




14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure - Final Abstract Number: ISE.114

Session: International Scientific Exchange

Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009

T. Singeltary Bacliff, TX, USA

Background: An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.

Methods: 12 years independent research of available data

Results: I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.

Conclusion: I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.


Wednesday, February 24, 2010

Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America 14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -


TSE


URGENT DATA ON ATYPICAL BSE RISK FACTORS TO HUMANS AND ANIMALS OIE REFUSE TO ACKNOWLEDGE $

position: Post Doctoral Fellow

Atypical BSE in Cattle

Closing date: December 24, 2009

Anticipated start date: January/February 2010

Employer: Canadian and OIE Reference Laboratories for BSE CFIA Lethbridge Laboratory, Lethbridge/Alberta

snip...

To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-t pe and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.


Sunday, April 4, 2010

USDA AND OIE OUT OF TOUCH WITH RISK FACTOR ON ATYPICAL TSE


IN FACT, the fumbling and bumbling the USDA and FDA et al did with the infamous 2004 enhanced BSE surveillance program was so BAD, one of the leading scientist for the NIH/CDC et al on prions, Dr. Paul Brown was quoted as saying ;

"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that." Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive. USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general. "Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...

snip...end

see FULL TEXT HERE ;

Wednesday, May 19, 2010

Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada


No competing interests declared.


PLOS ONE Journal 

IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure 

Terry S. Singeltary Sr., 03 Jul 2015 at 16:53 GMT

***however in 1 C-type challenged animal, Prion 2015 Poster Abstracts S67 PrPsc was not detected using rapid tests for BSE.

***Subsequent testing resulted in the detection of pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc detection by PMCA only.

*** IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure ***

http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action?root=86610

*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;

THURSDAY, AUGUST 19, 2021 

TME to cattle equal atypical L-type BSE USA, madcow origin, what if?


Saturday, August 14, 2010

BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY

(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)


2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006


***> Wednesday, January 23, 2019 

***> CFIA SFCR Guidance on Specified risk material (SRM) came into force on January 15, 2019 <***


TUESDAY, JANUARY 5, 2021 

Exploration of genetic factors resulting in abnormal disease in cattle experimentally challenged with bovine spongiform encephalopathy


TUESDAY, AUGUST 17, 2021 

EU Feed ban Commission authorises use of certain animal proteins, risk another mad cow type outbreak


SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 2021 

Brazil Confirms TWO More Cases of Mad Cow Disease BSE States of Mato Grosso and Minas Gerais 


MONDAY, APRIL 19, 2021 

OIE WAHIS Spain confirm bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)


THURSDAY, JANUARY 7, 2021 

Bovine spongiform encephalopathy, Spain OIE


TUESDAY, MAY 26, 2020 

Ireland OIE Atypical BSE H-type 


WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 2020 

Switzerland OIE Bovine spongiform encephalopathy atypical BSE type L TSE Prion


SATURDAY, MARCH 13, 2021 

Canada's application for negligible risk status for BSE passes an important milestone?

does not pass the smell test...tss


TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2020 

The European Union summary report on surveillance for the presence of transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) in 2019 First published 17 November 2020


WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 2020 

EFSA Annual report of the Scientific Network on BSE-TSE 2020 Singeltary Submission


THURSDAY, AUGUST 19, 2021 

TME to cattle equal atypical L-type BSE USA, madcow origin, what if?


FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2021 

Transmission of the atypical/Nor98 scrapie agent to Suffolk sheep with VRQ/ARQ, ARQ/ARQ, and ARQ/ARR genotypes


WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 03, 2021 

Scrapie TSE Prion United States of America a Review February 2021 Singeltary et al


THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 2021 

Guidance for reporting 2021 surveillance data on Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSE) 

APPROVED: 1 February 2021


SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 2021 

Recognition of the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Risk Status of Members Adapted Procedure, May 2020


CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION


Fri, Sep 3, 2021 5:02 pm


comments comments@tahc.texas.govHide


To Terry Singeltary flounder9@verizon.net


Cc comments comments@tahc.texas.gov


Mr. Singeltary,


This email is to acknowledge receipt of your proposed rule comments. Thank you for your interest and participation in the Texas Animal Health Commission’s rulemaking process.


Sincerely,


Amanda 


Amanda Bernhard


Assistant to the Executive Director


Texas Animal Health Commission


512-719-0704


www.tahc.texas.gov 


***> 1st and foremost your biggest problem is 'VOLUNTARY'! AS with the BSE 589.2001 FEED REGULATIONS, especially since it is still voluntary with cervid, knowing full well that cwd and scrapie will transmit to pigs by oral route. VOLUNTARY DOES NOT WORK! all animal products should be banned and be made mandatory, and the herd certification program should be mandatory, or you don't move cervid. IF THE CWD HERD CERTIFICATION IS NOT MANDATORY, it will be another colossal tse prion failure from the start.

***> 2nd USA should declare a Declaration of Extraordinary Emergency due to CWD, and all exports of cervid and cervid products must be stopped internationally, and there should be a ban of interstate movement of cervid, until a live cwd test is available.

***> 3rd Captive Farmed cervid ESCAPEES should be made mandatory to report immediately, and strict regulations for those suspect cwd deer that just happen to disappear. IF a cervid escapes and is not found, that farm should be indefinitely shut down, all movement, until aid MIA cervid is found, and if not ever found, that farm shut down permanently.

***> 4th Captive Farmed Cervid, INDEMNITY, NO MORE Federal indemnity program, or what i call, ENTITLEMENT PROGRAM for game farm industry. NO MORE BAIL OUTS FROM TAX PAYERS. if the captive industry can't buy insurance to protect not only themselves, but also their customers, and especially the STATE, from Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion or what some call mad deer disease and harm therefrom, IF they can't afford to buy that insurance that will cover all of it, then they DO NOT GET A PERMIT to have a game farm for anything. This CWD TSE Prion can/could/has caused property values to fall from some reports in some places. roll the dice, how much is a state willing to lose?

***> 5th QUARANTINE OF ALL FARMED CAPTIVE, BREEDERS, URINE, ANTLER, VELVET, SPERM, OR ANY FACILITY, AND THEIR PRODUCTS, that has been confirmed to have Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion, the QUARANTINE should be for 21 years due to science showing what scrapie can do. 5 years is NOT near long enough. see; Infectious agent of sheep scrapie may persist in the environment for at least 16 to 21 years.

***> 6th America BSE 589.2001 FEED REGULATIONS CWD TSE Prion

***> 7TH TRUCKING TRANSPORTING CERVID CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE TSE PRION VIOLATING THE LACEY ACT

***> 8TH ALL CAPTIVE FARMING CERVID OPERATIONS MUST BE INSURED TO PAY FOR ANY CLEAN UP OF CWD AND QUARANTINE THERE FROM FOR THE STATE, NO MORE ENTITLEMENT PROGRAM FOR CERVID GAME FARMING PAY TO PLAY FOR CWD TSE PRION OFF THE TAX PAYERS BACK.

***> 9TH ANY STATE WITH DOCUMENTED CWD, INTERSTATE, NATIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT OF ALL CERVID, AND ALL CERVID PRODUCTS MUST BE HALTED!

***> 10TH BAN THE SALE OF STRAW BRED BUCKS AND ALL CERVID SEMEN AND URINE PRODUCTS

***> 11th ALL CAPTIVE FARMED CERVID AND THEIR PRODUCTS MUST BE CWD TSE PRION TESTED ANNUALLY AND BEFORE SALE FOR CWD TSE PRION

SEE FULL SCIENCE REFERENCES AND REASONINGS ;

Control of Chronic Wasting Disease OMB Control Number: 0579-0189 APHIS-2021-0004 Singeltary Submission



Docket No. APHIS-2018-0011 Chronic Wasting Disease Herd Certification



5 or 6 years quarantine is NOT LONG ENOUGH FOR CWD TSE PRION !!!

QUARANTINE NEEDS TO BE 21 YEARS FOR CWD TSE PRION !

FRIDAY, APRIL 30, 2021 

Should Property Evaluations Contain Scrapie, CWD, TSE PRION Environmental Contamination of the land?

***> Confidential!!!!

***> As early as 1992-3 there had been long studies conducted on small pastures containing scrapie infected sheep at the sheep research station associated with the Neuropathogenesis Unit in Edinburgh, Scotland. Whether these are documented...I don't know. But personal recounts both heard and recorded in a daily journal indicate that leaving the pastures free and replacing the topsoil completely at least 2 feet of thickness each year for SEVEN years....and then when very clean (proven scrapie free) sheep were placed on these small pastures.... the new sheep also broke out with scrapie and passed it to offspring. I am not sure that TSE contaminated ground could ever be free of the agent!! A very frightening revelation!!!

---end personal email---end...tss


WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 11, 2021 

 

TAHC Chapter 40, Chronic Wasting Disease Terry Singeltary Comment Submission

 


FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 03, 2021 

Wisconsin Outagamie County Deer Farm Tests Positive for CWD


WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 01, 2021 

Wisconsin Langlade County Deer Farm Tests Positive for CWD


WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 01, 2021 

Michigan CWD TSE Prion 211 Cases To Date


TUESDAY, AUGUST 31, 2021 

TENNESSEE CWD TSE PRION CONFIRMED TO DATE 1300 POSITIVES IN 3 YEARS

''TURNS OUT WE HAVE A LOT OF IT, OVER A PRETTY BROAD AREA''


WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 25, 2021 

Arkansas CWD TSE Prion 1113 CONFIRMED TO DATE JUST TIP OF ICEBERG 

Public Meeting Mississippi, AR VIDEO 


TUESDAY, AUGUST 17, 2021 

Pennsylvania HUNTERS SHOULD BE AWARE OF ENHANCED CWD PROTECTIONS 08/17/2021

To date, CWD has been found in 727 deer. 


