BSE ATYPICAL TEXAS AND ALABAMA UPDATE JANUARY 20, 2007
2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA MAD COW FOUND IN 2006
Subject: Statement by USDA Chief Veterinary Officer John Clifford (DVM) Regarding Positive BSE Test Results
Jim Rogers (202) 690-4755 USDA Press Office (202) 720-4723
Statement by USDA Chief Veterinary Officer John Clifford (DVM) Regarding Positive BSE Test Results March 13, 2006
“We received a positive result on a Western blot confirmatory test conducted at the USDA laboratories in Ames, Iowa, on samples from an animal that had tested “inconclusive” on a rapid screening test performed on Friday, March 10.
“The samples were taken from a non-ambulatory animal on a farm in Alabama. A local private veterinarian euthanized and sampled the animal and sent the samples for further testing, which was conducted at one of our contract diagnostic laboratories at the University of Georgia. The animal was buried on the farm and it did not enter the animal or human food chains.
“We are now working with Alabama animal health officials to conduct an epidemiological investigation to gather any further information we can on the herd of origin of this animal. The animal had only resided on the most recent farm in Alabama for less than a year.
“We will be working to locate animals from this cow’s birth cohort (animals born in the same herd within one year of the affected animal) and any offspring. We will also work with Food and Drug Administration officials to determine any feed history that may be relevant to the investigation. Experience worldwide has shown us that it is highly unusual to find BSE in more than one animal in a herd or in an affected animal’s offspring. Nevertheless, all animals of interest will be tested for BSE.
“Under USDA testing protocols, surveillance samples are sent to contract laboratories for screening tests. If the sample is found to be inconclusive on the screening test, it is then shipped to our National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) in Ames, Iowa, for an additional rapid test and two confirmatory tests: the immunohistochemistry (IHC) test, which is conducted by APHIS scientists, and the Western blot test, which is conducted by scientists with USDA’s Agricultural Research Service. USDA considers an animal positive for BSE if either of the two confirmatory tests returns a positive result.
“In this instance, the inconclusive result from the contract lab in Georgia was confirmed through a second rapid test at NVSL. Now, the Western blot test has returned a positive result, and that is sufficient for us to confirm this animal to be positive for BSE, which is why we are making this announcement today. The IHC results are still pending and we will release those results as soon as they are available, which we expect to be later this week.
“I want to emphasize that human and animal health in the United States are protected by a system of interlocking safeguards, and that we remain very confident in the safety of U.S. beef. Again, this animal did not enter the human food or animal feed chains.
“While epidemiological work to determine the animal’s precise age is just getting underway and is ongoing, the attending veterinarian has indicated that, based on dentition, it was an older animal, quite possibly upwards of 10 years of age. This would indicate that this animal would have been born prior to the implementation of the Food and Drug Administration’s 1997 feed ban. Older animals are more likely to have been exposed to contaminated feed circulating before the FDA’s 1997 ban on ruminant-to-ruminant feeding practices, which scientific research has indicated is the most likely route for BSE transmission.
“By any measure, the incidence of BSE in this country is extremely low. Our enhanced surveillance program was designed as a one-time snapshot to provide information about the level of prevalence of BSE in the United States. We have conducted surveillance in the United States since 1990 and following the initial positive in December 2003, we developed an enhanced surveillance program. Since June 2004, all sectors of the cattle industry have cooperated in this program by submitting samples from more than 650,000 animals from the highest risk populations and more than 20,000 from clinically normal, older animals, as part our enhanced BSE surveillance program. To date, including the animal in today’s announcement, only two of these highest risk animals have tested positive for the disease as part of the enhanced surveillance program.
“As we approach the conclusion of our enhanced surveillance program, let me offer a few thoughts regarding surveillance going forward. I can assure you that we will continue to base our maintenance surveillance testing on international guidelines. Though the nature and extent of maintenance surveillance has not yet been finalized, the incidence of BSE in this country remains extremely low and our interlocking safeguards are working to protect both human and animal health and we remain very confident in the safety of U.S. beef.
“As we move forward with the epidemiological investigation that has been initiated today into this case of BSE, we will continue to be very transparent in sharing information with the public and with our trading partners around the world."
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/content/2006/03/bsestatement3-13-06_vs.shtml
FDA NEWS RELEASE FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE March 13, 2006 Media Inquiries: Susan Bro, 301-827-6242 Kimberly Rawlings, 301-827-6253 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA
FDA Statement on USDA Announcement of Positive BSE Test Result
Following confirmation today by the USDA of a cow found positive for BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy) or "mad cow" disease, the FDA is working with federal and state authorities to investigate the origin of the animal feed consumed by this cow. The USDA also confirmed the cow did not enter the animal feed or human food supply.
FDA is committed to protecting the safety of the U.S. human food and animal feed supply from BSE. As such, the FDA's 1997 animal feed ban rule has proven effective at keeping BSE out of the human food and animal feed supply. Recently, the FDA added safeguards prohibiting the use of certain cattle material in human food and cosmetics. Last year, the FDA also proposed to prohibit the use of certain cattle material in all animal feed.
We will continue to work closely with the USDA and state officials on this public health issue and will provide updates as information becomes available.
#
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2006/ucm108614.htm
March 17, 2006 - BSE UPDATE
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Videos From the BSE Update News Conference:
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Federal and state agriculture workers excavated the remains of the animal, which had been buried on the farm and did not enter the animal or human food chain, in accordance with USDA protocols. The carcass was that of a red crossbred beef type cow. An examination of the cow's teeth confirmed that the animal was at least 10 years of age. Samples were taken of the animal and the remaining carcass was transported to one of the department's diagnostic labs for proper disposal. State and Federal staff are continuing the traceback to determine the herd of origin.
One calf was identified by the owner as belonging to the red cow. The calf is approximately 6 weeks old and appeared to be a healthy animal. The calf was transported to a USDA lab where DNA from the calf will be compared to that of the red cow to confirm relation. If confirmed, this would be the first offspring of a BSE diagnosed cow in the United States. Officials today learned that in early 2005 the BSE-positive cow gave birth to another black bull calf. This animal is in the process of being traced.
The cow was first examined by a local veterinarian in late February 2006. After the animal failed to respond to medical attention, it was humanely euthanized. The cattle producer buried the cow at the farm because Alabama Department of Agriculture & Industries regulations require burial of livestock within 24 hours. The producer did not suspect that the cow had BSE. The local veterinarian sent samples of the cow to the Alabama Department of Agriculture & Industries lab system, which was then forwarded to the USDA lab in Athens, GA as part of the routine voluntary surveillance program for BSE testing. After the rapid test for BSE gave an inconclusive result, the samples were sent to Ames, Iowa for a Western Blot test, which gave a positive result. A third test, the immunohistochemistry (IHC) test, was performed this week and also returned positive results for BSE.
The Alabama Department of Agriculture and Industries and the USDA have been encouraging participation in Premises ID Registration as an important step in controlling animal disease. Since starting the program in 2005, over 2,000 premises have been registered in Alabama. For more information on Premises ID Registration call 334-240-7253.
«Previous Page · © Alabama Department of Agriculture
http://www.agi.state.al.us/press_releases/bse-update?op=makePrintable;pn=2
Alabama BSE Investigation Final Epidemiology Report
May 2, 2006
Summary:
Despite a thorough investigation of two farms that were known to contain the index cow, and 35 other farms that might have supplied the index cow to the farms where the index case was known to have resided, the investigators were unable to locate the herd of origin. The index case did not have unique or permanent identification, plus, the size and color of the cow being traced is very common in the Southern United States. Due to the unremarkable appearance of solid red cows, it is not easy for owners to remember individual animals. In the Southern United States, it is common business practice to buy breeding age cows and keep them for several years while they produce calves. Most calves produced are sold the year they are born, whereas breeding cows are sold when there is a lapse in breeding, which can occur multiple times in cows’ lives. For all of these reasons, USDA was unable to locate the herd of origin.
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/EPI_Final5-2-06.pdf
June 20, 2006, 5:13PM Feed Recalled Over Mad Cow Violation
© 2006 The Associated Press
WASHINGTON — Livestock feed ingredients shipped to nine states may have been contaminated with cattle remains in violation of a 1997 ban to protect against mad cow disease, a manufacturer said Tuesday.
H.J. Baker & Bro. Inc. said it was recalling three livestock feed ingredients, including two used to supplement feed given to dairy cows. A sample tested by the Food and Drug Administration was positive for cattle meat and bone meal, said Mark Hohnbaum, president of the Westport, Conn.-based company's feed products group.
"This is very concerning to us. This isn't something that happens to us. We are very serious about food safety," Hohnbaum said.
Mad cow disease is only known to spread when cows eat feed containing brain and other nerve tissue from infected cattle. Protein from cattle was commonly added to cattle feed to speed growth until the ban largely outlawed the practice.
Cattle tissue may have contaminated two feed ingredients given to dairy cows _ Pro-Lak and Pro-Amino II _ made by H.J. Baker between August 2005 and June. The third of the recalled ingredients, Pro-Pak with Porcine Meat and Bone, was mislabeled. It is used in poultry feed.
The company announced the recall in the wake of ongoing FDA inspections of its Albertville, Ala. plant, Hohnbaum said. The inspections have found manufacturing and clerical issues, he added.
The company shipped the ingredients to feed manufacturers and dairy farms in the following states: Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi and Tennessee. The company is notifying its customers of the voluntary recall. It does not know how much of the feed ingredients it sold, Hohnbaum said.
___
On the Net:
Food and Drug Administration animal feed information:
http://www.fda.gov/cvm/animalfeed.htm
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ap/fn/3987413.html
TSS
----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000374/!x-usc:mailto:flounder9@VERIZON.NET> T
o: <mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000374/!x-usc:mailto:BSE-L@aegee.org> Sent: Tuesday, June 20, 2006 9:30 AM
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA Albertville, AL -- June 16, 2006 -- H.J. Baker & Bro.
##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA Albertville, AL -- June 16, 2006 -- H.J. Baker & Bro. Date: June 20, 2006 at 6:55 am PST MAD COW FEED RECALL USA Albertville, AL -- June 16, 2006 -- H.J. Baker & Bro.
Recall -- Firm Press Release
FDA posts press releases and other notices of recalls and market withdrawals from the firms involved as a service to consumers, the media, and other interested parties. FDA does not endorse either the product or the company. This listserv covers mainly Class I (life-threatening) recalls. A complete listing of recalls can be found in the FDA Enforcement Report at:
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/Enforce.html
HJ Baker and Bro., Inc. Announces National Recall of Three Animal Feed Products Containing Prohibited Ingredients Contact: Mark Hohnbaum 501-664-4870
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE -- Albertville, AL -- June 16, 2006 -- H.J. Baker & Bro. has announced today that in cooperation with the US Food & Drug Administration (FDA) it has begun efforts to retrieve PRO-PAK WITH PORCINE MEAT AND BONE, PRO-LAK, AND PRO-AMINO II produced at its Albertville, AL facility. These products are used as an ingredient in the manufacturing of livestock feed, including feed for dairy animals. This action is being taken to address potential risk of unintentional contamination with ruminant derived protein that may have occurred at this facility from August 2005 to June 2006.
Certain mammalian protein is prohibited for use in ruminant feed. These products were distributed in bulk or bags to feed manufacturers and dairy farms in Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Florida, Alabama, Tennessee, Mississippi, California, and Louisiana.
If you have received any of these products, discontinue their use immediately. Quarantine the product so that it cannot be inadvertently used in the manufacture of feeds and contact the manufacturer at 501-664-4870 for further instructions.
"All production and shipment of these products from the Albertville mill have ceased and all of our customers are being notified of the potential contamination. With the advice and support of the FDA, we were able to respond rapidly to address this matter," said Christopher Smith, President & CEO.
H.J. Baker & Bro., Inc., headquartered in Westport, CT, has served the fertilizer and animal feed industries since the Company was founded in 1850.
####
FDA's Recalls, Market Withdrawals and Safety Alerts Page:
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/7alerts.html
lets see here now, we have mad cows in Alabama, we have mad cow feed in Alabama, however JUST another spontaneous event of more BSe. ...TSS
#################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html ####################
Subject: MAD COW PROTEIN IN COMMERCE USA 2006 RECALL UPDATE
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <[log in to unmask]>
Reply-To: SAFETY <[log in to unmask]>
Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2006 14:10:37 -0500 Content-Type: text/plain Parts/Attachments: text/plain (558 lines)
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV
Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST
PRODUCT a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6; b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6; c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6; d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6. CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons DISTRIBUTION AL
______________________________
snip...
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00968.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALLS ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006 KY, LA, MS, AL, GA, AND TN 11,000+ TONS Date: August 16, 2006 at 9:19 am PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE - CLASS II
______________________________
snip...
______________________________
PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-120-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tons DISTRIBUTION AL and MS
______________________________
PRODUCT a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6; b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6; c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6; d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6; e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6; f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6; g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6 CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags
DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2006/ENF00964.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS
Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006 Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST PRODUCT a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6; b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6; c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6; d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6; e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6; f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6; g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6; h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6; i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6; j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6; k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6; l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6; m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 CODE Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.
REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons DISTRIBUTION AL and FL
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html
MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II
______________________________
PRODUCT a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6; b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6; c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6; d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE a) Bulk b) None c) Bulk d) Bulk RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons
DISTRIBUTION Nationwide
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00960.html
look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;
Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates
Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog, Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe Deslys Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.
snip...
BSE bovine brain inoculum
100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg
Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)
Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%) 1/15 (7%)
RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)
PrPres biochemical detection
The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar PrPres concentration that was
inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of
bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.
Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected orally with similar BSE brain inocula
Published online January 27, 2005
http://www.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa
It is clear that the designing scientists must
also have shared Mr Bradley's surprise at the results because all the dose
levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s145d.pdf
2) Infectious dose:
To cattle: 1 gram of infected brain material (by oral ingestion)
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/sci/bio/bseesbe.shtml
http://list.uvm.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=SAFETY;pbpHeQ;20061009141037-0500B
SPRING 2009
COMPLYING WITH REGULATIONS ON SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS (SRMS)
SPRING 2009 USDA TEXAS AM
BSE TESTING 2006 - 7988
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PPT/How_To_Comply_SRM.ppt
Sunday, September 6, 2009
MAD COW USA 1997 SECRET VIDEO
SEE ANOTHER VIDEO THAT SHOWED IN CANADA, BUT NOT USA, ABOUT ANOTHER USA TSE COVER-UP MORE BRAINS NOT TESTED PROPERLY, key brain parts missing. ...
http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2009/09/mad-cow-usa-1997-video.html
SEE THIS DAMNING VIDEO AT BOTTOM OF ;
Monday, July 27, 2009
U.S.A. HIDING MAD COW DISEASE VICTIMS AS SPORADIC CJD ?
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2009/07/usa-hiding-mad-cow-disease-victims-as.html
DAMNING TESTIMONY FROM STANLEY PRUSINER THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE WINNER ON PRIONS SPEAKING ABOUT ANN VENEMAN
''nobody has ever ask''
''they dont want our comment''
''they don't want to know, the don't care''
''i have tried repeatedly''
''level of absolute ignorance''
''Entire policy was driven...heard from mr. laycraft, so now, after time has passed, it's ok for Canada, cattle under 30 month, to the USA, THAT'S ALL THAT MATTERED!
PRUSINER ASKED : IF FROM YOUR TESTIMONY, A DEMONSTRATED THREAT TO PUBLIC HEATH ?
''yes, i think prions are bad to eat, and you can die from them''
http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/prusinerclip.html
Wednesday, September 9, 2009
Co-existence of scrapie prion protein types 1 and 2 in sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: its effect on the phenotype and prion-type characteristics
sCJDMM1-2 should be considered as a separate entity at this time.
Thank you very much !
SEE FULL TEXT ;
http://cjdusa.blogspot.com/2009/09/co-existence-of-scrapie-prion-protein.html
Friday, September 4, 2009
FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/09/foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html
Saturday, August 29, 2009
FOIA REQUEST FEED RECALL 2009 Product may have contained prohibited materials Bulk Whole Barley, Recall # V-256-2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/08/foia-request-feed-recall-2009-product.html
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007
CODE
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007
CODE
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html
NEW URL
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm
Thursday, March 19, 2009
MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA WITH ONGOING 12 YEARS OF DENIAL NOW, WHY IN THE WORLD DO WE TO TALK ABOUT THIS ANYMORE $$$
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html
USA MEAT EXPORT
http://www.usmef.org/TradeLibrary/Statistics.asp
BSE TESTING USA
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/04/bse-mad-cow-testing-usa-2009-figures.html
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/08/creekstone-vs-usda-court-of-appeals.html
TSS
UPDATE TEXAS MAD COWS 2009
FDA STATEMENT FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA
Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms
On Friday, April 30th, the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.
FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.
FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.
Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).
FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.
To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.
Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry.
FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.
#
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2004/ucm108292.htm
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
May 13,2004
The Honorable Ann M. Veneman Secretary of Agriculture Department of Agriculture1400 Independence Avenue, SW Washington, DC 20250
Dear Madam Secretary:
I am writing to express concern that the recent failure of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to test a Texas cow with neurological syrnptoms for bovine spongifonnencephalopathy (BSE) may reflect wider problems in the surveillance program. USDA apparently does not keep track of how many cows condemned for central nervous system symptoms are tested for BSE nor does it require that suspect carcasses be held pending testing...
FULL TEXT ;
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20040607142914-86912.pdf
News Release Texas Animal Health Commission Box l2966 * Austin, Texas 78711 * (800) 550-8242 * FAX (512) 719-0719 Bob Hillman, DVM * Executive Director For info, contact Carla Everett, information officer, at 1-800-550-8242, ext. 710, or ceverett@tahc.state.tx.us
For immediate release---
State-Federal Team Responds to Texas BSE Case
The US Department of Agriculture announced June 29 that genetic testing has verified that an aged cow that tested positive for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy or BSE originated from a Texas beef cattle herd. Tissues for laboratory testing were initially collected from the animal in November 2004, and the carcass was incinerated and did not enter the human food, animal feed or fertilizer supply system. While tests in November indicated the animal did not have BSE, retesting in England in June confirmed the animal had the disease. The Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), the state’s livestock and poultry health regulatory agency, and USDA have jointly assigned a state-federal team to conduct the epidemiological investigation and response.
“The TAHC and US Department of Agriculture’s Veterinary Services are working with a complement of experts from federal and state animal health, food safety, public health and feed regulatory agencies to ensure the continued safety and wholesomeness of our meat supply,” said Dr. Bob Hillman, Texas state veterinarian and executive director of the TAHC, the state’s livestock and poultry health regulatory agency. “Epidemiological investigations are thorough and focus on verifying the herd of origin, and when, where and how the animal and potentially, any herd mates, were exposed to the abnormal prion, or disease agent, that causes BSE. Additionally, epidemiology investigations trace the infected animal’s movement and herd mates. Animals potentially exposed to the disease will be depopulated, with proper disposal. The animals will not be introduced into the human or animal food chain.”
The USDA’s BSE testing protocol requires testing of emaciated or injured cattle, cattle that exhibit central nervous system disorder, cattle unable to rise or to walk normally, and cattle that die of unknown causes. Since June 1, 2004, brain tissue samples from more than 394,000 cattle have been tested in the U.S. and were negative for BSE. Of those, 38,320 were tested in Texas, Dr. Hillman noted. BSE surveillance has been conducted in the U.S. since l990.
The U.S. has taken preventive measures against the introduction of BSE since l989, when prohibitions were placed on cattle and other ruminants from BSE-affected countries, noted Dr. Hillman. In 1997, the importation ban was extended to all of Europe.
Dr. Hillman said the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 1997 banned the use of ruminant-derived protein (from animals such as cattle and sheep) in feed for cattle and other ruminants. There is no evidence that BSE spreads from live animal to animal in the herd, but cattle can be exposed by eating feed that contains rendered protein from infected animals. “These measures taken by the USDA and the FDA are safeguards that work to protect livestock, and ultimately, our meat supply,” he said.
--30--
http://www.tahc.state.tx.us/news/pr/2005/2005Jun30_BSE_Positive_Results.pdf
Report on Food & Drug Administration Dallas District Investigation of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Event in Texas 2005 - August 30, 2005 Executive Summary:
On June 24, 2005, USDA informed FDA that a cow in Texas tested positive for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). Information provided by APHIS was that the BSE positive cow was born and raised in a herd in Texas and was approximately 12 years old. The animal was sampled for BSE at a pet food plant in Texas on November 15, 2004, as part of USDA’s enhanced surveillance program. The animal was disposed of by incineration and did not enter the human food or animal feed chains. Although the positive animal posed no risk to the animal feed supply, FDA, APHIS, the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), and the Texas Feed and Fertilizer Control Service (TFFCS) conducted a feed investigation with two main objectives. The first objective was to identify all protein sources in the animal’s feed history that could potentially have been the source of the BSE agent. The second objective was to verify that cattle leaving the herd after 1997 that were identified by USDA/APHIS as animals of concern (e.g. progeny and feed cohorts), were rendered at facilities in compliance with the regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) that prohibits most mammalian protein in feed for ruminants that became effective August 4, 1997 (herein called BSE/Ruminant Feed rule).
The feed history investigation identified 21 feed products that had been used on the farm since 1990. These feed products were purchased from three retail feed stores and had been manufactured at nine different feed mills. The investigators visited these establishments to collect information on formulations, shipping invoices, and use of ruminant meat and bone meal (MBM) on the premises both pre-1997 feed ban and post-1997 feed ban. This investigation found no feed products used on the farm since 1997 that had been formulated to contain prohibited mammalian protein.
The investigation identified one feed which contained an animal protein source that could not be identified. The investigation also found one feed mill that supplied feed to the farm that had used ruminant MBM in feed formulations for non-ruminant species after the BSE/Ruminant Feed rule went into effect, which is permitted under the rule, and that several feed mills had used ruminant MBM in feeds prior to the feed ban. Although the investigation did not identify a specific feed source as the likely cause of this animal’s infection, it is probable that the most likely route of exposure for this animal was consumption of an animal feed containing mammalian protein prior to the implementation of the BSE/Ruminant Feed rule in 1997.
The investigation into the disposition of herd mates from this farm involved visits to nine slaughter plants and eight rendering plants. The investigation found that all rendering plants were operating in compliance with the BSE/ruminant feed ban regulation. A review of the inspection history of each of these rendering firms found no violations.
Background of Investigation:
When notified on June 24, 2005, FDA Headquarters and Dallas District management officials immediately began making contacts with their Federal, State and Local counterparts to plan for and initiate follow-up investigational activities to determine the feed history in this herd and to assure the safety of the animal feed supply by evaluating current and historic compliance with the BSE/ruminant feed ban rule.
APHIS established a joint Incident Command Post and FDA Dallas District staffed this post full time with a Supervisory Investigator charged with coordinating activities between FDA, APHIS, TAHC and TFFCS. Coordination conference calls were set up with all Federal and State agencies involved in the investigation to keep everyone apprised of investigational developments.
Animal Tracing Activities and Renderer Follow-up Inspections:
One of APHIS’ primary objectives was to identify and trace the animals of interest (animals of interest would include any animals which could have been potential birth cohorts or feed cohorts of the index animal, or potential offspring of the index animal within the two years prior to the positive diagnosis) from the index herd. This objective included the identification of points of sale and ultimately the actual slaughter facilities for animals of interest that left the farm. As the trace information was developed, APHIS shared this information with FDA. Further information on animal of interest identification and tracing can be found in the USDA Texas BSE Final Epidemiology report.
APHIS identified nine slaughter establishments receiving these animals of interest. Eight of the slaughter establishments were located in the State of Texas and one was located in the State of Georgia. Dallas District Investigators notified USDA/FSIS of our plans to visit each slaughter establishment to identify rendering facilities receiving materials from these slaughter establishments during the timeframe they received animals of interest. Dallas District also issued an assignment to Atlanta District to visit and inspect the one slaughter/renderer establishment located in the State of Georgia.
Eight renderers and one protein source broker were identified as receiving materials from these slaughter establishments. Each rendering facility identified was inspected for current compliance with the mammalian protein feed ban rule. Each firm’s operations during the period of time of receipt of these animals post 1997 were evaluated from a historical viewpoint and no evidence of noncompliance was detected.
In all, FDA visited nine slaughter facilities, eight rendering facilities and one broker of these materials. All facilities inspected were found to be in compliance with the BSE/ruminant feed ban rule
Feed Investigation:
As information was learned about the index herd, FDA Investigators working with TAHC officials conducted multiple interviews with the producer of the animal regarding possible feeds, feed sources, animal husbandry practices, and other events which may have changed normal feeding practices over the course of the index animal’s life in the herd and any other information which may have been helpful in identifying the possible sources of feed for this animal and herd. FDA corroborated this information through interviews at the retail feed supply stores where the producer purchased feeds.
Follow-up at these retail feed supply stores identified 21 possible feed products the producer may have used during the history of the herd. Fifteen purchased feed products were identified, along with hay, native grass, rice straw, soybean meal, milk replacer/colostrum and bagged corn. These products were identified as originating from nine different manufacturers. Each of these manufacturers was inspected by FDA Dallas District and TFFCS Investigators.
Feed manufacturers were located throughout the State of Texas. An assignment was also issued to another FDA District to visit a Corporate Headquarters facility in an effort to review archived feed formulations and labels. During each of these inspections, the firm’s current compliance with the BSE/ruminant feed ban rule was evaluated and attempts were made to determine the protein sources used in feeds on the index farm. Many of the feeds investigated were manufactured and used prior to the implementation of the BSE/ruminant feed ban rule in 1997. Feed products of particular interest included any which may have contained a protein source and the primary focus was on identifying any possible mammalian protein source material in those feed products. We found that ruminant feeds that had contained mammalian meat and bone meal (MBM) prior to the BSE/ruminant feed ban rule had been discontinued or reformulated upon the implementation of these rules. There is no regulatory requirement for a feed mill to archive formulations for that length of time, so in those instances where an actual formulation could not be obtained, experienced employees of the firms were interviewed and their recollections recorded.
