Epidemiological verification of the mechanism of occurrence of atypical L-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy
Epidemiological verification of the mechanism of occurrence of atypical L-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy
Transbound Emerg Dis . 2022 Jul;69(4):e299-e308. doi: 10.1111/tbed.14298. Epub 2021 Sep 12.
Epidemiological verification of the mechanism of occurrence of atypical L-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy
Takateru Daikai 1 2, Takehisa Yamamoto 2 3
Affiliations
1Food Safety Policy Division, Food Safety and Consumer Affairs Bureau, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Tokyo, Japan.
2Cooperative Department of Veterinary Medicine, Graduate School of Veterinary Sciences, Iwate University, Iwate, Japan.
3Epidemiology Unit, National Institute of Animal Health, National Agriculture and Food Research Organization, Ibaraki, Japan.
PMID: 34407289 DOI: 10.1111/tbed.14298
Abstract
Since 2004, a novel bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), distinct from the conventional 'classical BSE' (C-BSE), has been reported as an atypical BSE. Atypical BSE is detected mostly in aged cattle, and it is suggested that atypical BSE may occur spontaneously. Relaxation of the relevant countermeasures such as feed ban, which prevents the use of bovine meat-and-bone meal as feed, has been discussed in recent years owing to the decrease in C-BSE cases. If atypical BSE occurs spontaneously without exposure to an agent called abnormal prion protein (PrPSc ), complete removal of these measures will be difficult. In this study, we verified the possibility that L-BSE, which is a subtype of atypical BSE, occurs spontaneously. We first hypothesized that L-BSE occurs only through the process of infection via oral exposure. If the hypothesis was true, the infection of L-BSE would be mostly limited to calves under 1 year of age due to their high susceptibility, and the feed ban would effectively reduce the number of infected calves by birth cohort. Thus, we created a mathematical model to estimate the number of infected calves by birth cohort and compared the effectiveness of the feed ban on C-BSE and L-BSE. The number of tested animals and detected cases in nine European countries were used for this analysis. Our results showed that the estimated number of infected calves in the birth cohort indicated that feed ban was less effective on L-BSE. This result supports the alternative hypothesis that at least a part of the L-BSE can occur without infection via oral exposure. Our results suggest that the complete abolition of countermeasures, such as feed ban, should be discussed carefully. As for the occurrence mechanism, although there remains uncertainty to reach conclusions, it is reasonable to assume that L-BSE can occur spontaneously at present.
Keywords: bovine spongiform encephalopathy; mathematical model; prion diseases; zoonotic infectious diseases.
© 2021 Wiley-VCH GmbH.
***Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.***
Even if the prevailing view is that sporadic CJD is due to the spontaneous formation of CJD prions, it remains possible that its apparent sporadic nature may, at least in part, result from our limited capacity to identify an environmental origin.
https://www.nature.com/articles/srep11573
REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR ANIMAL DISEASES Virtual, 1–11 February 2021
iv) Chronic wasting disease
The Commission considered the request by the Code Commission for clarification on the rationale for the Commission’s opinion that CWD did not fulfil the criteria for listing, specifically for point 2 of Article 1.2.26 of the Terrestrial Code. The Commission explained that the opinion was based on an extensive consultation process that took into account the opinions of the ad hoc Group on BSE, the Working Group on Wildlife and several subject-matter expert consultations. Based on this extensive consultation, the Commission indicated that the low disease prevalence, the impractical nature of currently available diagnostic tests, and the limited number of control measures make it difficult to eliminate the disease or scientifically provide evidence to demonstrate either freedom or impending freedom. The Commission considered also that despite the implementation of surveillance programmes by some Members, no country can currently demonstrate either freedom or impending freedom from disease.
Annex 19
WORK PROGRAMME OF THE SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR ANIMAL DISEASES (FEB 2021)
Define a procedure for the evaluation of diseases against the listing criteria of Chapter 1.2., and responding to requests for listing decisions
Evaluated proposals for (de)listing of:
• M. tuberculosis • Infestation of honey bees with Acarapis woodi • Infestation of honey bees with Tropilaelaps spp.
• Chronic wasting disease
• Atypical BSE
6.8. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (Chapter 11.4.), Application for official recognition by the OIE of risk status for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (Chapter 1.8.) and Glossary definition for ‘protein meal’
Background
In February 2018, following preliminary work and scientific exchanges, the Code Commission and the Scientific Commission agreed to an in-depth review of Chapter 11.4. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). The OIE convened three different ad hoc Groups between July 2018 and March 2019: i) an ad hoc Group on BSE risk assessment, which met twice, ii) an ad hoc Group on BSE surveillance, which met once, and iii) a joint ad hoc Group on BSE risk assessment and surveillance, which met once. The Code Commission, at its September 2019 meeting, reviewed the four ad hoc Group reports and the opinion of the Scientific Commission regarding the draft revised chapter and circulated a revised draft Chapter 11.4. for comments. In February 2020, the Code Commission considered comments received on the revised draft Chapter 11.4. and requested that the joint ad hoc Group on BSE risk assessment and surveillance be reconvened to address comments of a technical nature. In June 2020, the joint ad hoc Group was convened to address relevant comments and was also requested to review Chapter 1.8. Application for official recognition by the OIE of risk status for bovine spongiform encephalopathy to ensure alignment with the proposed changes in Chapter 11.4.
In September 2020, the Code Commission reviewed the joint ad hoc Group report and the revised draft Chapters 11.4. and 1.8. and made some additional amendments and circulated the revised chapters for comments in its September 2020 report. In February 2021, the Commission considered comments received and amended the chapters, as appropriate, and circulated the revised chapters for a third round of comments. In preparation for the September 2021 meetings, some members of the Code Commission and the Scientific Commission met to discuss key aspects of the revision of Chapters 11.4. and 1.8. to ensure a common understanding of the main concerns raised by Members, the decisions made on the revised chapters and their impact on the official status recognition, as well as on the adapted procedures that will be required. During this meeting, it was agreed that each Commission would address the issues relevant to its meeting and document discussions in their respective reports.
Discussion
SNIP...SEE FULL TEXT;
OIE Conclusions on transmissibility of atypical BSE among cattle
Given that cattle have been successfully infected by the oral route, at least for L-BSE, it is reasonable to conclude that atypical BSE is potentially capable of being recycled in a cattle population if cattle are exposed to contaminated feed. In addition, based on reports of atypical BSE from several countries that have not had C-BSE, it appears likely that atypical BSE would arise as a spontaneous disease in any country, albeit at a very low incidence in old cattle. In the presence of livestock industry practices that would allow it to be recycled in the cattle feed chain, it is likely that some level of exposure and transmission may occur. As a result, since atypical BSE can be reasonably considered to pose a potential background level of risk for any country with cattle, the recycling of both classical and atypical strains in the cattle and broader ruminant populations should be avoided.