MONDAY, APRIL 26, 2021 

Missouri MDC REPORTS FINAL CWD RESULTS FOR 2020-2021 44 POSITIVE WITH TOTAL TO DATE 206 CONFIRMED


WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 18, 2021 

Mississippi CWD TSE Prion Confirmed 82 Positives (Since February 2018) With Suspect Positive 1


MONDAY, AUGUST 30, 2021 

MONTANA CWD TSE PRION UPDATE What's new for chronic wasting disease (CWD) management for 2021


MONDAY, AUGUST 30, 2021 

North Dakota CWD Big Game Transport Rules, Hunting Big Game Over Bait, 26 deer have tested positive to date


SUNDAY, AUGUST 15, 2021 

New Mexico CWD TEST RESULTS 1/19/2021 update


FRIDAY, AUGUST 13, 2021 

Ohio Annual Deer Program Summary Spring 2021 CWD TSE Prion Update


FRIDAY, AUGUST 13, 2021 

West Virginia DNR CWD TSE Prion CWD has been found in 451 white-tailed deer to date 


WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 18, 2021 

Utah 131 mule deer and three elk have tested positive for CWD in Utah, to date


Sent: Fri, Aug 27, 2021 11:08 am

Subject: Chronic Wasting Disease from pigs is infectious in transgenic mice expressing human PRNP

FRIDAY, AUGUST 27, 2021 

Chronic Wasting Disease from pigs is infectious in transgenic mice expressing human PRNP



FRIDAY, AUGUST 27, 2021 

Cattle are highly susceptible to white-tailed deer CWD and mule deer CWD in experimental conditions


SUNDAY, DECEMBER 20, 2020 

Second passage of chronic wasting disease of mule deer in sheep compared to classical scrapie after intracranial inoculation


THURSDAY, DECEMBER 19, 2019 

TSE surveillance statistics exotic species and domestic cats Update December 2019


***> CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE TSE PRP HUMANS ZOONOSIS ZOONOTIC <***

WHAT WE HAVE HERE, IS A LACK OF COMMUNICATION!

seems to me we might have another zoonotic tse prion disease, OR multiple new tse prion zoonotic diseases, that no one wants to talk about, and that's bad...terry

i thought i might share some news about cwd zoonosis that i got, that i cannot share or post to the public yet, i promised for various reasons, one that it will cause a shit storm for sure, but it was something i really already knew from previous studies, but, i was told that ;

==================

''As you can imagine, 2 and 5 (especially 5) may raise alarms.  The evidence we have for 4 are not as strong or tight as I would like to have.   At this point, please do not post any of the points publicly yet, but you can refer to points 1-3 in private discussions and all 5 points when discussing with relevant public officials to highlight the long-term risks of CWD zoonosis.''

====================

so, i figure your as about as official as it gets, and i think this science is extremely important for you to know and to converse about with your officials. it's about to burn a whole in my pocket. this is about as close as it will ever get for cwd zoonosis to be proven in my time, this and what Canada Czub et al found with the Macaques, plus an old study from cjd surveillance unit back that showed cjd and a 9% increase in risk from folks that eat venison, i will post all this below for your files Sir. i remember back in the BSE nvCJD days, from when the first BSE case in bovine was confirmed around 1984 maybe 83, i forget the good vets named that screwed it up first, Carol something, but from 83ish to 95 96 when nvCJD was linked to humans from BSE in cattle, so that took 10 to 15 years. hell, at that rate, especially with Texas and cwd zoonsis, hell, i'll be dead before it's official, if ever, so here ya go Sir. there was a grant study on cwd zoonosis that had been going on for some time, i followed it over the years, then the grant date for said study had expired, so, i thought i would write the good Professor about said study i.e. Professor Kong, CWRU et al. i will post the grant study abstract first, and then after that, what reply i got back, about said study that i was told not to post/publish...

CWD ZOONOSIS GRANT FIRST;

===============

Cervid to human prion transmission

Kong, Qingzhong 

Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, United States

 Abstract Prion disease is transmissible and invariably fatal. Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is the prion disease affecting deer, elk and moose, and it is a widespread and expanding epidemic affecting 22 US States and 2 Canadian provinces so far. CWD poses the most serious zoonotic prion transmission risks in North America because of huge venison consumption (>6 million deer/elk hunted and consumed annually in the USA alone), significant prion infectivity in muscles and other tissues/fluids from CWD-affected cervids, and usually high levels of individual exposure to CWD resulting from consumption of the affected animal among often just family and friends. However, we still do not know whether CWD prions can infect humans in the brain or peripheral tissues or whether clinical/asymptomatic CWD zoonosis has already occurred, and we have no essays to reliably detect CWD infection in humans. We hypothesize that: (1) The classic CWD prion strain can infect humans at low levels in the brain and peripheral lymphoid tissues; (2) The cervid-to-human transmission barrier is dependent on the cervid prion strain and influenced by the host (human) prion protein (PrP) primary sequence; (3) Reliable essays can be established to detect CWD infection in humans; and (4) CWD transmission to humans has already occurred. We will test these hypotheses in 4 Aims using transgenic (Tg) mouse models and complementary in vitro approaches. 

Aim 1 will prove that the classical CWD strain may infect humans in brain or peripheral lymphoid tissues at low levels by conducting systemic bioassays in a set of humanized Tg mouse lines expressing common human PrP variants using a number of CWD isolates at varying doses and routes. Experimental human CWD samples will also be generated for Aim 3. 

Aim 2 will test the hypothesis that the cervid-to-human prion transmission barrier is dependent on prion strain and influenced by the host (human) PrP sequence by examining and comparing the transmission efficiency and phenotypes of several atypical/unusual CWD isolates/strains as well as a few prion strains from other species that have adapted to cervid PrP sequence, utilizing the same panel of humanized Tg mouse lines as in Aim 1. 

Aim 3 will establish reliable essays for detection and surveillance of CWD infection in humans by examining in details the clinical, pathological, biochemical and in vitro seeding properties of existing and future experimental human CWD samples generated from Aims 1-2 and compare them with those of common sporadic human Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (sCJD) prions. 

Aim 4 will attempt to detect clinical CWD-affected human cases by examining a significant number of brain samples from prion-affected human subjects in the USA and Canada who have consumed venison from CWD-endemic areas utilizing the criteria and essays established in Aim 3. The findings from this proposal will greatly advance our understandings on the potential and characteristics of cervid prion transmission in humans, establish reliable essays for CWD zoonosis and potentially discover the first case(s) of CWD infection in humans.

Public Health Relevance There are significant and increasing human exposure to cervid prions because chronic wasting disease (CWD, a widespread and highly infectious prion disease among deer and elk in North America) continues spreading and consumption of venison remains popular, but our understanding on cervid-to-human prion transmission is still very limited, raising public health concerns. This proposal aims to define the zoonotic risks of cervid prions and set up and apply essays to detect CWD zoonosis using mouse models and in vitro methods. The findings will greatly expand our knowledge on the potentials and characteristics of cervid prion transmission in humans, establish reliable essays for such infections and may discover the first case(s) of CWD infection in humans.

 Funding Agency Agency National Institute of Health (NIH) Institute National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS) Type Research Project (R01) Project # 1R01NS088604-01A1 Application # 9037884 Study Section Cellular and Molecular Biology of Neurodegeneration Study Section (CMND) Program Officer Wong, May Project Start 2015-09-30 Project End 2019-07-31 Budget Start 2015-09-30 Budget End 2016-07-31 Support Year 1 Fiscal Year 2015 Total Cost $337,507 Indirect Cost $118,756

snip... 


Professor Kongs reply to me just this month about above grant study that has NOT been published in peer reveiw yet...

=================================

Here is a brief summary of our findings:

snip...can't post, made a promise...tss

On Sat, Apr 3, 2021 at 12:19 PM Terry Singeltary <flounder9@verizon.net> wrote:

snip...

end...tss

==============

CWD ZOONOSIS THE FULL MONTY TO DATE

International Conference on Emerging Diseases, Outbreaks & Case Studies & 16th Annual Meeting on Influenza March 28-29, 2018 | Orlando, USA

Qingzhong Kong

Case Western Reserve University School of Medicine, USA

Zoonotic potential of chronic wasting disease prions from cervids

Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is the prion disease in cervids (mule deer, white-tailed deer, American elk, moose, and reindeer). It has become an epidemic in North America, and it has been detected in the Europe (Norway) since 2016. The widespread CWD and popular hunting and consumption of cervid meat and other products raise serious public health concerns, but questions remain on human susceptibility to CWD prions, especially on the potential difference in zoonotic potential among the various CWD prion strains. We have been working to address this critical question for well over a decade. We used CWD samples from various cervid species to inoculate transgenic mice expressing human or elk prion protein (PrP). We found infectious prions in the spleen or brain in a small fraction of CWD-inoculated transgenic mice expressing human PrP, indicating that humans are not completely resistant to CWD prions; this finding has significant ramifications on the public health impact of CWD prions. The influence of cervid PrP polymorphisms, the prion strain dependence of CWD-to-human transmission barrier, and the characterization of experimental human CWD prions will be discussed.

Speaker Biography Qingzhong Kong has completed his PhD from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst and Post-doctoral studies at Yale University. He is currently an Associate Professor of Pathology, Neurology and Regenerative Medicine. He has published over 50 original research papers in reputable journals (including Science Translational Medicine, JCI, PNAS and Cell Reports) and has been serving as an Editorial Board Member on seven scientific journals. He has multiple research interests, including public health risks of animal prions (CWD of cervids and atypical BSE of cattle), animal modeling of human prion diseases, mechanisms of prion replication and pathogenesis, etiology of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (CJD) in humans, normal cellular PrP in the biology and pathology of multiple brain and peripheral diseases, proteins responsible for the α-cleavage of cellular PrP, as well as gene therapy and DNA vaccination.






SUNDAY, JULY 25, 2021 

North American and Norwegian Chronic Wasting Disease prions exhibit different potential for interspecies transmission and zoonotic risk 

''Our data suggest that reindeer and red deer from Norway could be the most transmissible CWD prions to other mammals, whereas North American CWD prions were more prone to generate human prions in vitro.''


MONDAY, JULY 19, 2021 

***> U Calgary researchers at work on a vaccine against a fatal infectious disease affecting deer and potentially people


Prion Conference 2018 Abstracts

BSE aka MAD COW DISEASE, was first discovered in 1984, and it took until 1995 to finally admit that BSE was causing nvCJD, the rest there is history, but that science is still evolving i.e. science now shows that indeed atypical L-type BSE, atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and typical Scrapie are all zoonosis, zoonotic for humans, there from. 

HOW long are we going to wait for Chronic Wasting Disease, CWD TSE Prion of Cervid, and zoonosis, zoonotic tranmission to humans there from?

Studies have shown since 1994 that humans are susceptible to CWD TSE Prion, so, what's the hold up with making CWD a zoonotic zoonosis disease, the iatrogenic transmissions there from is not waiting for someone to make a decision.