Of all the feeds in use by the producer since 1997, none were discovered to have contained prohibited material (mammalian protein). Since the age of the index animal was determined to be approximately 12 years, investigating and reconstructing a feed history over such a long period of time is challenging. This ranch is a beef cow-calf operation and minimal feed records were maintained. Due to the nature of this investigation, it is difficult to determine what feeds were in use at specific times and what the formulation of those feeds were at the time they were fed. A feed history was developed through interviews with the producer and other farm personnel since they did not maintain any feed history documentation. Interviews with personnel at retail establishments disclosed incomplete records and cash sales that did not always identify the purchaser. Dallas District investigated any and all feed ingredients that were identified as being fed or potentially fed over the course of the last 15 years of this herd’s operation. Feeds discovered during this investigation with potential mammalian protein sources are as below:
One feed, used prior to 1996, before the implementation of the feed ban, was suspected to contain mammalian meat and bone meal, but this could not be confirmed as no formulation records were available. The producer recalled using a particular feed sporadically during the 1980’s and 1990’s, however, he could not remember the name or manufacturer of the feed and had no records identifying the product. It is not known whether this feed contained an animal protein source. Attempts to identify this feed through interviews with retail sources were unsuccessful. The producer identified one feed product that has been used since the year 2000 which contains fish meal as a protein source. Further investigation revealed that this product had contained mammalian meat and bone meal prior to 1997, but that it had been reformulated at that time using fish meal to replace the MBM. A tabular representation of the feed inspection follow-up activities is presented below:
Feed Dates of Use Protein Source Current BSE Inspection BSE Compliance History Feed #1 - Range Meal 1980’s - 2000 Unknown - Unable to determine actual manufacturer, no records available from producer N/A N/A Feed #2 - High Protein Starter Feed 2001 to present Feather meal BSE Compliant BSE Compliant Feed #3 - High Protein Starter Feed ~1995 - 2001 Feather meal BSE Compliant BSE Compliant Feed #4 - Cottonseed cake Prior to 1990 Cottonseed meal BSE Compliant BSE Compliant Feed #5 - Cottonseed cake Early 1980’s - 1990’s Cottonseed meal BSE Compliant BSE Compliant Feed #6 - Limiter 2001 to present Feather meal BSE Compliant BSE Compliant Feed #7 - Creep pellets Prior to 1970 Likely feather meal - no formulation could be obtained N/A N/A Feed #8 - Lick tub Since 2000 MBM prior to 1997 Fish Meal since 1997 BSE Compliant BSE Compliant Feed #9 - Cottonseed meal Continuously Cottonseed meal BSE Compliant BSE Compliant Feed #10 - Range Cubes Continuously since 1990 Feather meal BSE Compliant BSE Compliant[1] Feed #11 - Sulfur Salt Block Continuously Minerals; calcium - all non-animal derived BSE Compliant BSE Compliant Feed #12 - Lick tub Continuously since 1995 Feather meal BSE Compliant BSE Compliant Feed #13 - Beef Supplement Prior to 1996 Prior to 1997, suspect MBM - Not able to confirm, no formulation available BSE Compliant Same manufacturer as Feed #10[1] Feed #14 - Mineralized Salt Continuously since 1998 Minerals; calcium - all non-animal derived BSE Compliant BSE Compliant Feed #15 - Soybean meal Since 2000, sparingly Soybean meal N/A N/A Feed #16 - Corn Continuously Corn N/A N/A Feed #17 - Rice straw 1996, during dry year Rice straw N/A N/A Feed #18 - Hay Continuously Hay N/A N/A Feed #19 - Milk Replacer Since 2000, Infrequent use Dehydrated colostrums, whey N/A N/A Feed #20 - Grass Continuously Native grass N/A N/A Feed #21 - Soybean meal Since 2000, sparingly Soybean meal N/A N/A
[1] Dallas District previously documented one incident of the accidental addition of mammalian protein to a feed that was to be used for cattle at this facility. This incident was isolated to the manufacture of one lot of a custom cattle feed. A cross contamination error resulted in mammalian meat and bone meal being accidentally included in a feed. The error was detected soon after production. The firm acted swiftly in recalling the product and purchasing the animals that had consumed the feed. No products entered the human food or ruminant feed chain.
Dallas District Compliance History with BSE Feed Ban Rules:
Prior to 1997, feed manufacturers were not required to differentiate between protein sources used in ruminant and non-ruminant feeds. For a period of time following the implementation of the BSE/ruminant feed ban rule, some feed manufacturers continued to use both prohibited material and non-prohibited material within the same facility, employing separation and cleanout procedures to minimize cross-contamination. Although the regulations allow this practice, the potential for cross-contamination of ruminant feeds is greater. Most feed mills have found this practice to be difficult and have abandoned this practice.
Since the implementation of the BSE/ruminant feed ban rule in 1997, Dallas District and its State partners have inspected every known or registered feed manufacturer located in the states of Texas, Oklahoma and Arkansas. Further, every rendering operation and feed manufacturer actually processing with prohibited materials has been inspected annually. The compliance rate of the industry has been excellent.
Results:
In total FDA, along with TFFCS, conducted 33 inspections, investigations and interviews of the producer, retail feed establishments, feed manufacturers, corporate headquarters, slaughter facilities, renderers and a protein source broker. The FDA Dallas District follow-up to this incident resulted in the coordination of efforts of multiple Federal and State agencies. This report is the physical output of many hours of research, planning and coordination. All of the inspections conducted confirmed the feed manufacturers and rendering operations to be in compliance with the current BSE/ruminant feed ban rule.
Dallas District conducts annual inspections of all feed mills and rendering facilities who handle, use or produce PM for feed use. Inspections performed since the initiation of the BSE/ruminant feed ban rules in 1997 have confirmed a high degree of industry wide compliance with these important safeguards. The district also routinely coordinates and shares information regarding feed inspections with the TFFCS who are also responsible for the evaluating feed ban compliance in the state of Texas.
Food and Drug Administration August 30, 2005 Minor edit September 8, 2005
http://www.fda.gov/animalveterinary/guidancecomplianceenforcement/complianceenforcement/bovinespongiformencephalopathy/ucm129574.htm
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE P01-05 January 30, 2001 Print Media : 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA Note: On Dec. 23, 2003, the U.S. Department of Agriculture reported that a cow in Washington state had tested positive for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or mad cow disease). As a result, information on this Web page stating that no BSE cases had been found in the United States is now incorrect. However, because other information on this page continues to have value, the page will remain available for viewing.
FDA ANNOUNCES TEST RESULTS FROM TEXAS FEED LOT
Today the Food and Drug Administration announced the results of tests taken on feed used at a Texas feedlot that was suspected of containing meat and bone meal from other domestic cattle -- a violation of FDA's 1997 prohibition on using ruminant material in feed for other ruminants. Results indicate that a very low level of prohibited material was found in the feed fed to cattle.
FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.
It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were contaminated.
According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA's Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner, "The challenge to regulators and industry is to keep this disease out of the United States. One important defense is to prohibit the use of any ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined with other steps, like U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) ban on the importation of live ruminant animals from affected countries, these steps represent a series of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE."
Despite this negligible risk, Purina Mills, Inc., is nonetheless announcing that it is voluntarily purchasing all 1,222 of the animals held in Texas and mistakenly fed the animal feed containing the prohibited material. Therefore, meat from those animals will not enter the human food supply. FDA believes any cattle that did not consume feed containing the prohibited material are unaffected by this incident, and should be handled in the beef supply clearance process as usual.
FDA believes that Purina Mills has behaved responsibly by first reporting the human error that resulted in the misformulation of the animal feed supplement and then by working closely with State and Federal authorities.
This episode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put into place is essential for protecting the food supply and that continued vigilance needs to be taken, by all concerned, to ensure these rules are followed routinely.
FDA will continue working with USDA as well as State and local officials to ensure that companies and individuals comply with all laws and regulations designed to protect the U.S. food supply.
Office of Public Affairs 2001-JAN-30
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2001/new00752.html
''FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.'' ???
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html
January 29, 2001 Email: sma@tca.net
Volume 5, Issue 6 Home Page
Address: http://www.southwestmeat.org
Edited by Phyllis Zimmerman S O U T H W E S T M E A T A S S O C I A T I O N 4103
SOUTH TEXAS AVENUE, SUITE 101 BRYAN, TX 77802 (979) 846-9011 FAX (979) 846-8198
Texas Cattle Quarantined in Feed Ban Violation
More than 1,200 head of Texas cattle were under quarantine last Friday after possibly consuming feed containing meat and bone meal. Purina Mills, Inc., the largest livestock feed producer in the United States, confirmed it prepared a feed supplement containing ruminant byproducts at a Gonzales, Texas plant last week, and then shipped the feed to the feedlot in error. The company said the mix up involved 22 tons of feed mixed the evening of January 16. The mill immediately notified the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the feedlot of the mix up, and set in motion the precautionary measures being taken. Samples of the feed are being tested by the FDA and cattle that may have ingested the feed are being held pending further testing. However, the news sent feeder cattle futures falling in Friday morning trading on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. The FDA has forbidden U.S. feed manufacturers from mixing animal products into ruminant feed as a preemptive measure to safeguard against the spread of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) or mad cow disease. Although no cases of BSE have ever been reported in the U.S., every precaution is being taken to protect the food chain. Dr. Murray Lumpkin, senior medical adviser at the FDA, said, “We do know that the feed was American in origin, so there is no evidence at this point in time that the feed that the cows might have gotten might have been infected with BSE. Chances of that are very, very small. The bottom line is if we feel there was any exposure to a human safety issue, we will not allow them into the food chain.” Animal byproducts are added to feed as a protein supplement, and are considered safe for use in swine and poultry feed. Burt Rutherford, a spokesman for the Texas Cattle Feeders Association, praised the mill for their quick notification of the FDA and the feedlot. The company said the error was discovered through its “quality assurance program” of internal controls. A Purina Mills spokesman said the company has begun phasing out the use of meat and bone meal from cows in any of its livestock feed. “It’s a voluntary move on our behalf and takes us down to a zero risk factor for a misformulation in the future,” said Max Fisher. Tests on the feed samples should be complete early this week.
http://southwestmeat.org/newsletters/archive/Jan2901.PDF
Audit Report
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program – Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service
Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III
snip...
We attribute the failure to identify the BSE positive sample to rigid protocols, as well as the lack of adequate quality assurance controls over its testing program. Details of our concerns are discussed in Findings 3 and 4.
snip...
Section 2. Testing Protocols and Quality Assurance Controls
In November 2004, USDA announced that its rapid screening test, Bio-Rad Enzyme Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA), produced an inconclusive BSE test result as part of its enhanced BSE surveillance program. The ELISA rapid screening test performed at a BSE contract laboratory produced three high positive reactive results.40 As required,41 the contract laboratory forwarded the inconclusive sample to the APHIS National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) for confirmatory testing. NVSL repeated the ELISA testing and again produced three high positive reactive results.42 In accordance with its established protocol, NVSL ran its confirmatory test, an immunohistochemistry (IHC) test, which was interpreted as negative for BSE. In addition, NVSL performed a histological43 examination of the tissue and did not detect lesions44 consistent with BSE.
Faced with conflicting results, NVSL scientists recommended additional testing to resolve the discrepancy but APHIS headquarters officials concluded no further testing was necessary because testing protocols were followed. In our discussions with APHIS officials, they justified their decision not to do additional testing because the IHC is internationally recognized as the “gold standard.” Also, they believed that conducting additional tests would undermine confidence in USDA’s established testing protocols. However, OIG obtained evidence that indicated additional testing was prudent to ensure that USDA’s testing protocols were effective in detecting BSE and that confidence in USDA’s testing procedures was maintained. OIG came to this conclusion because the rapid tests produced six high positive reactive results, confirmatory testing conflicted with the rapid test results, and various standard operating procedures were not followed. Also, our review of scientific literature, other country protocols, as well as discussions with internationally recognized experts led us to conclude that confirmatory testing should not be limited when conflicting test results are obtained. To maintain objectivity and independence in our assessment, we requested the USDA Agricultural Research Service (ARS) perform the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) Scrapie-Associated Fibrils (SAF)
40 ELISA test procedures require two additional (duplicate) tests if the initial test is reactive, before final interpretation. If either of the duplicate tests is reactive, the test is deemed inconclusive. 41 Protocol for BSE Contract Laboratories to Receive and Test Bovine Brain Samples and Report Results for BSE Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), dated October 26, 2004. 42 The NVSL conducted an ELISA test on the original material tested at the contract laboratory and on two new cuts from the sample tissue. 43 A visual examination of brain tissue by a microscope. 44 A localized pathological change in a bodily organ or tissue.
USDA/OIG-A/50601-10-KC Page 31
immunoblot.45 ARS performed the test at the National Animal Disease Center because NVSL did not have the necessary equipment46 (ultracentrifuge) to do the test. APHIS scientists observed and participated, as appropriate, in this effort.
The additional tests conducted by ARS produced positive results. To confirm this finding, the Secretary requested the internationally recognized BSE reference laboratory in Weybridge, England, (Weybridge) to perform additional confirmatory testing. Weybridge conducted various tests, including their own IHC methods, as well as three Western blot methods. The tests confirmed that the suspect cow was infected with BSE. Also, Weybridge confirmed this case as an unequivocal positive case of BSE on the basis of IHC. As a result of this finding, the Secretary immediately directed USDA scientists to work with international experts to develop a new protocol that includes performing dual confirmatory tests in the event of another inconclusive BSE screening test.
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http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf
Release No. 0336.05 Contact: USDA Jim Rogers 202-690-4755 FDA Rae Jones 301-827- 6242
Printable version Email this page
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
Investigation Results of Texas Cow That Tested Positive for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Aug. 30, 2005
The U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have completed their investigations regarding a cow that tested positive for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in June 2005. The agencies conducted these investigations in collaboration with the Texas Animal Health Commission and the Texas Feed and Fertilizer Control Service.
Our results indicate that the positive animal, called the index animal, was born and raised on a ranch (termed the "index farm") in Texas. It was a cream colored Brahma cross approximately 12 years old at the time of its death. It was born prior to the implementation of the 1997 feed ban instituted by FDA to help minimize the risk that a cow might consume feed contaminated with the agent thought to cause BSE. The animal was sold through a livestock sale in November of 2004 and transported to a packing plant. The animal was dead upon arrival at the packing plant and was then shipped to a pet food plant where it was sampled for BSE. The plant did not use the animal in its product, and the carcass was destroyed in November 2004.
APHIS attempted to trace all adult animals that left the index farm after 1990, as well as all progeny born within 2 years of the index animal's death. Together, these animals are called animals of interest.
During the course of the investigation, USDA removed and tested a total of 67 animals of interest from the farm where the index animal's herd originated. All of these animals tested negative for BSE. 200 adult animals of interest were determined to have left the index farm. Of these 200, APHIS officials determined that 143 had gone to slaughter, two were found alive (one was determined not to be of interest because of its age and the other tested negative), 34 are presumed dead, one is known dead and 20 have been classified as untraceable. In addition to the adult animals, APHIS was looking for two calves born to the index animal. Due to record keeping and identification issues, APHIS had to trace 213 calves. Of these 213 calves, 208 entered feeding and slaughter channels, four are presumed to have entered feeding and slaughter channels and one calf was untraceable.
To determine whether contaminated feed could have played a role in the index animal's infection, FDA and the Texas Feed and Fertilizer Control Service conducted a feed investigation with two main objectives: 1) to identify all protein sources in the animal=s feed history that could potentially have been the source of the BSE agent, and 2) to verify that cattle leaving the herd after 1997 were identified by USDA as animals of interest and were rendered in compliance with the 1997 BSE/ruminant feed rule.
The feed history investigation identified 21 feeds or feed supplements that were used on the farm since 1990. These feed ingredients were purchased from three retail feed stores and were manufactured at nine feed mills. This investigation found that no feed or feed supplements used on the farm since 1997 were formulated to contain prohibited mammalian protein. Due to this finding, FDA has concluded that the animal was most likely infected prior to the 1997 BSE/ruminant feed rule.
The investigation into the disposition of herd mates from this farm involved visits to nine slaughter plants and eight rendering plants. The investigation found that all of the rendering plants were operating in compliance with the BSE/ruminant feed rule. A review of the inspection history of each of these rendering firms found no violations of the FDA feed ban rule.
APHIS and FDA are very pleased with the results of their investigations, which show the animals of interest did not present a threat to livestock and that the ruminant feed rule is being followed. The U.S. maintains an interlocking system of safeguards designed to prevent BSE from entering the human and animal food chain. USDA also remains vigilant in its attempt to find BSE in the United States. To date, there have been more than 450,000 animals tested in the last 14 months and only two BSE positive animals found in this country.
For more information on USDA's epidemiological investigation and a copy of the report, please visit the APHIS website at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/bse.html or
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/epi-updates/bse_final_epidemiology_report.pdf
For more information on FDA's feed investigation, please visit the FDA's website at
http://www.fda.gov/cvm/texasfeedrpt.htm
Last Modified: 08/31/2005
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/08/0336.xml
U.S. Completes Investigation of BSE-Infected Cow in Texas FDA Veterinarian Newsletter July/August 2005 Volume XX, No IV
After investigating the report of a cow in Texas found in June to be infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), Federal officials reported that appropriate safeguards were in place and working, which prevented the further spread of the disease.
The infected animal was destroyed and did not get into the food, feed, or pet food supply, officials said. This was the first native born cow in the United States found to be infected with BSE.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), which is in charge of tracking and preventing animal disease, reported the infected animal to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) on June 24, 2005. To determine if any other animals or offspring of animals from the herd of the infected animal were infected with BSE, USDA tracked down as many as it could of the 200 adult and 213 calves associated with the infected animals. No additional BSE was found.
Meanwhile, FDA officials, along with the Texas Animal Health Commission and the Texas Feed and Fertilizer Control Service, investigated the sources of feed given the infected animal to see if they could discover the source of the infectious material. In addition, the Federal and State authorities tracked the disposition of all animals associated with the infected cow to be sure the provisions of FDA’s 1997 BSE rule were followed.
The investigation concluded that the 1997 feed rule, which prohibits the feeding of most mammalian protein to cattle and other ruminants, was being followed. At an August 30 press teleconference, Dr. Stephen Sundlof, director of FDA’s Center for Veterinary Medicine, said that the investigation revealed that all companies involved were complying with the 1997 BSE feed rule.
FDA’s investigation identified 21 feed products used on the farm. FDA and State investigators went to three retail feed stores that had supplied the feed, and to nine feed mills that made the feed. According to Dr. Sundlof, “This investigation found no feed products used on the farm since 1997 had been formulated to contain prohibited mammalian protein.”
According to Dr. Sundlof, the infected cow, which was approximately 12 years old, had “very likely consumed contaminated feed well before 1997….”
The animals associated with the infected cow were properly handled during slaughter and disposition under the feed rule, Dr. Sundlof said: “The investigation into the disposition of herd-mates from this farm involved visits to nine slaughter plants and eight rendering plants. The investigation found that all rendering plants were operating in compliance with the BSE ruminant feed rule. A review of the inspection history of each of these rendering firms found no violation.”
On October 6, FDA announced proposed rules to further reduce the risk of BSE in the United States. The proposal would ban certain high risk cattle material from use in all feeds and pet foods. (See related story on page 1, “FDA Proposes Tighter Feed Ban to Prevent BSE.”)
http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/NewsEvents/FDAVeterinarianNewsletter/ucm092863.htm
Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report to Congress FY 2007 – 2nd Half
Two Texas Companies Sentenced and Fined for Misbranding Meat Products In April 2007, two closely held and related Texas companies pled guilty in Federal court and were sentenced to 12 months of probation and ordered to pay $10,250 in fines for misbranding meat products. One of the companies sold adulterated meat products to a retail store in New Mexico. Additionally, portions of the invoices failed to properly and consistently identify the meat products as being from cattle more than 30 months old at time of slaughter. This information is required to be disclosed because of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or “mad cow disease”) concerns. No adulterated meat reached consumers.
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc071212.pdf
Tuesday, July 14, 2009
U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary and BSE Red Book Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST
WHERE did we go wrong $$$
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/07/us-emergency-bovine-spongiform.html
Sunday, December 28, 2008
MAD COW DISEASE USA DECEMBER 28, 2008 an 8 year review of a failed and flawed policy
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html
Wednesday, August 20, 2008
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Mad Cow Disease typical and atypical strains, was there a cover-up ? August 20, 2008
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/08/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-mad.html
***UPDATE*** JANUARY 20, 2007
18 January 2007 - Draft minutes of the SEAC 95 meeting (426 KB) held on 7 December 2006 are now available.
snip...
4. Members had received information about the notification by the Health Protection Agency (HPA) of recipients of four batches of plasma products that had been produced from blood donated by individuals that had later developed variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (vCJD). THESE batches HAD NOT been included in a similar notification exercise in 2004, as the fate of these products COULD NOT BE TRACED at that time. The fourteenth annual report of the National CJD Surveillance Unit had been published. The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) had issued a consultation on a revised methodology for geographical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) risk assessment. Members could submit individual responses. Submission of a SEAC response was under consideration.
snip...
ITEM 9 - ANY OTHER BUSINESS
snip...
***$$$***
64. A member noted that at the recent Neuroprion meeting, a study was presented showing that in transgenic mice BSE passaged in sheep may be more virulent and infectious to a wider range of species than bovine derived BSE. Other work presented suggested that BSE and bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy (BASE) MAY BE RELATED. A mutation had been identified in the prion protein gene in an AMERICAN BASE CASE THAT WAS SIMILAR IN NATURE TO A MUTATION FOUND IN CASES OF SPORADIC CJD. A study also demonstrated that in a mouse model it was possible to alleviate the pathological changes of prion disease by suppressing expression of the prion protein gene after infection.
http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/95.pdf
TSS
Subject: Research Project: Study of Atypical BSE 2006 ARS Annual Report Date: January 13, 2007 at 3:16 pm PST
Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock
2006 Annual Report
4d.Progress report. This report serves to document research conducted under a specific cooperative agreement between ARS and the Italian Reference Centre for Animal TSE (CEA) at the Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Turin, Italy. Additional details of research can be found in the report for the parent project 3625-32000-073-00D, Transmission, Differentiation, and Pathobiology of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSEs).
The aim of the cooperative research project is (i) to compare the U.S. Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) isolates and the atypical BSE isolates identified in Italy and (ii) to determine whether diagnostic methods routinely used at the USDA are able to identify atypical BSE cases.
Within FY06, formalin fixed and frozen brain materials from animals with typical and atypical Italian (BASE) BSE have been sent by CEA to the USDA-ARS-NADC laboratory in Ames, IA. The serial brain material sections of BSE and BASE (consecutively numbered) will be analyzed in Ames using the USDA immunohistochemistry (IHC) protocol. To evaluate its reproducibility in Italian laboratories and to standardize the method, the USDA IHC protocol is being established at the CEA neuropathology laboratory. As soon as the Ventana NexES IHC Staining System is available to the CEA, the same samples (different cut numbers) will be examined by the CEA using the CEA in-house and the USDA IHC protocol.
In order to evaluate the USDA Western blot method, about 2 gram of typical Italian BSE and about 2 gram of atypical BASE brain tissue have been sent to the USDA-ARS-NADC laboratory. These samples and U.S. typical and atypical BSE samples have been analyzed in parallel using both the USDA and CEA Western blot methods and three different monoclonal antibodies (6H4, P4, SAF 84). These studies were performed during the visit by a CEA collaborator to the USDA-ARS-NADC. The latter studies revealed that both the Italian and USDA extraction and Western blot methods allowed the identification of the typical and atypical BSE samples tested.
http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?ACCN_NO=408490&showpars=true&fy=2006
ATYPICAL BSE BACKGROUND HISTORY USA
Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse
Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock
Project Number: 3625-32000-073-07 Project Type: Specific C/A
Start Date: Sep 15, 2004 End Date: Sep 14, 2007
Objective: The objective of this cooperative research project with Dr. Maria Caramelli from the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory in Turin, Italy, is to conduct comparative studies with the U.S. bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) isolate and the atypical BSE isolates identified in Italy. The studies will cover the following areas: 1. Evaluation of present diagnostics tools used in the U.S. for the detection of atypical BSE cases. 2. Molecular comparison of the U.S. BSE isolate and other typical BSE isolates with atypical BSE cases. 3. Studies on transmissibility and tissue distribution of atypical BSE isolates in cattle and other species.