Annex 7 (contd) AHG on BSE risk assessment and surveillance/March 2019
34 Scientific Commission/September 2019
3. Atypical BSE
The Group discussed and endorsed with minor revisions an overview of relevant literature on the risk of atypical BSE being recycled in a cattle population and its zoonotic potential that had been prepared ahead of the meeting by one expert from the Group. This overview is provided as Appendix IV and its main conclusions are outlined below. With regard to the risk of recycling of atypical BSE, recently published research confirmed that the L-type BSE prion (a type of atypical BSE prion) may be orally transmitted to calves1 . In light of this evidence, and the likelihood that atypical BSE could arise as a spontaneous disease in any country, albeit at a very low incidence, the Group was of the opinion that it would be reasonable to conclude that atypical BSE is potentially capable of being recycled in a cattle population if cattle were to be exposed to contaminated feed. Therefore, the recycling of atypical strains in cattle and broader ruminant populations should be avoided.
The Group acknowledged the challenges in demonstrating the zoonotic transmission of atypical strains of BSE in natural exposure scenarios. Overall, the Group was of the opinion that, at this stage, it would be premature to reach a conclusion other than that atypical BSE poses a potential zoonotic risk that may be different between atypical strains.
4. Definitions of meat-and-bone meal (MBM) and greaves
snip...
REFERENCES
SNIP...END SEE FULL TEXT;
Atypical L-type BSE
Emerg Infect Dis. 2017 Feb; 23(2): 284–287. doi: 10.3201/eid2302.161416 PMCID: PMC5324790 PMID: 28098532
Oral Transmission of L-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Agent among Cattle
Our study clearly confirms, experimentally, the potential risk for interspecies oral transmission of the agent of L-BSE. In our model, this risk appears higher than that for the agent of classical BSE, which could only be transmitted to mouse lemurs after a first passage in macaques (14). We report oral transmission of the L-BSE agent in young and adult primates. Transmission by the IC route has also been reported in young macaques (6,7). A previous study of L-BSE in transgenic mice expressing human PrP suggested an absence of any transmission barrier between cattle and humans for this particular strain of the agent of BSE, in contrast to findings for the agent of classical BSE (9). Thus, it is imperative to maintain measures that prevent the entry of tissues from cattle possibly infected with the agent of L-BSE into the food chain.
In most cases of naturally occurring atypical BSE identified so far, the animals were >8 years of age, except for 3 cases: 1 H-BSE and 1 L-BSE in Spain (1) and 1 H-BSE in Germany (12). Therefore, we cannot exclude the possibility that L-BSE developed sporadically/spontaneously.
Consumption of L-BSE–contaminated feed may pose a risk for oral transmission of the disease agent to cattle.
Atypical H-type BSE
Research Project: Pathobiology, Genetics, and Detection of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Location: Virus and Prion
Research Title: The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge
This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route.
These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.
Research Project: Pathobiology, Genetics, and Detection of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies
Location: Virus and Prion Research
Title: The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge
Author item Greenlee, Justin item MOORE, S - Orise Fellow item WEST-GREENLEE, M - Iowa State University
Submitted to: Prion
Publication Type: Abstract Only
Publication Acceptance Date: 5/14/2018
Publication Date: 5/22/2018
Citation: Greenlee, J.J., Moore, S.J., West Greenlee, M.H. 2018. The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge. Prion 2018, May 22-25, 2018, Santiago de Compostela, Spain. Paper No. P98, page 116. Interpretive Summary:
Technical Abstract: In 2006, a case of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) was reported in a cow with a previously unreported prion protein polymorphism (E211K). The E211K polymorphism is heritable and homologous to the E200K mutation in humans that is the most frequent PRNP mutation associated with familial Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. Although the prevalence of the E211K polymorphism is low, cattle carrying the K211 allele develop H-type BSE with a rapid onset after experimental inoculation by the intracranial route. The purpose of this study was to investigate whether the agents of H-type BSE or H-type BSE associated with the E211K polymorphism transmit to wild type cattle or cattle with the K211 allele after oronasal exposure. Wild type (EE211) or heterozygous (EK211) cattle were oronasally inoculated with either H-type BSE from the 2004 US H-type BSE case (n=3) or from the 2006 US H-type case associated with the E211K polymorphism (n=4) using 10% w/v brain homogenates. Cattle were observed daily throughout the course of the experiment for the development of clinical signs. At approximately 50 months post-inoculation, one steer (EK211 inoculated with E211K associated H-BSE) developed clinical signs including inattentiveness, loss of body condition, weakness, ataxia, and muscle fasciculations and was euthanized. Enzyme immunoassay confirmed that abundant misfolded protein was present in the brainstem, and immunohistochemistry demonstrated PrPSc throughout the brain. Western blot analysis of brain tissue from the clinically affected steer was consistent with the E211K H-type BSE inoculum. With the experiment currently at 55 months post-inoculation, no other cattle in this study have developed clinical signs suggestive of prion disease. This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route. These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.
P98 The agent of H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy associated with E211K prion protein polymorphism transmits after oronasal challenge
Greenlee JJ (1), Moore SJ (1), and West Greenlee MH (2) (1) United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, National Animal Disease Center, Virus and Prion Research Unit, Ames, IA, United States (2) Department of Biomedical Sciences, Iowa State University College of Veterinary Medicine, Ames, IA, United States.
With the experiment currently at 55 months post-inoculation, no other cattle in this study have developed clinical signs suggestive of prion disease. This study demonstrates that the H-type BSE agent is transmissible by the oronasal route.
These results reinforce the need for ongoing surveillance for classical and atypical BSE to minimize the risk of potentially infectious tissues entering the animal or human food chains.
PRION CONFERENCE 2018 CONFERENCE ABSTRACT
Published: 23 June 2011
Experimental H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy characterized by plaques and glial- and stellate-type prion protein deposits
The present study demonstrated successful intraspecies transmission of H-type BSE to cattle and the distribution and immunolabeling patterns of PrPSc in the brain of the H-type BSE-challenged cattle. TSE agent virulence can be minimally defined by oral transmission of different TSE agents (C-type, L-type, and H-type BSE agents) [59]. Oral transmission studies with H-type BSE-infected cattle have been initiated and are underway to provide information regarding the extent of similarity in the immunohistochemical and molecular features before and after transmission. In addition, the present data will support risk assessments in some peripheral tissues derived from cattle affected with H-type BSE.