Prion Conference 2018 Abstracts

P190 Human prion disease mortality rates by occurrence of chronic wasting disease in freeranging cervids, United States

Abrams JY (1), Maddox RA (1), Schonberger LB (1), Person MK (1), Appleby BS (2), Belay ED (1)

(1) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Atlanta, GA, USA (2) Case Western Reserve University, National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center (NPDPSC), Cleveland, OH, USA.

Background

Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a prion disease of deer and elk that has been identified in freeranging cervids in 23 US states. While there is currently no epidemiological evidence for zoonotic transmission through the consumption of contaminated venison, studies suggest the CWD agent can cross the species barrier in experimental models designed to closely mimic humans. We compared rates of human prion disease in states with and without CWD to examine the possibility of undetermined zoonotic transmission.

Methods

Death records from the National Center for Health Statistics, case records from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center, and additional state case reports were combined to create a database of human prion disease cases from 2003-2015. Identification of CWD in each state was determined through reports of positive CWD tests by state wildlife agencies. Age- and race-adjusted mortality rates for human prion disease, excluding cases with known etiology, were determined for four categories of states based on CWD occurrence: highly endemic (>16 counties with CWD identified in free-ranging cervids); moderately endemic (3-10 counties with CWD); low endemic (1-2 counties with CWD); and no CWD states. States were counted as having no CWD until the year CWD was first identified. Analyses stratified by age, sex, and time period were also conducted to focus on subgroups for which zoonotic transmission would be more likely to be detected: cases <55 years old, male sex, and the latter half of the study (2010-2015).

Results

Highly endemic states had a higher rate of prion disease mortality compared to non-CWD states (rate ratio [RR]: 1.12, 95% confidence interval [CI] = 1.01 - 1.23), as did low endemic states (RR: 1.15, 95% CI = 1.04 - 1.27). Moderately endemic states did not have an elevated mortality rate (RR: 1.05, 95% CI = 0.93 - 1.17). In age-stratified analyses, prion disease mortality rates among the <55 year old population were elevated for moderately endemic states (RR: 1.57, 95% CI = 1.10 – 2.24) while mortality rates were elevated among those ≥55 for highly endemic states (RR: 1.13, 95% CI = 1.02 - 1.26) and low endemic states (RR: 1.16, 95% CI = 1.04 - 1.29). In other stratified analyses, prion disease mortality rates for males were only elevated for low endemic states (RR: 1.27, 95% CI = 1.10 - 1.48), and none of the categories of CWD-endemic states had elevated mortality rates for the latter time period (2010-2015).

Conclusions

While higher prion disease mortality rates in certain categories of states with CWD in free-ranging cervids were noted, additional stratified analyses did not reveal markedly elevated rates for potentially sensitive subgroups that would be suggestive of zoonotic transmission. Unknown confounding factors or other biases may explain state-by-state differences in prion disease mortality.

=====

P172 Peripheral Neuropathy in Patients with Prion Disease

Wang H(1), Cohen M(1), Appleby BS(1,2)

(1) University Hospitals Cleveland Medical Center, Cleveland, Ohio (2) National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center, Cleveland, Ohio.

Prion disease is a fatal progressive neurodegenerative disease due to deposition of an abnormal protease-resistant isoform of prion protein. Typical symptoms include rapidly progressive dementia, myoclonus, visual disturbance and hallucinations. Interestingly, in patients with prion disease, the abnormal protein canould also be found in the peripheral nervous system. Case reports of prion deposition in peripheral nerves have been reported. Peripheral nerve involvement is thought to be uncommon; however, little is known about the exact prevalence and features of peripheral neuropathy in patients with prion disease.

We reviewed autopsy-proven prion cases from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center that were diagnosed between September 2016 to March 2017. We collected information regarding prion protein diagnosis, demographics, comorbidities, clinical symptoms, physical exam, neuropathology, molecular subtype, genetics lab, brain MRI, image and EMG reports. Our study included 104 patients. Thirteen (12.5%) patients had either subjective symptoms or objective signs of peripheral neuropathy. Among these 13 patients, 3 had other known potential etiologies of peripheral neuropathy such as vitamin B12 deficiency or prior chemotherapy. Among 10 patients that had no other clear etiology, 3 (30%) had familial CJD. The most common sCJD subtype was MV1-2 (30%), followed by MM1-2 (20%). The Majority of cases wasere male (60%). Half of them had exposure to wild game. The most common subjective symptoms were tingling and/or numbness of distal extremities. The most common objective finding was diminished vibratory sensation in the feet. Half of them had an EMG with the findings ranging from fasciculations to axonal polyneuropathy or demyelinating polyneuropathy.

Our study provides an overview of the pattern of peripheral neuropathy in patients with prion disease. Among patients with peripheral neuropathy symptoms or signs, majority has polyneuropathy. It is important to document the baseline frequency of peripheral neuropathy in prion diseases as these symptoms may become important when conducting surveillance for potential novel zoonotic prion diseases.

=====

P177 PrP plaques in methionine homozygous Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease patients as a potential marker of iatrogenic transmission

Abrams JY (1), Schonberger LB (1), Cali I (2), Cohen Y (2), Blevins JE (2), Maddox RA (1), Belay ED (1), Appleby BS (2), Cohen ML (2)

(1) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Atlanta, GA, USA (2) Case Western Reserve University, National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center (NPDPSC), Cleveland, OH, USA.

Background

Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) is widely believed to originate from de novo spontaneous conversion of normal prion protein (PrP) to its pathogenic form, but concern remains that some reported sporadic CJD cases may actually be caused by disease transmission via iatrogenic processes. For cases with methionine homozygosity (CJD-MM) at codon 129 of the PRNP gene, recent research has pointed to plaque-like PrP deposition as a potential marker of iatrogenic transmission for a subset of cases. This phenotype is theorized to originate from specific iatrogenic source CJD types that comprise roughly a quarter of known CJD cases.

Methods

We reviewed scientific literature for studies which described PrP plaques among CJD patients with known epidemiological links to iatrogenic transmission (receipt of cadaveric human grown hormone or dura mater), as well as in cases of reported sporadic CJD. The presence and description of plaques, along with CJD classification type and other contextual factors, were used to summarize the current evidence regarding plaques as a potential marker of iatrogenic transmission. In addition, 523 cases of reported sporadic CJD cases in the US from January 2013 through September 2017 were assessed for presence of PrP plaques.

Results

We identified four studies describing 52 total cases of CJD-MM among either dura mater recipients or growth hormone recipients, of which 30 were identified as having PrP plaques. While sporadic cases were not generally described as having plaques, we did identify case reports which described plaques among sporadic MM2 cases as well as case reports of plaques exclusively in white matter among sporadic MM1 cases. Among the 523 reported sporadic CJD cases, 0 of 366 MM1 cases had plaques, 2 of 48 MM2 cases had kuru plaques, and 4 of 109 MM1+2 cases had either kuru plaques or both kuru and florid plaques. Medical chart review of the six reported sporadic CJD cases with plaques did not reveal clinical histories suggestive of potential iatrogenic transmission.

Conclusions

PrP plaques occur much more frequently for iatrogenic CJD-MM cases compared to sporadic CJDMM cases. Plaques may indicate iatrogenic transmission for CJD-MM cases without a type 2 Western blot fragment. The study results suggest the absence of significant misclassifications of iatrogenic CJD as sporadic. To our knowledge, this study is the first to describe grey matter kuru plaques in apparently sporadic CJD-MM patients with a type 2 Western blot fragment.

=====

P180 Clinico-pathological analysis of human prion diseases in a brain bank series

Ximelis T (1), Aldecoa I (1,2), Molina-Porcel L (1,3), Grau-Rivera O (4), Ferrer I (5), Nos C (6), Gelpi E (1,7), Sánchez-Valle R (1,4)

(1) Neurological Tissue Bank of the Biobanc-Hospital ClÃnic-IDIBAPS, Barcelona, Spain (2) Pathological Service of Hospital ClÃnic de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain (3) EAIA Trastorns Cognitius, Centre Emili Mira, Parc de Salut Mar, Barcelona, Spain (4) Department of Neurology of Hospital ClÃnic de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain (5) Institute of Neuropathology, Hospital Universitari de Bellvitge, Hospitalet de Llobregat, Barcelona (6) General subdirectorate of Surveillance and Response to Emergencies in Public Health, Department of Public Health in Catalonia, Barcelona, Spain (7) Institute of Neurology, Medical University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria.

Background and objective:

The Neurological Tissue Bank (NTB) of the Hospital Clínic-Institut d‘Investigacions Biomèdiques August Pi i Sunyer, Barcelona, Spain is the reference center in Catalonia for the neuropathological study of prion diseases in the region since 2001. The aim of this study is to analyse the characteristics of the confirmed prion diseases registered at the NTB during the last 15 years.

Methods:

We reviewed retrospectively all neuropathologically confirmed cases registered during the period January 2001 to December 2016.

Results:

176 cases (54,3% female, mean age: 67,5 years and age range: 25-86 years) of neuropathological confirmed prion diseases have been studied at the NTB. 152 cases corresponded to sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (sCJD), 10 to genetic CJD, 10 to Fatal Familial Insomnia, 2 to GerstmannSträussler-Scheinker disease, and 2 cases to variably protease-sensitive prionopathy (VPSPr). Within sCJD subtypes the MM1 subtype was the most frequent, followed by the VV2 histotype.

Clinical and neuropathological diagnoses agreed in 166 cases (94%). The clinical diagnosis was not accurate in 10 patients with definite prion disease: 1 had a clinical diagnosis of Fronto-temporal dementia (FTD), 1 Niemann-Pick‘s disease, 1 Lewy Body‘s Disease, 2 Alzheimer‘s disease, 1 Cortico-basal syndrome and 2 undetermined dementia. Among patients with VPSPr, 1 had a clinical diagnosis of Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS) and the other one with FTD.

Concomitant pathologies are frequent in older age groups, mainly AD neuropathological changes were observed in these subjects.

