MEATINGPLACE.COM WAVES MAGIC WAND AND EXPECTS THE USDA MAD COW FOLLIES BSE TO BE GONE
MEATINGPLACE.COM WAVES MAGIC WAND AND EXPECTS THE USDA MAD COW FOLLIES BSE
TO BE GONE
bse be gone
TREND LINES
June 2012
Rather than rattle export markets, the fourth case of bovine spongiform
encephalopathy in the United States confirms the efficacy of safety measures.
By Meatingplace editors
Of the most recent headlines follow- ingthe discovery of a fourth case of
bovine spongiform encephalopathy in the United States in April, CNN's "USDA
quarantines 2 farms in mad cow investigation" might have had the effect of
spreading fear, except that it described a routine step the agency takes in a
safety protocol that has proven effective in pre- venting the disease from
spreading.
What a difference a decade makes. Fast-forward from the beef export-kill-
ing discovery in 2003 (the nation's first) of BSE in a cow imported from Canada
and processed in the United States, and the latest case hardly inspires a men-
tion a month after it's discovery. But however unsexy the topic has become to
the mainstream news corps, the event is noteworthy in that it validates a check
system that is working.
After BSE was first diagnosed in the UK in 1986, the number of cases peaked
in 1992 at 37,311, and has been reduced by 99 percent to just 29 cases worldwide
in 2011. The recent case in
10 meatlngplace June 2012
California, which was detected when the to-year-old cow was tested at a
rendering facility, was only the fourth ever confirmed in the U.S. The oth- ers
occurred in 2006, 2005 and 2003. USDA officials say the global success is
directly attributable to feed bans. Other safeguards against BSE in the United
States include the USDA ban on specified risk materials (SRMs) from the food
supply. USDA also bans all non-ambulatory cattle from entering the human food
chain. Meanwhile, the FDA's ban on ruminant material in cattle feed prevents the
spread of the disease in the cattle herd.
"Evidence shows that our systems and safeguards to prevent BSE are working,
as are similar actions taken by countries around the world," USDA Chief
Veterinary Officer John Clifford said when announcing the latest case. Perhaps
most encouraging about it was the finding of atypical BSE, a rare form not
generally associated with an animal consuming infected feed, long thought to be
the primary vector.
Greetings,
well, I was wondering what the official comment would be from
meatingplace.com about the 4th _documented_ case of mad cow disease in the USA,
and they did not surprise me by their comment. rubber stamped by USDA INC.
let’s analyze their science on atypical L-type BASE BSE mad cow in
California, and the myth the USDA et al keep spouting out about FEED, not being
a vector for any atypical BSE. this is simply a lie. nothing more, nothing less,
much like the rest of the junk science the USDA et al put out.
THE infamous partial and voluntary mad cow feed ban of august 4, 1997,
failed from the beginning, still failing as late as 2007, when fda et al decided
to cease posting that information for the consumer.
THE SRM removal failed terribly from day one.
THE infamous BSE Surveillance program was proven to be a scam by the GAO
and OIG.
all in all, the infamous usda triple BSE mad cow firewall was a joke, and
I’m still not laughing.
let’s review a few years, one decade post partial and voluntary mad cow
feed ban ;
Subject: Fw: MAD COW FDA FEED WARNING LETTER NO. 2007-NOL-01 October 26,
2006 H.J. Baker & Bro., Inc.
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." flounder9@VERIZON.NET
Reply-To: Sustainable Agriculture Network Discussion Group
SANET-MG@LISTS.IFAS.UFL.EDU
Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2006 20:03:47 –0600
Wednesday, November 17, 2010
MAD COW TESTING FAKED IN USA BY Nebraska INSPECTOR Senator Mike Johanns
STATE
Neb. inspector accused of faking mad cow tests
Published November 17, 2010
THE OTHER TEXAS MAD COW THEY DID SUCCEED IN COVERING UP ;
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Statement May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242
Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA
Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms On Friday,
April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central
nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering
into animal protein for use in animal feed.
FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began
an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators
inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal
came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the
slaughterhouse.
FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been
rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the
weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is
being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.
Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest
because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad
cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to
test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit
the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows,
goats, sheep, bison).
FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing
the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If
it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been
shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for
swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply
chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly
monitored and used only as feed for pigs.
To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian
protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA
established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K.
showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to
cattle.
Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not
allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying
that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to
poultry.
FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely
with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule
provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of
several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make
this strong system even stronger.
####
ALABAMA MAD COW
Summary: Despite a thorough investigation of two farms that were known to
contain the index cow, and 35 other farms that might have supplied the index cow
to the farms where the index case was known to have resided, the investigators
were unable to locate the herd of origin. The index case did not have unique or
permanent identification, plus, the size and color of the cow being traced is
very common in the Southern United States. Due to the unremarkable appearance of
solid red cows, it is not easy for owners to remember individual animals. In the
Southern United States, it is common business practice to buy breeding age cows
and keep them for several years while they produce calves. Most calves produced
are sold the year they are born, whereas breeding cows are sold when there is a
lapse in breeding, which can occur multiple times in cows’ lives. For all of
these reasons, USDA was unable to locate the herd of origin.