References...END
2.3.2. New evidence on the zoonotic potential of atypical BSE and atypical scrapie prion strains
PLEASE NOTE;
2.3.2. New evidence on the zoonotic potential of atypical BSE and atypical scrapie prion strains
Olivier Andreoletti, INRA Research Director, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA) – École Nationale Vétérinaire de Toulouse (ENVT), invited speaker, presented the results of two recently published scientific articles of interest, of which he is co-author:
‘Radical Change in Zoonotic Abilities of Atypical BSE Prion Strains as Evidenced by Crossing of Sheep Species Barrier in Transgenic Mice’ (MarinMoreno et al., 2020) and ‘The emergence of classical BSE from atypical/Nor98 scrapie’ (Huor et al., 2019).
In the first experimental study, H-type and L-type BSE were inoculated into transgenic mice expressing all three genotypes of the human PRNP at codon 129 and into adapted into ARQ and VRQ transgenic sheep mice. The results showed the alterations of the capacities to cross the human barrier species (mouse model) and emergence of sporadic CJD agents in Hu PrP expressing mice: type 2 sCJD in homozygous TgVal129 VRQ-passaged L-BSE, and type 1 sCJD in homozygous TgVal 129 and TgMet129 VRQ-passaged H-BSE.
3.2.1.2 Non‐cervid domestic species
The remarkably high rate of natural CWD transmission in the ongoing NA epidemics raises the question of the risk to livestock grazing on CWD‐contaminated shared rangeland and subsequently developing a novel CWD‐related prion disease. This issue has been investigated by transmitting CWD via experimental challenge to cattle, sheep and pigs and to tg mouse lines expressing the relevant species PrP.
For cattle challenged with CWD, PrPSc was detected in approximately 40% of intracerebrally inoculated animals (Hamir et al., 2005, 2006a, 2007). Tg mice expressing bovine PrP have also been challenged with CWD and while published studies have negative outcomes (Tamguney et al., 2009b), unpublished data provided for the purposes of this Opinion indicate that some transmission of individual isolates to bovinised mice is possible (Table 1).
In small ruminant recipients, a low rate of transmission was reported between 35 and 72 months post‐infection (mpi) in ARQ/ARQ and ARQ/VRQ sheep intracerebrally challenged with mule deer CWD (Hamir et al., 2006b), while two out of two ARQ/ARQ sheep intracerebrally inoculated with elk CWD developed clinical disease after 28 mpi (Madsen‐Bouterse et al., 2016). However, tg mice expressing ARQ sheep PrP were resistant (Tamguney et al., 2006) and tg mice expressing the VRQ PrP allele were poorly susceptible to clinical disease (Beringue et al., 2012; Madsen‐Bouterse et al., 2016). In contrast, tg mice expressing VRQ sheep PrP challenged with CWD have resulted in highly efficient, life‐long asymptomatic replication of these prions in the spleen tissue (Beringue et al., 2012).
A recent study investigated the potential for swine to serve as hosts of the CWD agent(s) by intracerebral or oral challenge of crossbred piglets (Moore et al., 2016b, 2017). Pigs sacrificed at 6 mpi, approximately the age at which pigs reach market weight, were clinically healthy and negative by diagnostic tests, although low‐level CWD agent replication could be detected in the CNS by bioassay in tg cervinised mice. Among pigs that were incubated for up to 73 mpi, some gave diagnostic evidence of CWD replication in the brain between 42 and 72 mpi. Importantly, this was observed also in one orally challenged pig at 64 mpi and the presence of low‐level CWD replication was confirmed by mouse bioassay. The authors of this study argued that pigs can support low‐level amplification of CWD prions, although the species barrier to CWD infection is relatively high and that the detection of infectivity in orally inoculated pigs with a mouse bioassay raises the possibility that naturally exposed pigs could act as a reservoir of CWD infectivity.
Very low oral exposure to prions of brain or saliva origin can transmit chronic wasting disease
Nathaniel D. Denkers ,Clare E. Hoover ,Kristen A. Davenport,Davin M. Henderson,Erin E. McNulty,Amy V. Nalls,Candace K. Mathiason,Edward A. Hoover
Published: August 20, 2020
We report that oral exposure to as little as 300 nanograms (ng) of CWD-positive brain or to saliva containing seeding activity equivalent to 300 ng of CWD-positive brain, were sufficient to transmit CWD disease. This was true whether the inoculum was administered as a single bolus or divided as three weekly 100 ng exposures. However, when the 300 ng total dose was apportioned as 10, 30 ng doses delivered over 12 weeks, no infection occurred. While low-dose exposures to prions of brain or saliva origin prolonged the time from inoculation to first detection of infection, once infection was established, we observed no differences in disease pathogenesis. These studies suggest that the CWD minimum infectious dose approximates 100 to 300 ng CWD-positive brain (or saliva equivalent), and that CWD infection appears to conform more with a threshold than a cumulative dose dynamic.
Research Project: TRANSMISSION, DIFFERENTIATION, AND PATHOBIOLOGY OF TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES Location: Virus and Prion Research
Title: Disease-associated prion protein detected in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged with the agent of chronic wasting disease
Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease. Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains.
Research Project: Pathobiology, Genetics, and Detection of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Location: Virus and Prion Research
Title: The agent of chronic wasting disease from pigs is infectious in transgenic mice expressing human PRNP
Author item MOORE, S - Orise Fellow item Kokemuller, Robyn item WEST-GREENLEE, M - Iowa State University item BALKEMA-BUSCHMANN, ANNE - Friedrich-Loeffler-institut item GROSCHUP, MARTIN - Friedrich-Loeffler-institut item Greenlee, Justin Submitted to: Prion Publication Type: Abstract Only Publication Acceptance Date: 5/10/2018 Publication Date: 5/22/2018 Citation: Moore, S.J., Kokemuller, R.D., West-Greenlee, M.H., Balkema-Buschmann, A., Groschup, M.H., Greenlee, J.J. 2018. The agent of chronic wasting disease from pigs is infectious in transgenic mice expressing human PRNP. Prion 2018, Santiago de Compostela, Spain, May 22-25, 2018. Paper No. WA15, page 44.