Approach: This project will be done as a Specific Cooperative Agreement with the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, in Turin, Italy. It is essential for the U.S. BSE surveillance program to analyze the effectiveness of the U.S diagnostic tools for detection of atypical cases of BSE. Molecular comparisons of the U.S. BSE isolate with atypical BSE isolates will provide further characterization of the U.S. BSE isolate. Transmission studies are already underway using brain homogenates from atypical BSE cases into mice, cattle and sheep. It will be critical to see whether the atypical BSE isolates behave similarly to typical BSE isolates in terms of transmissibility and disease pathogenesis. If transmission occurs, tissue distribution comparisons will be made between cattle infected with the atypical BSE isolate and the U.S. BSE isolate. Differences in tissue distribution could require new regulations regarding specific risk material (SRM) removal.
http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?ACCN_NO=408490
2005 Annual Report
4d.Progress report. This report serves to document research conducted under a specific cooperative agreement between ARS and the Italian Reference Centre for Animal TSE (CEA) at the Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Turin, Italy. Additional details of research can be found in then report for the parent project 3625-32000-073-00D, Transmission, Differentiation, and Pathobiology of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies. The aim of the cooperative research project conducted by the CEA and ARS is to compare the U.S. bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) isolate and the bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy isolates (BASE) identified in Italy. The first objective was to determine whether diagnostic methods routinely used by USDA are able to identify the Italian BASE cases. For this purpose, CEA received the immunohistochemistry (IHC) protocol developed by APHIS-USDA. The IHC protocol was reproduced and standardized in the CEA laboratory and will be applied to the Italian BSE and BASE cases. Furthermore, fixed brainstem sections and frozen brainstem material from Italian BSE and BASE cases will be sent to ARS for analysis using USDA IHC and Western blot (WB) methods. These studies will enable us to determine whether the present diagnostic tools (IHC and WB) employed at the USDA will be able to detect the Italian BASE cases and also enable us to compare Italian BSE and BASE with the U.S. BSE cases.
http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?ACCN_NO=408490&showpars=true&fy=2005
Volume 12, Number 12–December 2006
PERSPECTIVE
On the Question of Sporadic
or Atypical Bovine SpongiformEncephalopathy and
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
Paul Brown,* Lisa M. McShane,† Gianluigi Zanusso,‡ and Linda Detwiler§
Strategies to investigate the possible existence of sporadic
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) require
systematic testing programs to identify cases in countries
considered to have little or no risk for orally acquired disease,
or to detect a stable occurrence of atypical cases in
countries in which orally acquired disease is disappearing.
To achieve 95% statistical confidence that the prevalence
of sporadic BSE is no greater than 1 per million (i.e., the
annual incidence of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
[CJD] in humans) would require negative tests in 3 million
randomly selected older cattle. A link between BSE and
sporadic CJD has been suggested on the basis of laboratory
studies but is unsupported by epidemiologic observation.
Such a link might yet be established by the discovery
of a specific molecular marker or of particular combinations
of trends over time of typical and atypical BSE and various
subtypes of sporadic CJD, as their numbers are influenced
by a continuation of current public health measures that
exclude high-risk bovine tissues from the animal and
human food chains.
SNIP...
Sporadic CJD The possibility that at least some cases of apparently sporadic CJD might be due to infection by sporadic cases of BSE cannot be dismissed outright. Screening programs needed to identify sporadic BSE have yet to be implemented, and we know from already extant testing programs that at least a proportion of infected animals have no symptoms and thus would never be identified in the absence of systematic testing. Thus, sporadic BSE (or for that matter, sporadic disease in any mammalian species) might be occurring on a regular basis at perhaps the same annual frequency as sporadic CJD in humans, that is, in the range of 1 case per million animals.
Whether humans might be more susceptible to atypical forms of BSE cannot be answered at this time. Experimentally transmitted BASE shows shorter incubation periods than BSE in at least 1 breed of cattle, bovinized transgenic mice, and Cynomolgus monkeys (12,13). In humanized transgenic mice, BASE transmitted, whereas typical BSE did not transmit (13). Paradoxically, the other major phenotype (H) showed an unusually long incubation period in bovinized transgenic mice (12).
The limited experimental evidence bearing on a possible relationship between BSE and sporadic CJD is difficult to interpret. The original atypical BASE strain of BSE had a molecular protein signature very similar to that of 1 subtype (type 2 M/V) of sporadic CJD in humans (5). In another study, a strain of typical BSE injected into humanized mice encoding valine at codon 129 showed a glycopattern indistinguishable from the same subtype of sporadic CJD (15). In a third study, the glycopatterns of both the H and L strains of atypical BSE evidently did not resemble any of the known sporadic CJD subtypes (12).
To these molecular biology observations can be added the epidemiologic data accumulated during the past 30 years. The hypothesis that at least some cases of apparently sporadic CJD are due to unrecognized BSE infections cannot be formally refuted, but if correct, we might expect by now to have some epidemiologic evidence linking BSE to at least 1 cluster of apparently sporadic cases of CJD. Although only a few clusters have been found (and still fewer published), every proposed cluster that has been investigated has failed to show any common exposure to bovines. For that matter, no common exposure has been shown to any environmental vehicles of infection, including the consumption of foodstuffs from bovine, ovine, and porcine sources, the 3 livestock species known to be susceptible to transmissible spongiform encephalopathies. Additional negative evidence comes from several large case-control studies in which no statistically significant dietary differences were observed between patients with sporadic CJD and controls (16,17).
On the other hand, the difficulty of establishing a link between BSE and CJD may be compounded by our ignorance of the infectious parameters of a sporadic form of BSE (e.g., host range, tissue distribution of infectivity, route of transmission, minimum infectious dose for humans, whether single or multiple). Presumably, these parameters would resemble those of variant CJD; that is, high infectivity central nervous system and lymphoreticular tissues of an infected cow find their way into products consumed by humans. Transmissions that might have occurred in the past would be difficult to detect because meat products are generally not distributed in a way that results in detectable geographic clusters.
Barring the discovery of a specific molecular signature (as in variant CJD), the most convincing clue to an association will come from the observation of trends over time of the incidence of typical and atypical BSE and of sporadic and variant CJD. With 4 diseases, each of which could have increasing, unchanging, or decreasing trends, there could be 81 (34) possible different combinations. However, it is highly likely that the trends for typical BSE and variant CJD will both decrease in parallel as feed bans continue to interrupt recycled contamination. The remaining combinations are thus reduced to 9 (32), and some of them could be highly informative.
For example, if the incidence of atypical BSE declines in parallel with that of typical BSE, its candidacy as a sporadic form of disease would be eliminated (because sporadic disease would not be influenced by current measures to prevent oral infection). If, on the other hand, atypical BSE continues to occur as typical BSE disappears, this would be a strong indication that it is indeed sporadic, and if in addition at least 1 form of what is presently considered as sporadic CJD (such as the type 2 M/V subtype shown to have a Western blot signature like BASE) were to increase, this would suggest (although not prove) a causal relationship (Figure 5).
Recognition of the different forms of BSE and CJD depends upon continuing systematic testing for both bovines and humans, but bovine testing will be vulnerable to heavy pressure from industry to dismantle the program as the commercial impact of declining BSE cases ceases to be an issue. Industry should be aware, however, of the implications of sporadic BSE. Its occurrence would necessitate the indefinite retention of all of the public health measures that exclude high-risk bovine tissues from the animal and human food chains, whereas its nonoccurrence would permit tissues that are now destroyed to be used as before, once orally acquired BSE has disappeared.
SNIP...
PLEASE READ FULL TEXT ;
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0965.htm?s_cid=eid06_0965_e
3:00 Afternoon Refreshment Break, Poster and Exhibit Viewing in the Exhibit Hall
3:30 Transmission of the Italian Atypical BSE (BASE) in Humanized Mouse
Models Qingzhong Kong, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Pathology, Case Western Reserve University
Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy (BASE) is an atypical BSE strain discovered recently in Italy, and similar or different atypical BSE cases were also reported in other countries. The infectivity and phenotypes of these atypical BSE strains in humans are unknown. In collaboration with Pierluigi Gambetti, as well as Maria Caramelli and her co-workers, we have inoculated transgenic mice expressing human prion protein with brain homogenates from BASE or BSE infected cattle. Our data shows that about half of the BASE-inoculated mice became infected with an average incubation time of about 19 months; in contrast, none of the BSE-inoculated mice appear to be infected after more than 2 years. ***These results indicate that BASE is transmissible to humans and suggest that BASE is more virulent than classical BSE in humans.
6:30 Close of Day One
http://www.healthtech.com/2007/tse/day1.asp
SEE STEADY INCREASE IN SPORADIC CJD IN THE USA FROM 1997 TO 2006. SPORADIC CJD CASES TRIPLED, with phenotype of 'UNKNOWN' strain growing. ...
http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/resources-casereport.html
There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance collection.
He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf
JOURNAL OF NEUROLOGY
MARCH 26, 2003
RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease in the United States
Email Terry S. Singeltary:
flounder@wt.net
I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to
comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging
forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE
transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate
phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest
sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable
nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every
state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to
expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are
sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in
the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and
CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by
intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other
TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every
victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this
agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose
others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there
should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena
from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic
CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?
http://www.neurology.org/cgi/eletters/60/2/176#535
Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734.
http://jama.ama-assn.org/
BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL
BMJ
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/319/7220/1312/b#EL2
BMJ
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/320/7226/8/b#EL1
USA BSE OIG 2006
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf
CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006
The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.
The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.
These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.
"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.
USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end
http://www.upi.com/
CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm
PAUL BROWN M.D.
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-c000490-vol40.pdf
[Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and Requirement for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf
[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf
THE SEVEN SCIENTIST REPORT ***
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-EC244-Attach-1.pdf
9 December 2005 Division of Dockets Management (RFA-305)
SEROLOGICALS CORPORATION James J. Kramer, Ph.D. Vice President, Corporate Operations
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-c000383-01-vol35.pdf
Embassy of Japan http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02N-0273-EC240.htm
Dockets Entered on December 22, 2005 2005D-0330, Guidance for Industry and FDA Review Staff on Collection of Platelets by Automated ... EC 203, McDonald's Restaurants Corporation, Vol #:, 34 ... http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/05/Dec05/122205/122205.htm
03-025IF 03-025IF-631 Linda A. Detwiler [PDF] Page 1. 03-025IF 03-025IF-631 Linda A. Detwiler Page 2. Page 3. Page 4. Page 5. Page 6. Page 7. Page 8. Page 9. Page 10. Page 11. Page 12. http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-631.pdf
03-025IF 03-025IF-634 Linda A. Detwiler [PDF] Page 1. 03-025IF 03-025IF-634 Linda A. Detwiler Page 2. Page 3. Page 4. Page 5. Page 6. Page 7. Page 8. http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-634.pdf
Page 1 of 17 9/13/2005 [PDF] ... 2005 6:17 PM To: fsis.regulationscomments@fsis.usda.gov Subject: [Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food ... http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf
03-025IFA 03-025IFA-6 Jason Frost [PDF] ... Zealand Embassy COMMENTS ON FEDERAL REGISTER 9 CFR Parts 309 et al [Docket No. 03- 025IF] Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and ... http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-6.pdf
In its opinion of 7-8 December 2000 (EC 2000), the SSC ... [PDF] Page 1. Linda A. Detwiler, DVM 225 Hwy 35 Red Bank, New Jersey 07701 Phone: 732-741-2290 Cell: 732-580-9391 Fax: 732-741-7751 June 22, 2005 FSIS Docket Clerk US ...
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-589.pdf
Terry S. Singeltary SR. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################
Subject: SEAC Draft minutes of the open session of the 93rd meeting held on 6th July 2006 (atypical BSE USA) Date: August 22, 2006 at 3:03 pm PST SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Draft minutes of the open session of the 93rd meeting held on 6th July 2006
snip...
The Chair noted that recent reports described two cases of BSE in cattle in the United States of America (USA) as being similar to atypical cases of BSE found in a number of European countries. The Chair suggested that the term "atypical BSE", used in the USA report, is potentially confusing and that this would be discussed under any other business. Dr Danny Matthews (Veterinary Laboratories Agency [VLA]) explained that data from western blots of the USA cases resembled that of a small number of atypical cases of BSE in France. A study of the French cases had shown the condition to be transmissible to mice by intracerebral (ic) inoculation with the neuropathological phenotype maintained on transmission3. Claims have been made about the existence of atypical cases of BSE in other countries but these have yet to be confirmed. No study has yet examined the tissue distribution of abnormal prion protein (PrPSc) or infectivity in such atypical cases of BSE.
3 Baron et al. (2006) Transmission of new bovine prion to mice. Emerging. Infect. Diseases. 12, 1125-1128.
snip...
http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/draft93.pdf
However, based on analysis of molecular features of prion
diseases in cattle, this situation is similar to that in humans
(5), in which different subtypes of sporadic Creutzfeldt-
Jakob disease agents are found.
DISPATCHES
1126 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 12, No. 7, July 2006
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no07/pdfs/vol12no07.pdf
Medical Sciences Identification of a second bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy: Molecular similarities with sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
Cristina Casalone *, Gianluigi Zanusso , Pierluigi Acutis *, Sergio Ferrari , Lorenzo Capucci , Fabrizio Tagliavini ¶, Salvatore Monaco , and Maria Caramelli * *Centro di Referenza Nazionale per le Encefalopatie Animali, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, Liguria e Valle d'Aosta, Via Bologna, 148, 10195 Turin, Italy; Department of Neurological and Visual Science, Section of Clinical Neurology, Policlinico G.B. Rossi, Piazzale L.A. Scuro, 10, 37134 Verona, Italy; Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale della Lombardia ed Emilia Romagna, Via Bianchi, 9, 25124 Brescia, Italy; and ¶Istituto Nazionale Neurologico "Carlo Besta," Via Celoria 11, 20133 Milan, Italy
Edited by Stanley B. Prusiner, University of California, San Francisco, CA, and approved December 23, 2003 (received for review September 9, 2003)
Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), or prion diseases, are mammalian neurodegenerative disorders characterized by a posttranslational conversion and brain accumulation of an insoluble, protease-resistant isoform (PrPSc) of the host-encoded cellular prion protein (PrPC). Human and animal TSE agents exist as different phenotypes that can be biochemically differentiated on the basis of the molecular mass of the protease-resistant PrPSc fragments and the degree of glycosylation. Epidemiological, molecular, and transmission studies strongly suggest that the single strain of agent responsible for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) has infected humans, causing variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. The unprecedented biological properties of the BSE agent, which circumvents the so-called "species barrier" between cattle and humans and adapts to different mammalian species, has raised considerable concern for human health. To date, it is unknown whether more than one strain might be responsible for cattle TSE or whether the BSE agent undergoes phenotypic variation after natural transmission. Here we provide evidence of a second cattle TSE. The disorder was pathologically characterized by the presence of PrP-immunopositive amyloid plaques, as opposed to the lack of amyloid deposition in typical BSE cases, and by a different pattern of regional distribution and topology of brain PrPSc accumulation. In addition, Western blot analysis showed a PrPSc type with predominance of the low molecular mass glycoform and a protease-resistant fragment of lower molecular mass than BSE-PrPSc. Strikingly, the molecular signature of this previously undescribed bovine PrPSc was similar to that encountered in a distinct subtype of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C.C. and G.Z. contributed equally to this work.
To whom correspondence should be addressed.
E-mail: salvatore.monaco@mail.univr.it. www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0305777101
http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/0305777101v1
PLEASE NOTE!
SINCE spontaneous scrapie or CWD does not occur, then why is it that only BSE and sproadic CJD are capable of spontaneous mutation $$$
confusious is confused again;-) ...TSS
Science 24 September 2004: Vol. 305. no. 5692, pp. 1918 - 1921 DOI: 10.1126/science.1103581
Perspectives BIOMEDICINE:
A Fresh Look at BSE
Bruce Chesebro*
Mad cow disease, or bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), is the cattle form of a family of progressive brain diseases. These diseases include scrapie in sheep, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in humans, and chronic wasting disease (CWD) in deer and elk. They are also known as either "prion diseases" because of the association of a misfolded cellular prion protein in pathogenesis or "transmissible spongiform encephalopathies" (TSEs) because of the spongelike nature of the damaged brain tissue (1).
The recent discovery of two BSE-infected cows, one in Canada and one in the United States, has dramatically increased concern in North America among meat producers and consumers alike over the extent to which BSE poses a threat to humans as well as to domestic and wild animals. The European BSE epidemic of the late-1980s seems to have been initiated a decade earlier in the United Kingdom by changes in the production of meat and bone meal (MBM) from rendered livestock, which led to contamination of MBM with the BSE infectious agent. Furthermore, the fact that UK farmers fed this rendered MBM to younger animals and that this MBM was distributed to many countries may have contributed to the ensuing BSE epidemic in the United Kingdom and internationally (2).
Despite extensive knowledge about the spread of BSE through contaminated MBM, the source of BSE in Europe remains an unsolved mystery (2). It has been proposed that BSE could be derived from a cross-species infection, perhaps through contamination of MBM by scrapie-infected sheep tissues (see the figure). Alternatively, BSE may have been an endemic disease in cattle that went unnoticed because of its low level of horizontal transmission. Lastly, BSE might have originated by "spontaneous" misfolding of the normal cellular prion protein into the disease-associated abnormal isoform (3), which is postulated to be the infectious agent or "prion."
Five possible sources of BSE in North American cattle. Sheep, deer, and elk could spread prion diseases (TSEs) to cattle through direct animal contact or contamination of pastures. Endemic BSE has not been proven to exist anywhere in the world, but it is difficult to exclude this possibility because of the inefficient spread of BSE infectivity between individual animals (2). BSE caused by spontaneous misfolding of the prion protein has not been proven. CREDIT: KATHARINE SUTLIFF/SCIENCE
Spontaneous protein misfolding is not a new phenomenon as proteins are known to sometimes misfold after synthesis. Cells in turn have devised ingenious ways to deal with this problem. These include molecular chaperone proteins that bind to misfolded proteins and help them to unfold, and organelles called proteosomes that degrade misfolded or unwanted proteins. However, although misfolded prion proteins have been generated in test tubes as well as in cultured cells, it has been difficult to demonstrate that such misfolded abnormal prion proteins are infectious (4, 5). Even the most recent data do not prove conclusively that infectivity has been generated in vitro because misfolded synthetic prion proteins were not able to transfer disease directly to wild-type mice (6). To obtain infectivity and subsequent prion disease, the misfolded proteins had to be inoculated and incubated for 1 to 2 years in transgenic mice that overexpressed a mutant version of the prion protein. Previous data from this group showed that transgenic mice expressing high amounts of prion protein developed neurological disease without inoculation of misfolded prion protein (7). Thus, at the biochemical level, the critical attributes of the misfolded prion protein required for infectivity are not known, and misfolding of prion protein alone may not be sufficient to generate an infectious agent (8). Nevertheless, the idea that BSE might originate due to the spontaneous misfolding of prion proteins has received renewed interest in the wake of reports suggesting the occurrence of atypical BSE (9-11). These results imply that new strains of cattle BSE might have originated separately from the main UK outbreak. Where and how might such strains have originated? Although such rare events cannot be studied directly, any number of sources of the original BSE strain could also explain the discovery of additional BSE strains in cattle (see the figure). However, it would be worrisome if spontaneous BSE were really a valid etiology because such a mechanism would be impossible to prevent--unlike other possible scenarios that could be controlled by large-scale eradication of TSE-positive animals.
Another way to look at this problem is to examine evidence for possible spontaneous TSE disease in other animals besides cattle. Spontaneous BSE would be extremely difficult to detect in cattle, where horizontal spread is minimal. However, in the case of the sheep TSE disease, scrapie, which spreads from ewes to lambs at birth as well as between adults, spontaneous disease should be detectable as new foci of clinical infection. In the early 1950s scrapie was eradicated in both Australia and New Zealand, and the mainland of both these countries has remained scrapie-free ever since. This scrapie-free status is not the result of selection of sheep resistant to scrapie because sheep from New Zealand are as susceptible as their UK counterparts to experimental scrapie infection (12). These experiments of man and nature appear to indicate that spontaneous clinical scrapie does not occur in sheep. Similarly, because CWD is known to spread horizontally, the lack of CWD in the deer or elk of eastern North America but its presence in western regions would also argue against a spontaneous disease mechanism. This is particularly noteworthy in New Zealand, where there are large numbers of deer and elk farms and yet no evidence of spontaneous CWD. If spontaneous scrapie does not occur in sheep or deer, this would suggest that spontaneous forms of BSE and sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (sCJD) are unlikely to be found in cattle or humans. The main caveat to this notion is that spontaneous disease may arise in some animal species but not others. In humans, sCJD--which is considered by some researchers to begin by spontaneous misfolding of the prion protein--usually takes more than 50 years to appear. Thus, in animals with a shorter life-span, such as sheep, deer, and cattle, an analogous disease mechanism might not have time to develop.
What can we conclude so far about BSE in North America? Is the BSE detected in two North American cows sporadic or spontaneous or both? "Sporadic" pertains to the rarity of disease occurrence. "Spontaneous" pertains to a possible mechanism of origin of the disease. These are not equivalent terms. The rarity of BSE in North America qualifies it as a sporadic disease, but this low incidence does not provide information about cause. For the two reported North American BSE cases, exposure to contaminated MBM remains the most likely culprit. However, other mechanisms are still possible, including cross-infection by sheep with scrapie or cervids with CWD, horizontal transmission from cattle with endemic BSE, and spontaneous disease in individual cattle. Based on our understanding of other TSEs, the spontaneous mechanism is probably the least likely. Thus, "idiopathic" BSE--that is, BSE of unknown etiology--might be a better term to describe the origin of this malady.
What does all this imply about testing cattle for BSE in North America? Current testing in the United States indicates that BSE is rare (one positive result in 40,000 cattle tested). However, additional testing of 200,000 head of slaughtered cattle over the next 1 to 2 years, as recently proposed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), should tell us the incidence more precisely. Nevertheless, if any rare cases are detected, we may still not know their origin. If evidence arises of a focal occurrence of BSE, we might gain important insight into unexpected sources of contamination. However, because current tests do not seem to be able to detect BSE in infected animals less than 30 months of age, even more extensive testing will not completely guarantee the negative status of younger animals in the food chain. Therefore, the alternative option of testing all slaughtered cattle, as implemented in some countries such as Japan, would appear to provide little additional benefit. This fact has been acknowledged as the basis for a new agreement between the United States and Japan aimed at reestablishing the beef trade between the two countries.
One problem with the current U.S. testing program was the announcement a few months ago of unconfirmed positive BSE tests in two additional North American animals that were subsequently found to be negative when tested with the more accurate method of Western blotting. The public release of information about unconfirmed positive tests detected by the rapid test used for mass screening may be a good idea in the interest of openness, but it has the potential to create unwarranted anxiety. If unconfirmed positives are a frequent occurrence, it would seem reasonable to follow a more cautious approach and wait until confirmatory testing is complete before publicly announcing the details.
Based on the experience of many European countries, the mainstays of controlling BSE in cattle and avoiding spread to humans are threefold: first, eliminate feeding of ruminant tissues to ruminants; second, remove high-risk cattle tissues from human food; and third, continue to test for BSE in cattle in order to monitor progress with the elimination of the disease on a local and national basis. In the next 12 months, after extensive USDA test results are available, the extent of any possible BSE spread in the United States will be better documented. But, in fact, the United States and Canada have already instituted the most important steps to prevent the spread of cattle BSE in advance of the results--that is, a ban on feeding ruminant MBM to other ruminants and removal of high-risk tissues from meat for human consumption. It is hoped that the new data will not deviate enough from previous predictions to require further measures for management of this problem. The most important line of defense against any possible spread of BSE will be to maintain strict vigilance in the implementation of the current regulations.
References
S. B. Prusiner, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A 95, 13363 (1998) [Medline]. P. G. Smith, R. Bradley, Br. Med. Bull. 66, 185 (2003) [Medline]. C. Weissmann, A. Aguzzi, Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 7, 695 (1997) [Medline]. A. F. Hill et al., J. Gen. Virol. 80, 11 (1999) [Medline]. R. Chiesa et al., J. Virol. 77, 7611 (2003) [Medline]. G. Legname et al., Science 305, 673 (2004). D. Westaway et al., Cell 76, 117 (1994) [Medline]. B. Chesebro, Science 279, 42 (1998). A. G. Biacabe et al., EMBO Rep. 5, 110 (2004) [Medline]. Y. Yamakawa et al., Jpn. J. Infect. Dis. 56, 221 (2003) [Medline]. C. Casalone et al., Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 101, 3065 (2004) [Medline]. E. F. Houston et al., J. Gen. Virol. 83, 1247 (2002) [Medline].
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/305/5692/1918
US atypical BSE – further details
As reported in the last BSE Report (Which? BSE May 2006) French research findings
concerning the two most recent cases of BSE in the USA suggest that these cases were
not typical of BSE in cattle and may reflect a sporadic form of the disease.
I
n the two US cases, discovered in herds in Texas and Alabama, threre was an absence
of telltale spongy lesions caused by prions. In addition, the prions in brain tissue
samples from these cows seemed to be distributed differently from the classic form.
Laboratory studies on mice in France showed that both the classic and atypical strains
could be spread from one animal to another, but the atypical strain might happen
spontaneously in cattle. The Texas and Alabama cows were older animals, as were
some of the other animals in Europe with seemingly atypical forms of BSE.31
Linda Detwiler, a former Agriculture Department veterinarian who consults for major
food companies, cautioned against making that assumption. "I think it's kind of early to
say that would be the case," Detwiler said. Other theories, she said, suggest the
atypical strain might come from a mutation of BSE or even from a related disease in
sheep.
The US Agriculture Department has stated that whatever the cause there is no reason
to change federal testing or control measures. "It's most important right now, till the
science tells us otherwise, that we treat this as BSE regardless," the department's chief
veterinarian, John Clifford, said in an interview. ...
http://www.which.co.uk/files/application/pdf/bserep0606-445-89308.pdf
BSE, BOVINE - USA: ATYPICAL STRAIN (02) *************************************** A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the International Society for Infectious Diseases
[1] Date: Tue 6 Jun 2006 From: Terry Singeltary Source: News.Farmpage.com [edited]
USDA Confirms BSE Tests On U.S. Cows Found Identical To Atypical Cases In France ----------------------------------------------- A USDA official confirmed that the positive BSE tests in 2 U.S.-born cattle were indeed an "atypical" type of the disease.
A USDA spokesman acknowledged Friday [2 Jun 2006] that positive BSE tests from 2 domestic-born cattle were from a rare strain of the disease found in a small number of European cases.
BSE, scientifically known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy and commonly known as mad cow disease, is a degenerative, fatal disease affecting the central nervous system of adult cattle.
USDA officials have declined in the past to provide such details, but released information Friday [2 Jun 2006] after a French researcher revealed earlier this week that the cases in Texas last year 2005 and Alabama last spring 2006 were identical to "atypical" cases of BSE found in France.