ALABAMA MAD COW PROTEIN IN COMMERCE
Subject: MAD COW FDA FEED WARNING LETTER NO. 2007-NOL-01 October 26, 2006
H.J. Baker & Bro., Inc. Date: November 7, 2006 at 9:08 am PST Food and Drug
Administration
New Orleans District
404 BNA Drive, Building 200, Suite 500
Nashville, TN 37217
Telephone: 615-366-7801
Facsimile: 615-366-7802
October 26, 2006
WARNING LETTER NO. 2007-NOL-01
FEDERAL EXPRESS
OVERNIGHT DELIVERY
Mr. Christopher V. B. Smith
Corporate President, CEO
H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc.
228 Saugatuck Avenue
Westport, Connecticut 06880
Dear Mr. Smith:
On June 6, 8, 12-15, and 23, 2006, a U.S . Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) investigator inspected
your animal feed protein supplement manufacturing facility, located at 603
Railroad Avenue,
Albertville, Alabama. The inspection revealed significant deviations from
the requirements set forth in
Title 21, Code ofFederal Regulations, Part 589.2000 (21 CFR 589.2000),
Animal Proteins Prohibited in
Ruminant Feed. This regulation is intended to prevent the establishment and
amplification of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). You failed to follow the requirements of
this regulation, resulting
in products being manufactured and distributed by your facility because
they are adulterated within the
meaning of Section 402(a)(4) [21 USC 342(a)(4)] of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (the
Act) and misbranded within the meaning of Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC
343(a)(1)] of the Act.
Our investigation determined adulteration resulted from the failure of your
firm to establish and
implement measures sufficient to prevent commingling or cross-contamination
. The adulterated feed
was subsequently misbranded because it was not properly labeled.
Specifically, we found :
" Your firm failed to establish and use cleanout procedures or other means
to prevent carry-over of
products which contain or may contain protein derived from mammalian
tissues into animal protein
or feeds which may be used for ruminants, as required by 21 CFR
589.2000(e)(1)(iii)(B) .
Specifically, you failed to establish and use such measures for a screw
auger installed in February
2005 . This auger is used to convey both prohibited and non-prohibited
material to bulk storage bins.
In addition, you failed to follow the cleanout procedure your firm had
developed for the receiving
systems. Your feed is, therefore, adulterated under Section 402(a)(4) [21
USC 342(a)(4)] of the Act.
" You failed to label all products which contained or may have contained
prohibited materials with the
BSE cautionary statement, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants," as
required by 21 CFR
589.2000(e)(1)(i) . Such products are misbranded under Section 403(3) [21
USC 343(a)(1)] of the
Act. These misbranded products include the three Pro-Pak products mentioned
below, as well as
Page 2 - H. J . Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, Alabama Warning Letter
No. 2007-NOL-O 1
those bulk loads of individual feed ingredients processed through this
common screw auger and
distributed between the time it was installed in February 2005, and June 9,
2006 .
This letter is not intended to serve as an all-inclusive list of violations
at your facility. As a
manufacturer of materials intended for animal feed use, you are responsible
for ensuring your overall
operation and the products you manufacture and distribute are in compliance
with the law. You should take prompt action to correct these violations, and you
should establish a system whereby violations do not recur. Failure to promptly
correct these violations may result in regulatory action, such as seizure and/or
injunction, without further notice.
We acknowledge your June 16, 2006, voluntary recall of three products you
manufactured from
February 2005 to June 2006. The three products recalled were: Pro-Lak
Protein Concentrate for
Lactating Dairy Animals; Pro-Amino II for PreFresh and Lactating Cows; and,
Pro-Pak Marine & Animal Protein Concentrate for Use in Animal Feed. Recall
effectiveness checks and other measures
will determine the merit of this recall . We recognize you now label all
products with the required BSE
cautionary statement and we also acknowledge your intent, given verbally to
New Orleans District
management of the FDA, to discontinue the production of supplements which
do not contain prohibited
materials. In your written response to this letter, please confirm in
writing you have taken these steps.
You should notify this office in writing within 15 working days of
receiving this letter, outlining the specific steps you have taken to bring your
firm into compliance with the law, including the steps we acknowledge above and
any additional steps you have taken. Your response should include an
explanation of each step taken to correct the violations and prevent their
recurrence. If corrective action cannot be completed within 15 working days,
state the reason for the delay and the date by which the corrections will be
completed. Include copies of any available documentation demonstrating
corrections have been made.
Your reply should be directed to Kari L. Batey, Compliance Officer, at the
address above. If you have
questions regarding any issue in this letter, please contact Ms. Batey at
(615) 366-7808.
Sincerely,
,
Carol S . Sanchez
Acting District Director
New Orleans District
Enclosure: Form FDA 483
cc: Craig R. Waterhouse
Plant Manager
H.J. Baker & Bros., Inc.
603 Railroad Avenue
Albertville, Alabama 35951-3419
MORE 2006 FEED BAN VIOLATIONS BELOW, ''IN COMMERCE'' ;
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA
SEPT 6, 2006
1961.72 TONS
IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST
PRODUCT a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6; b) Performance Chick
Starter, Recall # V-131-6; c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6; d)
Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6. CODE None RECALLING
FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc.,
Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006.
Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant
based protein.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons
DISTRIBUTION AL
______________________________
PRODUCT a) Dairy feed, custom, Recall # V-134-6; b) Custom Dairy Feed with
Monensin, Recall # V-135-6. CODE None. Bulk product RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Recalling Firm: Burkmann Feed, Greeneville, TN, by Telephone beginning on June
28, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL. Firm
initiated recall is complete.