Interpretive Summary:
The successful transmission of pig-passaged CWD to Tg40 mice reported here suggests that passage of the CWD agent through pigs results in a change of the transmission characteristics which reduces the transmission barrier of Tg40 mice to the CWD agent. If this biological behavior is recapitulated in the original host species, passage of the CWD agent through pigs could potentially lead to increased pathogenicity of the CWD agent in humans.
cwd scrapie pigs oral routes
***> However, at 51 months of incubation or greater, 5 animals were positive by one or more diagnostic methods. Furthermore, positive bioassay results were obtained from all inoculated groups (oral and intracranial; market weight and end of study) suggesting that swine are potential hosts for the agent of scrapie. <***
>*** Although the current U.S. feed ban is based on keeping tissues from TSE infected cattle from contaminating animal feed, swine rations in the U.S. could contain animal derived components including materials from scrapie infected sheep and goats. These results indicating the susceptibility of pigs to sheep scrapie, coupled with the limitations of the current feed ban, indicates that a revision of the feed ban may be necessary to protect swine production and potentially human health. <***
***> Results: PrPSc was not detected by EIA and IHC in any RPLNs. All tonsils and MLNs were negative by IHC, though the MLN from one pig in the oral <6 month group was positive by EIA. PrPSc was detected by QuIC in at least one of the lymphoid tissues examined in 5/6 pigs in the intracranial <6 months group, 6/7 intracranial >6 months group, 5/6 pigs in the oral <6 months group, and 4/6 oral >6 months group. Overall, the MLN was positive in 14/19 (74%) of samples examined, the RPLN in 8/18 (44%), and the tonsil in 10/25 (40%).
***> Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease. Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains.
Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease. Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains.
CONFIDENTIAL
EXPERIMENTAL PORCINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
LINE TO TAKE
3. If questions on pharmaceuticals are raised at the Press conference, the suggested line to take is as follows:-
"There are no medicinal products licensed for use on the market which make use of UK-derived porcine tissues with which any hypothetical “high risk" ‘might be associated. The results of the recent experimental work at the CSM will be carefully examined by the CSM‘s Working Group on spongiform encephalopathy at its next meeting.
DO Hagger RM 1533 MT Ext 3201
While this clearly is a cause for concern we should not jump to the conclusion that this means that pigs will necessarily be infected by bone and meat meal fed by the oral route as is the case with cattle. ...
we cannot rule out the possibility that unrecognised subclinical spongiform encephalopathy could be present in British pigs though there is no evidence for this: only with parenteral/implantable pharmaceuticals/devices is the theoretical risk to humans of sufficient concern to consider any action.
May I, at the outset, reiterate that we should avoid dissemination of papers relating to this experimental finding to prevent premature release of the information. ...
3. It is particularly important that this information is not passed outside the Department, until Ministers have decided how they wish it to be handled. ...
But it would be easier for us if pharmaceuticals/devices are not directly mentioned at all. ...
Our records show that while some use is made of porcine materials in medicinal products, the only products which would appear to be in a hypothetically ''higher risk'' area are the adrenocorticotrophic hormone for which the source material comes from outside the United Kingdom, namely America China Sweden France and Germany. The products are manufactured by Ferring and Armour. A further product, ''Zenoderm Corium implant'' manufactured by Ethicon, makes use of porcine skin - which is not considered to be a ''high risk'' tissue, but one of its uses is described in the data sheet as ''in dural replacement''. This product is sourced from the United Kingdom.....
seems that the USA feed ban for ruminant protein is still a serious problem, so there seems to still be a risk factor for pigs and Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion disease. now with the updated science showing that pigs are susceptible to the Chronic Wasting Disease TSE Prion ORALLY, and cwd running rampant in the USA, any use of porcine organs should be tested for the CWD TSE Prion...
CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease.
Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains.
See what DEFRA says;
For elk and deer considered at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed system. However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law.
However, given that non-ruminant feed produced in the USA may contain deer and elk PAP, it is theoretically possible that wild deer may be exposed to deer protein in legally imported non-ruminant feed. For this to occur, wild deer would need to access nonruminant feed (e.g. pig, fish and chicken feed) on farms near their habitat. Alternatively, wild deer may be exposed to CWD prion in the faeces of pets that have consumed and digested imported, contaminated pet feed. The frequency in which these routes may occur is unknown and is considered to be a greater than negligible risk with associated uncertainty.
***Moreover, sporadic disease has never been observed in breeding colonies or primate research laboratories, most notably among hundreds of animals over several decades of study at the National Institutes of Health25, and in nearly twenty older animals continuously housed in our own facility.***
Even if the prevailing view is that sporadic CJD is due to the spontaneous formation of CJD prions, it remains possible that its apparent sporadic nature may, at least in part, result from our limited capacity to identify an environmental origin.
https://www.nature.com/articles/srep11573
O.05: Transmission of prions to primates after extended silent incubation periods: Implications for BSE and scrapie risk assessment in human populations
Emmanuel Comoy, Jacqueline Mikol, Valerie Durand, Sophie Luccantoni, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra, Capucine Dehen, and Jean-Philippe Deslys Atomic Energy Commission; Fontenay-aux-Roses, France
Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD summing 80% of human prion cases).
Non-human primate models provided the first evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid origins even after very long silent incubation periods.
*** We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period,
***with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold long incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014),
***is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE),
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases.
We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health.
===============
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases***
===============
***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals.
==============
https://prion2015.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/prion2015abstracts.pdf
***Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice.
***Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion.
***These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19336896.2016.1163048?journalCode=kprn20
Prion diseases (PD) are the unique neurodegenerative proteinopathies reputed to be transmissible under field conditions since decades. The transmission of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) to humans evidenced that an animal PD might be zoonotic under appropriate conditions. Contrarily, in the absence of obvious (epidemiological or experimental) elements supporting a transmission or genetic predispositions, PD, like the other proteinopathies, are reputed to occur spontaneously (atpical animal prion strains, sporadic CJD summing 80% of human prion cases).
Non-human primate models provided the first evidences supporting the transmissibiity of human prion strains and the zoonotic potential of BSE. Among them, cynomolgus macaques brought major information for BSE risk assessment for human health (Chen, 2014), according to their phylogenetic proximity to humans and extended lifetime. We used this model to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal PD from bovine, ovine and cervid origins even after very long silent incubation periods.
*** We recently observed the direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to macaque after a 10-year silent incubation period,
***with features similar to some reported for human cases of sporadic CJD, albeit requiring fourfold long incubation than BSE. Scrapie, as recently evoked in humanized mice (Cassard, 2014),
***is the third potentially zoonotic PD (with BSE and L-type BSE),
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases.
We will present an updated panorama of our different transmission studies and discuss the implications of such extended incubation periods on risk assessment of animal PD for human health.
===============
***thus questioning the origin of human sporadic cases***
===============
***our findings suggest that possible transmission risk of H-type BSE to sheep and human. Bioassay will be required to determine whether the PMCA products are infectious to these animals.