Scientists from around the world are trying to quantify the significance of these rare cases. They also want to know whether these cases may be sporadic.
In an e-mail, a USDA spokesman said the cases raise "many unanswered questions about these unusual findings, and additional research is needed to help characterize the significance -- or lack of significance -- of any of these findings."
The USDA spokesperson said nothing in the test results of the 2 cattle justifies any changes in surveillance, disease control or public-health measures already being taken in the U.S.
-- Terry Singeltary
****** [2] Date: Tue 6 Jun 2006 From: Terry Singeltary Source: Farmers Weekly [edited]
Cattle disease might be unknown strain of BSE ----------------------------------------------- Scientists across Europe and the United States are following the emergence of a new Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) in cattle that could be a new strain of BSE.
Speaking last weekend at an international conference on prion diseases in domestic livestock (such as BSE in cows and scrapie in sheep and goats), scientists from France and Italy described how the disease had been detected in a small number of cattle ranging from 5 to 15 years old.
The strain differs from BSE in that it has a longer incubation time and is consequently being found in older cattle.
The new strain also demonstrates different characteristics from BSE in laboratory tests and was originally detected through active surveillance of live animals rather than during inspection of a suspect fallen animal.
Marion Simmons of the Veterinary Laboratory Agency at Weybridge urged caution, saying there are not yet sufficient supporting data to suggest that the disease is a new strain of BSE.
-- Terry Singeltary
[It has long been debated whether this atypical form is sporadic or whether the sporadic appearance was an atypical form. There does not seem to be a good explanation, which simply highlights the need for more research and understanding of this disease. - Mod.TG]
[see also: BSE, bovine - USA: atypical strain 20060601.1525] ..........tg/msp/dk
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Order Code RS22345
Updated July 18, 2006
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS
BSE (“Mad Cow Disease”): A Brief Overview
Geoffrey S. Becker
Specialist in Agricultural Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
snip...
1 This report, which replaces CRS Issue Brief IB10127, Mad Cow Disease: Agricultural Issues
for Congress, summarizes and updates information in other CRS reports, listed on page 6.
Sources for facts and citation to reports and studies can be found in these CRS reports.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Order Code RS22345
Updated July 18, 2006
BSE (“Mad Cow Disease”): A Brief Overview
Geoffrey S. Becker
Specialist in Agricultural Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Summary
The appearance of BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy or “mad cow disease”)
in North America in 2003 raised meat safety concerns and disrupted trade for cattle and
beef producers. A major issue for Congress has been how to rebuild foreign confidence
in the safety of U.S. beef and regain lost markets like Japan and Korea. Among other
issues are whether additional measures are needed to further protect the public and cattle
herd, and concerns over the relative costs and benefits of such measures for consumers,
taxpayers and industry. This report will be updated if significant developments ensue.1
What Is BSE?
BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy or “mad cow disease”) is a fatal
neurological disease of cattle, believed to be transmitted mainly by feeding infected cattle
parts back to cattle. More than 187,000 cases have been reported worldwide, 183,000 of
them in the United Kingdom (UK) where BSE was first identified in 1986. The annual
number of new cases has declined steeply since 1992. Humans who eat contaminated
beef are believed susceptible to a rare but fatal brain wasting disease, variant Creutzfeldt-
Jakob disease (vCJD). About 160 people, most in the UK, have been diagnosed with
vCJD since 1986, but none has been linked to any Canadian or U.S. meat consumption.
BSE in North America
BSE has been reported in 11 North American cattle, 10 born here and one imported
from the UK. The first native case was an Alberta, Canada, beef cow reported in May
2003. Canada has since reported six more cases, most recently in July 2006 in a 50-
month-old dairy cow in Manitoba. The first U.S. case was in a Canadian-born dairy cow
found in Washington state in December 2003. The other two U.S. cases were a 12-yearold
Texas-born and -raised beef cow, found in November 2004 but not confirmed until
June 2005, and a 10-year-old Alabama beef cow found in late February 2006.
CRS-2
In epidemiological investigations of the three U.S. cases, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) was unable to track down all related animals of interest, but those
that were located tested negative for the disease. Despite a beef recall, some meat from
the first U.S. BSE cow may have been consumed, USDA said, adding, however, that the
highest-risk tissues never entered the food supply. No materials from the other two U.S.
cows entered the food supply, USDA also said. In the recent Alabama case, authorities
were unable to determine the cow’s herd of origin. Animal health officials initially
indicated that all of the North American cases were caused by the consumption of BSEcontaminated
feed. However, USDA reportedly now believes that the two native-born
U.S. cattle had “atypical” BSE, which differs from other cases. If these cases are
determined to be “spontaneous,” that may affect future control strategies.
snip...
http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/06Jul/RS22345.pdf
Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse
Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock
Project Number: 3625-32000-073-07 Project Type: Specific C/A
Start Date: Sep 15, 2004 End Date: Sep 14, 2007
Objective: The objective of this cooperative research project with Dr. Maria Caramelli from the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory in Turin, Italy, is to conduct comparative studies with the U.S. bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) isolate and the atypical BSE isolates identified in Italy. The studies will cover the following areas: 1. Evaluation of present diagnostics tools used in the U.S. for the detection of atypical BSE cases. 2. Molecular comparison of the U.S. BSE isolate and other typical BSE isolates with atypical BSE cases. 3. Studies on transmissibility and tissue distribution of atypical BSE isolates in cattle and other species.
Approach: This project will be done as a Specific Cooperative Agreement with the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, in Turin, Italy. It is essential for the U.S. BSE surveillance program to analyze the effectiveness of the U.S diagnostic tools for detection of atypical cases of BSE. Molecular comparisons of the U.S. BSE isolate with atypical BSE isolates will provide further characterization of the U.S. BSE isolate. Transmission studies are already underway using brain homogenates from atypical BSE cases into mice, cattle and sheep. It will be critical to see whether the atypical BSE isolates behave similarly to typical BSE isolates in terms of transmissibility and disease pathogenesis. If transmission occurs, tissue distribution comparisons will be made between cattle infected with the atypical BSE isolate and the U.S. BSE isolate. Differences in tissue distribution could require new regulations regarding specific risk material (SRM) removal.
http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?ACCN_NO=408490
Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse
Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock
2005 Annual Report
This report serves to document research conducted under a specific cooperative agreement between ARS and the Italian Reference Centre for Animal TSE (CEA) at the Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Turin, Italy. Additional details of research can be found in then report for the parent project 3625-32000-073-00D, Transmission, Differentiation, and Pathobiology of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies. The aim of the cooperative research project conducted by the CEA and ARS is to compare the U.S. bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) isolate and the bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy isolates (BASE) identified in Italy. The first objective was to determine whether diagnostic methods routinely used by USDA are able to identify the Italian BASE cases. For this purpose, CEA received the immunohistochemistry (IHC) protocol developed by APHIS-USDA. The IHC protocol was reproduced and standardized in the CEA laboratory and will be applied to the Italian BSE and BASE cases. Furthermore, fixed brainstem sections and frozen brainstem material from Italian BSE and BASE cases will be sent to ARS for analysis using USDA IHC and Western blot (WB) methods. These studies will enable us to determine whether the present diagnostic tools (IHC and WB) employed at the USDA will be able to detect the Italian BASE cases and also enable us to compare Italian BSE and BASE with the U.S. BSE cases.
http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?ACCN_NO=408490&showpars=true&fy=2005
Research Project: Transmission, Differentiation, and Pathobiology of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies
Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock
Title: Where We've Been and Where We're Going with Bse Testing in the United States
Authors item Hall, Mark - NVSL-APHIS-USDA item Richt, Juergen item Davis, Arthur - NVSL-APHIS-USDA item Levings, Randall - NVSL-APHIS-USDA
Submitted to: American Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians Publication Type: Abstract Publication Acceptance Date: September 1, 2005 Publication Date: November 3, 2005 Citation: Hall, M.S., Richt, J.A., Davis, A.J., Levings, R.L. 2005. Where We've Been and Where We're Going with Bse Testing in the United States [abstract]. 48th Annual Meeting of the American Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians. P. 20.
Technical Abstract: A review of the laboratory aspects of the United States Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program from its beginning to the present day will be provided. Validated diagnostic tests for BSE require brain tissue. There are no ante mortem (blood/serum) tests for BSE available at present. From a historical perspective, diagnostic tests for BSE continue to evolve. The original diagnostic test method was histopathology in which sections of brain were examined under a microscope, and the classical vacuoles and spongiform change in specific areas of the brain would allow a diagnosis to be made. This method was accurate but only allowed a diagnosis to be made relatively late in the course of the disease. In the mid-1990s, immunohistochemistry (IHC) and Western blotting were developed which allow the detection of the abnormal form of the prion protein (PrPSc) and a diagnosis could be made prior to the development of spongiform changes and clinical signs. In the past decade, so-called "rapid tests" have been introduced commercially for BSE. Five commercial tests are currently licensed/permitted in the United States for BSE. These licensed tests include the Prionics Western blot, Prionics ELISA, Enfer/Abbott ELISA, IDEXX ELISA, and the BioRad ELISA. This presentation will discuss various attributes of the validated test methods available today. Both IHC and Western blot are considered confirmatory tests for BSE by the World Organisation of Animal Health (OIE). IHC provides for a specific immunological detection of PrPSc and enables the specific anatomical location to be determined. Western blot provides both immunological detection of PrPSc as well as specific molecular weight characterizations; certain Western blot procedures can be extremely sensitive due to various concentration procedures before analysis of the sample. The OIE recommended Western blot and IHC methods for confirmatory diagnosis of BSE used by USDA and the Veterinary Laboratories Agency in Weybridge, England, will be discussed. The overall enhanced testing plan that has been used for the past 18 months will be described including changes that have occurred during this time. The USDA's BSE enhanced surveillance plan has been a very successful national surveillance testing program that has been a shared effort between state veterinary diagnostic laboratories as part of the National Animal Health Laboratory Network and the National Veterinary Services Laboratories.
http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publications.htm?SEQ_NO_115=183829
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf
3.57 The experiment which might have determined whether BSE and scrapie were caused by the same agent (ie, the feeding of natural scrapie to cattle) was never undertaken in the UK. It was, however, performed in the USA in 1979, when it was shown that cattle inoculated with the scrapie agent endemic in the flock of Suffolk sheep at the United States Department of Agriculture in Mission, Texas, developed a TSE quite unlike BSE. 32 The findings of the initial transmission, though not of the clinical or neurohistological examination, were communicated in October 1988 to Dr Watson, Director of the CVL, following a visit by Dr Wrathall, one of the project leaders in the Pathology Department of the CVL, to the United States Department of Agriculture. 33 The results were not published at this point, since the attempted transmission to mice from the experimental cow brain had been inconclusive. The results of the clinical and histological differences between scrapie-affected sheep and cattle were published in 1995. Similar studies in which cattle were inoculated intracerebrally with scrapie inocula derived from a number of scrapie-affected sheep of different breeds and from different States, were carried out at the US National Animal Disease Centre. 34 The results, published in 1994, showed that this source of scrapie agent, though pathogenic for cattle, did not produce the same clinical signs of brain lesions characteristic of BSE.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/
The findings of the initial transmission, though not of the clinical or neurohistological examination, were communicated in October 1988 to Dr Watson, Director of the CVL, following a visit by Dr Wrathall, one of the project leaders in the Pathology Department of the CVL, to the United States Department of Agriculture. 33
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1988/10/00001001.pdf
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/
The results were not published at this point, since the attempted transmission to mice from the experimental cow brain had been inconclusive. The results of the clinical and histological differences between scrapie-affected sheep and cattle were published in 1995. Similar studies in which cattle were inoculated intracerebrally with scrapie inocula derived from a number of scrapie-affected sheep of different breeds and from different States, were carried out at the US National Animal Disease Centre. 34 The results, published in 1994, showed that this source of scrapie agent, though pathogenic for cattle, did not produce the same clinical signs of brain lesions characteristic of BSE.
3.58 There are several possible reasons why the experiment was not performed in the UK. It had been recommended by Sir Richard Southwood (Chairman of the Working Party on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy) in his letter to the Permanent Secretary of MAFF, Mr (now Sir) Derek Andrews, on 21 June 1988, 35 though it was not specifically recommended in the Working Party Report or indeed in the Tyrrell Committee Report (details of the Southwood Working Party and the Tyrell Committee can be found in vol. 4: The Southwood Working Party, 1988-89 and vol. 11: Scientists after Southwood respectively). The direct inoculation of scrapie into calves was given low priority, because of its high cost and because it was known that it had already taken place in the USA. 36 It was also felt that the results of such an experiment would be hard to interpret. While a negative result would be informative, a positive result would need to demonstrate that when scrapie was transmitted to cattle, the disease which developed in cattle was the same as BSE. 37 Given the large number of strains of scrapie and the possibility that BSE was one of them, it would be necessary to transmit every scrapie strain to cattle separately, to test the hypothesis properly. Such an experiment would be expensive. Secondly, as measures to control the epidemic took hold, the need for the experiment from the policy viewpoint was not considered so urgent. It was felt that the results would be mainly of academic interest. 38
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON SCRAPIE
Chair: Dr. Jim Logan, Cheyenne, WY
Vice Chair: Dr. Joe D. Ross, Sonora, TX
Dr. Deborah L. Brennan, MS; Dr. Beth Carlson, ND; Dr. John R. Clifford, DC; Dr. Thomas F. Conner, OH; Dr. Walter E. Cook, WY; Dr. Wayne E. Cunningham, CO; Dr. Jerry W. Diemer, TX; Dr. Anita J. Edmondson, CA; Dr. Dee Ellis, TX; Dr. Lisa A. Ferguson, MD; Dr. Keith R. Forbes, NY; Dr. R. David Glauer, OH; Dr. James R. Grady, CO; Dr. William L. Hartmann, MN; Dr. Carolyn Inch, CAN; Dr. Susan J. Keller, ND; Dr. Allen M. Knowles, TN; Dr. Thomas F. Linfield, MT; Dr. Michael R. Marshall, UT; Dr. Cheryl A. Miller, In; Dr. Brian V. Noland, CO; Dr. Charles Palmer, CA; Dr. Kristine R. Petrini, MN; Mr. Stan Potratz, IA; Mr. Paul E. Rodgers, CO; Dr. Joan D. Rowe, CA; Dr. Pamela L. Smith, IA; Dr. Diane L. Sutton, MD; Dr. Lynn Anne Tesar, SD; Dr. Delwin D. Wilmot, NE; Dr. Nora E. Wineland, CO; Dr. Cindy B. Wolf, MN.
The Committee met on November 9, 2005, from 8:00am until 11:55am, Hershey Lodge and Convention Center, Hershey, Pennsylvania. The meeting was called to order by Dr. Jim Logan, chair, with vice chairman Dr. Joe D. Ross attending. There were 74 people in attendance.
The Scrapie Program Update was provided by Dr. Diane Sutton, National Scrapie Program Coordinator, United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS). The complete text of the Status Report is included in these Proceedings.
Dr. Patricia Meinhardt, USDA-APHIS-VS-National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) gave the Update on Genotyping Labs and Discrepancies in Results. NVSL conducts investigations into discrepancies on genotype testing results associated with the Scrapie Eradication Program. It is the policy of the Program to conduct a second genotype test at a second laboratory on certain individual animals. Occasionally, there are discrepancies in those results. The NVSL conducts follow-up on these situations through additional testing on additional samples from the field and archive samples from the testing laboratories.
For the period of time from January 1, 2005, until October 15, 2005, there were 23 instances of discrepancies in results from 35 flocks. Of those 23 instances, 14 were caused by laboratory error (paperwork or sample mix-up), 3 results from field error, 5 were not completely resolved, and 1 originated from the use of a non-approved laboratory for the first test. As a result of inconsistencies, one laboratory’s certification was revoked by APHIS-VS.
snip...
Infected and Source Flocks
As of September 30, 2005, there were 105 scrapie infected and source flocks. There were a total of 165** new infected and source flocks reported for FY 2005. The total infected and source flocks that have been released in FY 2005 was 128. The ratio of infected and source flocks cleaned up or placed on clean up plans vs. new infected and source flocks discovered in FY 2005 was 1.03 : 1*. In addition 622 scrapie cases were confirmed and reported by the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) in FY 2005, of which 130 were RSSS cases. Fifteen cases of scrapie in goats have been reported since 1990. The last goat case was reported in May 2005. Approximately 5,626 animals were indemnified comprised of 49% non-registered sheep, 45% registered sheep, 1.4% non-registered goats and 4.6% registered goats.
Regulatory Scrapie Slaughter Surveillance (RSSS)
RSSS was designed to utilize the findings of the Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health (CEAH) Scrapie: Ovine Slaughter Surveillance (SOSS) study. The results of SOSS can be found at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cahm/Sheep/sheep.htm . RSSS started April 1,
2003. It is a targeted slaughter surveillance program which is designed to identify infected flocks for clean-up. During FY 2005 collections increased by 32% overall and by 90% for black and mottled faced sheep improving overall program effectiveness and efficiency as demonstrated by the 26% decrease in percent positive black faced sheep compared to FY 2004. Samples have been collected from 62,864 sheep since April 1, 2003, of which results have been reported for 59,105 of which 209 were confirmed positive. During FY 2005, 33,137 samples were collected from 81 plants. There have been 130 NVSL confirmed positive cases (30 collected in FY 2004 and confirmed in FY 2005 and 100 collected and confirmed in FY 2005) in FY 2005. Face colors of these positives were 114 black, 14 mottled, 1 white and 1 unknown. The percent positive by face color is shown in the chart below.
Scrapie Testing
In FY 2005, 35,845 animals have been tested for scrapie: 30,192 RSSS; 4,742 regulatory field cases; 772 regulatory third eyelid biopsies; 10 third eyelid validations; and 129 necropsy validations (chart 9).
Animal ID
As of October 04, 2005, 103,580 sheep and goat premises have been assigned identification numbers in the Scrapie National Generic Database. Official eartags have been issued to 73,807 of these premises.
*This number based on an adjusted 12 month interval to accommodate the 60 day period for setting up flock plans.
http://www.usaha.org/committees/reports/2005/report-scr-2005.pdf
Published online before print October 20, 2005
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 10.1073/pnas.0502296102 Medical Sciences
A newly identified type of scrapie agent can naturally infect sheep with resistant PrP genotypes
( sheep prion transgenic mice )
Annick Le Dur *, Vincent Béringue *, Olivier Andréoletti , Fabienne Reine *, Thanh Lan Laï *, Thierry Baron , Bjørn Bratberg ¶, Jean-Luc Vilotte , Pierre Sarradin **, Sylvie L. Benestad ¶, and Hubert Laude * *Virologie Immunologie Moléculaires and Génétique Biochimique et Cytogénétique, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, 78350 Jouy-en-Josas, France; Unité Mixte de Recherche, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique-Ecole Nationale Vétérinaire de Toulouse, Interactions Hôte Agent Pathogène, 31066 Toulouse, France; Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments, Unité Agents Transmissibles Non Conventionnels, 69364 Lyon, France; **Pathologie Infectieuse et Immunologie, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, 37380 Nouzilly, France; and ¶Department of Pathology, National Veterinary Institute, 0033 Oslo, Norway
Edited by Stanley B. Prusiner, University of California, San Francisco, CA, and approved September 12, 2005 (received for review March 21, 2005)
Scrapie in small ruminants belongs to transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), or prion diseases, a family of fatal neurodegenerative disorders that affect humans and animals and can transmit within and between species by ingestion or inoculation. Conversion of the host-encoded prion protein (PrP), normal cellular PrP (PrPc), into a misfolded form, abnormal PrP (PrPSc), plays a key role in TSE transmission and pathogenesis. The intensified surveillance of scrapie in the European Union, together with the improvement of PrPSc detection techniques, has led to the discovery of a growing number of so-called atypical scrapie cases. These include clinical Nor98 cases first identified in Norwegian sheep on the basis of unusual pathological and PrPSc molecular features and "cases" that produced discordant responses in the rapid tests currently applied to the large-scale random screening of slaughtered or fallen animals. Worryingly, a substantial proportion of such cases involved sheep with PrP genotypes known until now to confer natural resistance to conventional scrapie. Here we report that both Nor98 and discordant cases, including three sheep homozygous for the resistant PrPARR allele (A136R154R171), efficiently transmitted the disease to transgenic mice expressing ovine PrP, and that they shared unique biological and biochemical features upon propagation in mice. These observations support the view that a truly infectious TSE agent, unrecognized until recently, infects sheep and goat flocks and may have important implications in terms of scrapie control and public health.
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Author contributions: H.L. designed research; A.L.D., V.B., O.A., F.R., T.L.L., J.-L.V., and H.L. performed research; T.B., B.B., P.S., and S.L.B. contributed new reagents/analytic tools; V.B., O.A., and H.L. analyzed data; and H.L. wrote the paper.
A.L.D. and V.B. contributed equally to this work.
To whom correspondence should be addressed.
Hubert Laude, E-mail: laude@jouy.inra.fr
www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0502296102
http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/0502296102v1
12/10/76 AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTE ON SCRAPIE Office Note CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR PETER WILDY
snip...
A The Present Position with respect to Scrapie A] The Problem
Scrapie is a natural disease of sheep and goats. It is a slow and inexorably progressive degenerative disorder of the nervous system and it ia fatal. It is enzootic in the United Kingdom but not in all countries.
The field problem has been reviewed by a MAFF working group (ARC 35/77). It is difficult to assess the incidence in Britain for a variety of reasons but the disease causes serious financial loss; it is estimated that it cost Swaledale breeders alone $l.7 M during the five years 1971-1975. A further inestimable loss arises from the closure of certain export markets, in particular those of the United States, to British sheep.
It is clear that scrapie in sheep is important commercially and for that reason alone effective measures to control it should be devised as quickly as possible.
Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether scrapie is transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the disease has been transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid speculation (Gajdusek 1977) conjectures that the agents of scrapie, kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and transmissible encephalopathy of mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S. Department of Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed for human or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)" The problem is emphasised by the finding that some strains of scrapie produce lesions identical to the once which characterise the human dementias"
Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety of laboratory personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action such as the "scorched meat" policy of USDA makes the solution of the acrapie problem urgent if the sheep industry is not to suffer grievously.
snip...
76/10.12/4.6
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1976/10/12004001.pdf
Subject: SCRAPIE and CWD USA UPDATE July 19, 2006 Date: July 19, 2006 at 12:06 pm PST SCRAPIE USA UPDATE MAY 31, 2006
Infected and Source Flocks
As of May 31, 2006, there were 93 scrapie infected and source flocks (Figure 3). There were 12 new infected and source flocks reported in May (Figure 4) with a total of 67 flocks reported for FY 2006 (Figure 5). The total infected and source flocks that have been released in FY 2006 are 53 (Figure 6), with 7 flocks released in May. The ratio of infected and source flocks released to newly infected and source flocks for FY 2006 = 0.79 : 1. In addition, as of May 31, 2006, 216 scrapie cases have been confirmed and reported by the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL), of which 33 were RSSS cases (Figure 7). This includes 33 newly confirmed cases in May 2006 (Figure 8). Eighteen cases of scrapie in goats have been reported since 1990 (Figure 9). The last goat case was reported in March 2006. New infected flocks, source flocks, and flocks released for FY 2006 are depicted in Chart 3. New infected and source statuses from 1997 to 2006 are depicted in Chart 4.
snip...
Scrapie Testing
In FY 2006, 26,185 animals have been tested for scrapie : 22,634 RSSS*; 2063 regulatory field cases; 61 necropsy validations, 5 rectal biopsy and 1427 regulatory third eyelid biopsies (Chart 9). ...
snip...END
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/nahps/scrapie/monthly_report/monthly-report.html
TSS
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Aug 30, 2005 USDA Texas BSE Investigation—Final Epidemiology Report
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/bse_final_epi_report8-05.pdf
TSS REPORT ON 2ND TEJAS MAD COW Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 -0600 (the one that did NOT get away, thanks to the Honorable Phyllis Fong)
-------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ??? Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 -0600 From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." To: Carla Everett References: <[log in to unmask]> <[log in to unmask] us>
Greetings Carla,still hear a rumor;
Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food chain?
and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up forsomething, but they forgot a url for update?I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION YET...can you confirm???terry
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-------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ??? Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2004 11:38:21 -0600 From: Carla Everett To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." References: <[log in to unmask]>
The USDA has made a statement, and we are referring all callers to the USDA web site. We have no informationabout the animal being in Texas. CarlaAt 09:44 AM 11/19/2004, you wrote:>Greetings Carla,>>i am getting unsubstantiated claims of this BSE 'inconclusive' cow is from>TEXAS. can you comment on this either way please?>>thank you,>Terry S. Singeltary Sr.>> ===================
-------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ??? Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 18:33:20 -0600 From: Carla Everett To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." References: <[log in to unmask]> <[log in to unmask] us> <[log in to unmask]> <[log in to unmask] us> <[log in to unmask]>
our computer department was working on a place holder we could postUSDA's announcement of any results. There are no results to be announced tonightby NVSL, so we are back in a waiting mode and will post the USDA announcementwhen we hear something.At 06:05 PM 11/22/2004, you wrote:>why was the announcement on your TAHC site removed?>>Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy:>November 22: Press Release title here >>star image More BSE information>>>>terry>>Carla Everett wrote:>>>no confirmation on the U.S.' inconclusive test...>>no confirmation on location of animal.>>>>>>========================== ==========================
THEN, 7+ MONTHS OF COVER-UP BY JOHANN ET AL! no doubt about it now $$$
NO, it's not pretty, hell, im not pretty, but these are the facts, take em or leave em, however, you cannot change them.
with kindest regards,
I am still sincerely disgusted and tired in sunny Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
FULL 130 LASHINGS TO USDA BY OIG again
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf
Link: TSS
http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0612&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=23557
Subject: Statement by USDA Chief Veterinary Officer John Clifford (DVM) Regarding Positive BSE Test Results
Jim Rogers (202) 690-4755 USDA Press Office (202) 720-4723
Statement by USDA Chief Veterinary Officer John Clifford (DVM) Regarding Positive BSE Test Results March 13, 2006
“We received a positive result on a Western blot confirmatory test conducted at the USDA laboratories in Ames, Iowa, on samples from an animal that had tested “inconclusive” on a rapid screening test performed on Friday, March 10.