REASON Possible contamination of dairy feeds with ruminant derived meat and
bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 1,484 tons
DISTRIBUTION TN and WV
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALLS ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006 KY,
LA, MS, AL, GA, AND TN 11,000+ TONS
Date: August 16, 2006 at 9:19 am PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE - CLASS II
______________________________
PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-115-6 CODE None RECALLING
FIRM/MANUFACTURER Hiseville Feed & Seed Co., Hiseville, KY, by telephone and
letter on or about July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may
contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE Approximately 2,223 tons
DISTRIBUTION KY
______________________________
PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-116-6 CODE None RECALLING
FIRM/MANUFACTURER Rips Farm Center, Tollesboro, KY, by telephone and letter on
July 14, 2006. FDA initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak which may
contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 1,220 tons
DISTRIBUTION KY
______________________________
PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-117-6 CODE None RECALLING
FIRM/MANUFACTURER Kentwood Co-op, Kentwood, LA, by telephone on June 27, 2006.
FDA initiated recall is completed.
REASON Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including
ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat
and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 40 tons
DISTRIBUTION LA and MS
______________________________
PRODUCT Bulk Dairy Feed, Recall V-118-6 CODE None RECALLING
FIRM/MANUFACTURER Cal Maine Foods, Inc., Edwards, MS, by telephone on June 26,
2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.
REASON Possible contamination of animal feed ingredients, including
ingredients that are used in feed for dairy animals, with ruminant derived meat
and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,150 tons
DISTRIBUTION MS
______________________________
PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-119-6 CODE None RECALLING
FIRM/MANUFACTURER Walthall County Co-op, Tylertown, MS, by telephone on June 26,
2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived
meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 87 tons
DISTRIBUTION MS
______________________________
PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-120-6 CODE None RECALLING
FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006.
Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived
meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tons
DISTRIBUTION AL and MS
______________________________
PRODUCT a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50
lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6; b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder
Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6; c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird
Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6; d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble,
Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6; e) Tucker
Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6; f) Tucker
Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6; g)
Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6
CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 RECALLING
FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by
telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006.
Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall
is ongoing.
REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with
ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags
DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006
###
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL MI MAMMALIAN PROTEIN VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN
COMMERCE 27,694,240 lbs
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:14 pm PST
PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy feds manufactured from concentrates, Recall #
V-113-6 CODE All dairy feeds produced between 2/1/05 and 6/16/06 and containing
H. J. Baker recalled feed products.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Vita Plus Corp., Gagetown, MI, by visit
beginning on June 21, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON The feed was manufactured from materials that may have been
contaminated with mammalian protein.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 27,694,240 lbs
DISTRIBUTION MI
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125
TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST
PRODUCT
a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;
b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall #
V-101-6;
c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;
d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;
e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;
f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50
lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;
g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%,
Recall # V-106-6;
h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to
20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall #
V-107-6;
i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;
j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;
k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall #
V-110-6;
l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;
m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6
CODE Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL,
by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is
complete.
REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant
based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons
DISTRIBUTION AL and FL
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL KY VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ?????
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:19 pm PST
PRODUCT Bulk custom made dairy feed, Recall # V-114-6 CODE None RECALLING
FIRM/MANUFACTURER Burkmann Feeds LLC, Glasgow, KY, by letter on July 14, 2006.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON Custom made feeds contain ingredient called Pro-Lak, which may
contain ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE ?????
DISTRIBUTION KY
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
CJD WATCH MESSAGE BOARD TSS MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS
NATIONWIDE
Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals,
Recall # V-079-6;
b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg),
Recall # V-080-6;
c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED,
Recall # V-081-6;
d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE a) Bulk b) None c) Bulk d) Bulk
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL,
by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat
and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons
DISTRIBUTION Nationwide
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006
###
Subject: MAD COW FEED BAN WARNING LETTER ISSUED MAY 17, 2006
Date: June 27, 2006 at 7:42 am PST
Public Health Service Food and Drug Administration
New Orleans District 297 Plus Park Blvd. Nashville, TN 37217
Telephone: 615-781-5380 Fax: 615-781-5391
May 17, 2006
WARNING LETTER NO. 2006-NOL-06
FEDERAL EXPRESS OVERNIGHT DELIVERY
Mr. William Shirley, Jr., Owner Louisiana.DBA Riegel By-Products 2621 State
Street Dallas, Texas 75204
Dear Mr. Shirley:
On February 12, 17, 21, and 22, 2006, a U.S. Food & Drug Administration
(FDA) investigator inspected your rendering plant, located at 509 Fortson
Street, Shreveport, Louisiana. The inspection revealed significant deviations
from the requirements set forth in Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, Part
589.2000 [21 CFR 589.2000], Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed. This
regulation is intended to prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). You failed to follow the requirements of this
regulation; products being manufactured and distributed by your facility are
misbranded within the meaning of Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act).
Our investigation found you failed to provide measures, including
sufficient written procedures, to prevent commingling or cross-contamination and
to maintain sufficient written procedures [21 CFR 589.2000(e)] because:
You failed to use clean-out procedures or other means adequate to prevent
carryover of protein derived from mammalian tissues into animal protein or feeds
which may be used for ruminants. For example, your facility uses the same
equipment to process mammalian and poultry tissues. However, you use only hot
water to clean the cookers between processing tissues from each species. You do
not clean the auger, hammer mill, grinder, and spouts after processing mammalian
tissues.