==============
https://prion2015.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/prion2015abstracts.pdf
***Transmission data also revealed that several scrapie prions propagate in HuPrP-Tg mice with efficiency comparable to that of cattle BSE. While the efficiency of transmission at primary passage was low, subsequent passages resulted in a highly virulent prion disease in both Met129 and Val129 mice.
***Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion.
***These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19336896.2016.1163048?journalCode=kprn20
PRION 2016 TOKYO
Saturday, April 23, 2016
SCRAPIE WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential 2016
Prion. 10:S15-S21. 2016 ISSN: 1933-6896 printl 1933-690X online
Taylor & Francis
Prion 2016 Animal Prion Disease Workshop Abstracts
WS-01: Prion diseases in animals and zoonotic potential
Transmission of the different scrapie isolates in these mice leads to the emergence of prion strain phenotypes that showed similar characteristics to those displayed by MM1 or VV2 sCJD prion.
These results demonstrate that scrapie prions have a zoonotic potential and raise new questions about the possible link between animal and human prions.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/19336896.2016.1163048?journalCode=kprn20
Title: Transmission of scrapie prions to primate after an extended silent incubation period)
*** In complement to the recent demonstration that humanized mice are susceptible to scrapie, we report here the first observation of direct transmission of a natural classical scrapie isolate to a macaque after a 10-year incubation period. Neuropathologic examination revealed all of the features of a prion disease: spongiform change, neuronal loss, and accumulation of PrPres throughout the CNS.
*** This observation strengthens the questioning of the harmlessness of scrapie to humans, at a time when protective measures for human and animal health are being dismantled and reduced as c-BSE is considered controlled and being eradicated.
*** Our results underscore the importance of precautionary and protective measures and the necessity for long-term experimental transmission studies to assess the zoonotic potential of other animal prion strains.
http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publications.htm?SEQ_NO_115=313160
GAME FARM INDUSTRY WANTS TO COVER UP FINDINGS OF INCREASE RISK TO CJD FROM CERVID
BSE INQUIRY
CJD9/10022
October 1994
Mr R.N. Elmhirst Chairman British Deer Farmers Association Holly Lodge Spencers Lane
BerksWell Coventry CV7 7BZ
Dear Mr Elmhirst,
CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE (CJD) SURVEILLANCE UNIT REPORT
Thank you for your recent letter concerning the publication of the third annual report from the CJD Surveillance Unit. I am sorry that you are dissatisfied with the way in which this report was published.
The Surveillance Unit is a completely independant outside body and the Department of Health is committed to publishing their reports as soon as they become available. In the circumstances it is not the practice to circulate the report for comment since the findings of the report would not be amended.. In future we can ensure that the British Deer Farmers Association receives a copy of the report in advance of publication.
The Chief Medical Officer has undertaken to keep the public fully informed of the results of any research in respect of CJD. This report was entirely the work of the unit and was produced completely independantly of the the Department.
The statistical results regarding the consumption of venison was put into perspective in the body of the report and was not mentioned at all in the press release. Media attention regarding this report was low key but gave a realistic presentation of the statistical findings of the Unit. This approach to publication was successful in that consumption of venison was highlighted only once by the media ie. in the News at one television proqramme.
I believe that a further statement about the report, or indeed statistical links between CJD and consumption of venison, would increase, and quite possibly give damaging credence, to the whole issue. From the low key media reports of which I am aware it seems unlikely that venison consumption will suffer adversely, if at all.
http://web.archive.org/web/20030511010117/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1994/10/00003001.pdf
Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether scrapie is transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the disease has been transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid speculation (Gajdusek 1977) conjectures that the agents of scrapie, kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and transmissible encephalopathy of mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S. Department of Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed for human or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)" The problem is emphasized by the finding that some strains of scrapie produce lesions identical to the once which characterize the human dementias"
Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety of laboratory personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action such as the "scorched meat" policy of USDA makes the solution of the scrapie problem urgent if the sheep industry is not to suffer grievously.
snip...
76/10.12/4.6
IN CONFIDENCE
SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION TO CHIMPANZEES
IN CONFIDENCE
reference...
RB3.20
TRANSMISSION TO CHIMPANZEES
1. Kuru and CJD have been successfully transmitted to chimpanzees but scrapie and TME have not.
2. We cannot say that scrapie will not transmit to chimpanzees. There are several scrapie strains and I am not aware that all have been tried (that would have to be from mouse passaged material). Nor has a wide enough range of field isolates subsequently strain typed in mice been inoculated by the appropriate routes (i/c, ilp and i/v) :
3. I believe the proposed experiment to determine transmissibility, if conducted, would only show the susceptibility or resistance of the chimpanzee to infection/disease by the routes used and the result could not be interpreted for the predictability of the susceptibility for man. Proposals for prolonged oral exposure of chimpanzees to milk from cattle were suggested a long while ago and rejected.
4. In view of Dr Gibbs' probable use of chimpazees Mr Wells' comments (enclosed) are pertinent. I have yet to receive a direct communication from Dr Schellekers but before any collaboration or provision of material we should identify the Gibbs' proposals and objectives.
5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severely would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough. Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might be best to retain that hypothesis.
6. A negative result would take a lifetime to determine but that would be a shorter period than might be available for human exposure and it would still not answer the question regarding mans' susceptibility. In the meantime no doubt the negativity would be used defensively. It would however be counterproductive if the experiment finally became positive. We may learn more about public reactions following next Monday' s meeting.
R. Bradley
23 September 1990
CVO (+Mr Wells' comments)
Dr T W A Little
Dr B J Shreeve
90/9.23/1.1.
http://web.archive.org/web/20090506041740/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/09/23001001.pdf
IN CONFIDENCE CHIMPANZEES
CODE 18-77 Reference RB3.46
Some further information that may assist in decision making has been gained by discussion with Dr Rosalind Ridley.
She says that careful study of Gajdusek's work shows no increased susceptibility of chimpanzees over New World Monkeys such as Squirrel Monkeys. She does not think it would tell you anything about the susceptibility to man. Also Gajdusek did not, she believes, challenge chimpanzees with scrapie as severely as we did pigs and we know little of that source of scrapie. Comparisons would be difficult. She also would not expect the Home Office to sanction such experiments here unless there was a very clear and important objective that would be important for human health protection. She doubted such a case could be made. If this is the case she thought it would be unethical to do an experiment abroad because we could not do it in our own country.
Retrospectively she feels they should have put up more marmosets than they did. They all remain healthy. They would normally regard the transmission as negative if no disease resulted in five years.
We are not being asked for a decision but I think that before we made one we should gain as much knowledge as we can. If we decided to proceed we would have to bear any criticisms for many years if there was an adverse view by scientists or media. This should not be undertaken lightly. There is already some adverse comment here, I gather, on the pig experiment though that will subside.