“The samples were taken from a non-ambulatory animal on a farm in Alabama. A local private veterinarian euthanized and sampled the animal and sent the samples for further testing, which was conducted at one of our contract diagnostic laboratories at the University of Georgia. The animal was buried on the farm and it did not enter the animal or human food chains.
“We are now working with Alabama animal health officials to conduct an epidemiological investigation to gather any further information we can on the herd of origin of this animal. The animal had only resided on the most recent farm in Alabama for less than a year.
“We will be working to locate animals from this cow’s birth cohort (animals born in the same herd within one year of the affected animal) and any offspring. We will also work with Food and Drug Administration officials to determine any feed history that may be relevant to the investigation. Experience worldwide has shown us that it is highly unusual to find BSE in more than one animal in a herd or in an affected animal’s offspring. Nevertheless, all animals of interest will be tested for BSE.
“Under USDA testing protocols, surveillance samples are sent to contract laboratories for screening tests. If the sample is found to be inconclusive on the screening test, it is then shipped to our National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) in Ames, Iowa, for an additional rapid test and two confirmatory tests: the immunohistochemistry (IHC) test, which is conducted by APHIS scientists, and the Western blot test, which is conducted by scientists with USDA’s Agricultural Research Service. USDA considers an animal positive for BSE if either of the two confirmatory tests returns a positive result.
“In this instance, the inconclusive result from the contract lab in Georgia was confirmed through a second rapid test at NVSL. Now, the Western blot test has returned a positive result, and that is sufficient for us to confirm this animal to be positive for BSE, which is why we are making this announcement today. The IHC results are still pending and we will release those results as soon as they are available, which we expect to be later this week.
“I want to emphasize that human and animal health in the United States are protected by a system of interlocking safeguards, and that we remain very confident in the safety of U.S. beef. Again, this animal did not enter the human food or animal feed chains.
“While epidemiological work to determine the animal’s precise age is just getting underway and is ongoing, the attending veterinarian has indicated that, based on dentition, it was an older animal, quite possibly upwards of 10 years of age. This would indicate that this animal would have been born prior to the implementation of the Food and Drug Administration’s 1997 feed ban. Older animals are more likely to have been exposed to contaminated feed circulating before the FDA’s 1997 ban on ruminant-to-ruminant feeding practices, which scientific research has indicated is the most likely route for BSE transmission.
“By any measure, the incidence of BSE in this country is extremely low. Our enhanced surveillance program was designed as a one-time snapshot to provide information about the level of prevalence of BSE in the United States. We have conducted surveillance in the United States since 1990 and following the initial positive in December 2003, we developed an enhanced surveillance program. Since June 2004, all sectors of the cattle industry have cooperated in this program by submitting samples from more than 650,000 animals from the highest risk populations and more than 20,000 from clinically normal, older animals, as part our enhanced BSE surveillance program. To date, including the animal in today’s announcement, only two of these highest risk animals have tested positive for the disease as part of the enhanced surveillance program.
“As we approach the conclusion of our enhanced surveillance program, let me offer a few thoughts regarding surveillance going forward. I can assure you that we will continue to base our maintenance surveillance testing on international guidelines. Though the nature and extent of maintenance surveillance has not yet been finalized, the incidence of BSE in this country remains extremely low and our interlocking safeguards are working to protect both human and animal health and we remain very confident in the safety of U.S. beef.
“As we move forward with the epidemiological investigation that has been initiated today into this case of BSE, we will continue to be very transparent in sharing information with the public and with our trading partners around the world."
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/content/2006/03/bsestatement3-13-06_vs.shtml
FDA NEWS RELEASE FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE March 13, 2006 Media Inquiries: Susan Bro, 301-827-6242 Kimberly Rawlings, 301-827-6253 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA
FDA Statement on USDA Announcement of Positive BSE Test Result
Following confirmation today by the USDA of a cow found positive for BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy) or "mad cow" disease, the FDA is working with federal and state authorities to investigate the origin of the animal feed consumed by this cow. The USDA also confirmed the cow did not enter the animal feed or human food supply.
FDA is committed to protecting the safety of the U.S. human food and animal feed supply from BSE. As such, the FDA's 1997 animal feed ban rule has proven effective at keeping BSE out of the human food and animal feed supply. Recently, the FDA added safeguards prohibiting the use of certain cattle material in human food and cosmetics. Last year, the FDA also proposed to prohibit the use of certain cattle material in all animal feed.
We will continue to work closely with the USDA and state officials on this public health issue and will provide updates as information becomes available.
#
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2006/ucm108614.htm
March 17, 2006 - BSE UPDATE
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Videos From the BSE Update News Conference:
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Federal and state agriculture workers excavated the remains of the animal, which had been buried on the farm and did not enter the animal or human food chain, in accordance with USDA protocols. The carcass was that of a red crossbred beef type cow. An examination of the cow's teeth confirmed that the animal was at least 10 years of age. Samples were taken of the animal and the remaining carcass was transported to one of the department's diagnostic labs for proper disposal. State and Federal staff are continuing the traceback to determine the herd of origin.
One calf was identified by the owner as belonging to the red cow. The calf is approximately 6 weeks old and appeared to be a healthy animal. The calf was transported to a USDA lab where DNA from the calf will be compared to that of the red cow to confirm relation. If confirmed, this would be the first offspring of a BSE diagnosed cow in the United States. Officials today learned that in early 2005 the BSE-positive cow gave birth to another black bull calf. This animal is in the process of being traced.
The cow was first examined by a local veterinarian in late February 2006. After the animal failed to respond to medical attention, it was humanely euthanized. The cattle producer buried the cow at the farm because Alabama Department of Agriculture & Industries regulations require burial of livestock within 24 hours. The producer did not suspect that the cow had BSE. The local veterinarian sent samples of the cow to the Alabama Department of Agriculture & Industries lab system, which was then forwarded to the USDA lab in Athens, GA as part of the routine voluntary surveillance program for BSE testing. After the rapid test for BSE gave an inconclusive result, the samples were sent to Ames, Iowa for a Western Blot test, which gave a positive result. A third test, the immunohistochemistry (IHC) test, was performed this week and also returned positive results for BSE.
The Alabama Department of Agriculture and Industries and the USDA have been encouraging participation in Premises ID Registration as an important step in controlling animal disease. Since starting the program in 2005, over 2,000 premises have been registered in Alabama. For more information on Premises ID Registration call 334-240-7253.
«Previous Page · © Alabama Department of Agriculture
http://www.agi.state.al.us/press_releases/bse-update?op=makePrintable;pn=2
Alabama BSE Investigation Final Epidemiology Report
May 2, 2006
Summary:
Despite a thorough investigation of two farms that were known to contain the index cow, and 35 other farms that might have supplied the index cow to the farms where the index case was known to have resided, the investigators were unable to locate the herd of origin. The index case did not have unique or permanent identification, plus, the size and color of the cow being traced is very common in the Southern United States. Due to the unremarkable appearance of solid red cows, it is not easy for owners to remember individual animals. In the Southern United States, it is common business practice to buy breeding age cows and keep them for several years while they produce calves. Most calves produced are sold the year they are born, whereas breeding cows are sold when there is a lapse in breeding, which can occur multiple times in cows’ lives. For all of these reasons, USDA was unable to locate the herd of origin.
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/EPI_Final5-2-06.pdf
June 20, 2006, 5:13PM Feed Recalled Over Mad Cow Violation
© 2006 The Associated Press
WASHINGTON — Livestock feed ingredients shipped to nine states may have been contaminated with cattle remains in violation of a 1997 ban to protect against mad cow disease, a manufacturer said Tuesday.
H.J. Baker & Bro. Inc. said it was recalling three livestock feed ingredients, including two used to supplement feed given to dairy cows. A sample tested by the Food and Drug Administration was positive for cattle meat and bone meal, said Mark Hohnbaum, president of the Westport, Conn.-based company's feed products group.
"This is very concerning to us. This isn't something that happens to us. We are very serious about food safety," Hohnbaum said.
Mad cow disease is only known to spread when cows eat feed containing brain and other nerve tissue from infected cattle. Protein from cattle was commonly added to cattle feed to speed growth until the ban largely outlawed the practice.
Cattle tissue may have contaminated two feed ingredients given to dairy cows _ Pro-Lak and Pro-Amino II _ made by H.J. Baker between August 2005 and June. The third of the recalled ingredients, Pro-Pak with Porcine Meat and Bone, was mislabeled. It is used in poultry feed.
The company announced the recall in the wake of ongoing FDA inspections of its Albertville, Ala. plant, Hohnbaum said. The inspections have found manufacturing and clerical issues, he added.
The company shipped the ingredients to feed manufacturers and dairy farms in the following states: Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi and Tennessee. The company is notifying its customers of the voluntary recall. It does not know how much of the feed ingredients it sold, Hohnbaum said.
___
On the Net:
Food and Drug Administration animal feed information:
http://www.fda.gov/cvm/animalfeed.htm
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ap/fn/3987413.html
TSS
----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000374/!x-usc:mailto:flounder9@VERIZON.NET> T
o: <mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000374/!x-usc:mailto:BSE-L@aegee.org> Sent: Tuesday, June 20, 2006 9:30 AM
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA Albertville, AL -- June 16, 2006 -- H.J. Baker & Bro.
##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA Albertville, AL -- June 16, 2006 -- H.J. Baker & Bro. Date: June 20, 2006 at 6:55 am PST MAD COW FEED RECALL USA Albertville, AL -- June 16, 2006 -- H.J. Baker & Bro.
Recall -- Firm Press Release
FDA posts press releases and other notices of recalls and market withdrawals from the firms involved as a service to consumers, the media, and other interested parties. FDA does not endorse either the product or the company. This listserv covers mainly Class I (life-threatening) recalls. A complete listing of recalls can be found in the FDA Enforcement Report at:
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/Enforce.html
HJ Baker and Bro., Inc. Announces National Recall of Three Animal Feed Products Containing Prohibited Ingredients Contact: Mark Hohnbaum 501-664-4870
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE -- Albertville, AL -- June 16, 2006 -- H.J. Baker & Bro. has announced today that in cooperation with the US Food & Drug Administration (FDA) it has begun efforts to retrieve PRO-PAK WITH PORCINE MEAT AND BONE, PRO-LAK, AND PRO-AMINO II produced at its Albertville, AL facility. These products are used as an ingredient in the manufacturing of livestock feed, including feed for dairy animals. This action is being taken to address potential risk of unintentional contamination with ruminant derived protein that may have occurred at this facility from August 2005 to June 2006.
Certain mammalian protein is prohibited for use in ruminant feed. These products were distributed in bulk or bags to feed manufacturers and dairy farms in Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Florida, Alabama, Tennessee, Mississippi, California, and Louisiana.
If you have received any of these products, discontinue their use immediately. Quarantine the product so that it cannot be inadvertently used in the manufacture of feeds and contact the manufacturer at 501-664-4870 for further instructions.
"All production and shipment of these products from the Albertville mill have ceased and all of our customers are being notified of the potential contamination. With the advice and support of the FDA, we were able to respond rapidly to address this matter," said Christopher Smith, President & CEO.
H.J. Baker & Bro., Inc., headquartered in Westport, CT, has served the fertilizer and animal feed industries since the Company was founded in 1850.
####
FDA's Recalls, Market Withdrawals and Safety Alerts Page:
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/7alerts.html
lets see here now, we have mad cows in Alabama, we have mad cow feed in Alabama, however JUST another spontaneous event of more BSe. ...TSS
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Subject: MAD COW PROTEIN IN COMMERCE USA 2006 RECALL UPDATE
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <[log in to unmask]>
Reply-To: SAFETY <[log in to unmask]>
Date: Mon, 9 Oct 2006 14:10:37 -0500 Content-Type: text/plain Parts/Attachments: text/plain (558 lines)
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV
Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST
PRODUCT a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6; b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6; c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6; d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6. CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons DISTRIBUTION AL
______________________________
snip...
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00968.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALLS ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006 KY, LA, MS, AL, GA, AND TN 11,000+ TONS Date: August 16, 2006 at 9:19 am PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE - CLASS II
______________________________
snip...
______________________________
PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-120-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tons DISTRIBUTION AL and MS
______________________________
PRODUCT a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6; b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6; c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6; d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6; e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6; f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6; g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6 CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags
DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2006/ENF00964.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS
Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006 Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST PRODUCT a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6; b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6; c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6; d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6; e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6; f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6; g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6; h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6; i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6; j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6; k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6; l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6; m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 CODE Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.
REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons DISTRIBUTION AL and FL
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html
MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II
______________________________
PRODUCT a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6; b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6; c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6; d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE a) Bulk b) None c) Bulk d) Bulk RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons
DISTRIBUTION Nationwide
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00960.html
look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;
Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates
Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog, Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe Deslys Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.
snip...
BSE bovine brain inoculum
100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg
Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)
Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%) 1/15 (7%)
RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)
PrPres biochemical detection
The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar PrPres concentration that was
inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of
bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.
Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected orally with similar BSE brain inocula
Published online January 27, 2005
http://www.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa
It is clear that the designing scientists must
also have shared Mr Bradley's surprise at the results because all the dose
levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s145d.pdf
2) Infectious dose:
To cattle: 1 gram of infected brain material (by oral ingestion)
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/sci/bio/bseesbe.shtml
http://list.uvm.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2=SAFETY;pbpHeQ;20061009141037-0500B
SPRING 2009
COMPLYING WITH REGULATIONS ON SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS (SRMS)
SPRING 2009 USDA TEXAS AM
BSE TESTING 2006 - 7988
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PPT/How_To_Comply_SRM.ppt
Sunday, September 6, 2009
MAD COW USA 1997 SECRET VIDEO
SEE ANOTHER VIDEO THAT SHOWED IN CANADA, BUT NOT USA, ABOUT ANOTHER USA TSE COVER-UP MORE BRAINS NOT TESTED PROPERLY, key brain parts missing. ...
http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2009/09/mad-cow-usa-1997-video.html
SEE THIS DAMNING VIDEO AT BOTTOM OF ;
Monday, July 27, 2009
U.S.A. HIDING MAD COW DISEASE VICTIMS AS SPORADIC CJD ?
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2009/07/usa-hiding-mad-cow-disease-victims-as.html
DAMNING TESTIMONY FROM STANLEY PRUSINER THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE WINNER ON PRIONS SPEAKING ABOUT ANN VENEMAN
''nobody has ever ask''
''they dont want our comment''
''they don't want to know, the don't care''
''i have tried repeatedly''
''level of absolute ignorance''
''Entire policy was driven...heard from mr. laycraft, so now, after time has passed, it's ok for Canada, cattle under 30 month, to the USA, THAT'S ALL THAT MATTERED!
PRUSINER ASKED : IF FROM YOUR TESTIMONY, A DEMONSTRATED THREAT TO PUBLIC HEATH ?
''yes, i think prions are bad to eat, and you can die from them''
http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/prusinerclip.html
Wednesday, September 9, 2009
Co-existence of scrapie prion protein types 1 and 2 in sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: its effect on the phenotype and prion-type characteristics
sCJDMM1-2 should be considered as a separate entity at this time.
Thank you very much !
SEE FULL TEXT ;
http://cjdusa.blogspot.com/2009/09/co-existence-of-scrapie-prion-protein.html
Friday, September 4, 2009
FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/09/foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html
Saturday, August 29, 2009
FOIA REQUEST FEED RECALL 2009 Product may have contained prohibited materials Bulk Whole Barley, Recall # V-256-2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/08/foia-request-feed-recall-2009-product.html
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007
CODE
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007
CODE
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html
NEW URL
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm
Thursday, March 19, 2009
MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA WITH ONGOING 12 YEARS OF DENIAL NOW, WHY IN THE WORLD DO WE TO TALK ABOUT THIS ANYMORE $$$
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html
USA MEAT EXPORT
http://www.usmef.org/TradeLibrary/Statistics.asp
BSE TESTING USA
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/04/bse-mad-cow-testing-usa-2009-figures.html
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/08/creekstone-vs-usda-court-of-appeals.html
TSS
UPDATE TEXAS MAD COWS 2009
FDA STATEMENT FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA
Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms
On Friday, April 30th, the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.
FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.
FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.
Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).
FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.
To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.
Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry.
FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.
#
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2004/ucm108292.htm
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
May 13,2004
The Honorable Ann M. Veneman Secretary of Agriculture Department of Agriculture1400 Independence Avenue, SW Washington, DC 20250
Dear Madam Secretary:
I am writing to express concern that the recent failure of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to test a Texas cow with neurological syrnptoms for bovine spongifonnencephalopathy (BSE) may reflect wider problems in the surveillance program. USDA apparently does not keep track of how many cows condemned for central nervous system symptoms are tested for BSE nor does it require that suspect carcasses be held pending testing...
FULL TEXT ;
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20040607142914-86912.pdf
News Release Texas Animal Health Commission Box l2966 * Austin, Texas 78711 * (800) 550-8242 * FAX (512) 719-0719 Bob Hillman, DVM * Executive Director For info, contact Carla Everett, information officer, at 1-800-550-8242, ext. 710, or ceverett@tahc.state.tx.us
For immediate release---
State-Federal Team Responds to Texas BSE Case
The US Department of Agriculture announced June 29 that genetic testing has verified that an aged cow that tested positive for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy or BSE originated from a Texas beef cattle herd. Tissues for laboratory testing were initially collected from the animal in November 2004, and the carcass was incinerated and did not enter the human food, animal feed or fertilizer supply system. While tests in November indicated the animal did not have BSE, retesting in England in June confirmed the animal had the disease. The Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), the state’s livestock and poultry health regulatory agency, and USDA have jointly assigned a state-federal team to conduct the epidemiological investigation and response.
“The TAHC and US Department of Agriculture’s Veterinary Services are working with a complement of experts from federal and state animal health, food safety, public health and feed regulatory agencies to ensure the continued safety and wholesomeness of our meat supply,” said Dr. Bob Hillman, Texas state veterinarian and executive director of the TAHC, the state’s livestock and poultry health regulatory agency. “Epidemiological investigations are thorough and focus on verifying the herd of origin, and when, where and how the animal and potentially, any herd mates, were exposed to the abnormal prion, or disease agent, that causes BSE. Additionally, epidemiology investigations trace the infected animal’s movement and herd mates. Animals potentially exposed to the disease will be depopulated, with proper disposal. The animals will not be introduced into the human or animal food chain.”
The USDA’s BSE testing protocol requires testing of emaciated or injured cattle, cattle that exhibit central nervous system disorder, cattle unable to rise or to walk normally, and cattle that die of unknown causes. Since June 1, 2004, brain tissue samples from more than 394,000 cattle have been tested in the U.S. and were negative for BSE. Of those, 38,320 were tested in Texas, Dr. Hillman noted. BSE surveillance has been conducted in the U.S. since l990.
The U.S. has taken preventive measures against the introduction of BSE since l989, when prohibitions were placed on cattle and other ruminants from BSE-affected countries, noted Dr. Hillman. In 1997, the importation ban was extended to all of Europe.
Dr. Hillman said the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 1997 banned the use of ruminant-derived protein (from animals such as cattle and sheep) in feed for cattle and other ruminants. There is no evidence that BSE spreads from live animal to animal in the herd, but cattle can be exposed by eating feed that contains rendered protein from infected animals. “These measures taken by the USDA and the FDA are safeguards that work to protect livestock, and ultimately, our meat supply,” he said.
--30--
http://www.tahc.state.tx.us/news/pr/2005/2005Jun30_BSE_Positive_Results.pdf
Report on Food & Drug Administration Dallas District Investigation of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Event in Texas 2005 - August 30, 2005 Executive Summary:
On June 24, 2005, USDA informed FDA that a cow in Texas tested positive for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). Information provided by APHIS was that the BSE positive cow was born and raised in a herd in Texas and was approximately 12 years old. The animal was sampled for BSE at a pet food plant in Texas on November 15, 2004, as part of USDA’s enhanced surveillance program. The animal was disposed of by incineration and did not enter the human food or animal feed chains. Although the positive animal posed no risk to the animal feed supply, FDA, APHIS, the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), and the Texas Feed and Fertilizer Control Service (TFFCS) conducted a feed investigation with two main objectives. The first objective was to identify all protein sources in the animal’s feed history that could potentially have been the source of the BSE agent. The second objective was to verify that cattle leaving the herd after 1997 that were identified by USDA/APHIS as animals of concern (e.g. progeny and feed cohorts), were rendered at facilities in compliance with the regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) that prohibits most mammalian protein in feed for ruminants that became effective August 4, 1997 (herein called BSE/Ruminant Feed rule).
The feed history investigation identified 21 feed products that had been used on the farm since 1990. These feed products were purchased from three retail feed stores and had been manufactured at nine different feed mills. The investigators visited these establishments to collect information on formulations, shipping invoices, and use of ruminant meat and bone meal (MBM) on the premises both pre-1997 feed ban and post-1997 feed ban. This investigation found no feed products used on the farm since 1997 that had been formulated to contain prohibited mammalian protein.
The investigation identified one feed which contained an animal protein source that could not be identified. The investigation also found one feed mill that supplied feed to the farm that had used ruminant MBM in feed formulations for non-ruminant species after the BSE/Ruminant Feed rule went into effect, which is permitted under the rule, and that several feed mills had used ruminant MBM in feeds prior to the feed ban. Although the investigation did not identify a specific feed source as the likely cause of this animal’s infection, it is probable that the most likely route of exposure for this animal was consumption of an animal feed containing mammalian protein prior to the implementation of the BSE/Ruminant Feed rule in 1997.
The investigation into the disposition of herd mates from this farm involved visits to nine slaughter plants and eight rendering plants. The investigation found that all rendering plants were operating in compliance with the BSE/ruminant feed ban regulation. A review of the inspection history of each of these rendering firms found no violations.
Background of Investigation:
When notified on June 24, 2005, FDA Headquarters and Dallas District management officials immediately began making contacts with their Federal, State and Local counterparts to plan for and initiate follow-up investigational activities to determine the feed history in this herd and to assure the safety of the animal feed supply by evaluating current and historic compliance with the BSE/ruminant feed ban rule.
APHIS established a joint Incident Command Post and FDA Dallas District staffed this post full time with a Supervisory Investigator charged with coordinating activities between FDA, APHIS, TAHC and TFFCS. Coordination conference calls were set up with all Federal and State agencies involved in the investigation to keep everyone apprised of investigational developments.
Animal Tracing Activities and Renderer Follow-up Inspections:
One of APHIS’ primary objectives was to identify and trace the animals of interest (animals of interest would include any animals which could have been potential birth cohorts or feed cohorts of the index animal, or potential offspring of the index animal within the two years prior to the positive diagnosis) from the index herd. This objective included the identification of points of sale and ultimately the actual slaughter facilities for animals of interest that left the farm. As the trace information was developed, APHIS shared this information with FDA. Further information on animal of interest identification and tracing can be found in the USDA Texas BSE Final Epidemiology report.
APHIS identified nine slaughter establishments receiving these animals of interest. Eight of the slaughter establishments were located in the State of Texas and one was located in the State of Georgia. Dallas District Investigators notified USDA/FSIS of our plans to visit each slaughter establishment to identify rendering facilities receiving materials from these slaughter establishments during the timeframe they received animals of interest. Dallas District also issued an assignment to Atlanta District to visit and inspect the one slaughter/renderer establishment located in the State of Georgia.
Eight renderers and one protein source broker were identified as receiving materials from these slaughter establishments. Each rendering facility identified was inspected for current compliance with the mammalian protein feed ban rule. Each firm’s operations during the period of time of receipt of these animals post 1997 were evaluated from a historical viewpoint and no evidence of noncompliance was detected.
In all, FDA visited nine slaughter facilities, eight rendering facilities and one broker of these materials. All facilities inspected were found to be in compliance with the BSE/ruminant feed ban rule
Feed Investigation:
As information was learned about the index herd, FDA Investigators working with TAHC officials conducted multiple interviews with the producer of the animal regarding possible feeds, feed sources, animal husbandry practices, and other events which may have changed normal feeding practices over the course of the index animal’s life in the herd and any other information which may have been helpful in identifying the possible sources of feed for this animal and herd. FDA corroborated this information through interviews at the retail feed supply stores where the producer purchased feeds.
Follow-up at these retail feed supply stores identified 21 possible feed products the producer may have used during the history of the herd. Fifteen purchased feed products were identified, along with hay, native grass, rice straw, soybean meal, milk replacer/colostrum and bagged corn. These products were identified as originating from nine different manufacturers. Each of these manufacturers was inspected by FDA Dallas District and TFFCS Investigators.
Feed manufacturers were located throughout the State of Texas. An assignment was also issued to another FDA District to visit a Corporate Headquarters facility in an effort to review archived feed formulations and labels. During each of these inspections, the firm’s current compliance with the BSE/ruminant feed ban rule was evaluated and attempts were made to determine the protein sources used in feeds on the index farm. Many of the feeds investigated were manufactured and used prior to the implementation of the BSE/ruminant feed ban rule in 1997. Feed products of particular interest included any which may have contained a protein source and the primary focus was on identifying any possible mammalian protein source material in those feed products. We found that ruminant feeds that had contained mammalian meat and bone meal (MBM) prior to the BSE/ruminant feed ban rule had been discontinued or reformulated upon the implementation of these rules. There is no regulatory requirement for a feed mill to archive formulations for that length of time, so in those instances where an actual formulation could not be obtained, experienced employees of the firms were interviewed and their recollections recorded.