Discussion:

A wide spectrum of human prion diseases have been identified in the NTB being the relative frequencies and main characteristics like other published series. There is a high rate of agreement between clinical and neuropathological diagnoses with prion diseases. These findings show the importance that public health has given to prion diseases during the past 15 years. Continuous surveillance of human prion disease allows identification of new emerging phenotypes. Brain tissue samples from these donors are available to the scientific community. For more information please visit:


=====

P192 Prion amplification techniques for the rapid evaluation of surface decontamination procedures

Bruyere-Ostells L (1), Mayran C (1), Belondrade M (1), Boublik Y (2), Haïk S (3), Fournier-Wirth C (1), Nicot S (1), Bougard D (1)

(1) Pathogenesis and control of chronic infections, Etablissement Français du Sang, Inserm, Université de Montpellier, Montpellier, France. (2) Centre de Recherche en Biologie cellulaire de Montpellier, CNRS, Université de Montpellier, Montpellier, France. (3) Inserm U 1127, CNRS UMR 7225, Sorbonne Universités, UPMC Université Paris 06 UMR S 1127, Institut du Cerveau et de la Moelle épinière, ICM, Paris, France.

Aims:

Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSE) or prion diseases are a group of incurable and always fatal neurodegenerative disorders including Creutzfeldt-Jakob diseases (CJD) in humans. These pathologies include sporadic (sCJD), genetic and acquired (variant CJD) forms. By the past, sCJD and vCJD were transmitted by different prion contaminated biological materials to patients resulting in more than 400 iatrogenic cases (iCJD). The atypical nature and the biochemical properties of the infectious agent, formed by abnormal prion protein or PrPTSE, make it particularly resistant to conventional decontamination procedures. In addition, PrPTSE is widely distributed throughout the organism before clinical onset in vCJD and can also be detected in some peripheral tissues in sporadic CJD. Risk of iatrogenic transmission of CJD by contaminated medical device remains thus a concern for healthcare facilities. Bioassay is the gold standard method to evaluate the efficacy of prion decontamination procedures but is time-consuming and expensive. Here, we propose to compare in vitro prion amplification techniques: Protein Misfolding Cyclic Amplification (PMCA) and Real-Time Quaking Induced Conversion (RT-QuIC) for the detection of residual prions on surface after decontamination.

Methods:

Stainless steel wires, by mimicking the surface of surgical instruments, were proposed as a carrier model of prions for inactivation studies. To determine the sensitivity of the two amplification techniques on wires (Surf-PMCA and Surf-QuIC), steel wires were therefore contaminated with serial dilutions of brain homogenates (BH) from a 263k infected hamster and from a patient with sCJD (MM1 subtype). We then compared the different standard decontamination procedures including partially and fully efficient treatments by detecting the residual seeding activity on 263K and sCJD contaminated wires. We completed our study by the evaluation of marketed reagents endorsed for prion decontamination.

Results:

The two amplification techniques can detect minute quantities of PrPTSE adsorbed onto a single wire. 8/8 wires contaminated with a 10-6 dilution of 263k BH and 1/6 with the 10-8 dilution are positive with Surf-PMCA. Similar performances were obtained with Surf-QuIC on 263K: 10/16 wires contaminated with 10-6 dilution and 1/8 wires contaminated with 10-8 dilution are positive. Regarding the human sCJD-MM1 prion, Surf-QuIC allows us to detect 16/16 wires contaminated with 10-6 dilutions and 14/16 with 10-7 . Results obtained after decontamination treatments are very similar between 263K and sCJD prions. Efficiency of marketed treatments to remove prions is lower than expected.

Conclusions:

Surf-PMCA and Surf-QuIC are very sensitive methods for the detection of prions on wires and could be applied to prion decontamination studies for rapid evaluation of new treatments. Sodium hypochlorite is the only product to efficiently remove seeding activity of both 263K and sCJD prions.

=====

WA2 Oral transmission of CWD into Cynomolgus macaques: signs of atypical disease, prion conversion and infectivity in macaques and bio-assayed transgenic mice

Schatzl HM (1, 2), Hannaoui S (1, 2), Cheng Y-C (1, 2), Gilch S (1, 2), Beekes M (3), SchulzSchaeffer W (4), Stahl-Hennig C (5) and Czub S (2, 6)

(1) University of Calgary, Calgary Prion Research Unit, Calgary, Canada (2) University of Calgary, Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, Calgary, Canada, (3) Robert Koch Institute, Berlin, Germany, (4) University of Homburg/Saar, Homburg, Germany, (5) German Primate Center, Goettingen, Germany, (6) Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), Lethbridge, Canada.

To date, BSE is the only example of interspecies transmission of an animal prion disease into humans. The potential zoonotic transmission of CWD is an alarming issue and was addressed by many groups using a variety of in vitro and in vivo experimental systems. Evidence from these studies indicated a substantial, if not absolute, species barrier, aligning with the absence of epidemiological evidence suggesting transmission into humans. Studies in non-human primates were not conclusive so far, with oral transmission into new-world monkeys and no transmission into old-world monkeys. Our consortium has challenged 18 Cynomolgus macaques with characterized CWD material, focusing on oral transmission with muscle tissue. Some macaques have orally received a total of 5 kg of muscle material over a period of 2 years. After 5-7 years of incubation time some animals showed clinical symptoms indicative of prion disease, and prion neuropathology and PrPSc deposition were found in spinal cord and brain of euthanized animals. PrPSc in immunoblot was weakly detected in some spinal cord materials and various tissues tested positive in RT-QuIC, including lymph node and spleen homogenates. To prove prion infectivity in the macaque tissues, we have intracerebrally inoculated 2 lines of transgenic mice, expressing either elk or human PrP. At least 3 TgElk mice, receiving tissues from 2 different macaques, showed clinical signs of a progressive prion disease and brains were positive in immunoblot and RT-QuIC. Tissues (brain, spinal cord and spleen) from these and preclinical mice are currently tested using various read-outs and by second passage in mice. Transgenic mice expressing human PrP were so far negative for clear clinical prion disease (some mice >300 days p.i.). In parallel, the same macaque materials are inoculated into bank voles. Taken together, there is strong evidence of transmissibility of CWD orally into macaques and from macaque tissues into transgenic mouse models, although with an incomplete attack rate. The clinical and pathological presentation in macaques was mostly atypical, with a strong emphasis on spinal cord pathology. Our ongoing studies will show whether the transmission of CWD into macaques and passage in transgenic mice represents a form of non-adaptive prion amplification, and whether macaque-adapted prions have the potential to infect mice expressing human PrP. The notion that CWD can be transmitted orally into both new-world and old-world non-human primates asks for a careful reevaluation of the zoonotic risk of CWD.

See also poster P103

***> The notion that CWD can be transmitted orally into both new-world and old-world non-human primates asks for a careful reevaluation of the zoonotic risk of CWD.

=====

WA16 Monitoring Potential CWD Transmission to Humans

Belay ED

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases, Atlanta, GA, USA.

The spread of chronic wasting disease (CWD) in animals has raised concerns about increasing human exposure to the CWD agent via hunting and venison consumption, potentially facilitating CWD transmission to humans. Several studies have explored this possibility, including limited epidemiologic studies, in vitro experiments, and laboratory studies using various types of animal models. Most human exposures to the CWD agent in the United States would be expected to occur in association with deer and elk hunting in CWD-endemic areas. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) collaborated with state health departments in Colorado, Wisconsin, and Wyoming to identify persons at risk of CWD exposure and to monitor their vital status over time. Databases were established of persons who hunted in Colorado and Wyoming and those who reported consumption of venison from deer that later tested positive in Wisconsin. Information from the databases is periodically cross-checked with mortality data to determine the vital status and causes of death for deceased persons. Long-term follow-up of these hunters is needed to assess their risk of development of a prion disease linked to CWD exposure.

=====

P166 Characterization of CJD strain profiles in venison consumers and non-consumers from Alberta and Saskatchewan

Stephanie Booth (1,2), Lise Lamoureux (1), Debra Sorensen (1), Jennifer L. Myskiw (1,2), Megan Klassen (1,2), Michael Coulthart (3), Valerie Sim (4)

(1) Zoonotic Diseases and Special Pathogens, National Microbiology Laboratory, Public Health Agency of Canada, Winnipeg (2) Department of Medical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg (3) Canadian CJD Surveillance System, Public Health Agency of Canada, Ottawa (4) Division of Neurology, Department of Medicine Centre for Prions and Protein Folding Diseases, University of Alberta, Edmonton.

Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is spreading rapidly through wild cervid populations in the Canadian provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan. While this has implications for tourism and hunting, there is also concern over possible zoonotic transmission to humans who eat venison from infected deer. Whilst there is no evidence of any human cases of CWD to date, the Canadian CJD Surveillance System (CJDSS) in Canada is staying vigilant. When variant CJD occurred following exposure to BSE, the unique biochemical fingerprint of the pathologic PrP enabled a causal link to be confirmed. However, we cannot be sure what phenotype human CWD prions would present with, or indeed, whether this would be distinct from that see in sporadic CJD. Therefore we are undertaking a systematic analysis of the molecular diversity of CJD cases of individuals who resided in Alberta and Saskatchewan at their time of death comparing venison consumers and non-consumers, using a variety of clinical, imaging, pathological and biochemical markers. Our initial objective is to develop novel biochemical methodologies that will extend the baseline glycoform and genetic polymorphism typing that is already completed by the CJDSS. Firstly, we are reviewing MRI, EEG and pathology information from over 40 cases of CJD to select clinically affected areas for further investigation. Biochemical analysis will include assessment of the levels of protease sensitive and resistant prion protein, glycoform typing using 2D gel electrophoresis, testing seeding capabilities and kinetics of aggregation by quaking-induced conversion, and determining prion oligomer size distributions with asymmetric flow field fractionation with in-line light scattering. Progress and preliminary data will be presented. Ultimately, we intend to further define the relationship between PrP structure and disease phenotype and establish a baseline for the identification of future atypical CJD cases that may arise as a result of exposure to CWD.