The Gibbs' (as' distinct from Schellekers') study is somewhat different. We are merely supplying material for comparative studies in a laboratory with the greatest experience of human SEs in the world and it has been sanctioned by USDA (though we do not know for certain yet if chimpanzees specifically will be used). This would keep it at a lower profile than if we conducted such an experiment in the UK or Europe.
I consider we must have very powerful and defendable objectives to go beyond Gibbs' proposed experiments and should not initiate others just because an offer has been made.
Scientists have a responsibility to seek other methods of investigative research other than animal experimentation. At present no objective has convinced me we need to do research using Chimpanzees - a species in need of protection. Resisting such proposals would enable us to communicate that information to the scientist and the public should the need arise. A line would have been drawn.
CVO cc Dr T Dr B W A Little Dr B J Shreeve
R Bradley
26 September 1990
90/9.26/3.2
http://web.archive.org/web/20090506041605/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/09/26003001.pdf
this is tse prion political theater here, i.e. what i call TSE PRION POKER...tss
3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to accord it a very low profile indeed. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical incident to be avoided in the US at all costs.
snip...
PAGE 26
Transmission Studies
Mule deer transmissions of CWD were by intracerebral inoculation and compared with natural cases {the following was written but with a single line marked through it ''first passage (by this route)}....TSS
resulted in a more rapidly progressive clinical disease with repeated episodes of synocopy ending in coma. One control animal became affected, it is believed through contamination of inoculum (?saline). Further CWD transmissions were carried out by Dick Marsh into ferret, mink and squirrel monkey. Transmission occurred in ALL of these species with the shortest incubation period in the ferret.
The occurrence of CWD must be viewed against the contest of the locations in which it occurred. It was an incidental and unwelcome complication of the respective wildlife research programmes. Despite its subsequent recognition as a new disease of cervids, therefore justifying direct investigation, no specific research funding was forthcoming. The USDA viewed it as a wildlife problem and consequently not their province! ...page 26.
snip...see;
IN CONFIDENCE
PERCEPTIONS OF UNCONVENTIONAL SLOW VIRUS DISEASE OF ANIMALS IN THE USA
GAH WELLS
REPORT OF A VISIT TO THE USA
APRIL-MAY 1989
why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $
5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for man.
***> I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough.
***> Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might be best to retain that hypothesis.
snip...
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2019
***> MAD DOGS AND ENGLISHMEN BSE, SCRAPIE, CWD, CJD, TSE PRION A REVIEW 2019
PLOS ONE Journal
*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;
IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure
Terry S. Singeltary Sr., 03 Jul 2015 at 16:53 GMT
***however in 1 C-type challenged animal, Prion 2015 Poster Abstracts S67 PrPsc was not detected using rapid tests for BSE.
***Subsequent testing resulted in the detection of pathologic lesion in unusual brain location and PrPsc detection by PMCA only.
*** IBNC Tauopathy or TSE Prion disease, it appears, no one is sure ***
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2020
***> REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE SCIENTIFIC COMMISSION FOR ANIMAL DISEASES Paris, 9–13 September 2019 BSE, TSE, PRION
see updated concerns with atypical BSE from feed and zoonosis...terry
Tuesday, May 31, 2022
89th General Session of the World Assembly of OIE Delegates image for WOAH General Summit 2022 Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion Discussions and Concerns
Published: 06 September 2021
***> Chronic wasting disease: a cervid prion infection looming to spillover
Alicia Otero, Camilo Duque Velásquez, Judd Aiken & Debbie McKenzie
Veterinary Research volume 52, Article number: 115 (2021)
Sunday, January 10, 2021
APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087] Singeltary Submission June 17, 2019
APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087] Singeltary Submission
Greetings APHIS et al,
I would kindly like to comment on APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087], and my comments are as follows, with the latest peer review and transmission studies as references of evidence.
THE OIE/USDA BSE Minimal Risk Region MRR is nothing more than free pass to import and export the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion disease. December 2003, when the USDA et al lost it's supposedly 'GOLD CARD' ie BSE FREE STATUS (that was based on nothing more than not looking and not finding BSE), once the USA lost it's gold card BSE Free status, the USDA OIE et al worked hard and fast to change the BSE Geographical Risk Statuses i.e. the BSE GBR's, and replaced it with the BSE MRR policy, the legal tool to trade mad cow type disease TSE Prion Globally. The USA is doing just what the UK did, when they shipped mad cow disease around the world, except with the BSE MRR policy, it's now legal.
Also, the whole concept of the BSE MRR policy is based on a false pretense, that atypical BSE is not transmissible, and that only typical c-BSE is transmissible via feed. This notion that atypical BSE TSE Prion is an old age cow disease that is not infectious is absolutely false, there is NO science to show this, and on the contrary, we now know that atypical BSE will transmit by ORAL ROUTES, but even much more concerning now, recent science has shown that Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion in deer and elk which is rampant with no stopping is sight in the USA, and Scrapie TSE Prion in sheep and goat, will transmit to PIGS by oral routes, this is our worst nightmare, showing even more risk factors for the USA FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED ban.
The FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED ban has failed terribly bad, and is still failing, since August 1997. there is tonnage and tonnage of banned potential mad cow feed that went into commerce, and still is, with one decade, 10 YEARS, post August 1997 FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED ban, 2007, with 10,000,000 POUNDS, with REASON, Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. you can see all these feed ban warning letters and tonnage of mad cow feed in commerce, year after year, that is not accessible on the internet anymore like it use to be, you can see history of the FDA failure August 1997 FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED ban here, but remember this, we have a new outbreak of TSE Prion disease in a new livestock species, the camel, and this too is very worrisome.
WITH the OIE and the USDA et al weakening the global TSE prion surveillance, by not classifying the atypical Scrapie as TSE Prion disease, and the notion that they want to do the same thing with typical scrapie and atypical BSE, it's just not scientific.
WE MUST abolish the BSE MRR policy, go back to the BSE GBR risk assessments by country, and enhance them to include all strains of TSE Prion disease in all species. With Chronic Wasting CWD TSE Prion disease spreading in Europe, now including, Norway, Finland, Sweden, also in Korea, Canada and the USA, and the TSE Prion in Camels, the fact the the USA is feeding potentially CWD, Scrapie, BSE, typical and atypical, to other animals, and shipping both this feed and or live animals or even grains around the globe, potentially exposed or infected with the TSE Prion. this APHIS Concurrence With OIE Risk Designation for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [Docket No. APHIS-2018-0087], under it's present definition, does NOT show the true risk of the TSE Prion in any country. as i said, it's nothing more than a legal tool to trade the TSE Prion around the globe, nothing but ink on paper.