You failed to maintain written procedures specifying the clean-out
procedures or other means to prevent carryover of protein derived from mammalian
tissues into feeds which may be used for ruminants.
As a result . the poultry meal you manufacture may contain protein derived
from mammalian tissues prohibited in ruminant feed. Pursuant to 21 CFR
589.2000(e)(1)(i), any products containing or may contain protein derived from
mammalian tissues must be labeled, "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants."
Since you failed to label a product which may contain protein derived from
mammalian tissues with the required cautionary statement. the poultry meal is
misbranded under Section 403(a)(1) [21 USC 343(a)(1)] of the Act.
This letter is not intended as an all-inclusive list of violations at your
facility. As a manufacturer of materials intended for animal feed use, you are
responsible for ensuring your overall operation and the products you manufacture
and distribute are in compliance with the law. You should take prompt action to
correct these violations, and you should establish a system whereby violations
do not recur. Failure to promptly correct these violations may result in
regulatory action, such as seizure and/or injunction, without further
notice.
You should notify this office in writing within 15 working days of
receiving this letter, outlining the specific steps you have taken to bring your
firm into compliance with the law. Your response should include an explanation
of each step taken to correct the violations and prevent their recurrence. If
corrective action cannot be completed within 15 working days, state the reason
for the delay and the date by which the corrections will be completed. Include
copies of any available documentation demonstrating corrections have been
made.
Your reply should be directed to Mark W. Rivero, Compliance Officer, U.S.
Food and Drug Administration, 2424 Edenborn Avenue, Suite 410, Metairie,
Louisiana 70001. If you have questions regarding any issue in this letter,
please contact Mr. Rivero at (504) 219-8818, extension 103.
Sincerely,
/S
Carol S. Sanchez Acting District Director New Orleans District
2007
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN
COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried,
Recall # V-024-2007
CODE
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-
contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been
manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE
statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot-
Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M
CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B
DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal,
JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT
Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral,
BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC
LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall #
V-025-2007
CODE
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with
commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm
initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross
contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear
cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm)
caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;
P04.27
Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral
Route
Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3;
Ingrosso, L3; Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6;
Löwer, J1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique,
France; 3Instituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious
Disease control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate
Center, Germany
Background:
In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans to
contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was titrated
in cynomolgus monkeys.
Aims:
The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose
(MID50) for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to
assess the risk for humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the
disease to identify possible biomarkers.
Methods:
Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of BSE
brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study, animals
were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).
Results:
In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already
developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the onset of
the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical course
between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the
detection of biomarkers.
Conclusions:
Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route
using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the incubation
period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus 4 years).
However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that develop
simian vCJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.
The work referenced was performed in partial fulfilment of the study “BSE
in primates“ supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).
look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm)
caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;
Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in
primates
Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog,
Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie
Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe
Deslys Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
(vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral
infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to
transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human
primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a
BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months
after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the
basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary
estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance
that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.
snip...
BSE bovine brain inoculum
100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg
Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)
Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%)
1/15 (7%)
RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)
PrPres biochemical detection
The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum
used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar
PrPres concentration that was
inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals
positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in
the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of
bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic
ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.
Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected
orally with similar BSE brain inocula
Published online January 27, 2005
Calves were challenged by mouth with homogenised brain from confirmed cases
of BSE. Some received 300g (3 doses of 100g), some 100g, 10g or 1g. They were
then left to develop BSE, but were not subjected to the normal stresses that
they might have encountered in a dairy herd. Animals in all four groups
developed BSE. There has been a considerable spread of incubation period in some
of the groups, but it appears as if those in the 1 and 10g challenge groups most
closely fit the picture of incubation periods seen in the epidemic. Experiments
in progress indicate that oral infection can occur in some animals with doses as
low as 0.01g and 0.001g. .........
It is clear that the designing scientists must also have shared Mr
Bradley's surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1
gram triggered infection.
6. It also appears to me that Mr Bradley's answer (that it would take less
than say 100 grams) was probably given with the benefit of hindsight;
particularly if one considers that later in the same answer Mr Bradley expresses
his surprise that it could take as little of 1 gram of brain to cause BSE by the
oral route within the same species. This information did not become available
until the "attack rate" experiment had been completed in 1995/96. This was a
titration experiment designed to ascertain the infective dose. A range of
dosages was used to ensure that the actual result was within both a lower and an
upper limit within the study and the designing scientists would not have
expected all the dose levels to trigger infection. The dose ranges chosen by the
most informed scientists at that time ranged from 1 gram to three times one
hundred grams. It is clear that the designing scientists must have also shared
Mr Bradley's surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1
gram triggered infection.
Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in
primates
SNIP...SEE ;
Subject: Fw: MAD COW FDA FEED WARNING LETTER NO. 2007-NOL-01 October 26,
2006 H.J. Baker & Bro., Inc.
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." flounder9@VERIZON.NET
Reply-To: Sustainable Agriculture Network Discussion Group
SANET-MG@LISTS.IFAS.UFL.EDU
Date: Thu, 9 Nov 2006 20:03:47 -0600
NOW, what about those pesky prions and SRM removal in the USA ???