Of all the feeds in use by the producer since 1997, none were discovered to have contained prohibited material (mammalian protein). Since the age of the index animal was determined to be approximately 12 years, investigating and reconstructing a feed history over such a long period of time is challenging. This ranch is a beef cow-calf operation and minimal feed records were maintained. Due to the nature of this investigation, it is difficult to determine what feeds were in use at specific times and what the formulation of those feeds were at the time they were fed. A feed history was developed through interviews with the producer and other farm personnel since they did not maintain any feed history documentation. Interviews with personnel at retail establishments disclosed incomplete records and cash sales that did not always identify the purchaser. Dallas District investigated any and all feed ingredients that were identified as being fed or potentially fed over the course of the last 15 years of this herd’s operation. Feeds discovered during this investigation with potential mammalian protein sources are as below:
One feed, used prior to 1996, before the implementation of the feed ban, was suspected to contain mammalian meat and bone meal, but this could not be confirmed as no formulation records were available. The producer recalled using a particular feed sporadically during the 1980’s and 1990’s, however, he could not remember the name or manufacturer of the feed and had no records identifying the product. It is not known whether this feed contained an animal protein source. Attempts to identify this feed through interviews with retail sources were unsuccessful. The producer identified one feed product that has been used since the year 2000 which contains fish meal as a protein source. Further investigation revealed that this product had contained mammalian meat and bone meal prior to 1997, but that it had been reformulated at that time using fish meal to replace the MBM. A tabular representation of the feed inspection follow-up activities is presented below:
Feed Dates of Use Protein Source Current BSE Inspection BSE Compliance History Feed #1 - Range Meal 1980’s - 2000 Unknown - Unable to determine actual manufacturer, no records available from producer N/A N/A Feed #2 - High Protein Starter Feed 2001 to present Feather meal BSE Compliant BSE Compliant Feed #3 - High Protein Starter Feed ~1995 - 2001 Feather meal BSE Compliant BSE Compliant Feed #4 - Cottonseed cake Prior to 1990 Cottonseed meal BSE Compliant BSE Compliant Feed #5 - Cottonseed cake Early 1980’s - 1990’s Cottonseed meal BSE Compliant BSE Compliant Feed #6 - Limiter 2001 to present Feather meal BSE Compliant BSE Compliant Feed #7 - Creep pellets Prior to 1970 Likely feather meal - no formulation could be obtained N/A N/A Feed #8 - Lick tub Since 2000 MBM prior to 1997 Fish Meal since 1997 BSE Compliant BSE Compliant Feed #9 - Cottonseed meal Continuously Cottonseed meal BSE Compliant BSE Compliant Feed #10 - Range Cubes Continuously since 1990 Feather meal BSE Compliant BSE Compliant[1] Feed #11 - Sulfur Salt Block Continuously Minerals; calcium - all non-animal derived BSE Compliant BSE Compliant Feed #12 - Lick tub Continuously since 1995 Feather meal BSE Compliant BSE Compliant Feed #13 - Beef Supplement Prior to 1996 Prior to 1997, suspect MBM - Not able to confirm, no formulation available BSE Compliant Same manufacturer as Feed #10[1] Feed #14 - Mineralized Salt Continuously since 1998 Minerals; calcium - all non-animal derived BSE Compliant BSE Compliant Feed #15 - Soybean meal Since 2000, sparingly Soybean meal N/A N/A Feed #16 - Corn Continuously Corn N/A N/A Feed #17 - Rice straw 1996, during dry year Rice straw N/A N/A Feed #18 - Hay Continuously Hay N/A N/A Feed #19 - Milk Replacer Since 2000, Infrequent use Dehydrated colostrums, whey N/A N/A Feed #20 - Grass Continuously Native grass N/A N/A Feed #21 - Soybean meal Since 2000, sparingly Soybean meal N/A N/A
[1] Dallas District previously documented one incident of the accidental addition of mammalian protein to a feed that was to be used for cattle at this facility. This incident was isolated to the manufacture of one lot of a custom cattle feed. A cross contamination error resulted in mammalian meat and bone meal being accidentally included in a feed. The error was detected soon after production. The firm acted swiftly in recalling the product and purchasing the animals that had consumed the feed. No products entered the human food or ruminant feed chain.
Dallas District Compliance History with BSE Feed Ban Rules:
Prior to 1997, feed manufacturers were not required to differentiate between protein sources used in ruminant and non-ruminant feeds. For a period of time following the implementation of the BSE/ruminant feed ban rule, some feed manufacturers continued to use both prohibited material and non-prohibited material within the same facility, employing separation and cleanout procedures to minimize cross-contamination. Although the regulations allow this practice, the potential for cross-contamination of ruminant feeds is greater. Most feed mills have found this practice to be difficult and have abandoned this practice.
Since the implementation of the BSE/ruminant feed ban rule in 1997, Dallas District and its State partners have inspected every known or registered feed manufacturer located in the states of Texas, Oklahoma and Arkansas. Further, every rendering operation and feed manufacturer actually processing with prohibited materials has been inspected annually. The compliance rate of the industry has been excellent.
Results:
In total FDA, along with TFFCS, conducted 33 inspections, investigations and interviews of the producer, retail feed establishments, feed manufacturers, corporate headquarters, slaughter facilities, renderers and a protein source broker. The FDA Dallas District follow-up to this incident resulted in the coordination of efforts of multiple Federal and State agencies. This report is the physical output of many hours of research, planning and coordination. All of the inspections conducted confirmed the feed manufacturers and rendering operations to be in compliance with the current BSE/ruminant feed ban rule.
Dallas District conducts annual inspections of all feed mills and rendering facilities who handle, use or produce PM for feed use. Inspections performed since the initiation of the BSE/ruminant feed ban rules in 1997 have confirmed a high degree of industry wide compliance with these important safeguards. The district also routinely coordinates and shares information regarding feed inspections with the TFFCS who are also responsible for the evaluating feed ban compliance in the state of Texas.
Food and Drug Administration August 30, 2005 Minor edit September 8, 2005
http://www.fda.gov/animalveterinary/guidancecomplianceenforcement/complianceenforcement/bovinespongiformencephalopathy/ucm129574.htm
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE P01-05 January 30, 2001 Print Media : 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA Note: On Dec. 23, 2003, the U.S. Department of Agriculture reported that a cow in Washington state had tested positive for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or mad cow disease). As a result, information on this Web page stating that no BSE cases had been found in the United States is now incorrect. However, because other information on this page continues to have value, the page will remain available for viewing.
FDA ANNOUNCES TEST RESULTS FROM TEXAS FEED LOT
Today the Food and Drug Administration announced the results of tests taken on feed used at a Texas feedlot that was suspected of containing meat and bone meal from other domestic cattle -- a violation of FDA's 1997 prohibition on using ruminant material in feed for other ruminants. Results indicate that a very low level of prohibited material was found in the feed fed to cattle.
FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.
It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were contaminated.
According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA's Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner, "The challenge to regulators and industry is to keep this disease out of the United States. One important defense is to prohibit the use of any ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined with other steps, like U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) ban on the importation of live ruminant animals from affected countries, these steps represent a series of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE."
Despite this negligible risk, Purina Mills, Inc., is nonetheless announcing that it is voluntarily purchasing all 1,222 of the animals held in Texas and mistakenly fed the animal feed containing the prohibited material. Therefore, meat from those animals will not enter the human food supply. FDA believes any cattle that did not consume feed containing the prohibited material are unaffected by this incident, and should be handled in the beef supply clearance process as usual.
FDA believes that Purina Mills has behaved responsibly by first reporting the human error that resulted in the misformulation of the animal feed supplement and then by working closely with State and Federal authorities.
This episode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put into place is essential for protecting the food supply and that continued vigilance needs to be taken, by all concerned, to ensure these rules are followed routinely.
FDA will continue working with USDA as well as State and local officials to ensure that companies and individuals comply with all laws and regulations designed to protect the U.S. food supply.
Office of Public Affairs 2001-JAN-30
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2001/new00752.html
''FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.'' ???
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html
January 29, 2001 Email: sma@tca.net
Volume 5, Issue 6 Home Page
Address: http://www.southwestmeat.org
Edited by Phyllis Zimmerman S O U T H W E S T M E A T A S S O C I A T I O N 4103
SOUTH TEXAS AVENUE, SUITE 101 BRYAN, TX 77802 (979) 846-9011 FAX (979) 846-8198
Texas Cattle Quarantined in Feed Ban Violation
More than 1,200 head of Texas cattle were under quarantine last Friday after possibly consuming feed containing meat and bone meal. Purina Mills, Inc., the largest livestock feed producer in the United States, confirmed it prepared a feed supplement containing ruminant byproducts at a Gonzales, Texas plant last week, and then shipped the feed to the feedlot in error. The company said the mix up involved 22 tons of feed mixed the evening of January 16. The mill immediately notified the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the feedlot of the mix up, and set in motion the precautionary measures being taken. Samples of the feed are being tested by the FDA and cattle that may have ingested the feed are being held pending further testing. However, the news sent feeder cattle futures falling in Friday morning trading on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. The FDA has forbidden U.S. feed manufacturers from mixing animal products into ruminant feed as a preemptive measure to safeguard against the spread of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) or mad cow disease. Although no cases of BSE have ever been reported in the U.S., every precaution is being taken to protect the food chain. Dr. Murray Lumpkin, senior medical adviser at the FDA, said, “We do know that the feed was American in origin, so there is no evidence at this point in time that the feed that the cows might have gotten might have been infected with BSE. Chances of that are very, very small. The bottom line is if we feel there was any exposure to a human safety issue, we will not allow them into the food chain.” Animal byproducts are added to feed as a protein supplement, and are considered safe for use in swine and poultry feed. Burt Rutherford, a spokesman for the Texas Cattle Feeders Association, praised the mill for their quick notification of the FDA and the feedlot. The company said the error was discovered through its “quality assurance program” of internal controls. A Purina Mills spokesman said the company has begun phasing out the use of meat and bone meal from cows in any of its livestock feed. “It’s a voluntary move on our behalf and takes us down to a zero risk factor for a misformulation in the future,” said Max Fisher. Tests on the feed samples should be complete early this week.
http://southwestmeat.org/newsletters/archive/Jan2901.PDF
Audit Report
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program – Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service
Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III
snip...
We attribute the failure to identify the BSE positive sample to rigid protocols, as well as the lack of adequate quality assurance controls over its testing program. Details of our concerns are discussed in Findings 3 and 4.
snip...
Section 2. Testing Protocols and Quality Assurance Controls
In November 2004, USDA announced that its rapid screening test, Bio-Rad Enzyme Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA), produced an inconclusive BSE test result as part of its enhanced BSE surveillance program. The ELISA rapid screening test performed at a BSE contract laboratory produced three high positive reactive results.40 As required,41 the contract laboratory forwarded the inconclusive sample to the APHIS National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) for confirmatory testing. NVSL repeated the ELISA testing and again produced three high positive reactive results.42 In accordance with its established protocol, NVSL ran its confirmatory test, an immunohistochemistry (IHC) test, which was interpreted as negative for BSE. In addition, NVSL performed a histological43 examination of the tissue and did not detect lesions44 consistent with BSE.
Faced with conflicting results, NVSL scientists recommended additional testing to resolve the discrepancy but APHIS headquarters officials concluded no further testing was necessary because testing protocols were followed. In our discussions with APHIS officials, they justified their decision not to do additional testing because the IHC is internationally recognized as the “gold standard.” Also, they believed that conducting additional tests would undermine confidence in USDA’s established testing protocols. However, OIG obtained evidence that indicated additional testing was prudent to ensure that USDA’s testing protocols were effective in detecting BSE and that confidence in USDA’s testing procedures was maintained. OIG came to this conclusion because the rapid tests produced six high positive reactive results, confirmatory testing conflicted with the rapid test results, and various standard operating procedures were not followed. Also, our review of scientific literature, other country protocols, as well as discussions with internationally recognized experts led us to conclude that confirmatory testing should not be limited when conflicting test results are obtained. To maintain objectivity and independence in our assessment, we requested the USDA Agricultural Research Service (ARS) perform the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) Scrapie-Associated Fibrils (SAF)
40 ELISA test procedures require two additional (duplicate) tests if the initial test is reactive, before final interpretation. If either of the duplicate tests is reactive, the test is deemed inconclusive. 41 Protocol for BSE Contract Laboratories to Receive and Test Bovine Brain Samples and Report Results for BSE Surveillance Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), dated October 26, 2004. 42 The NVSL conducted an ELISA test on the original material tested at the contract laboratory and on two new cuts from the sample tissue. 43 A visual examination of brain tissue by a microscope. 44 A localized pathological change in a bodily organ or tissue.
USDA/OIG-A/50601-10-KC Page 31
immunoblot.45 ARS performed the test at the National Animal Disease Center because NVSL did not have the necessary equipment46 (ultracentrifuge) to do the test. APHIS scientists observed and participated, as appropriate, in this effort.
The additional tests conducted by ARS produced positive results. To confirm this finding, the Secretary requested the internationally recognized BSE reference laboratory in Weybridge, England, (Weybridge) to perform additional confirmatory testing. Weybridge conducted various tests, including their own IHC methods, as well as three Western blot methods. The tests confirmed that the suspect cow was infected with BSE. Also, Weybridge confirmed this case as an unequivocal positive case of BSE on the basis of IHC. As a result of this finding, the Secretary immediately directed USDA scientists to work with international experts to develop a new protocol that includes performing dual confirmatory tests in the event of another inconclusive BSE screening test.
snip...
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf
Release No. 0336.05 Contact: USDA Jim Rogers 202-690-4755 FDA Rae Jones 301-827- 6242
Printable version Email this page
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
Investigation Results of Texas Cow That Tested Positive for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Aug. 30, 2005
The U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have completed their investigations regarding a cow that tested positive for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in June 2005. The agencies conducted these investigations in collaboration with the Texas Animal Health Commission and the Texas Feed and Fertilizer Control Service.
Our results indicate that the positive animal, called the index animal, was born and raised on a ranch (termed the "index farm") in Texas. It was a cream colored Brahma cross approximately 12 years old at the time of its death. It was born prior to the implementation of the 1997 feed ban instituted by FDA to help minimize the risk that a cow might consume feed contaminated with the agent thought to cause BSE. The animal was sold through a livestock sale in November of 2004 and transported to a packing plant. The animal was dead upon arrival at the packing plant and was then shipped to a pet food plant where it was sampled for BSE. The plant did not use the animal in its product, and the carcass was destroyed in November 2004.
APHIS attempted to trace all adult animals that left the index farm after 1990, as well as all progeny born within 2 years of the index animal's death. Together, these animals are called animals of interest.
During the course of the investigation, USDA removed and tested a total of 67 animals of interest from the farm where the index animal's herd originated. All of these animals tested negative for BSE. 200 adult animals of interest were determined to have left the index farm. Of these 200, APHIS officials determined that 143 had gone to slaughter, two were found alive (one was determined not to be of interest because of its age and the other tested negative), 34 are presumed dead, one is known dead and 20 have been classified as untraceable. In addition to the adult animals, APHIS was looking for two calves born to the index animal. Due to record keeping and identification issues, APHIS had to trace 213 calves. Of these 213 calves, 208 entered feeding and slaughter channels, four are presumed to have entered feeding and slaughter channels and one calf was untraceable.
To determine whether contaminated feed could have played a role in the index animal's infection, FDA and the Texas Feed and Fertilizer Control Service conducted a feed investigation with two main objectives: 1) to identify all protein sources in the animal=s feed history that could potentially have been the source of the BSE agent, and 2) to verify that cattle leaving the herd after 1997 were identified by USDA as animals of interest and were rendered in compliance with the 1997 BSE/ruminant feed rule.
The feed history investigation identified 21 feeds or feed supplements that were used on the farm since 1990. These feed ingredients were purchased from three retail feed stores and were manufactured at nine feed mills. This investigation found that no feed or feed supplements used on the farm since 1997 were formulated to contain prohibited mammalian protein. Due to this finding, FDA has concluded that the animal was most likely infected prior to the 1997 BSE/ruminant feed rule.
The investigation into the disposition of herd mates from this farm involved visits to nine slaughter plants and eight rendering plants. The investigation found that all of the rendering plants were operating in compliance with the BSE/ruminant feed rule. A review of the inspection history of each of these rendering firms found no violations of the FDA feed ban rule.
APHIS and FDA are very pleased with the results of their investigations, which show the animals of interest did not present a threat to livestock and that the ruminant feed rule is being followed. The U.S. maintains an interlocking system of safeguards designed to prevent BSE from entering the human and animal food chain. USDA also remains vigilant in its attempt to find BSE in the United States. To date, there have been more than 450,000 animals tested in the last 14 months and only two BSE positive animals found in this country.
For more information on USDA's epidemiological investigation and a copy of the report, please visit the APHIS website at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/bse.html or
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse/epi-updates/bse_final_epidemiology_report.pdf
For more information on FDA's feed investigation, please visit the FDA's website at
http://www.fda.gov/cvm/texasfeedrpt.htm
Last Modified: 08/31/2005
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/08/0336.xml
U.S. Completes Investigation of BSE-Infected Cow in Texas FDA Veterinarian Newsletter July/August 2005 Volume XX, No IV
After investigating the report of a cow in Texas found in June to be infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), Federal officials reported that appropriate safeguards were in place and working, which prevented the further spread of the disease.
The infected animal was destroyed and did not get into the food, feed, or pet food supply, officials said. This was the first native born cow in the United States found to be infected with BSE.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), which is in charge of tracking and preventing animal disease, reported the infected animal to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) on June 24, 2005. To determine if any other animals or offspring of animals from the herd of the infected animal were infected with BSE, USDA tracked down as many as it could of the 200 adult and 213 calves associated with the infected animals. No additional BSE was found.
Meanwhile, FDA officials, along with the Texas Animal Health Commission and the Texas Feed and Fertilizer Control Service, investigated the sources of feed given the infected animal to see if they could discover the source of the infectious material. In addition, the Federal and State authorities tracked the disposition of all animals associated with the infected cow to be sure the provisions of FDA’s 1997 BSE rule were followed.
The investigation concluded that the 1997 feed rule, which prohibits the feeding of most mammalian protein to cattle and other ruminants, was being followed. At an August 30 press teleconference, Dr. Stephen Sundlof, director of FDA’s Center for Veterinary Medicine, said that the investigation revealed that all companies involved were complying with the 1997 BSE feed rule.
FDA’s investigation identified 21 feed products used on the farm. FDA and State investigators went to three retail feed stores that had supplied the feed, and to nine feed mills that made the feed. According to Dr. Sundlof, “This investigation found no feed products used on the farm since 1997 had been formulated to contain prohibited mammalian protein.”
According to Dr. Sundlof, the infected cow, which was approximately 12 years old, had “very likely consumed contaminated feed well before 1997….”
The animals associated with the infected cow were properly handled during slaughter and disposition under the feed rule, Dr. Sundlof said: “The investigation into the disposition of herd-mates from this farm involved visits to nine slaughter plants and eight rendering plants. The investigation found that all rendering plants were operating in compliance with the BSE ruminant feed rule. A review of the inspection history of each of these rendering firms found no violation.”
On October 6, FDA announced proposed rules to further reduce the risk of BSE in the United States. The proposal would ban certain high risk cattle material from use in all feeds and pet foods. (See related story on page 1, “FDA Proposes Tighter Feed Ban to Prevent BSE.”)
http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/NewsEvents/FDAVeterinarianNewsletter/ucm092863.htm
Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report to Congress FY 2007 – 2nd Half
Two Texas Companies Sentenced and Fined for Misbranding Meat Products In April 2007, two closely held and related Texas companies pled guilty in Federal court and were sentenced to 12 months of probation and ordered to pay $10,250 in fines for misbranding meat products. One of the companies sold adulterated meat products to a retail store in New Mexico. Additionally, portions of the invoices failed to properly and consistently identify the meat products as being from cattle more than 30 months old at time of slaughter. This information is required to be disclosed because of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or “mad cow disease”) concerns. No adulterated meat reached consumers.
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc071212.pdf
Tuesday, July 14, 2009
U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary and BSE Red Book Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST
WHERE did we go wrong $$$
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/07/us-emergency-bovine-spongiform.html
Sunday, December 28, 2008
MAD COW DISEASE USA DECEMBER 28, 2008 an 8 year review of a failed and flawed policy
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html
Wednesday, August 20, 2008
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Mad Cow Disease typical and atypical strains, was there a cover-up ? August 20, 2008
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/08/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-mad.html
***UPDATE*** JANUARY 20, 2007
18 January 2007 - Draft minutes of the SEAC 95 meeting (426 KB) held on 7 December 2006 are now available.
snip...
4. Members had received information about the notification by the Health Protection Agency (HPA) of recipients of four batches of plasma products that had been produced from blood donated by individuals that had later developed variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (vCJD). THESE batches HAD NOT been included in a similar notification exercise in 2004, as the fate of these products COULD NOT BE TRACED at that time. The fourteenth annual report of the National CJD Surveillance Unit had been published. The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) had issued a consultation on a revised methodology for geographical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) risk assessment. Members could submit individual responses. Submission of a SEAC response was under consideration.
snip...
ITEM 9 - ANY OTHER BUSINESS
snip...
***$$$***
64. A member noted that at the recent Neuroprion meeting, a study was presented showing that in transgenic mice BSE passaged in sheep may be more virulent and infectious to a wider range of species than bovine derived BSE. Other work presented suggested that BSE and bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy (BASE) MAY BE RELATED. A mutation had been identified in the prion protein gene in an AMERICAN BASE CASE THAT WAS SIMILAR IN NATURE TO A MUTATION FOUND IN CASES OF SPORADIC CJD. A study also demonstrated that in a mouse model it was possible to alleviate the pathological changes of prion disease by suppressing expression of the prion protein gene after infection.
http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/95.pdf
TSS
Subject: Research Project: Study of Atypical BSE 2006 ARS Annual Report Date: January 13, 2007 at 3:16 pm PST
Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock
2006 Annual Report
4d.Progress report. This report serves to document research conducted under a specific cooperative agreement between ARS and the Italian Reference Centre for Animal TSE (CEA) at the Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Turin, Italy. Additional details of research can be found in the report for the parent project 3625-32000-073-00D, Transmission, Differentiation, and Pathobiology of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSEs).
The aim of the cooperative research project is (i) to compare the U.S. Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) isolates and the atypical BSE isolates identified in Italy and (ii) to determine whether diagnostic methods routinely used at the USDA are able to identify atypical BSE cases.
Within FY06, formalin fixed and frozen brain materials from animals with typical and atypical Italian (BASE) BSE have been sent by CEA to the USDA-ARS-NADC laboratory in Ames, IA. The serial brain material sections of BSE and BASE (consecutively numbered) will be analyzed in Ames using the USDA immunohistochemistry (IHC) protocol. To evaluate its reproducibility in Italian laboratories and to standardize the method, the USDA IHC protocol is being established at the CEA neuropathology laboratory. As soon as the Ventana NexES IHC Staining System is available to the CEA, the same samples (different cut numbers) will be examined by the CEA using the CEA in-house and the USDA IHC protocol.
In order to evaluate the USDA Western blot method, about 2 gram of typical Italian BSE and about 2 gram of atypical BASE brain tissue have been sent to the USDA-ARS-NADC laboratory. These samples and U.S. typical and atypical BSE samples have been analyzed in parallel using both the USDA and CEA Western blot methods and three different monoclonal antibodies (6H4, P4, SAF 84). These studies were performed during the visit by a CEA collaborator to the USDA-ARS-NADC. The latter studies revealed that both the Italian and USDA extraction and Western blot methods allowed the identification of the typical and atypical BSE samples tested.
http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?ACCN_NO=408490&showpars=true&fy=2006
ATYPICAL BSE BACKGROUND HISTORY USA
Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse
Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock
Project Number: 3625-32000-073-07 Project Type: Specific C/A
Start Date: Sep 15, 2004 End Date: Sep 14, 2007
Objective: The objective of this cooperative research project with Dr. Maria Caramelli from the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory in Turin, Italy, is to conduct comparative studies with the U.S. bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) isolate and the atypical BSE isolates identified in Italy. The studies will cover the following areas: 1. Evaluation of present diagnostics tools used in the U.S. for the detection of atypical BSE cases. 2. Molecular comparison of the U.S. BSE isolate and other typical BSE isolates with atypical BSE cases. 3. Studies on transmissibility and tissue distribution of atypical BSE isolates in cattle and other species.
Approach: This project will be done as a Specific Cooperative Agreement with the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, in Turin, Italy. It is essential for the U.S. BSE surveillance program to analyze the effectiveness of the U.S diagnostic tools for detection of atypical cases of BSE. Molecular comparisons of the U.S. BSE isolate with atypical BSE isolates will provide further characterization of the U.S. BSE isolate. Transmission studies are already underway using brain homogenates from atypical BSE cases into mice, cattle and sheep. It will be critical to see whether the atypical BSE isolates behave similarly to typical BSE isolates in terms of transmissibility and disease pathogenesis. If transmission occurs, tissue distribution comparisons will be made between cattle infected with the atypical BSE isolate and the U.S. BSE isolate. Differences in tissue distribution could require new regulations regarding specific risk material (SRM) removal.
http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?ACCN_NO=408490
2005 Annual Report
4d.Progress report. This report serves to document research conducted under a specific cooperative agreement between ARS and the Italian Reference Centre for Animal TSE (CEA) at the Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Turin, Italy. Additional details of research can be found in then report for the parent project 3625-32000-073-00D, Transmission, Differentiation, and Pathobiology of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies. The aim of the cooperative research project conducted by the CEA and ARS is to compare the U.S. bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) isolate and the bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy isolates (BASE) identified in Italy. The first objective was to determine whether diagnostic methods routinely used by USDA are able to identify the Italian BASE cases. For this purpose, CEA received the immunohistochemistry (IHC) protocol developed by APHIS-USDA. The IHC protocol was reproduced and standardized in the CEA laboratory and will be applied to the Italian BSE and BASE cases. Furthermore, fixed brainstem sections and frozen brainstem material from Italian BSE and BASE cases will be sent to ARS for analysis using USDA IHC and Western blot (WB) methods. These studies will enable us to determine whether the present diagnostic tools (IHC and WB) employed at the USDA will be able to detect the Italian BASE cases and also enable us to compare Italian BSE and BASE with the U.S. BSE cases.
http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?ACCN_NO=408490&showpars=true&fy=2005
Volume 12, Number 12–December 2006
PERSPECTIVE
On the Question of Sporadic
or Atypical Bovine SpongiformEncephalopathy and
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
Paul Brown,* Lisa M. McShane,† Gianluigi Zanusso,‡ and Linda Detwiler§
Strategies to investigate the possible existence of sporadic
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) require
systematic testing programs to identify cases in countries
considered to have little or no risk for orally acquired disease,
or to detect a stable occurrence of atypical cases in
countries in which orally acquired disease is disappearing.