=====

Source Prion Conference 2018 Abstracts




Volume 24, Number 8—August 2018 Research Susceptibility of Human Prion Protein to Conversion by Chronic Wasting Disease Prions

Marcelo A. BarriaComments to Author , Adriana Libori, Gordon Mitchell, and Mark W. Head Author affiliations: National CJD Research and Surveillance Unit, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK (M.A. Barria, A. Libori, M.W. Head); National and OIE Reference Laboratory for Scrapie and CWD, Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada (G. Mitchell)

Abstract Chronic wasting disease (CWD) is a contagious and fatal neurodegenerative disease and a serious animal health issue for deer and elk in North America. The identification of the first cases of CWD among free-ranging reindeer and moose in Europe brings back into focus the unresolved issue of whether CWD can be zoonotic like bovine spongiform encephalopathy. We used a cell-free seeded protein misfolding assay to determine whether CWD prions from elk, white-tailed deer, and reindeer in North America can convert the human prion protein to the disease-associated form. We found that prions can convert, but the efficiency of conversion is affected by polymorphic variation in the cervid and human prion protein genes. In view of the similarity of reindeer, elk, and white-tailed deer in North America to reindeer, red deer, and roe deer, respectively, in Europe, a more comprehensive and thorough assessment of the zoonotic potential of CWD might be warranted.

snip...

Discussion Characterization of the transmission properties of CWD and evaluation of their zoonotic potential are important for public health purposes. Given that CWD affects several members of the family Cervidae, it seems reasonable to consider whether the zoonotic potential of CWD prions could be affected by factors such as CWD strain, cervid species, geographic location, and Prnp–PRNP polymorphic variation. We have previously used an in vitro conversion assay (PMCA) to investigate the susceptibility of the human PrP to conversion to its disease-associated form by several animal prion diseases, including CWD (15,16,22). The sensitivity of our molecular model for the detection of zoonotic conversion depends on the combination of 1) the action of proteinase K to degrade the abundant human PrPC that constitutes the substrate while only N terminally truncating any human PrPres produced and 2) the presence of the 3F4 epitope on human but not cervid PrP. In effect, this degree of sensitivity means that any human PrPres formed during the PMCA reaction can be detected down to the limit of Western blot sensitivity. In contrast, if other antibodies that detect both cervid and human PrP are used, such as 6H4, then newly formed human PrPres must be detected as a measurable increase in PrPres over the amount remaining in the reaction product from the cervid seed. Although best known for the efficient amplification of prions in research and diagnostic contexts, the variation of the PMCA method employed in our study is optimized for the definitive detection of zoonotic reaction products of inherently inefficient conversion reactions conducted across species barriers. By using this system, we previously made and reported the novel observation that elk CWD prions could convert human PrPC from human brain and could also convert recombinant human PrPC expressed in transgenic mice and eukaryotic cell cultures (15).

A previous publication suggested that mule deer PrPSc was unable to convert humanized transgenic substrate in PMCA assays (23) and required a further step of in vitro conditioning in deer substrate PMCA before it was able to cross the deer–human molecular barrier (24). However, prions from other species, such as elk (15) and reindeer affected by CWD, appear to be compatible with the human protein in a single round of amplification (as shown in our study). These observations suggest that different deer species affected by CWD could present differing degrees of the olecular compatibility with the normal form of human PrP.

The contribution of the polymorphism at codon 129 of the human PrP gene has been extensively studied and is recognized as a risk factor for Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (4). In cervids, the equivalent codon corresponds to the position 132 encoding methionine or leucine. This polymorphism in the elk gene has been shown to play an important role in CWD susceptibility (25,26). We have investigated the effect of this cervid Prnp polymorphism on the conversion of the humanized transgenic substrate according to the variation in the equivalent PRNP codon 129 polymorphism. Interestingly, only the homologs methionine homozygous seed–substrate reactions could readily convert the human PrP, whereas the heterozygous elk PrPSc was unable to do so, even though comparable amounts of PrPres were used to seed the reaction. In addition, we observed only low levels of human PrPres formation in the reactions seeded with the homozygous methionine (132 MM) and the heterozygous (132 ML) seeds incubated with the other 2 human polymorphic substrates (129 MV and 129 VV). The presence of the amino acid leucine at position 132 of the elk Prnp gene has been attributed to a lower degree of prion conversion compared with methionine on the basis of experiments in mice made transgenic for these polymorphic variants (26). Considering the differences observed for the amplification of the homozygous human methionine substrate by the 2 polymorphic elk seeds (MM and ML), reappraisal of the susceptibility of human PrPC by the full range of cervid polymorphic variants affected by CWD would be warranted.

In light of the recent identification of the first cases of CWD in Europe in a free-ranging reindeer (R. tarandus) in Norway (2), we also decided to evaluate the in vitro conversion potential of CWD in 2 experimentally infected reindeer (18). Formation of human PrPres was readily detectable after a single round of PMCA, and in all 3 humanized polymorphic substrates (MM, MV, and VV). This finding suggests that CWD prions from reindeer could be more compatible with human PrPC generally and might therefore present a greater risk for zoonosis than, for example, CWD prions from white-tailed deer. A more comprehensive comparison of CWD in the affected species, coupled with the polymorphic variations in the human and deer PRNP–Prnp genes, in vivo and in vitro, will be required before firm conclusions can be drawn. Analysis of the Prnp sequence of the CWD reindeer in Norway was reported to be identical to the specimens used in our study (2). This finding raises the possibility of a direct comparison of zoonotic potential between CWD acquired in the wild and that produced in a controlled laboratory setting. (Table).

The prion hypothesis proposes that direct molecular interaction between PrPSc and PrPC is necessary for conversion and prion replication. Accordingly, polymorphic variants of the PrP of host and agent might play a role in determining compatibility and potential zoonotic risk. In this study, we have examined the capacity of the human PrPC to support in vitro conversion by elk, white-tailed deer, and reindeer CWD PrPSc. Our data confirm that elk CWD prions can convert the human PrPC, at least in vitro, and show that the homologous PRNP polymorphisms at codon 129 and 132 in humans and cervids affect conversion efficiency. Other species affected by CWD, particularly caribou or reindeer, also seem able to convert the human PrP. It will be important to determine whether other polymorphic variants found in other CWD-affected Cervidae or perhaps other factors (17) exert similar effects on the ability to convert human PrP and thus affect their zoonotic potential.

Dr. Barria is a research scientist working at the National CJD Research and Surveillance Unit, University of Edinburgh. His research has focused on understanding the molecular basis of a group of fatal neurologic disorders called prion diseases.

Acknowledgments We thank Aru Balachandran for originally providing cervid brain tissues, Abigail Diack and Jean Manson for providing mouse brain tissue, and James Ironside for his critical reading of the manuscript at an early stage.

This report is independent research commissioned and funded by the United Kingdom’s Department of Health Policy Research Programme and the Government of Scotland. The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Health or the Government of Scotland.

Author contributions: The study was conceived and designed by M.A.B. and M.W.H. The experiments were conducted by M.A.B. and A.L. Chronic wasting disease brain specimens were provided by G.M. The manuscript was written by M.A.B. and M.W.H. All authors contributed to the editing and revision of the manuscript.



Prion 2017 Conference Abstracts
First evidence of intracranial and peroral transmission of Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) into Cynomolgus macaques: a work in progress Stefanie Czub1, Walter Schulz-Schaeffer2, Christiane Stahl-Hennig3, Michael Beekes4, Hermann Schaetzl5 and Dirk Motzkus6 1 
University of Calgary Faculty of Veterinary Medicine/Canadian Food Inspection Agency; 2Universitatsklinikum des Saarlandes und Medizinische Fakultat der Universitat des Saarlandes; 3 Deutsches Primaten Zentrum/Goettingen; 4 Robert-Koch-Institut Berlin; 5 University of Calgary Faculty of Veterinary Medicine; 6 presently: Boehringer Ingelheim Veterinary Research Center; previously: Deutsches Primaten Zentrum/Goettingen 
This is a progress report of a project which started in 2009. 
21 cynomolgus macaques were challenged with characterized CWD material from white-tailed deer (WTD) or elk by intracerebral (ic), oral, and skin exposure routes. Additional blood transfusion experiments are supposed to assess the CWD contamination risk of human blood product. Challenge materials originated from symptomatic cervids for ic, skin scarification and partially per oral routes (WTD brain). Challenge material for feeding of muscle derived from preclinical WTD and from preclinical macaques for blood transfusion experiments. We have confirmed that the CWD challenge material contained at least two different CWD agents (brain material) as well as CWD prions in muscle-associated nerves. 
Here we present first data on a group of animals either challenged ic with steel wires or per orally and sacrificed with incubation times ranging from 4.5 to 6.9 years at postmortem. Three animals displayed signs of mild clinical disease, including anxiety, apathy, ataxia and/or tremor. In four animals wasting was observed, two of those had confirmed diabetes. All animals have variable signs of prion neuropathology in spinal cords and brains and by supersensitive IHC, reaction was detected in spinal cord segments of all animals. Protein misfolding cyclic amplification (PMCA), real-time quaking-induced conversion (RT-QuiC) and PET-blot assays to further substantiate these findings are on the way, as well as bioassays in bank voles and transgenic mice. 
At present, a total of 10 animals are sacrificed and read-outs are ongoing. Preclinical incubation of the remaining macaques covers a range from 6.4 to 7.10 years. Based on the species barrier and an incubation time of > 5 years for BSE in macaques and about 10 years for scrapie in macaques, we expected an onset of clinical disease beyond 6 years post inoculation. 
PRION 2017 DECIPHERING NEURODEGENERATIVE DISORDERS ABSTRACTS REFERENCE
8. Even though human TSE‐exposure risk through consumption of game from European cervids can be assumed to be minor, if at all existing, no final conclusion can be drawn due to the overall lack of scientific data. In particular the US data do not clearly exclude the possibility of human (sporadic or familial) TSE development due to consumption of venison. The Working Group thus recognizes a potential risk to consumers if a TSE would be present in European cervids. It might be prudent considering appropriate measures to reduce such a risk, e.g. excluding tissues such as CNS and lymphoid tissues from the human food chain, which would greatly reduce any potential risk for consumers. However, it is stressed that currently, no data regarding a risk of TSE infections from cervid products are available.


SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2019 

Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion and THE FEAST 2003 CDC an updated review of the science 2019


TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 04, 2014 

Six-year follow-up of a point-source exposure to CWD contaminated venison in an Upstate New York community: risk behaviours and health outcomes 2005–2011

Authors, though, acknowledged the study was limited in geography and sample size and so it couldn't draw a conclusion about the risk to humans. They recommended more study. Dr. Ermias Belay was the report's principal author but he said New York and Oneida County officials are following the proper course by not launching a study. "There's really nothing to monitor presently. No one's sick," Belay said, noting the disease's incubation period in deer and elk is measured in years. "


Transmission Studies

Mule deer transmissions of CWD were by intracerebral inoculation and compared with natural cases {the following was written but with a single line marked through it ''first passage (by this route)}....TSS

resulted in a more rapidly progressive clinical disease with repeated episodes of synocopy ending in coma. One control animal became affected, it is believed through contamination of inoculum (?saline). Further CWD transmissions were carried out by Dick Marsh into ferret, mink and squirrel monkey. Transmission occurred in ALL of these species with the shortest incubation period in the ferret.

snip.... 