Saturday, July 23, 2011
CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS, BEEF TONGUES, SPINAL CORD, SPECIFIED RISK
MATERIALS (SRM's) AND PRIONS, AKA MAD COW DISEASE
Greetings,
I have put a few of these recalls together from previous SRM recalls.
Probably missed some, but i am a bit disturbed that the FSIS has apparently
chosen not to list this recall from July 14, 2011 due to SRM spinal cord
contamination, that i could find. The state of Ohio made a statement about a
voluntary recall of an unknown amount of beef products that may contain the
spinal cord and vertebral column, which are considered specified risk materials
(SRMs) {see below} ;
Thursday, July 14, 2011
Valley Farm Meats (DBA Strasburg Provision, Inc) Issues Precautionary
Recall for Beef Products Due to Possible Contamination with Prohibited Materials
SRM Ohio Department of Agriculture and Ohio Department of Health
YET, FSIS seems to find it important enough to list this recall from Ohio
;
Ohio Firm Recalls Various Beef Jerky Products due to Misbranding and
Undeclared Allergens
Recall Release CLASS II RECALL FSIS-RC-053-2011 HEALTH RISK: LOW
Congressional and Public Affairs (202) 720-9113 Adam Tarr
WASHINGTON, July 22, 2011 –
HOWEVER, look at the recalls of the past (see below), the first two were
other voluntary recalls from other Companies, which i am using as an example
(and see others that follow), but my question, WHY has the FSIS et al apparently
chosen NOT to announce this recall on their website here ;
Valley Farm Meats (DBA Strasburg Provision, Inc) Issues Precautionary
Recall for Beef Products Due to Possible Contamination with Prohibited Materials
SRM Ohio Department of Agriculture and Ohio Department of Health
I have written both the FSIS and MEATINGPLACE.COM/, both of which have
failed to report this important, life long exposure and human health risk factor
for TSE from this voluntary recall, and all it got me was being banned from
meatingplace.com/ again, and this time i did not even post anything, just sent
them a kind note ;
----- Original Message -----
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. To: AgRepublicanPress@mail.house.gov
Sent: Friday, July 22, 2011 4:23 PM
Subject: Fw: Valley Farm Meats (DBA Strasburg Provision, Inc) Issues
Precautionary Recall for Beef Products Due to Possible Contamination with
Prohibited Materials SRM
Greetings USDA et al,
I have not seen this on the USDA site yet ???
have i missed it ???
thank you, kind regards, terry
Ohio Department of Agriculture and Ohio Department of Health
Governor
John R. Kasich
Lieutenant Governor
Mary Taylor
ODA Director
James Zehringer
ODH Director
Theodore E. Wymyslo, M.D.
DT: July 14, 2011
TO: Health Commissioners, Directors of Environmental Health and Interested
Parties
RE: Recall Announcement (ODA/ODH) 2011-076
Valley Farm Meats (DBA Strasburg Provision, Inc) Issues Precautionary
Recall for Beef Products Due to Possible Contamination with Prohibited
Materials
snip...end...TSS
=========================================
----- Original Message -----
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
To: tjohnston@meatingplace.com
Sent: Thursday, July 21, 2011 2:17 PM
Subject: Valley Farm Meats (DBA Strasburg Provision, Inc) Issues
Precautionary Recall for Beef Products Due to Possible Contamination with
Prohibited Materials SRM
Hello Mr. Johnston !
i have not seen this posted on meatingplace ???
I have stopped commenting on the forum at meatingplace, because everytime i
comment or leave some science, i get blocked.
but i thought this important enought to send you you directly.
kind regards, terry
Ohio Department of Agriculture and Ohio Department of Health
Governor
John R. Kasich
Lieutenant Governor
Mary Taylor
ODA Director
James Zehringer
ODH Director
Theodore E. Wymyslo, M.D.
DT: July 14, 2011
TO: Health Commissioners, Directors of Environmental Health and Interested
Parties
RE: Recall Announcement (ODA/ODH) 2011-076
Valley Farm Meats (DBA Strasburg Provision, Inc) Issues Precautionary
Recall for Beef Products Due to Possible Contamination with Prohibited
Materials
[STRASBURG, Ohio] – Valley Farm Meats (DBA Strasburg Provision, Inc) of
Strasburg, OH announces a voluntary recall of an unknown amount of beef products
that may contain the spinal cord and vertebral column, which are considered
specified risk materials (SRMs). SRMs must be removed from cattle over 30 months
of age in accordance with federal and state regulations. SRMs are tissues that
are known to contain the infective agent in cattle infected with Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), as well as materials that are closely
associated with these potentially infective tissues. Therefore, federal and
state regulations prohibit SRMs from use as human food to minimize potential
human exposure to the BSE agent.
The products subject to recall include all beef products slaughtered and
processed by or purchased from Valley Farm Meats retail store, 1317 N. Wooster
Ave NW, Strasburg, OH 44680 or purchased from Ed Lind Livestock and Poultry,
3333 Church Rd B, Medina, Ohio 44256. These products were produced between
01/28/2011 and 07/05/2011 and offered for sale from 01/28/2011 through
07/11/2011.