To achieve 95% statistical confidence that the prevalence
of sporadic BSE is no greater than 1 per million (i.e., the
annual incidence of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
[CJD] in humans) would require negative tests in 3 million
randomly selected older cattle. A link between BSE and
sporadic CJD has been suggested on the basis of laboratory
studies but is unsupported by epidemiologic observation.
Such a link might yet be established by the discovery
of a specific molecular marker or of particular combinations
of trends over time of typical and atypical BSE and various
subtypes of sporadic CJD, as their numbers are influenced
by a continuation of current public health measures that
exclude high-risk bovine tissues from the animal and
human food chains.
SNIP...
Sporadic CJD The possibility that at least some cases of apparently sporadic CJD might be due to infection by sporadic cases of BSE cannot be dismissed outright. Screening programs needed to identify sporadic BSE have yet to be implemented, and we know from already extant testing programs that at least a proportion of infected animals have no symptoms and thus would never be identified in the absence of systematic testing. Thus, sporadic BSE (or for that matter, sporadic disease in any mammalian species) might be occurring on a regular basis at perhaps the same annual frequency as sporadic CJD in humans, that is, in the range of 1 case per million animals.
Whether humans might be more susceptible to atypical forms of BSE cannot be answered at this time. Experimentally transmitted BASE shows shorter incubation periods than BSE in at least 1 breed of cattle, bovinized transgenic mice, and Cynomolgus monkeys (12,13). In humanized transgenic mice, BASE transmitted, whereas typical BSE did not transmit (13). Paradoxically, the other major phenotype (H) showed an unusually long incubation period in bovinized transgenic mice (12).
The limited experimental evidence bearing on a possible relationship between BSE and sporadic CJD is difficult to interpret. The original atypical BASE strain of BSE had a molecular protein signature very similar to that of 1 subtype (type 2 M/V) of sporadic CJD in humans (5). In another study, a strain of typical BSE injected into humanized mice encoding valine at codon 129 showed a glycopattern indistinguishable from the same subtype of sporadic CJD (15). In a third study, the glycopatterns of both the H and L strains of atypical BSE evidently did not resemble any of the known sporadic CJD subtypes (12).
To these molecular biology observations can be added the epidemiologic data accumulated during the past 30 years. The hypothesis that at least some cases of apparently sporadic CJD are due to unrecognized BSE infections cannot be formally refuted, but if correct, we might expect by now to have some epidemiologic evidence linking BSE to at least 1 cluster of apparently sporadic cases of CJD. Although only a few clusters have been found (and still fewer published), every proposed cluster that has been investigated has failed to show any common exposure to bovines. For that matter, no common exposure has been shown to any environmental vehicles of infection, including the consumption of foodstuffs from bovine, ovine, and porcine sources, the 3 livestock species known to be susceptible to transmissible spongiform encephalopathies. Additional negative evidence comes from several large case-control studies in which no statistically significant dietary differences were observed between patients with sporadic CJD and controls (16,17).
On the other hand, the difficulty of establishing a link between BSE and CJD may be compounded by our ignorance of the infectious parameters of a sporadic form of BSE (e.g., host range, tissue distribution of infectivity, route of transmission, minimum infectious dose for humans, whether single or multiple). Presumably, these parameters would resemble those of variant CJD; that is, high infectivity central nervous system and lymphoreticular tissues of an infected cow find their way into products consumed by humans. Transmissions that might have occurred in the past would be difficult to detect because meat products are generally not distributed in a way that results in detectable geographic clusters.
Barring the discovery of a specific molecular signature (as in variant CJD), the most convincing clue to an association will come from the observation of trends over time of the incidence of typical and atypical BSE and of sporadic and variant CJD. With 4 diseases, each of which could have increasing, unchanging, or decreasing trends, there could be 81 (34) possible different combinations. However, it is highly likely that the trends for typical BSE and variant CJD will both decrease in parallel as feed bans continue to interrupt recycled contamination. The remaining combinations are thus reduced to 9 (32), and some of them could be highly informative.
For example, if the incidence of atypical BSE declines in parallel with that of typical BSE, its candidacy as a sporadic form of disease would be eliminated (because sporadic disease would not be influenced by current measures to prevent oral infection). If, on the other hand, atypical BSE continues to occur as typical BSE disappears, this would be a strong indication that it is indeed sporadic, and if in addition at least 1 form of what is presently considered as sporadic CJD (such as the type 2 M/V subtype shown to have a Western blot signature like BASE) were to increase, this would suggest (although not prove) a causal relationship (Figure 5).
Recognition of the different forms of BSE and CJD depends upon continuing systematic testing for both bovines and humans, but bovine testing will be vulnerable to heavy pressure from industry to dismantle the program as the commercial impact of declining BSE cases ceases to be an issue. Industry should be aware, however, of the implications of sporadic BSE. Its occurrence would necessitate the indefinite retention of all of the public health measures that exclude high-risk bovine tissues from the animal and human food chains, whereas its nonoccurrence would permit tissues that are now destroyed to be used as before, once orally acquired BSE has disappeared.
SNIP...
PLEASE READ FULL TEXT ;
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0965.htm?s_cid=eid06_0965_e
3:00 Afternoon Refreshment Break, Poster and Exhibit Viewing in the Exhibit Hall
3:30 Transmission of the Italian Atypical BSE (BASE) in Humanized Mouse
Models Qingzhong Kong, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Pathology, Case Western Reserve University
Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy (BASE) is an atypical BSE strain discovered recently in Italy, and similar or different atypical BSE cases were also reported in other countries. The infectivity and phenotypes of these atypical BSE strains in humans are unknown. In collaboration with Pierluigi Gambetti, as well as Maria Caramelli and her co-workers, we have inoculated transgenic mice expressing human prion protein with brain homogenates from BASE or BSE infected cattle. Our data shows that about half of the BASE-inoculated mice became infected with an average incubation time of about 19 months; in contrast, none of the BSE-inoculated mice appear to be infected after more than 2 years. ***These results indicate that BASE is transmissible to humans and suggest that BASE is more virulent than classical BSE in humans.
6:30 Close of Day One
http://www.healthtech.com/2007/tse/day1.asp
SEE STEADY INCREASE IN SPORADIC CJD IN THE USA FROM 1997 TO 2006. SPORADIC CJD CASES TRIPLED, with phenotype of 'UNKNOWN' strain growing. ...
http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/resources-casereport.html
There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance collection.
He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf
JOURNAL OF NEUROLOGY
MARCH 26, 2003
RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease in the United States
Email Terry S. Singeltary:
flounder@wt.net
I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to
comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging
forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE
transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate
phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest
sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable
nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every
state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to
expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are
sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in
the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and
CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by
intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other
TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every
victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this
agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose
others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there
should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena
from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic
CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?
http://www.neurology.org/cgi/eletters/60/2/176#535
Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734.
http://jama.ama-assn.org/
BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL
BMJ
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/319/7220/1312/b#EL2
BMJ
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/320/7226/8/b#EL1
USA BSE OIG 2006
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf
CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006
The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.
The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.
These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.
"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.
USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end
http://www.upi.com/
CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm
PAUL BROWN M.D.
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-c000490-vol40.pdf
[Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and Requirement for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf
[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf
THE SEVEN SCIENTIST REPORT ***
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-EC244-Attach-1.pdf
9 December 2005 Division of Dockets Management (RFA-305)
SEROLOGICALS CORPORATION James J. Kramer, Ph.D. Vice President, Corporate Operations
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02n-0273-c000383-01-vol35.pdf
Embassy of Japan http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/02n0273/02N-0273-EC240.htm
Dockets Entered on December 22, 2005 2005D-0330, Guidance for Industry and FDA Review Staff on Collection of Platelets by Automated ... EC 203, McDonald's Restaurants Corporation, Vol #:, 34 ... http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/05/Dec05/122205/122205.htm
03-025IF 03-025IF-631 Linda A. Detwiler [PDF] Page 1. 03-025IF 03-025IF-631 Linda A. Detwiler Page 2. Page 3. Page 4. Page 5. Page 6. Page 7. Page 8. Page 9. Page 10. Page 11. Page 12. http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-631.pdf
03-025IF 03-025IF-634 Linda A. Detwiler [PDF] Page 1. 03-025IF 03-025IF-634 Linda A. Detwiler Page 2. Page 3. Page 4. Page 5. Page 6. Page 7. Page 8. http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-634.pdf
Page 1 of 17 9/13/2005 [PDF] ... 2005 6:17 PM To: fsis.regulationscomments@fsis.usda.gov Subject: [Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food ... http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf
03-025IFA 03-025IFA-6 Jason Frost [PDF] ... Zealand Embassy COMMENTS ON FEDERAL REGISTER 9 CFR Parts 309 et al [Docket No. 03- 025IF] Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and ... http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-6.pdf
In its opinion of 7-8 December 2000 (EC 2000), the SSC ... [PDF] Page 1. Linda A. Detwiler, DVM 225 Hwy 35 Red Bank, New Jersey 07701 Phone: 732-741-2290 Cell: 732-580-9391 Fax: 732-741-7751 June 22, 2005 FSIS Docket Clerk US ...
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IF/03-025IF-589.pdf
Terry S. Singeltary SR. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################
Subject: SEAC Draft minutes of the open session of the 93rd meeting held on 6th July 2006 (atypical BSE USA) Date: August 22, 2006 at 3:03 pm PST SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Draft minutes of the open session of the 93rd meeting held on 6th July 2006
snip...
The Chair noted that recent reports described two cases of BSE in cattle in the United States of America (USA) as being similar to atypical cases of BSE found in a number of European countries. The Chair suggested that the term "atypical BSE", used in the USA report, is potentially confusing and that this would be discussed under any other business. Dr Danny Matthews (Veterinary Laboratories Agency [VLA]) explained that data from western blots of the USA cases resembled that of a small number of atypical cases of BSE in France. A study of the French cases had shown the condition to be transmissible to mice by intracerebral (ic) inoculation with the neuropathological phenotype maintained on transmission3. Claims have been made about the existence of atypical cases of BSE in other countries but these have yet to be confirmed. No study has yet examined the tissue distribution of abnormal prion protein (PrPSc) or infectivity in such atypical cases of BSE.
3 Baron et al. (2006) Transmission of new bovine prion to mice. Emerging. Infect. Diseases. 12, 1125-1128.
snip...
http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/draft93.pdf
However, based on analysis of molecular features of prion
diseases in cattle, this situation is similar to that in humans
(5), in which different subtypes of sporadic Creutzfeldt-
Jakob disease agents are found.
DISPATCHES
1126 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 12, No. 7, July 2006
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no07/pdfs/vol12no07.pdf
Medical Sciences Identification of a second bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy: Molecular similarities with sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
Cristina Casalone *, Gianluigi Zanusso , Pierluigi Acutis *, Sergio Ferrari , Lorenzo Capucci , Fabrizio Tagliavini ¶, Salvatore Monaco , and Maria Caramelli * *Centro di Referenza Nazionale per le Encefalopatie Animali, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, Liguria e Valle d'Aosta, Via Bologna, 148, 10195 Turin, Italy; Department of Neurological and Visual Science, Section of Clinical Neurology, Policlinico G.B. Rossi, Piazzale L.A. Scuro, 10, 37134 Verona, Italy; Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale della Lombardia ed Emilia Romagna, Via Bianchi, 9, 25124 Brescia, Italy; and ¶Istituto Nazionale Neurologico "Carlo Besta," Via Celoria 11, 20133 Milan, Italy
Edited by Stanley B. Prusiner, University of California, San Francisco, CA, and approved December 23, 2003 (received for review September 9, 2003)
Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), or prion diseases, are mammalian neurodegenerative disorders characterized by a posttranslational conversion and brain accumulation of an insoluble, protease-resistant isoform (PrPSc) of the host-encoded cellular prion protein (PrPC). Human and animal TSE agents exist as different phenotypes that can be biochemically differentiated on the basis of the molecular mass of the protease-resistant PrPSc fragments and the degree of glycosylation. Epidemiological, molecular, and transmission studies strongly suggest that the single strain of agent responsible for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) has infected humans, causing variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. The unprecedented biological properties of the BSE agent, which circumvents the so-called "species barrier" between cattle and humans and adapts to different mammalian species, has raised considerable concern for human health. To date, it is unknown whether more than one strain might be responsible for cattle TSE or whether the BSE agent undergoes phenotypic variation after natural transmission. Here we provide evidence of a second cattle TSE. The disorder was pathologically characterized by the presence of PrP-immunopositive amyloid plaques, as opposed to the lack of amyloid deposition in typical BSE cases, and by a different pattern of regional distribution and topology of brain PrPSc accumulation. In addition, Western blot analysis showed a PrPSc type with predominance of the low molecular mass glycoform and a protease-resistant fragment of lower molecular mass than BSE-PrPSc. Strikingly, the molecular signature of this previously undescribed bovine PrPSc was similar to that encountered in a distinct subtype of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C.C. and G.Z. contributed equally to this work.
To whom correspondence should be addressed.
E-mail: salvatore.monaco@mail.univr.it. www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0305777101
http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/0305777101v1
PLEASE NOTE!
SINCE spontaneous scrapie or CWD does not occur, then why is it that only BSE and sproadic CJD are capable of spontaneous mutation $$$
confusious is confused again;-) ...TSS
Science 24 September 2004: Vol. 305. no. 5692, pp. 1918 - 1921 DOI: 10.1126/science.1103581
Perspectives BIOMEDICINE:
A Fresh Look at BSE
Bruce Chesebro*
Mad cow disease, or bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), is the cattle form of a family of progressive brain diseases. These diseases include scrapie in sheep, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in humans, and chronic wasting disease (CWD) in deer and elk. They are also known as either "prion diseases" because of the association of a misfolded cellular prion protein in pathogenesis or "transmissible spongiform encephalopathies" (TSEs) because of the spongelike nature of the damaged brain tissue (1).
The recent discovery of two BSE-infected cows, one in Canada and one in the United States, has dramatically increased concern in North America among meat producers and consumers alike over the extent to which BSE poses a threat to humans as well as to domestic and wild animals. The European BSE epidemic of the late-1980s seems to have been initiated a decade earlier in the United Kingdom by changes in the production of meat and bone meal (MBM) from rendered livestock, which led to contamination of MBM with the BSE infectious agent. Furthermore, the fact that UK farmers fed this rendered MBM to younger animals and that this MBM was distributed to many countries may have contributed to the ensuing BSE epidemic in the United Kingdom and internationally (2).
Despite extensive knowledge about the spread of BSE through contaminated MBM, the source of BSE in Europe remains an unsolved mystery (2). It has been proposed that BSE could be derived from a cross-species infection, perhaps through contamination of MBM by scrapie-infected sheep tissues (see the figure). Alternatively, BSE may have been an endemic disease in cattle that went unnoticed because of its low level of horizontal transmission. Lastly, BSE might have originated by "spontaneous" misfolding of the normal cellular prion protein into the disease-associated abnormal isoform (3), which is postulated to be the infectious agent or "prion."
Five possible sources of BSE in North American cattle. Sheep, deer, and elk could spread prion diseases (TSEs) to cattle through direct animal contact or contamination of pastures. Endemic BSE has not been proven to exist anywhere in the world, but it is difficult to exclude this possibility because of the inefficient spread of BSE infectivity between individual animals (2). BSE caused by spontaneous misfolding of the prion protein has not been proven. CREDIT: KATHARINE SUTLIFF/SCIENCE
Spontaneous protein misfolding is not a new phenomenon as proteins are known to sometimes misfold after synthesis. Cells in turn have devised ingenious ways to deal with this problem. These include molecular chaperone proteins that bind to misfolded proteins and help them to unfold, and organelles called proteosomes that degrade misfolded or unwanted proteins. However, although misfolded prion proteins have been generated in test tubes as well as in cultured cells, it has been difficult to demonstrate that such misfolded abnormal prion proteins are infectious (4, 5). Even the most recent data do not prove conclusively that infectivity has been generated in vitro because misfolded synthetic prion proteins were not able to transfer disease directly to wild-type mice (6). To obtain infectivity and subsequent prion disease, the misfolded proteins had to be inoculated and incubated for 1 to 2 years in transgenic mice that overexpressed a mutant version of the prion protein. Previous data from this group showed that transgenic mice expressing high amounts of prion protein developed neurological disease without inoculation of misfolded prion protein (7). Thus, at the biochemical level, the critical attributes of the misfolded prion protein required for infectivity are not known, and misfolding of prion protein alone may not be sufficient to generate an infectious agent (8). Nevertheless, the idea that BSE might originate due to the spontaneous misfolding of prion proteins has received renewed interest in the wake of reports suggesting the occurrence of atypical BSE (9-11). These results imply that new strains of cattle BSE might have originated separately from the main UK outbreak. Where and how might such strains have originated? Although such rare events cannot be studied directly, any number of sources of the original BSE strain could also explain the discovery of additional BSE strains in cattle (see the figure). However, it would be worrisome if spontaneous BSE were really a valid etiology because such a mechanism would be impossible to prevent--unlike other possible scenarios that could be controlled by large-scale eradication of TSE-positive animals.
Another way to look at this problem is to examine evidence for possible spontaneous TSE disease in other animals besides cattle. Spontaneous BSE would be extremely difficult to detect in cattle, where horizontal spread is minimal. However, in the case of the sheep TSE disease, scrapie, which spreads from ewes to lambs at birth as well as between adults, spontaneous disease should be detectable as new foci of clinical infection. In the early 1950s scrapie was eradicated in both Australia and New Zealand, and the mainland of both these countries has remained scrapie-free ever since. This scrapie-free status is not the result of selection of sheep resistant to scrapie because sheep from New Zealand are as susceptible as their UK counterparts to experimental scrapie infection (12). These experiments of man and nature appear to indicate that spontaneous clinical scrapie does not occur in sheep. Similarly, because CWD is known to spread horizontally, the lack of CWD in the deer or elk of eastern North America but its presence in western regions would also argue against a spontaneous disease mechanism. This is particularly noteworthy in New Zealand, where there are large numbers of deer and elk farms and yet no evidence of spontaneous CWD. If spontaneous scrapie does not occur in sheep or deer, this would suggest that spontaneous forms of BSE and sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (sCJD) are unlikely to be found in cattle or humans. The main caveat to this notion is that spontaneous disease may arise in some animal species but not others. In humans, sCJD--which is considered by some researchers to begin by spontaneous misfolding of the prion protein--usually takes more than 50 years to appear. Thus, in animals with a shorter life-span, such as sheep, deer, and cattle, an analogous disease mechanism might not have time to develop.
What can we conclude so far about BSE in North America? Is the BSE detected in two North American cows sporadic or spontaneous or both? "Sporadic" pertains to the rarity of disease occurrence. "Spontaneous" pertains to a possible mechanism of origin of the disease. These are not equivalent terms. The rarity of BSE in North America qualifies it as a sporadic disease, but this low incidence does not provide information about cause. For the two reported North American BSE cases, exposure to contaminated MBM remains the most likely culprit. However, other mechanisms are still possible, including cross-infection by sheep with scrapie or cervids with CWD, horizontal transmission from cattle with endemic BSE, and spontaneous disease in individual cattle. Based on our understanding of other TSEs, the spontaneous mechanism is probably the least likely. Thus, "idiopathic" BSE--that is, BSE of unknown etiology--might be a better term to describe the origin of this malady.
What does all this imply about testing cattle for BSE in North America? Current testing in the United States indicates that BSE is rare (one positive result in 40,000 cattle tested). However, additional testing of 200,000 head of slaughtered cattle over the next 1 to 2 years, as recently proposed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), should tell us the incidence more precisely. Nevertheless, if any rare cases are detected, we may still not know their origin. If evidence arises of a focal occurrence of BSE, we might gain important insight into unexpected sources of contamination. However, because current tests do not seem to be able to detect BSE in infected animals less than 30 months of age, even more extensive testing will not completely guarantee the negative status of younger animals in the food chain. Therefore, the alternative option of testing all slaughtered cattle, as implemented in some countries such as Japan, would appear to provide little additional benefit. This fact has been acknowledged as the basis for a new agreement between the United States and Japan aimed at reestablishing the beef trade between the two countries.
One problem with the current U.S. testing program was the announcement a few months ago of unconfirmed positive BSE tests in two additional North American animals that were subsequently found to be negative when tested with the more accurate method of Western blotting. The public release of information about unconfirmed positive tests detected by the rapid test used for mass screening may be a good idea in the interest of openness, but it has the potential to create unwarranted anxiety. If unconfirmed positives are a frequent occurrence, it would seem reasonable to follow a more cautious approach and wait until confirmatory testing is complete before publicly announcing the details.
Based on the experience of many European countries, the mainstays of controlling BSE in cattle and avoiding spread to humans are threefold: first, eliminate feeding of ruminant tissues to ruminants; second, remove high-risk cattle tissues from human food; and third, continue to test for BSE in cattle in order to monitor progress with the elimination of the disease on a local and national basis. In the next 12 months, after extensive USDA test results are available, the extent of any possible BSE spread in the United States will be better documented. But, in fact, the United States and Canada have already instituted the most important steps to prevent the spread of cattle BSE in advance of the results--that is, a ban on feeding ruminant MBM to other ruminants and removal of high-risk tissues from meat for human consumption. It is hoped that the new data will not deviate enough from previous predictions to require further measures for management of this problem. The most important line of defense against any possible spread of BSE will be to maintain strict vigilance in the implementation of the current regulations.
References
S. B. Prusiner, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A 95, 13363 (1998) [Medline]. P. G. Smith, R. Bradley, Br. Med. Bull. 66, 185 (2003) [Medline]. C. Weissmann, A. Aguzzi, Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 7, 695 (1997) [Medline]. A. F. Hill et al., J. Gen. Virol. 80, 11 (1999) [Medline]. R. Chiesa et al., J. Virol. 77, 7611 (2003) [Medline]. G. Legname et al., Science 305, 673 (2004). D. Westaway et al., Cell 76, 117 (1994) [Medline]. B. Chesebro, Science 279, 42 (1998). A. G. Biacabe et al., EMBO Rep. 5, 110 (2004) [Medline]. Y. Yamakawa et al., Jpn. J. Infect. Dis. 56, 221 (2003) [Medline]. C. Casalone et al., Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 101, 3065 (2004) [Medline]. E. F. Houston et al., J. Gen. Virol. 83, 1247 (2002) [Medline].
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/305/5692/1918
US atypical BSE – further details
As reported in the last BSE Report (Which? BSE May 2006) French research findings
concerning the two most recent cases of BSE in the USA suggest that these cases were
not typical of BSE in cattle and may reflect a sporadic form of the disease.
I
n the two US cases, discovered in herds in Texas and Alabama, threre was an absence
of telltale spongy lesions caused by prions. In addition, the prions in brain tissue
samples from these cows seemed to be distributed differently from the classic form.
Laboratory studies on mice in France showed that both the classic and atypical strains
could be spread from one animal to another, but the atypical strain might happen
spontaneously in cattle. The Texas and Alabama cows were older animals, as were
some of the other animals in Europe with seemingly atypical forms of BSE.31
Linda Detwiler, a former Agriculture Department veterinarian who consults for major
food companies, cautioned against making that assumption. "I think it's kind of early to
say that would be the case," Detwiler said. Other theories, she said, suggest the
atypical strain might come from a mutation of BSE or even from a related disease in
sheep.
The US Agriculture Department has stated that whatever the cause there is no reason
to change federal testing or control measures. "It's most important right now, till the
science tells us otherwise, that we treat this as BSE regardless," the department's chief
veterinarian, John Clifford, said in an interview. ...
http://www.which.co.uk/files/application/pdf/bserep0606-445-89308.pdf
BSE, BOVINE - USA: ATYPICAL STRAIN (02) *************************************** A ProMED-mail post
ProMED-mail is a program of the International Society for Infectious Diseases
[1] Date: Tue 6 Jun 2006 From: Terry Singeltary Source: News.Farmpage.com [edited]
USDA Confirms BSE Tests On U.S. Cows Found Identical To Atypical Cases In France ----------------------------------------------- A USDA official confirmed that the positive BSE tests in 2 U.S.-born cattle were indeed an "atypical" type of the disease.
A USDA spokesman acknowledged Friday [2 Jun 2006] that positive BSE tests from 2 domestic-born cattle were from a rare strain of the disease found in a small number of European cases.
BSE, scientifically known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy and commonly known as mad cow disease, is a degenerative, fatal disease affecting the central nervous system of adult cattle.
USDA officials have declined in the past to provide such details, but released information Friday [2 Jun 2006] after a French researcher revealed earlier this week that the cases in Texas last year 2005 and Alabama last spring 2006 were identical to "atypical" cases of BSE found in France.
Scientists from around the world are trying to quantify the significance of these rare cases. They also want to know whether these cases may be sporadic.