Prion Infectivity in Fat of Deer with Chronic Wasting Disease▿ 

Brent Race#, Kimberly Meade-White#, Richard Race and Bruce Chesebro* + Author Affiliations

In mice, prion infectivity was recently detected in fat. Since ruminant fat is consumed by humans and fed to animals, we determined infectivity titers in fat from two CWD-infected deer. Deer fat devoid of muscle contained low levels of CWD infectivity and might be a risk factor for prion infection of other species. 


Prions in Skeletal Muscles of Deer with Chronic Wasting Disease 

Here bioassays in transgenic mice expressing cervid prion protein revealed the presence of infectious prions in skeletal muscles of CWD-infected deer, demonstrating that humans consuming or handling meat from CWD-infected deer are at risk to prion exposure. 


*** now, let’s see what the authors said about this casual link, personal communications years ago, and then the latest on the zoonotic potential from CWD to humans from the TOKYO PRION 2016 CONFERENCE.

see where it is stated NO STRONG evidence. so, does this mean there IS casual evidence ???? “Our conclusion stating that we found no strong evidence of CWD transmission to humans”

From: TSS 

Subject: CWD aka MAD DEER/ELK TO HUMANS ???

Date: September 30, 2002 at 7:06 am PST

From: "Belay, Ermias"

To: Cc: "Race, Richard (NIH)" ; ; "Belay, Ermias"

Sent: Monday, September 30, 2002 9:22 AM

Subject: RE: TO CDC AND NIH - PUB MED- 3 MORE DEATHS - CWD - YOUNG HUNTERS

Dear Sir/Madam,

In the Archives of Neurology you quoted (the abstract of which was attached to your email), we did not say CWD in humans will present like variant CJD.. That assumption would be wrong. I encourage you to read the whole article and call me if you have questions or need more clarification (phone: 404-639-3091). Also, we do not claim that "no-one has ever been infected with prion disease from eating venison." Our conclusion stating that we found no strong evidence of CWD transmission to humans in the article you quoted or in any other forum is limited to the patients we investigated.

Ermias Belay, M.D. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

-----Original Message-----

From: Sent: Sunday, September 29, 2002 10:15 AM


Subject: TO CDC AND NIH - PUB MED- 3 MORE DEATHS - CWD - YOUNG HUNTERS

Sunday, November 10, 2002 6:26 PM .......snip........end..............TSS

Thursday, April 03, 2008

A prion disease of cervids: Chronic wasting disease 2008 1: Vet Res. 2008 Apr 3;39(4):41 A prion disease of cervids: Chronic wasting disease Sigurdson CJ.

snip...

*** twenty-seven CJD patients who regularly consumed venison were reported to the Surveillance Center***,

snip... full text ; 


> However, to date, no CWD infections have been reported in people. 

sporadic, spontaneous CJD, 85%+ of all human TSE, did not just happen. never in scientific literature has this been proven.

if one looks up the word sporadic or spontaneous at pubmed, you will get a laundry list of disease that are classified in such a way;



key word here is 'reported'. science has shown that CWD in humans will look like sporadic CJD. SO, how can one assume that CWD has not already transmitted to humans? they can't, and it's as simple as that. from all recorded science to date, CWD has already transmitted to humans, and it's being misdiagnosed as sporadic CJD. ...terry 

*** LOOKING FOR CWD IN HUMANS AS nvCJD or as an ATYPICAL CJD, LOOKING IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES $$$ ***

> However, to date, no CWD infections have been reported in people.
key word here is ‘reported’. science has shown that CWD in humans will look like sporadic CJD. SO, how can one assume that CWD has not already transmitted to humans? they can’t, and it’s as simple as that. from all recorded science to date, CWD has already transmitted to humans, and it’s being misdiagnosed as sporadic CJD. …terry
*** LOOKING FOR CWD IN HUMANS AS nvCJD or as an ATYPICAL CJD, LOOKING IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES $$$ ***
*** These results would seem to suggest that CWD does indeed have zoonotic potential, at least as judged by the compatibility of CWD prions and their human PrPC target. Furthermore, extrapolation from this simple in vitro assay suggests that if zoonotic CWD occurred, it would most likely effect those of the PRNP codon 129-MM genotype and that the PrPres type would be similar to that found in the most common subtype of sCJD (MM1).***
CWD TSE PRION AND ZOONOTIC, ZOONOSIS, POTENTIAL

Subject: Re: DEER SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY SURVEY & HOUND STUDY 

Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2002 23:12:22 +0100 

From: Steve Dealler 

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Organization: Netscape Online member 

To: BSE-L@ References: <3daf5023 .4080804="" wt.net="">

Dear Terry,

An excellent piece of review as this literature is desparately difficult to get back from Government sites.

What happened with the deer was that an association between deer meat eating and sporadic CJD was found in about 1993. The evidence was not great but did not disappear after several years of asking CJD cases what they had eaten. I think that the work into deer disease largely stopped because it was not helpful to the UK industry...and no specific cases were reported. Well, if you dont look adequately like they are in USA currenly then you wont find any!

Steve Dealler =============== 


''The association between venison eating and risk of CJD shows similar pattern, with regular venison eating associated with a 9 FOLD INCREASE IN RISK OF CJD (p = 0.04).''

CREUTZFELDT JAKOB DISEASE SURVEILLANCE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM THIRD ANNUAL REPORT AUGUST 1994

Consumption of venison and veal was much less widespread among both cases and controls. For both of these meats there was evidence of a trend with increasing frequency of consumption being associated with increasing risk of CJD. (not nvCJD, but sporadic CJD...tss) These associations were largely unchanged when attention was restricted to pairs with data obtained from relatives. ...

Table 9 presents the results of an analysis of these data.

There is STRONG evidence of an association between ‘’regular’’ veal eating and risk of CJD (p = .0.01).

Individuals reported to eat veal on average at least once a year appear to be at 13 TIMES THE RISK of individuals who have never eaten veal.

There is, however, a very wide confidence interval around this estimate. There is no strong evidence that eating veal less than once per year is associated with increased risk of CJD (p = 0.51).

The association between venison eating and risk of CJD shows similar pattern, with regular venison eating associated with a 9 FOLD INCREASE IN RISK OF CJD (p = 0.04).

There is some evidence that risk of CJD INCREASES WITH INCREASING FREQUENCY OF LAMB EATING (p = 0.02).

The evidence for such an association between beef eating and CJD is weaker (p = 0.14). When only controls for whom a relative was interviewed are included, this evidence becomes a little STRONGER (p = 0.08).

snip...

It was found that when veal was included in the model with another exposure, the association between veal and CJD remained statistically significant (p = < 0.05 for all exposures), while the other exposures ceased to be statistically significant (p = > 0.05).

snip...

In conclusion, an analysis of dietary histories revealed statistical associations between various meats/animal products and INCREASED RISK OF CJD. When some account was taken of possible confounding, the association between VEAL EATING AND RISK OF CJD EMERGED AS THE STRONGEST OF THESE ASSOCIATIONS STATISTICALLY. ...

snip...

In the study in the USA, a range of foodstuffs were associated with an increased risk of CJD, including liver consumption which was associated with an apparent SIX-FOLD INCREASE IN THE RISK OF CJD. By comparing the data from 3 studies in relation to this particular dietary factor, the risk of liver consumption became non-significant with an odds ratio of 1.2 (PERSONAL COMMUNICATION, PROFESSOR A. HOFMAN. ERASMUS UNIVERSITY, ROTTERDAM). (???...TSS)

snip...see full report ;




Stephen Dealler is a consultant medical microbiologist  deal@airtime.co.uk 

BSE Inquiry Steve Dealler

Management In Confidence

BSE: Private Submission of Bovine Brain Dealler

snip...see full text;

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2019

***> MAD DOGS AND ENGLISHMEN BSE, SCRAPIE, CWD, CJD, TSE PRION A REVIEW 2019


***> ''The association between venison eating and risk of CJD shows similar pattern, with regular venison eating associated with a 9 FOLD INCREASE IN RISK OF CJD (p = 0.04).''

***> In conclusion, sensory symptoms and loss of reflexes in Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker syndrome can be explained by neuropathological changes in the spinal cord. We conclude that the sensory symptoms and loss of lower limb reflexes in Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker syndrome is due to pathology in the caudal spinal cord. <***

***> The clinical and pathological presentation in macaques was mostly atypical, with a strong emphasis on spinal cord pathology.<*** 

***> The notion that CWD can be transmitted orally into both new-world and old-world non-human primates asks for a careful reevaluation of the zoonotic risk of CWD. <***

***> All animals have variable signs of prion neuropathology in spinal cords and brains and by supersensitive IHC, reaction was detected in spinal cord segments of all animals.<*** 

***> In particular the US data do not clearly exclude the possibility of human (sporadic or familial) TSE development due to consumption of venison. The Working Group thus recognizes a potential risk to consumers if a TSE would be present in European cervids.'' Scientific opinion on chronic wasting disease (II) <***


North American and Norwegian Chronic Wasting Disease prions exhibit different potential for interspecies transmission and zoonotic risk

Sandra Pritzkow1,*, Damian Gorski1,*, Frank Ramirez1 , Glenn C. Telling2 , Sylvie L. Benestad3 and Claudio Soto1,#

1 Mitchell Center for Alzheimer's disease and related Brain disorders, Department of Neurology, University of Texas McGovern Medical School at Houston, Texas, USA 2 Prion Research Center, Department of Microbiology, Immunology and Pathology, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado, USA 3 Norwegian Veterinary Institute, OIE Reference Laboratory for CWD, Oslo, Norway.

Summary: We investigated the in vitro spillover and zoonotic potential of CWD from various cervid species. Our results suggest that Norway CWD prions have a higher potential to infect other animals, but NorthAmerican CWD appear more prone to generate human prions.