The package labels or beef carcasses may bear the Ohio mark of inspection
and “Est. 80”, however products processed through Ed Lind Livestock and Poultry
may not contain such markings. The problem was discovered through routine
inspection activities by the Ohio Department of Agriculture’s Division of Meat
Inspection. The Department has received no reports of illnesses associated with
consumption of this product.
The United States Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection
Service classifies this type of potential contamination as a low health risk,
however individuals concerned about an illness should contact a health care
provider.
Because of potential product contamination, Valley Farm Meats urges its
customers who have purchased the suspect product(s) not to eat them and to
return them to the company. Customers may bring those designated packages to
Valley Farm Meats, 1317 N Wooster Avenue NW, Strasburg, OH 44680 during regular
business hours or call the company’s owner, Paul Berry at 330-878-5557.
Valley Farm Meats issues beef recall
TimesReporter.com staff report
Posted Jul 13, 2011 @ 03:18 PM
=========================================
has there been another change in protocol to help cover-up more needless
expossure to the TSE in the USA ???
or did i just miss this recall ???
see old FSIS example of SRM recalls from the past ;
North Dakota Firm Recalls Whole Beef Head Products That Contain Prohibited
Materials
Recall Release CLASS II RECALL FSIS-RC-023-2010 HEALTH RISK: LOW
Congressional and Public Affairs (202) 720-9113 Catherine Cochran
WASHINGTON, April 5, 2010 - North American Bison Co-Op, a New Rockford,
N.D., establishment is recalling approximately 25,000 pounds of whole beef heads
containing tongues that may not have had the tonsils completely removed, which
is not compliant with regulations that require the removal of tonsils from
cattle of all ages, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and
Inspection Service (FSIS) announced today.
Tonsils are considered a specified risk material (SRM) and must be removed
from cattle of all ages in accordance with FSIS regulations. SRMs are tissues
that are known to contain the infective agent in cattle infected with Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), as well as materials that are closely
associated with these potentially infective tissues. Therefore, FSIS prohibits
SRMs from use as human food to minimize potential human exposure to the BSE
agent.
The product subject to recall includes: Various weight cases of "Beef Heads
KEEP FROZEN." Each case bears the establishment number "EST. 18859" inside the
USDA mark of inspection and a case code number "16999." "North Dakota Natural
Beef" is printed in the bottom left-hand corner of each label.
The recalled products were produced between June 25, 2009, and February 19,
2010. These products were shipped to distribution centers in Md., Mich., and
Minn. for further sale.
The problem was discovered during FSIS inspection activities at the
establishment. FSIS routinely conducts recall effectiveness checks to verify
recalling firms notify their customers of the recall and that steps are taken to
make certain that the product is no longer available to consumers.
Media with questions about the recall should contact Philip Wicke, Vice
President of Operations, at (701) 356-7723. Consumers with questions about the
recall should contact Jeremy Anderson, Director of Customer Service, at (952)
545-2495.
Consumers with food safety questions can "Ask Karen," the FSIS virtual
representative available 24 hours a day at AskKaren.gov. The toll-free USDA Meat
and Poultry Hotline 1-888-MPHotline (1-888-674-6854) is available in English and
Spanish and can be reached from l0 a.m. to 4 p.m. (Eastern Time) Monday through
Friday. Recorded food safety messages are available 24 hours a day. #
Missouri Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials
Recall Release CLASS II RECALL FSIS-RC-021-2008 HEALTH RISK: LOW
Congressional and Public Affairs (202) 720-9113 Amanda Eamich
WASHINGTON, June 26, 2008 – Paradise Locker Meats, a Trimble, Mo.,
establishment, is voluntarily recalling approximately 120 pounds of fresh cattle
heads with tonsils not completely removed, which is not compliant with
regulations that require the removal of tonsils from cattle of all ages, the
U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service announced
today.
Tonsils are considered a specified risk material (SRM) and must be removed
from cattle of all ages in accordance with FSIS regulations. SRMs are tissues
that are known to contain the infective agent in cattle infected with BSE, as
well as materials that are closely associated with these potentially infective
tissues. Therefore, FSIS prohibits SRMs from use as human food to minimize
potential human exposure to the BSE agent.
The products subject to recall include: Boxes of “BEEF HEAD, PARADISE
LOCKER MEATS.” Each shipping package bears the establishment numbers “EST.
31865” inside the USDA mark of inspection.
These products were sent to retail establishments and restaurants in the
Kansas City, Kansas, area.
The problem was discovered through routine FSIS inspection that verified
there had been incomplete removal of the tonsils by the recalling
establishment.
Media and consumers with questions about the recall should contact company
Production Supervisor Louis Fantasma at (816) 370-6328.