AS long as the BSE MRR policy stays in effect, TSE Prion disease will continued to be bought and sold as food for both humans and animals around the globe, and the future ramifications from friendly fire there from, i.e. iatrogenic exposure and transmission there from from all of the above, should not be underestimated. ...
Control of Chronic Wasting Disease OMB Control Number: 0579-0189 APHIS-2021-0004 Singeltary Submission
Docket No. APHIS-2018-0011 Chronic Wasting Disease Herd Certification
Sunday, February 14, 2010
[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
snip...SEE FULL TEXT;
BSE research project final report 2005 to 2008 SE1796 SID5
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 07, 2021
Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE OIE, FDA 589.2001 FEED REGULATIONS, and Ingestion Therefrom
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE Prion Origin USA?
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 12, 2022
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE Prion Origin USA, what if?
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 8, 2021
Importation of Sheep, Goats, and Certain Other Ruminants AGENCY: Animal APHIA, USDA, FINAL RULE [Docket No. APHIS–2009–0095] RIN 0579–AD10
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 2021
USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 2020 IMPACT REPORT BSE TSE Prion Testing and Surveillance MIA
https://animalhealthreportpriontse.blogspot.com/2021/03/usda-animal-and-plant-health-inspection.html
THURSDAY, AUGUST 20, 2020
Why is USDA "only" BSE TSE Prion testing 25,000 samples a year?
SUNDAY, MARCH 21, 2021
Investigation Results of Texas Cow That Tested Positive for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Aug. 30, 2005 Singeltary's Regiew 2021
***> The U.S. cases were animals born and raised in the U.S. (Texas, Alabama).
SEE HISTORY AT THE BOTTOM...TSS
2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006
Saturday, August 14, 2010
BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY
(see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)
FRIDAY, APRIL 1, 2022
USDA TAKES THE C OUT OF COOL, what's up with that?
MONDAY, JUNE 6, 2022
APHIS USDA History Highlight: APHIS Combats Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Published Jun 1, 2022
THURSDAY, MARCH 31, 2022
EFSA ONE Conference 2022 Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE PrP of Cervid and Zoonosis Zoonotic Transmission Singeltary Submission
TUESDAY, MARCH 29, 2022
***> OIE Agent causing chronic wasting disease (CWD) TSE Prion of Cervid <***
Tuesday, May 31, 2022
89th General Session of the World Assembly of OIE Delegates image for WOAH General Summit 2022 Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion Discussions and Concerns
(this link is good and safe from my one of my tse prion blogs, My Norton has chosen wrongly to mark it as suspicious...terry)
TUESDAY, MAY 31, 2022
USA Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE: description of typical and atypical cases
SUNDAY, MAY 08, 2022
USA National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Surveillance Update April 11th, 2022
TUESDAY, MAY 24, 2022
Texas Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease CJD TSE Prion Update Singeltary FOIA Request Received May 23, 2022
TUESDAY, MAY 10, 2022
Concordance of CSF RT-QuIC across the European Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease surveillance network
TUESDAY, APRIL 05, 2022
Incidence of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in the United States 1993-2014
MONDAY, JANUARY 31, 2022
Validation of Revised International Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Surveillance Network Diagnostic Criteria for Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Singeltary Comment Submission
Friday, March 11, 2022
Prevalence of Surgical Procedures at Symptomatic Onset of Prion Disease
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 02, 2022
Understanding the nature of PrP found in Appendix tissues in the UK population
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 24, 2021
***> Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease CJD TSE Prion Update December 25, 2021 <***
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 26, 2021
Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in a Very Young Person Singeltary Reply 2021
Saturday, December 18, 2021
Direct neural transmission of vCJD/BSE in macaque after finger incision
Tuesday, November 30, 2021
Second death in France in a laboratory working on prions
Second lab worker with deadly prion disease prompts research pause in France
A lab worker died of prion disease in 2019, nine years after a lab accident.
BETH MOLE - 7/29/2021, 5:16 PM
A 2020 paper published in the New England Journal of Medicine left little doubt that Jaumain had been infected on the job. She had variant CJD, but since Europe’s ‘mad cow’ outbreak ended after 2000 and the disease virtually disappeared, the paper said it was virtually impossible for someone her age in France to contract food-borne vCJD.
Science also said two independent reports – one by government inspectors – had found no safety violations at the lab where Jaumain worked. The press release also noted that the inspectors concluded there was “the presence of a risk control culture within the research teams”. The Jaumain family’s lawyer called the neutrality of the reports into question, however.
At the same time, the government inspectors’ report also revealed that there had been at least 17 accidents among the 100 or so scientists and technicians in France working with prions in the previous decade, raising concerns about how effective this risk control culture is. Five of these occurred when workers “stabbed or cut themselves with contaminated syringes or blades”.
Wednesday, July 28, 2021
France issues moratorium on prion research after fatal brain disease strikes two lab workers
Wednesday, July 28, 2021
France issues moratorium on prion research after fatal brain disease strikes two lab workers
Friendly fire, pass it forward, they call it iatrogenic cjd, or what i call 'tse prion poker', are you all in $$$
all iatrogenic cjd is, is sporadic cjd, before the iatrogenic event is discovered, traced back, proven, documented, put into the academic domain, and then finally the public domain, this very seldom happens, thus problem solved, it's all sporadic cjd...
SATURDAY, AUGUST 01, 2020
Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease among Physicians, Germany, 1993–2018 high proportion of physicians with sCJD were surgeons
SUNDAY, JULY 19, 2020
Joseph J. Zubak Orthopaedic surgeon passed away Monday, July 6, 2020, Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD)
Variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob Disease Diagnosed 7.5 Years after Occupational Exposure
Variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease was identified in a technician who had cut her thumb while handling brain sections of mice infected with adapted BSE 7.5 years earlier. The long incubation period was similar to that of the transfusion-transmitted form of the disease.
THURSDAY, JULY 02, 2020
Variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob Disease Diagnosed 7.5 Years after Occupational Exposure
Tuesday, June 28, 2022
Subclinical infection occurs frequently following low dose exposure to prions by blood transfusion
Thursday, October 28, 2021
Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) TSE Prion Zoonosis, friendly fire, iatrogenic transmission, blood products, sporadic CJD, what if?