The current evidence for CWD transmission to humans is controversial; indeed, while transgenic mice expressing human PrP did not develop disease when challenged with CWD prions in various laboratories [6-8, 41], experimental inoculation of CWD into squirrel monkeys produced disease [9, 10]. Studies in macaques, which are phylogenetically closer to humans than squirrel monkeys [45] have shown mixed results. A study from Czub and colleagues found that CWD prions can induce disease and pathologic abnormalities typical of prion disease in macaques exposed to CWD prions, even by oral inoculation of muscle tissue from cervids affected by CWD [46]. However, a different study found no evidence for prion disease in macaques inoculated with CWD [47]. To assess the cervid/human species barrier, we previously used PMCA to determine prion replication in vitro. We found that, after stabilization by successive passages in deer PrPC, PrPSc from CWD infected deer can convert human PrPC into a novel form of PrPSc [13]. Our current study to evaluate in vitro zoonotic potential of various CWD prions showed that although the cervid/human barrier is large, we were able to observe generation of human PrPSc with some specific CWD strains in a second round of PMCA (Fig. 5). The three North American CWD isolates were capable to sustain generation of human PrPSc, with white-tailed deer showing the highest efficiency. Conversely, none of the three Norway CWD isolates generated any detectable PrPSc signal up to the second round of PMCA. This data suggest that North American CWD prions might be of a greater risk to humans than the infected animals in Northern Europe. We speculate that these differences might be due to Norwegian CWD being less stable prion strains as compared to North American CWD, which have had longer time to replicate in cervids and become stabilized through many rounds of natural infection. Our findings may provide important information to understand the diversity of natural CWD prion strains in different animals across distinct geographical areas and their consequences for the spillover into other animal species, including humans.


MONDAY, JULY 19, 2021 

U Calgary researchers at work on a vaccine against a fatal infectious disease affecting deer and potentially people


TUESDAY, JULY 13, 2021

Chronic Wasting Disease and the Canadian Agriculture and Agri-food Sectors Current Knowledge Risks and Policy Options

''The science is progressing on the possibility of transmission of CWD to humans through oral transmission, but the complete assessment of this possibility remains to be done.''


MONDAY, DECEMBER 16, 2019 

Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion aka mad cow type disease in cervid Zoonosis Update

***> ''In particular the US data do not clearly exclude the possibility of human (sporadic or familial) TSE development due to consumption of venison. The Working Group thus recognizes a potential risk to consumers if a TSE would be present in European cervids.'' Scientific opinion on chronic wasting disease (II) <***

What if?


TUESDAY, MAY 11, 2021 
 
A Unique Presentation of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in a Patient Consuming Deer Antler Velvet

Conclusion

We believe that our patient’s case of CJD is highly suspicious for cervid etiology given the circumstances of the case as well as the strong evidence of plausibility reported in published literature. This is the first known case of CJD in a patient who had consumed deer antler velvet. Despite the confirmed diagnosis of CJD, a causal relationship between the patient’s disease and his consumption of deer antler velvet cannot be definitively concluded.

Supplemental data including molecular tissue sample analysis and autopsy findings could yield further supporting evidence. Given this patient’s clinical resemblance to CBD and the known histological similarities of CBD with CJD, clinicians should consider both diseases in the differential diagnosis of patients with a similarly esoteric presentation. Regardless of the origin of this patient’s disease, it is clear that the potential for prion transmission from cervids to humans should be further investigated by the academic community with considerable urgency. 


''We believe that our patient’s case of CJD is highly suspicious for cervid etiology given the circumstances of the case as well as the strong evidence of plausibility reported in published literature. This is the first known case of CJD in a patient who had consumed deer antler velvet. Despite the confirmed diagnosis of CJD, a causal relationship between the patient’s disease and his consumption of deer antler velvet cannot be definitively concluded.''
 

ABOUT that deer antler spray and CWD TSE PRION...
 
I have been screaming this since my neighbors mom died from cjd, and she had been taking a supplement that contained bovine brain, bovine eyeball, and other SRMs specified risk materials, the most high risk for mad cow disease.
just saying...
 
I made a submission to the BSE Inquiry long ago during the BSE Inquiry days, and they seemed pretty interested.
 
Sender: "Patricia Cantos"
 
To: "Terry S Singeltary Sr. (E-mail)"
 
Subject: Your submission to the Inquiry
 
Date: Fri, 3 Jul 1998 10:10:05 +0100
 
3 July 1998
 
Mr Terry S Singeltary Sr.
 
E-Mail: Flounder at wt.net
 
Ref: E2979
 
Dear Mr Singeltary,
 
Thank you for your E-mail message of the 30th of June 1998 providing the Inquiry with your further comments.
 
Thank you for offering to provide the Inquiry with any test results on the nutritional supplements your mother was taking before she died.
 
As requested I am sending you our general Information Pack and a copy of the Chairman's letter. Please contact me if your system cannot read the attachments.
 
Regarding your question, the Inquiry is looking into many aspects of the scientific evidence on BSE and nvCJD. I would refer you to the transcripts of evidence we have already heard which are found on our internet site at ;
 
 
Could you please provide the Inquiry with a copy of the press article you refer to in your e-mail? If not an approximate date for the article so that we can locate it?
 
In the meantime, thank you for you comments. Please do not hesitate to contact me on...
 
snip...end...tss
 
everyone I tell this too gets it screwed up...MY MOTHER WAS NOT TAKING THOSE SUPPLEMENTS IPLEX (that I ever knew of). this was my neighbors mother that died exactly one year _previously_ and to the day of sporadic CJD that was diagnosed as Alzheimer’s at first. my mother died exactly a year later from the Heidenhain Variant of Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease hvCJD, and exceedingly rare strains of the ever growing sporadic CJD’s. _both_ cases confirmed. ...kind regards, terry
 
TSEs i.e. mad cow disease's BSE/BASE and NUTRITIONAL SUPPLEMENTS
 
IPLEX, mad by standard process;
 
vacuum dried bovine BRAIN, bone meal, bovine EYE, veal Bone, bovine liver powder, bovine adrenal, vacuum dried bovine kidney, and vacuum dried porcine stomach.
 
also;
 
what about potential mad cow candy bars ?
 
see their potential mad cow candy bar list too...
 
THESE are just a few of MANY of just this ONE COMPANY...TSS
 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
 
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION CENTER FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION AND RESEARCH
 
TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES ADVISORY COMMITTEE
 
Friday, January 19, 2001 snip...
 
17 But I think that we could exhibit some quite
 
18 reasonable concern about blood donors who are taking dietary
 
19 supplements that contain a certain amount of unspecified-
 
20 origin brain, brain-related, brain and pituitary material.
 
21 If they have done this for more than a sniff or something
 
22 like that, then, perhaps, they should be deferred as blood
 
23 donors.
 
24 That is probably worse than spending six months in
 
25 the U.K.
 
1/19/01
 
3681t2.rtf(845) page 501
 
 
 
 
see full text ;
 

Saturday, May 1, 2021 

Clinical Use of Improved Diagnostic Testing for Detection of Prion Disease

TUESDAY, MAY 11, 2021 

 

A Unique Presentation of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in a Patient Consuming Deer Antler Velvet

 


Thursday, July 29, 2021 

TSE PRION OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE VIA ANIMAL OR HUMAN, iatrogenic transmission, nvCJD or sCJD, what if? 


Wednesday, July 28, 2021 

France issues moratorium on prion research after fatal brain disease strikes two lab workers


TUESDAY, AUGUST 03, 2021 

USA Tables of Cases Examined National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined July 9th, 2021


JOHN CORNYN TEXAS UNITED STATES SENATE WASHINGTON, DC 20510-4305 April 26,2005
Mr. Terry Singeltary

P.O. Box 

Bacliff, Texas 77518

Dear Mr. Singeltary:

In response to your recent request for my assistance, I have contacted the National Institutes of Health. I will write you again as soon as I receive a reply. I appreciate having the opportunity to represent you in the United States Senate and to be of service in this matter.

Sincerely,

JOHN CORNYN United States Senator JC:djl 

=============== 

JOHN CORNYN TEXAS UNITED STATES SENATE WASHINGTON, DC 20510-4305

May 18,2005

Mr. Terry Singeltary

P.O. Box 

Bacliff, Texas 77518

Dear Mr. Singeltary:

Enclosed is the reply I received from the Department of Health and Human Services in response to my earlier inquiry on your behalf. I hope this will be useful to you. I appreciate having the opportunity to represent you in the United States Senate. Thank you for taking time to contact me. Sincerely,

JOHN CORNYN United States Senate JC:djl Enclosure

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES National Institutes of Health National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke NINDS Building 31, Room 8A52 31 Center Dr., MSC 2540 Bethesda, Maryland 20892-2540 Phone: 301-496-9746 Fax: 301-496-0296 Email: [log in to unmask]

May 10, 2005

The Honorable John Cornyn United States Senator Occidental Tower5005 LBJ Freeway, Suite 1150Dallas, Texas 75244-6199

Dear Senator Cornyn:

Your letter to the National Institutes of Health (NIH) forwarding correspondence from Mr. Terry S. Singeltary, Sr., has been forwarded to me for reply. Mr. Singeltary is concerned about the preservation of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) brain samples that have been maintained by the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS) Intramural Research program for many years. I am sorry to learn that Mr. Singeltary's mother died of CJD and can certainly understand his desire that any tissues that could help investigators unravel the puzzle of this deadly disease are preserved. I hope he will be pleased to learn that all the brains and other tissues with potential to help scientists learn about CJD are, and will continue to be, conserved. (The tissues that are discarded are those that have either decayed to an extent that renders them no longer appropriate for research or those for which we do not have sufficient identification.) The purpose of gathering these brains and tissues is to help scientists learn about CJD. To that end, some of the NINDS-held samples are distributed to investigators who can demonstrate that they have a compelling research or public health need for such materials. For example, samples have been transferred to NIH grantee Dr. Pierluigi Gambetti, who heads the National Prion Diseases Pathology Surveillance Center at Case Western Reserve University in Ohio and works with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to monitor all cases of CJD in the United States. Dr. Gambetti studies the tissues to learn about the formation, physical and chemical properties, and pathogenic mechanisms of prion proteins, which are believed to be involved inthe cause of CJD. Samples have also been transferred to Dr. David Asher, at the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, for use in assessing a potential diagnostic test for CJD.