Consumers with food safety questions can “Ask Karen,” the FSIS virtual
representative available 24 hours a day at AskKaren.gov. The toll-free USDA Meat
and Poultry Hotline 1-888-MPHotline (1-888-674-6854) is available in English and
Spanish and can be reached from l0 a.m. to 4 p.m. (Eastern Time) Monday through
Friday. Recorded food safety messages are available 24 hours a day. #
HAS the greed and money gotten so bad that the FSIS, USDA, APHIS, OIE et
al, just decided that not only to exempt the atypical Scrapies and apparently
now the BSE's, exempt them all, and just agreed to choose to not even speak
about it anymore. i mean...really, the USDA and OIE have systematically covered
up mad cow disease i.e. they call it SSS policy. where is USA burying them all
at ? i do not accept the star trek like cloaking device that appears to be the
only thing left that could be protecting the USA from mad cow disease....really.
sadly, Canada has now taken the same low road as the USA in regards to
discussing and making public documents on there mad cow cases. all this, 2011,
with the science mounting, still follow the global myth of the UKBSEnvCJD only
theory, and that all the sporadic CJDs (85%+ of all human TSE) are a mear
happenstance of bad luck, when North America is plum full of different strains
of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy in different species, all of
which over a period of time, decades, were rendered and fed to food producing
animals for human and animal food...really. i really just don't buy it...tss
some history on SRM's IN COMMERCE ;
SEE FULL TEXT HERE ;
Tuesday, July 1, 2008
Missouri Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials
SRMs
Sunday, October 18, 2009
Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM
WASHINGTON, October 17, 2009
Thursday, October 15, 2009
Nebraska Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM
WASHINGTON, Oct 15, 2009
Thursday, June 26, 2008
Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials
Friday, August 8, 2008
Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs
941,271 pounds with tonsils not completely removed
Saturday, April 5, 2008
SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS
KANSAS
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to
lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings
Wednesday, April 30, 2008
Consumption of beef tongue: Human BSE risk associated with exposure to
lymphoid tissue in bovine tongue in consideration of new research findings
Friday, October 15, 2010
BSE infectivity in the absence of detectable PrPSc accumulation in the
tongue and nasal mucosa of terminally diseased cattle
SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS SRMs
SEE WHERE ONE OF THE BIGGEST BLUNDERS OF THE USDA ET AL WERE THE USDA NSLP
DEAD STOCK DOWNER COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM, WHERE CHILDREN ALL ACROSS THE UNITED
STATES WERE FED THE MOST HIGH RISK CATTLE FOR BSE I.E. DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS,
FOR OVER 4 YEARS THAT COULD BE DOCUMENTED. who will watch these children for the
next 50 years for CJD prion disease ???
FINAL !
Subject: deadstock downer cows NSLP
> > > Ackerman says downed cattle are 50 times more likely to have
mad cow disease (also known as Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, or BSE) than
ambulatory cattle that are suspected of having BSE. Of the 20 confirmed cases of
mad cow disease in North America since 1993, at least 16 have involved downer
cattle, he said. < < <
don’t forget the children...
PLEASE be aware, for 4 years, the USDA fed our children all across the
Nation (including TEXAS) dead stock downer cows, the most high risk cattle for
BSE aka mad cow disease and other dangerous pathogens.
who will watch our children for CJD for the next 5+ decades ???
WAS your child exposed to mad cow disease via the NSLP ???
SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM FROM DOWNER CATTLE UPDATE
DID YOUR CHILD CONSUME SOME OF THESE DEAD STOCK DOWNER COWS, THE MOST HIGH
RISK FOR MAD COW DISEASE ???
you can check and see here ;
TEXAS MAD COW
THEY DID FINALLY TEST AFTER SITTING 7+ MONTHS ON A SHELF WHILE GW BORE THE
BSE MRR POLICY, i.e. legal trading of all strains of TSE. now understand, i
confirmed this case 7 months earlier to the TAHC, and then, only after i
contacted the Honorable Phyllis Fong and after an act of Congress, this animal
was finally confirmed ;
During the course of the investigation, USDA removed and tested a total of
67 animals of interest from the farm where the index animal's herd originated.
All of these animals tested negative for BSE. 200 adult animals of interest were
determined to have left the index farm. Of these 200, APHIS officials determined
that 143 had gone to slaughter, two were found alive (one was determined not to
be of interest because of its age and the other tested negative), 34 are
presumed dead, one is known dead and 20 have been classified as untraceable. In
addition to the adult animals, APHIS was looking for two calves born to the
index animal. Due to record keeping and identification issues, APHIS had to
trace 213 calves. Of these 213 calves, 208 entered feeding and slaughter
channels, four are presumed to have entered feeding and slaughter channels and
one calf was untraceable.
Executive Summary In June 2005, an inconclusive bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE) sample from November 2004, that had originally been
classified as negative on the immunohistochemistry test, was confirmed positive
on SAF immunoblot (Western blot). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
identified the herd of origin for the index cow in Texas; that identification
was confirmed by DNA analysis. USDA, in close cooperation with the Texas Animal
Health Commission (TAHC), established an incident command post (ICP) and began
response activities according to USDA’s BSE Response Plan of September 2004.
Response personnel removed at-risk cattle and cattle of interest (COI) from the
index herd, euthanized them, and tested them for BSE; all were negative. USDA
and the State extensively traced all at-risk cattle and COI that left the index
herd. The majority of these animals entered rendering and/or slaughter channels
well before the investigation began. USDA’s response to the Texas finding was
thorough and effective.
snip...
Trace Herd 3 The owner of Trace Herd 3 was identified as possibly having
received an animal of interest. The herd was placed under hold order on 7/27/05.
The herd inventory was conducted on 7/28/05. The animal of interest was not
present within the herd, and the hold order was released on 7/28/05. The person
who thought he sold the animal to the owner of Trace Herd 3 had no records and
could not remember who else he might have sold the cow to. Additionally, a
search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not
result in a match to the animal of interest. The animal of interest traced to
this herd was classified as untraceable because all leads were exhausted.