In an e-mail, a USDA spokesman said the cases raise "many unanswered questions about these unusual findings, and additional research is needed to help characterize the significance -- or lack of significance -- of any of these findings."
The USDA spokesperson said nothing in the test results of the 2 cattle justifies any changes in surveillance, disease control or public-health measures already being taken in the U.S.
-- Terry Singeltary
****** [2] Date: Tue 6 Jun 2006 From: Terry Singeltary Source: Farmers Weekly [edited]
Cattle disease might be unknown strain of BSE ----------------------------------------------- Scientists across Europe and the United States are following the emergence of a new Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE) in cattle that could be a new strain of BSE.
Speaking last weekend at an international conference on prion diseases in domestic livestock (such as BSE in cows and scrapie in sheep and goats), scientists from France and Italy described how the disease had been detected in a small number of cattle ranging from 5 to 15 years old.
The strain differs from BSE in that it has a longer incubation time and is consequently being found in older cattle.
The new strain also demonstrates different characteristics from BSE in laboratory tests and was originally detected through active surveillance of live animals rather than during inspection of a suspect fallen animal.
Marion Simmons of the Veterinary Laboratory Agency at Weybridge urged caution, saying there are not yet sufficient supporting data to suggest that the disease is a new strain of BSE.
-- Terry Singeltary
[It has long been debated whether this atypical form is sporadic or whether the sporadic appearance was an atypical form. There does not seem to be a good explanation, which simply highlights the need for more research and understanding of this disease. - Mod.TG]
[see also: BSE, bovine - USA: atypical strain 20060601.1525] ..........tg/msp/dk
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Order Code RS22345
Updated July 18, 2006
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS
BSE (“Mad Cow Disease”): A Brief Overview
Geoffrey S. Becker
Specialist in Agricultural Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
snip...
1 This report, which replaces CRS Issue Brief IB10127, Mad Cow Disease: Agricultural Issues
for Congress, summarizes and updates information in other CRS reports, listed on page 6.
Sources for facts and citation to reports and studies can be found in these CRS reports.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Order Code RS22345
Updated July 18, 2006
BSE (“Mad Cow Disease”): A Brief Overview
Geoffrey S. Becker
Specialist in Agricultural Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Summary
The appearance of BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy or “mad cow disease”)
in North America in 2003 raised meat safety concerns and disrupted trade for cattle and
beef producers. A major issue for Congress has been how to rebuild foreign confidence
in the safety of U.S. beef and regain lost markets like Japan and Korea. Among other
issues are whether additional measures are needed to further protect the public and cattle
herd, and concerns over the relative costs and benefits of such measures for consumers,
taxpayers and industry. This report will be updated if significant developments ensue.1
What Is BSE?
BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy or “mad cow disease”) is a fatal
neurological disease of cattle, believed to be transmitted mainly by feeding infected cattle
parts back to cattle. More than 187,000 cases have been reported worldwide, 183,000 of
them in the United Kingdom (UK) where BSE was first identified in 1986. The annual
number of new cases has declined steeply since 1992. Humans who eat contaminated
beef are believed susceptible to a rare but fatal brain wasting disease, variant Creutzfeldt-
Jakob disease (vCJD). About 160 people, most in the UK, have been diagnosed with
vCJD since 1986, but none has been linked to any Canadian or U.S. meat consumption.
BSE in North America
BSE has been reported in 11 North American cattle, 10 born here and one imported
from the UK. The first native case was an Alberta, Canada, beef cow reported in May
2003. Canada has since reported six more cases, most recently in July 2006 in a 50-
month-old dairy cow in Manitoba. The first U.S. case was in a Canadian-born dairy cow
found in Washington state in December 2003. The other two U.S. cases were a 12-yearold
Texas-born and -raised beef cow, found in November 2004 but not confirmed until
June 2005, and a 10-year-old Alabama beef cow found in late February 2006.
CRS-2
In epidemiological investigations of the three U.S. cases, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) was unable to track down all related animals of interest, but those
that were located tested negative for the disease. Despite a beef recall, some meat from
the first U.S. BSE cow may have been consumed, USDA said, adding, however, that the
highest-risk tissues never entered the food supply. No materials from the other two U.S.
cows entered the food supply, USDA also said. In the recent Alabama case, authorities
were unable to determine the cow’s herd of origin. Animal health officials initially
indicated that all of the North American cases were caused by the consumption of BSEcontaminated
feed. However, USDA reportedly now believes that the two native-born
U.S. cattle had “atypical” BSE, which differs from other cases. If these cases are
determined to be “spontaneous,” that may affect future control strategies.
snip...
http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/06Jul/RS22345.pdf
Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse
Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock
Project Number: 3625-32000-073-07 Project Type: Specific C/A
Start Date: Sep 15, 2004 End Date: Sep 14, 2007
Objective: The objective of this cooperative research project with Dr. Maria Caramelli from the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory in Turin, Italy, is to conduct comparative studies with the U.S. bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) isolate and the atypical BSE isolates identified in Italy. The studies will cover the following areas: 1. Evaluation of present diagnostics tools used in the U.S. for the detection of atypical BSE cases. 2. Molecular comparison of the U.S. BSE isolate and other typical BSE isolates with atypical BSE cases. 3. Studies on transmissibility and tissue distribution of atypical BSE isolates in cattle and other species.
Approach: This project will be done as a Specific Cooperative Agreement with the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, in Turin, Italy. It is essential for the U.S. BSE surveillance program to analyze the effectiveness of the U.S diagnostic tools for detection of atypical cases of BSE. Molecular comparisons of the U.S. BSE isolate with atypical BSE isolates will provide further characterization of the U.S. BSE isolate. Transmission studies are already underway using brain homogenates from atypical BSE cases into mice, cattle and sheep. It will be critical to see whether the atypical BSE isolates behave similarly to typical BSE isolates in terms of transmissibility and disease pathogenesis. If transmission occurs, tissue distribution comparisons will be made between cattle infected with the atypical BSE isolate and the U.S. BSE isolate. Differences in tissue distribution could require new regulations regarding specific risk material (SRM) removal.
http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?ACCN_NO=408490
Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse
Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock
2005 Annual Report
This report serves to document research conducted under a specific cooperative agreement between ARS and the Italian Reference Centre for Animal TSE (CEA) at the Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Turin, Italy. Additional details of research can be found in then report for the parent project 3625-32000-073-00D, Transmission, Differentiation, and Pathobiology of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies. The aim of the cooperative research project conducted by the CEA and ARS is to compare the U.S. bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) isolate and the bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy isolates (BASE) identified in Italy. The first objective was to determine whether diagnostic methods routinely used by USDA are able to identify the Italian BASE cases. For this purpose, CEA received the immunohistochemistry (IHC) protocol developed by APHIS-USDA. The IHC protocol was reproduced and standardized in the CEA laboratory and will be applied to the Italian BSE and BASE cases. Furthermore, fixed brainstem sections and frozen brainstem material from Italian BSE and BASE cases will be sent to ARS for analysis using USDA IHC and Western blot (WB) methods. These studies will enable us to determine whether the present diagnostic tools (IHC and WB) employed at the USDA will be able to detect the Italian BASE cases and also enable us to compare Italian BSE and BASE with the U.S. BSE cases.
http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?ACCN_NO=408490&showpars=true&fy=2005
Research Project: Transmission, Differentiation, and Pathobiology of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies
Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock
Title: Where We've Been and Where We're Going with Bse Testing in the United States
Authors item Hall, Mark - NVSL-APHIS-USDA item Richt, Juergen item Davis, Arthur - NVSL-APHIS-USDA item Levings, Randall - NVSL-APHIS-USDA
Submitted to: American Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians Publication Type: Abstract Publication Acceptance Date: September 1, 2005 Publication Date: November 3, 2005 Citation: Hall, M.S., Richt, J.A., Davis, A.J., Levings, R.L. 2005. Where We've Been and Where We're Going with Bse Testing in the United States [abstract]. 48th Annual Meeting of the American Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians. P. 20.
Technical Abstract: A review of the laboratory aspects of the United States Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program from its beginning to the present day will be provided. Validated diagnostic tests for BSE require brain tissue. There are no ante mortem (blood/serum) tests for BSE available at present. From a historical perspective, diagnostic tests for BSE continue to evolve. The original diagnostic test method was histopathology in which sections of brain were examined under a microscope, and the classical vacuoles and spongiform change in specific areas of the brain would allow a diagnosis to be made. This method was accurate but only allowed a diagnosis to be made relatively late in the course of the disease. In the mid-1990s, immunohistochemistry (IHC) and Western blotting were developed which allow the detection of the abnormal form of the prion protein (PrPSc) and a diagnosis could be made prior to the development of spongiform changes and clinical signs. In the past decade, so-called "rapid tests" have been introduced commercially for BSE. Five commercial tests are currently licensed/permitted in the United States for BSE. These licensed tests include the Prionics Western blot, Prionics ELISA, Enfer/Abbott ELISA, IDEXX ELISA, and the BioRad ELISA. This presentation will discuss various attributes of the validated test methods available today. Both IHC and Western blot are considered confirmatory tests for BSE by the World Organisation of Animal Health (OIE). IHC provides for a specific immunological detection of PrPSc and enables the specific anatomical location to be determined. Western blot provides both immunological detection of PrPSc as well as specific molecular weight characterizations; certain Western blot procedures can be extremely sensitive due to various concentration procedures before analysis of the sample. The OIE recommended Western blot and IHC methods for confirmatory diagnosis of BSE used by USDA and the Veterinary Laboratories Agency in Weybridge, England, will be discussed. The overall enhanced testing plan that has been used for the past 18 months will be described including changes that have occurred during this time. The USDA's BSE enhanced surveillance plan has been a very successful national surveillance testing program that has been a shared effort between state veterinary diagnostic laboratories as part of the National Animal Health Laboratory Network and the National Veterinary Services Laboratories.
http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publications.htm?SEQ_NO_115=183829
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf
3.57 The experiment which might have determined whether BSE and scrapie were caused by the same agent (ie, the feeding of natural scrapie to cattle) was never undertaken in the UK. It was, however, performed in the USA in 1979, when it was shown that cattle inoculated with the scrapie agent endemic in the flock of Suffolk sheep at the United States Department of Agriculture in Mission, Texas, developed a TSE quite unlike BSE. 32 The findings of the initial transmission, though not of the clinical or neurohistological examination, were communicated in October 1988 to Dr Watson, Director of the CVL, following a visit by Dr Wrathall, one of the project leaders in the Pathology Department of the CVL, to the United States Department of Agriculture. 33 The results were not published at this point, since the attempted transmission to mice from the experimental cow brain had been inconclusive. The results of the clinical and histological differences between scrapie-affected sheep and cattle were published in 1995. Similar studies in which cattle were inoculated intracerebrally with scrapie inocula derived from a number of scrapie-affected sheep of different breeds and from different States, were carried out at the US National Animal Disease Centre. 34 The results, published in 1994, showed that this source of scrapie agent, though pathogenic for cattle, did not produce the same clinical signs of brain lesions characteristic of BSE.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/
The findings of the initial transmission, though not of the clinical or neurohistological examination, were communicated in October 1988 to Dr Watson, Director of the CVL, following a visit by Dr Wrathall, one of the project leaders in the Pathology Department of the CVL, to the United States Department of Agriculture. 33
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1988/10/00001001.pdf
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/
The results were not published at this point, since the attempted transmission to mice from the experimental cow brain had been inconclusive. The results of the clinical and histological differences between scrapie-affected sheep and cattle were published in 1995. Similar studies in which cattle were inoculated intracerebrally with scrapie inocula derived from a number of scrapie-affected sheep of different breeds and from different States, were carried out at the US National Animal Disease Centre. 34 The results, published in 1994, showed that this source of scrapie agent, though pathogenic for cattle, did not produce the same clinical signs of brain lesions characteristic of BSE.
3.58 There are several possible reasons why the experiment was not performed in the UK. It had been recommended by Sir Richard Southwood (Chairman of the Working Party on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy) in his letter to the Permanent Secretary of MAFF, Mr (now Sir) Derek Andrews, on 21 June 1988, 35 though it was not specifically recommended in the Working Party Report or indeed in the Tyrrell Committee Report (details of the Southwood Working Party and the Tyrell Committee can be found in vol. 4: The Southwood Working Party, 1988-89 and vol. 11: Scientists after Southwood respectively). The direct inoculation of scrapie into calves was given low priority, because of its high cost and because it was known that it had already taken place in the USA. 36 It was also felt that the results of such an experiment would be hard to interpret. While a negative result would be informative, a positive result would need to demonstrate that when scrapie was transmitted to cattle, the disease which developed in cattle was the same as BSE. 37 Given the large number of strains of scrapie and the possibility that BSE was one of them, it would be necessary to transmit every scrapie strain to cattle separately, to test the hypothesis properly. Such an experiment would be expensive. Secondly, as measures to control the epidemic took hold, the need for the experiment from the policy viewpoint was not considered so urgent. It was felt that the results would be mainly of academic interest. 38
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON SCRAPIE
Chair: Dr. Jim Logan, Cheyenne, WY
Vice Chair: Dr. Joe D. Ross, Sonora, TX
Dr. Deborah L. Brennan, MS; Dr. Beth Carlson, ND; Dr. John R. Clifford, DC; Dr. Thomas F. Conner, OH; Dr. Walter E. Cook, WY; Dr. Wayne E. Cunningham, CO; Dr. Jerry W. Diemer, TX; Dr. Anita J. Edmondson, CA; Dr. Dee Ellis, TX; Dr. Lisa A. Ferguson, MD; Dr. Keith R. Forbes, NY; Dr. R. David Glauer, OH; Dr. James R. Grady, CO; Dr. William L. Hartmann, MN; Dr. Carolyn Inch, CAN; Dr. Susan J. Keller, ND; Dr. Allen M. Knowles, TN; Dr. Thomas F. Linfield, MT; Dr. Michael R. Marshall, UT; Dr. Cheryl A. Miller, In; Dr. Brian V. Noland, CO; Dr. Charles Palmer, CA; Dr. Kristine R. Petrini, MN; Mr. Stan Potratz, IA; Mr. Paul E. Rodgers, CO; Dr. Joan D. Rowe, CA; Dr. Pamela L. Smith, IA; Dr. Diane L. Sutton, MD; Dr. Lynn Anne Tesar, SD; Dr. Delwin D. Wilmot, NE; Dr. Nora E. Wineland, CO; Dr. Cindy B. Wolf, MN.
The Committee met on November 9, 2005, from 8:00am until 11:55am, Hershey Lodge and Convention Center, Hershey, Pennsylvania. The meeting was called to order by Dr. Jim Logan, chair, with vice chairman Dr. Joe D. Ross attending. There were 74 people in attendance.
The Scrapie Program Update was provided by Dr. Diane Sutton, National Scrapie Program Coordinator, United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS). The complete text of the Status Report is included in these Proceedings.
Dr. Patricia Meinhardt, USDA-APHIS-VS-National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) gave the Update on Genotyping Labs and Discrepancies in Results. NVSL conducts investigations into discrepancies on genotype testing results associated with the Scrapie Eradication Program. It is the policy of the Program to conduct a second genotype test at a second laboratory on certain individual animals. Occasionally, there are discrepancies in those results. The NVSL conducts follow-up on these situations through additional testing on additional samples from the field and archive samples from the testing laboratories.
For the period of time from January 1, 2005, until October 15, 2005, there were 23 instances of discrepancies in results from 35 flocks. Of those 23 instances, 14 were caused by laboratory error (paperwork or sample mix-up), 3 results from field error, 5 were not completely resolved, and 1 originated from the use of a non-approved laboratory for the first test. As a result of inconsistencies, one laboratory’s certification was revoked by APHIS-VS.
snip...
Infected and Source Flocks
As of September 30, 2005, there were 105 scrapie infected and source flocks. There were a total of 165** new infected and source flocks reported for FY 2005. The total infected and source flocks that have been released in FY 2005 was 128. The ratio of infected and source flocks cleaned up or placed on clean up plans vs. new infected and source flocks discovered in FY 2005 was 1.03 : 1*. In addition 622 scrapie cases were confirmed and reported by the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) in FY 2005, of which 130 were RSSS cases. Fifteen cases of scrapie in goats have been reported since 1990. The last goat case was reported in May 2005. Approximately 5,626 animals were indemnified comprised of 49% non-registered sheep, 45% registered sheep, 1.4% non-registered goats and 4.6% registered goats.
Regulatory Scrapie Slaughter Surveillance (RSSS)
RSSS was designed to utilize the findings of the Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health (CEAH) Scrapie: Ovine Slaughter Surveillance (SOSS) study. The results of SOSS can be found at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cahm/Sheep/sheep.htm . RSSS started April 1,
2003. It is a targeted slaughter surveillance program which is designed to identify infected flocks for clean-up. During FY 2005 collections increased by 32% overall and by 90% for black and mottled faced sheep improving overall program effectiveness and efficiency as demonstrated by the 26% decrease in percent positive black faced sheep compared to FY 2004. Samples have been collected from 62,864 sheep since April 1, 2003, of which results have been reported for 59,105 of which 209 were confirmed positive. During FY 2005, 33,137 samples were collected from 81 plants. There have been 130 NVSL confirmed positive cases (30 collected in FY 2004 and confirmed in FY 2005 and 100 collected and confirmed in FY 2005) in FY 2005. Face colors of these positives were 114 black, 14 mottled, 1 white and 1 unknown. The percent positive by face color is shown in the chart below.
Scrapie Testing
In FY 2005, 35,845 animals have been tested for scrapie: 30,192 RSSS; 4,742 regulatory field cases; 772 regulatory third eyelid biopsies; 10 third eyelid validations; and 129 necropsy validations (chart 9).
Animal ID
As of October 04, 2005, 103,580 sheep and goat premises have been assigned identification numbers in the Scrapie National Generic Database. Official eartags have been issued to 73,807 of these premises.
*This number based on an adjusted 12 month interval to accommodate the 60 day period for setting up flock plans.
http://www.usaha.org/committees/reports/2005/report-scr-2005.pdf
Published online before print October 20, 2005
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 10.1073/pnas.0502296102 Medical Sciences
A newly identified type of scrapie agent can naturally infect sheep with resistant PrP genotypes
( sheep prion transgenic mice )
Annick Le Dur *, Vincent Béringue *, Olivier Andréoletti , Fabienne Reine *, Thanh Lan Laï *, Thierry Baron , Bjørn Bratberg ¶, Jean-Luc Vilotte , Pierre Sarradin **, Sylvie L. Benestad ¶, and Hubert Laude * *Virologie Immunologie Moléculaires and Génétique Biochimique et Cytogénétique, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, 78350 Jouy-en-Josas, France; Unité Mixte de Recherche, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique-Ecole Nationale Vétérinaire de Toulouse, Interactions Hôte Agent Pathogène, 31066 Toulouse, France; Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments, Unité Agents Transmissibles Non Conventionnels, 69364 Lyon, France; **Pathologie Infectieuse et Immunologie, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, 37380 Nouzilly, France; and ¶Department of Pathology, National Veterinary Institute, 0033 Oslo, Norway
Edited by Stanley B. Prusiner, University of California, San Francisco, CA, and approved September 12, 2005 (received for review March 21, 2005)
Scrapie in small ruminants belongs to transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), or prion diseases, a family of fatal neurodegenerative disorders that affect humans and animals and can transmit within and between species by ingestion or inoculation. Conversion of the host-encoded prion protein (PrP), normal cellular PrP (PrPc), into a misfolded form, abnormal PrP (PrPSc), plays a key role in TSE transmission and pathogenesis. The intensified surveillance of scrapie in the European Union, together with the improvement of PrPSc detection techniques, has led to the discovery of a growing number of so-called atypical scrapie cases. These include clinical Nor98 cases first identified in Norwegian sheep on the basis of unusual pathological and PrPSc molecular features and "cases" that produced discordant responses in the rapid tests currently applied to the large-scale random screening of slaughtered or fallen animals. Worryingly, a substantial proportion of such cases involved sheep with PrP genotypes known until now to confer natural resistance to conventional scrapie. Here we report that both Nor98 and discordant cases, including three sheep homozygous for the resistant PrPARR allele (A136R154R171), efficiently transmitted the disease to transgenic mice expressing ovine PrP, and that they shared unique biological and biochemical features upon propagation in mice. These observations support the view that a truly infectious TSE agent, unrecognized until recently, infects sheep and goat flocks and may have important implications in terms of scrapie control and public health.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Author contributions: H.L. designed research; A.L.D., V.B., O.A., F.R., T.L.L., J.-L.V., and H.L. performed research; T.B., B.B., P.S., and S.L.B. contributed new reagents/analytic tools; V.B., O.A., and H.L. analyzed data; and H.L. wrote the paper.
A.L.D. and V.B. contributed equally to this work.
To whom correspondence should be addressed.
Hubert Laude, E-mail: laude@jouy.inra.fr
www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0502296102
http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/0502296102v1
12/10/76 AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTE ON SCRAPIE Office Note CHAIRMAN: PROFESSOR PETER WILDY
snip...
A The Present Position with respect to Scrapie A] The Problem
Scrapie is a natural disease of sheep and goats. It is a slow and inexorably progressive degenerative disorder of the nervous system and it ia fatal. It is enzootic in the United Kingdom but not in all countries.
The field problem has been reviewed by a MAFF working group (ARC 35/77). It is difficult to assess the incidence in Britain for a variety of reasons but the disease causes serious financial loss; it is estimated that it cost Swaledale breeders alone $l.7 M during the five years 1971-1975. A further inestimable loss arises from the closure of certain export markets, in particular those of the United States, to British sheep.
It is clear that scrapie in sheep is important commercially and for that reason alone effective measures to control it should be devised as quickly as possible.
Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether scrapie is transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the disease has been transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid speculation (Gajdusek 1977) conjectures that the agents of scrapie, kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and transmissible encephalopathy of mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S. Department of Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed for human or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)" The problem is emphasised by the finding that some strains of scrapie produce lesions identical to the once which characterise the human dementias"
Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety of laboratory personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action such as the "scorched meat" policy of USDA makes the solution of the acrapie problem urgent if the sheep industry is not to suffer grievously.
snip...
76/10.12/4.6
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1976/10/12004001.pdf
Subject: SCRAPIE and CWD USA UPDATE July 19, 2006 Date: July 19, 2006 at 12:06 pm PST SCRAPIE USA UPDATE MAY 31, 2006
Infected and Source Flocks
As of May 31, 2006, there were 93 scrapie infected and source flocks (Figure 3). There were 12 new infected and source flocks reported in May (Figure 4) with a total of 67 flocks reported for FY 2006 (Figure 5). The total infected and source flocks that have been released in FY 2006 are 53 (Figure 6), with 7 flocks released in May. The ratio of infected and source flocks released to newly infected and source flocks for FY 2006 = 0.79 : 1. In addition, as of May 31, 2006, 216 scrapie cases have been confirmed and reported by the National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL), of which 33 were RSSS cases (Figure 7). This includes 33 newly confirmed cases in May 2006 (Figure 8). Eighteen cases of scrapie in goats have been reported since 1990 (Figure 9). The last goat case was reported in March 2006. New infected flocks, source flocks, and flocks released for FY 2006 are depicted in Chart 3. New infected and source statuses from 1997 to 2006 are depicted in Chart 4.
snip...
Scrapie Testing
In FY 2006, 26,185 animals have been tested for scrapie : 22,634 RSSS*; 2063 regulatory field cases; 61 necropsy validations, 5 rectal biopsy and 1427 regulatory third eyelid biopsies (Chart 9). ...
snip...END
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/nahps/scrapie/monthly_report/monthly-report.html
TSS
#################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html ####################
Aug 30, 2005 USDA Texas BSE Investigation—Final Epidemiology Report
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/bse_final_epi_report8-05.pdf
TSS REPORT ON 2ND TEJAS MAD COW Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 -0600 (the one that did NOT get away, thanks to the Honorable Phyllis Fong)
-------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ??? Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 -0600 From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." To: Carla Everett References: <[log in to unmask]> <[log in to unmask] us>
Greetings Carla,still hear a rumor;
Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food chain?
and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up forsomething, but they forgot a url for update?I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION YET...can you confirm???terry
==============================
-------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ??? Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2004 11:38:21 -0600 From: Carla Everett To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." References: <[log in to unmask]>
The USDA has made a statement, and we are referring all callers to the USDA web site. We have no informationabout the animal being in Texas. CarlaAt 09:44 AM 11/19/2004, you wrote:>Greetings Carla,>>i am getting unsubstantiated claims of this BSE 'inconclusive' cow is from>TEXAS. can you comment on this either way please?>>thank you,>Terry S. Singeltary Sr.>> ===================
-------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ??? Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 18:33:20 -0600 From: Carla Everett To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." References: <[log in to unmask]> <[log in to unmask] us> <[log in to unmask]> <[log in to unmask] us> <[log in to unmask]>
our computer department was working on a place holder we could postUSDA's announcement of any results. There are no results to be announced tonightby NVSL, so we are back in a waiting mode and will post the USDA announcementwhen we hear something.At 06:05 PM 11/22/2004, you wrote:>why was the announcement on your TAHC site removed?>>Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy:>November 22: Press Release title here >>star image More BSE information>>>>terry>>Carla Everett wrote:>>>no confirmation on the U.S.' inconclusive test...>>no confirmation on location of animal.>>>>>>========================== ==========================
THEN, 7+ MONTHS OF COVER-UP BY JOHANN ET AL! no doubt about it now $$$
NO, it's not pretty, hell, im not pretty, but these are the facts, take em or leave em, however, you cannot change them.
with kindest regards,
I am still sincerely disgusted and tired in sunny Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
FULL 130 LASHINGS TO USDA BY OIG again
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf
Link: TSS
http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0612&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=23557
posted by Terry S. Singeltary Sr. at
4:22 PM
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