Page 2 - The Honorable John Cornyn

in closing, we know that donating organs and tissue from loved ones is a very difficult and personal choice that must often be made at the most stressful of times. We at the NINDS are grateful to those stalwart family members who make this choice in the selfless hope that it will help others afflicted with CJD. We also know the invaluable contribution such donations make to the advancement of medical science, and we are dedicated to the preservation of all of the tissue samples that can help in our efforts to overcome CJD.

I hope this information is helpful to you in responding to Mr. Singeltary. Sincerely,

Story C. Landis, Ph.D. Director, National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke

snip...see full text;



Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Singeltary, Sr et al. 

JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14, 2001 JAMA 

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease 

To the Editor: In their Research Letter, Dr Gibbons and colleagues1 reported that the annual US death rate due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has been stable since 1985. These estimates, however, are based only on reported cases, and do not include misdiagnosed or preclinical cases. It seems to me that misdiagnosis alone would drastically change these figures. An unknown number of persons with a diagnosis of Alzheimer disease in fact may have CJD, although only a small number of these patients receive the postmortem examination necessary to make this diagnosis. Furthermore, only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies should be reportable nationwide and internationally.. 

Terry S. Singeltary, Sr Bacliff, Tex 1. Gibbons RV, Holman RC, Belay ED, Schonberger LB. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States: 1979-1998. JAMA. 2000;284:2322-2323. 


doi:10.1016/S1473-3099(03)00715-1 Copyright © 2003 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Newsdesk

Tracking spongiform encephalopathies in North America

Xavier Bosch

Available online 29 July 2003. 

Volume 3, Issue 8, August 2003, Page 463 

“My name is Terry S Singeltary Sr, and I live in Bacliff, Texas. I lost my mom to hvCJD (Heidenhain variant CJD) and have been searching for answers ever since. What I have found is that we have not been told the truth. CWD in deer and elk is a small portion of a much bigger problem..” 



January 28, 2003; 60 (2) VIEWS & REVIEWS

RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States Terry S. Singeltary, retired (medically) 

Published March 26, 2003

26 March 2003

Terry S. Singeltary, retired (medically) CJD WATCH

I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?


SPORADIC CJD LAYING ODDS


In brief

BMJ 2000; 320 doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.320.7226.8/b (Published 01 January 2000)

Cite this as: BMJ 2000;320:8

Rapid Response:

02 January 2000

Terry S Singeltary

retired

U.S. Scientist should be concerned with a CJD epidemic in the U.S., as well... In reading your short article about 'Scientist warn of CJD epidemic' news in brief Jan. 1, 2000. I find the findings in the PNAS old news, made famous again. Why is the U.S. still sitting on their butts, ignoring the facts? We have the beginning of a CJD epidemic in the U.S., and the U.S. Gov. is doing everything in it's power to conceal it.

The exact same recipe for B.S.E. existed in the U.S. for years and years. In reading over the Qualitative Analysis of BSE Risk Factors-1, this is a 25 page report by the USDA:APHIS:VS. It could have been done in one page. The first page, fourth paragraph says it all;

"Similarities exist in the two countries usage of continuous rendering technology and the lack of usage of solvents, however, large differences still remain with other risk factors which greatly reduce the potential risk at the national level."

Then, the next 24 pages tries to down-play the high risks of B.S.E. in the U.S., with nothing more than the cattle to sheep ratio count, and the geographical locations of herds and flocks. That's all the evidence they can come up with, in the next 24 pages.

Something else I find odd, page 16;

"In the United Kingdom there is much concern for a specific continuous rendering technology which uses lower temperatures and accounts for 25 percent of total output. This technology was _originally_ designed and imported from the United States. However, the specific application in the production process is _believed_ to be different in the two countries."

A few more factors to consider, page 15;

"Figure 26 compares animal protein production for the two countries. The calculations are based on slaughter numbers, fallen stock estimates, and product yield coefficients. This approach is used due to variation of up to 80 percent from different reported sources. At 3.6 million tons, the United States produces 8 times more animal rendered product than the United Kingdom."

"The risk of introducing the BSE agent through sheep meat and bone meal is more acute in both relative and absolute terms in the United Kingdom (Figures 27 and 28). Note that sheep meat and bone meal accounts for 14 percent, or 61 thousand tons, in the United Kingdom versus 0.6 percent or 22 thousand tons in the United States. For sheep greater than 1 year, this is less than one-tenth of one percent of the United States supply."

"The potential risk of amplification of the BSE agent through cattle meat and bone meal is much greater in the United States where it accounts for 59 percent of total product or almost 5 times more than the total amount of rendered product in the United Kingdom."

Considering, it would only take _one_ scrapie infected sheep to contaminate the feed. Considering Scrapie has run rampant in the U.S. for years, as of Aug. 1999, 950 scrapie infected flocks. Also, Considering only one quarter spoonful of scrapie infected material is lethal to a cow.

Considering all this, the sheep to cow ration is meaningless. As I said, it's 24 pages of B.S.e.

To be continued...

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

Bacliff, Texas USA

Competing interests: No competing interests


Rapid response to:

US scientists develop a possible test for BSE

15 November 1999

Terry S Singeltary

NA

BMJ 1999; 319 doi: https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.319.7220.1312b (Published 13 November 1999)

Cite this as: BMJ 1999;319:1312

Article Related content Article metrics 

Rapid responses 

Response Rapid Response: Re: vCJD in the USA * BSE in U.S. In reading the recent article in the BMJ about the potential BSE tests being developed in the U.S. and Bart Van Everbroeck reply. It does not surprize me, that the U.S. has been concealing vCJD. There have been people dying from CJD, with all the symptoms and pathological findings that resemble U.K. vCJD for some time. It just seems that when there is one found, they seem to change the clarical classification of the disease, to fit their agenda. I have several autopsies, stating kuru type amyloid plaques, one of the victims was 41 years of age. Also, my Mom died a most hideous death, Heidenhain Variant Creutzfeldt Jakob disease. Her symptoms resemble that of all the U.K. vCJD victims. She would jerk so bad at times, it would take 3 of us to hold her down, while she screamed "God, what's wrong with me, why can't I stop this." 1st of symptoms to death, 10 weeks, she went blind in the first few weeks. But, then they told me that this was just another strain of sporadic CJD. They can call it what ever they want, but I know what I saw, and what she went through. Sporadic, simply means, they do not know. My neighbors Mom also died from CJD. She had been taking a nutritional supplement which contained the following; vacuum dried bovine BRAIN, bone meal, bovine EYE, veal bone, bovine liver powder, bovine adrenal, vacuum dried bovine kidney, and vacuum dried porcine stomach. As I said, this woman taking these nutritional supplements, died from CJD. The particular batch of pills that was located, in which she was taking, was tested. From what I have heard, they came up negative, for the prion protein. But, in the same breath, they said their testing, may not have been strong enough to pick up the infectivity. Plus, she had been taking these type pills for years, so, could it have come from another batch?

CWD is just a small piece of a very big puzzle. I have seen while deer hunting, deer, squirrels and birds, eating from cattle feed troughs where they feed cattle, the high protein cattle by products, at least up until Aug. 4, 1997.

So why would it be so hard to believe that this is how they might become infected with a TSE. Or, even by potentially infected land. It's been well documented that it could be possible, from scrapie. Cats becoming infected with a TSE. Have you ever read the ingredients on the labels of cat and dog food? But, they do not put these tissues from these animals in pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, nutritional supplements, hGH, hPG, blood products, heart valves, and the many more products that come from bovine, ovine, or porcine tissues and organs. So, as I said, this CWD would be a small piece of a very big puzzle. But, it is here, and it most likely has killed. You see, greed is what caused this catastrophe, rendering and feeding practices. But, once Pandora's box was opened, the potential routes of infection became endless.

No BSE in the U.S.A.? I would not be so sure of that considering that since 1990;

Since 1990 the U.S. has raised 1,250,880,700 cattle;

Since 1990 the U.S. has ONLY checked 8,881 cattle brains for BSE, as of Oct. 4, 1999;

There are apprx. 100,000 DOWNER cattle annually in the U.S., that up until Aug. 4, 1997 went to the renders for feed;

Scrapie running rampant for years in the U.S., 950 infected FLOCKS, as of Aug. 1999;

Our feeding and rendering practices have mirrored that of the U.K. for years, some say it was worse. Everything from the downer cattle, to those scrapie infected sheep, to any roadkill, including the city police horse and the circus elephant went to the renders for feed and other products for consumption. Then they only implemented a partial feed ban on Aug. 4, 1997, but pigs, chickens, dogs, and cats, and humans were exempt from that ban. So they can still feed pigs and chickens those potentially TSE tainted by-products, and then they can still feed those by-products back to the cows. I believe it was Dr. Joe Gibbs, that said, the prion protein, can survive the digestinal track. So you have stopped nothing. It was proven in Oprah Winfrey's trial, that Cactus Cattle feeders, sent neurologically ill cattle, some with encephalopathy stamped on the dead slips, were picked up and sent to the renders, along with sheep carcasses. Speaking of autopsies, I have a stack of them, from CJD victims. You would be surprised of the number of them, who ate cow brains, elk brains, deer brains, or hog brains.

I believe all these TSE's are going to be related, and originally caused by the same greedy Industries, and they will be many. Not just the Renders, but you now see, that they are re-using medical devices that were meant for disposal. Some medical institutions do not follow proper auto- claving procedures (even Olympus has put out a medical warning on their endescopes about CJD, and the fact you cannot properly clean these instruments from TSE's), and this is just one product. Another route of infection.

Regardless what the Federal Government in the U.S. says. It's here, I have seen it, and the longer they keep sweeping it under the rug and denying the fact that we have a serious problem, one that could surpass aids (not now, but in the years to come, due to the incubation period), they will be responsible for the continued spreading of this deadly disease.

It's their move, it's CHECK, but once CHECKMATE has been called, how many thousands or millions, will be at risk or infected or even dead. You can't play around with these TSE's. I cannot stress that enough. They are only looking at body bags, and the fact the count is so low. But, then you have to look at the fact it is not a reportable disease in most states, mis-diagnosis, no autopsies performed. The fact that their one-in-a- million theory is a crude survey done about 5 years ago, that's a joke, under the above circumstances. A bad joke indeed........

The truth will come, but how many more have to die such a hideous death. It's the Government's call, and they need to make a serious move, soon. This problem, potential epidemic, is not going away, by itself.

Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

Bacliff, Texas 77518 USA


Competing interests: No competing interests


Terry S. Singeltary Sr.