FRIDAY, JULY 15, 2022
Texas Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion Positives Increase By 8 to 369 TOTAL Confirmed To Date
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. TUESDAY, JUNE 28, 2022
TAHC PROPOSES CHANGES TO VOLUNTARY CWD PROGRAM CHAPTER 40, CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE SINGELTARY SUBMISSION JUNE 28, 2022
Control of Chronic Wasting Disease OMB Control Number: 0579-0189 APHIS-2021-0004 Singeltary Submission
Docket No. APHIS-2018-0011 Chronic Wasting Disease Herd Certification
***> TEXAS HISTORY OF CWD <***
Singeltary telling TAHC, that CWD was waltzing into Texas from WSMR around Trans Pecos region, starting around 2001, 2002, and every year, there after, until New Mexico finally shamed TAHC et al to test where i had been telling them to test for a decade. 2012 cwd was detected first right there where i had been trying to tell TAHC for 10 years.
***> Singeltary on Texas Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion History <***
FRIDAY, JULY 15, 2022
Texas Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion Positives Increase By 8 to 369 TOTAL Confirmed To Date
MONDAY, JUNE 06, 2022
Pennsylvania CWD TSE Prion disease the number of deer being impacted by Chronic Wasting Disease continues to rise
CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION PENNSYLVANIA IN GAME FARMS GONE WILD!
CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CASESCWD - STATUS OF CAPTIVE HERDS Updated May 2022
MONDAY, JUNE 20, 2022
Utah CWD confirmed in deer for first time in Salt Lake County and Currently 157 mule deer and 3 elk have tested positive for CWD in Utah
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 18, 2021
Utah 131 mule deer and three elk have tested positive for CWD in Utah, to date
MONDAY, MAY 02, 2022
Arkansas has detected 1,324 case of CWD TSE Prion in Cervid AS OF 31 MAR 2022
Tuesday, May 03, 2016
Arkansas Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion and Elk Restoration Project and Hunkering Down in the BSE Situation Room USDA 1998
MONDAY, MAY 09, 2022
Michigan MDARD: Chronic Wasting Disease Confirmed in a Farmed White-Tailed Deer from Mecosta County
THURSDAY, APRIL 14, 2022
Michigan’s 2021 deer seasons included targeted CWD surveillance, 25 positive deer
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 2022
Michigan Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion Update February 2022
MICHIGAN-SPORTSMAN 2002
MICHIGAN-SPORTSMAN 2018
MONDAY, MAY 09, 2022
Ohio 9 ADDITIONAL CWD-POSITIVE DEER CONFIRMED IN WYANDOT, MARION COUNTIES
THURSDAY, APRIL 07, 2022
Ohio Captive Deer Program update Dr. Leeza Bercaw, CWD epidemiologist
MONDAY, MAY 09, 2022
Colorado CWD TSE Prion Detected in 40 of 54 deer herds, 17 of 42 elk herds, and 2 of 9 moose herds
SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2022
COLORADO Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE PrP 2022 UPDATE
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 27, 2022
Missouri MDC reports final CWD results for 2021 deer season with 86 testing positive for CWD
TUESDAY, APRIL 26, 2022
Wyoming Game and Fish lab tests nearly 7,000 CWD samples in 2021 and 831 samples were positive
TUESDAY, JULY 19, 2022
Tennessee CWD-Positive Deer Confirmed in Dyer County, Obion County, Lake County Become High-Risk
SATURDAY, APRIL 23, 2022
Tennessee TWRA 2 deer in Hardin County Confirmed Chronic wasting disease (CWD)
THURSDAY, MARCH 31, 2022
North Carolina Wildlife Commission Announces First Chronic Wasting Disease CWD-Positive TSE PrP Deer
THURSDAY, MAY 19, 2022
Maryland DNR reported that 53 WTD sampled within Allegany and Washington counties in 2021 tested positive for chronic wasting disease CWD
MONDAY, MARCH 21, 2022
New Mexico Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE PrP Confirmed February 2022
THURSDAY, MARCH 10, 2022
Mississippi CWD TSE Prion 2022 Samples Shows 38 Positive To Date
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 09, 2022
Virginia Summary DWR’s 2021–2022 deer hunting season CWD surveillance in the Disease Management Areas (DMA) Finds 25 More Positives
TUESDAY, MARCH 08, 2022
Minnesota Board of Animal Health Report Concurrent Authority Regulating Farmed White-tailed Deer and CWD TSE Prion
SATURDAY, JANUARY 29, 2022
Minnesota Chronic Wasting Disease CWD PrP 146 WILD Positive To Date
Minnesota captive cwd to date???
TUESDAY, MARCH 08, 2022
Alabama Second Case of CWD Confirmed in Northwest
FRIDAY, JANUARY 07, 2022
ALABAMA DETECTS FIRST CASE CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION Lauderdale County
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2022
North Dakota Game and Fish Department reports 26 deer tested positive during the 2021 hunting season
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2022
Idaho Fish and Game Commission will consider proposed hunting season changes for Unit 14 in response to five deer and an elk testing positive for Chronic Wasting Disease
THURSDAY, JANUARY 13, 2022
Idaho Two more Chronic Wasting Disease cases detected in cow elk and white-tailed doe in Unit 14
SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 05, 2022
Louisiana, NVSL Confirms first case of CWD TSE PrP in WTD
SUNDAY, DECEMBER 22, 2019
Illinois CWD TSE Prion 90 CWD-positive deer with 826 confirmed positive Total positives through June 30, 2019
WEDNESDAY, MAY 18, 2022
Wisconsin Walworth County Deer Farm Tests Positive for CWD
SUNDAY, MARCH 20, 2022
CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CASES CWD STATUS OF CAPTIVE HERDS AS OF February 2022
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 31, 2021
CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE CWD TSE PRION END OF YEAR REPORT
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 2020
Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion Cervid State by State and Global Update November 2020
SATURDAY, APRIL 30, 2022
H.R.5608 - Chronic Wasting Disease Research and Management Act 117th Congress (2021-2022) Singeltary Submission
THURSDAY, MARCH 31, 2022
EFSA ONE Conference 2022 Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE PrP of Cervid and Zoonosis Zoonotic Transmission Singeltary Submission
TUESDAY, MARCH 29, 2022
OIE Agent causing chronic wasting disease (CWD) TSE Prion of Cervid
Tuesday, May 31, 2022
89th General Session of the World Assembly of OIE Delegates image for WOAH General Summit 2022 Chronic Wasting Disease CWD TSE Prion Discussions and Concerns
TUESDAY, APRIL 26, 2022
Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) in Cervids and the Consequences of a Mutable Protein Conformation
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
posted by Terry S. Singeltary Sr. at
2:39 PM
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RE: Inactivation of porcine endogenous retrovirus in pigs using CRISPR-Cas9
TERRY S. SINGELTARY SR.- retired
- Mr.