Trace Herd 4 The owner of Trace Herd 4 was identified as having received
one of the COI through an order buyer. Trace Herd 4 was placed under hold order
on 7/29/05. A complete herd inventory was conducted on 8/22/05 and 8/23/05.
There were 233 head of cattle that were examined individually by both State and
Federal personnel for all man-made identification and brands. The animal of
interest was not present within the herd. Several animals were reported to have
died in the herd sometime after they arrived on the premises in April 2005. A
final search of GDB records yielded no further results on the eartag of interest
at either subsequent market sale or slaughter. With all leads having been
exhausted, this animal of interest has been classified as untraceable. The hold
order on Trace Herd 4 was released on 8/23/05.
Trace Herd 5 The owner of Trace Herd 5 was identified as having received
two COI and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 5 is made up of 67
head of cattle in multiple pastures. During the course of the herd inventory,
the owner located records that indicated that one of the COI, a known birth
cohort, had been sold to Trace Herd 8 where she was subsequently found alive.
Upon completion of the herd inventory, the other animal of interest was not
found within the herd. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on
Trace Herd 5 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the
identification tag of the animal of interest and she was subsequently classified
as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace
Herd 5 was released on 8/8/05.
Trace Herd 6 The owner of Trace Herd 6 was identified as possibly having
received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. This
herd is made up of 58 head of cattle on two pastures. A herd inventory was
conducted and the animal of interest was not present within the herd. The owner
of Trace Herd 6 had very limited records and was unable to provide further
information on where the cow might have gone after he purchased her from the
livestock market. A search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by
that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest.
Additionally, many of the animals presented for sale by the owner of the herd
had been re-tagged at the market effectually losing the traceability of the
history of that animal prior to re-tagging. The animal of interest traced to
this herd was classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted.
The hold order on Trace Herd 6 was released on 8/3/05.
Trace Herd 7 The owner of Trace Herd 7 was identified as having received an
animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 7
contains 487 head of cattle on multiple pastures in multiple parts of the State,
including a unit kept on an island. The island location is a particularly rough
place to keep cattle and the owner claimed to have lost 22 head on the island in
2004 due to liver flukes. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the animal of
interest was not found present within Trace Herd 7. A GDB search of all recorded
herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 7 and all market sales by the owner failed to
locate the identification tag of the animal of interest. The cow was
subsequently classified as untraceable. It is quite possible though that she may
have died within the herd, especially if she belonged to the island unit. The
hold order on Trace Herd 7 was released on 8/8/05.
THE OTHER TEXAS MAD COW THEY DID SUCCEED IN COVERING UP ;
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Statement May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242
Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA
Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms On Friday,
April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central
nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering
into animal protein for use in animal feed.
FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began
an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators
inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal
came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the
slaughterhouse.
FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been
rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the
weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is
being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.
Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest
because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad
cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to
test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit
the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows,
goats, sheep, bison).
FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing
the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If
it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been
shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for
swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply
chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly
monitored and used only as feed for pigs.
To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian
protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA
established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K.
showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to
cattle.
Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not
allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying
that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to
poultry.
FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely
with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule
provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of
several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make
this strong system even stronger.
####
ALABAMA MAD COW
Summary: Despite a thorough investigation of two farms that were known to
contain the index cow, and 35 other farms that might have supplied the index cow
to the farms where the index case was known to have resided, the investigators
were unable to locate the herd of origin. The index case did not have unique or
permanent identification, plus, the size and color of the cow being traced is
very common in the Southern United States. Due to the unremarkable appearance of
solid red cows, it is not easy for owners to remember individual animals. In the
Southern United States, it is common business practice to buy breeding age cows
and keep them for several years while they produce calves. Most calves produced
are sold the year they are born, whereas breeding cows are sold when there is a
lapse in breeding, which can occur multiple times in cows’ lives. For all of
these reasons, USDA was unable to locate the herd of origin.
2012
***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently
sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases
constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European
approach to prion diseases.
Second threat
snip...
MAD COW USDA ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE, the rest of the story...
***Oral Transmission of L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Primate
Model
***Infectivity in skeletal muscle of BASE-infected cattle
***feedstuffs- It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE
in these countries.
***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently
sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.
The present study demonstrated successful intraspecies transmission of
H-type BSE to cattle and the distribution and immunolabeling patterns of PrPSc
in the brain of the H-type BSE-challenged cattle. TSE agent virulence can be
minimally defined by oral transmission of different TSE agents (C-type, L-type,
and H-type BSE agents) [59]. Oral transmission studies with H-type BSEinfected
cattle have been initiated and are underway to provide information regarding the
extent of similarity in the immunohistochemical and molecular features before
and after transmission.
In addition, the present data will support risk assessments in some
peripheral tissues derived from cattle affected with H-type BSE.
Thursday, June 21, 2012
Clinical and Pathologic Features of H-Type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
Associated with E211K Prion Protein Polymorphism
Justin J. Greenlee1*, Jodi D. Smith1, M. Heather West Greenlee2, Eric M.
Nicholson1
1 National Animal Disease Center, United States Department of Agriculture,
Agricultural Research Service, Ames, Iowa, United States of America, 2 Iowa
State University, Ames, Iowa, United States of America
Abstract
The majority of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) cases have been
ascribed to the classical form of the disease. Htype and L-type BSE cases have
atypical molecular profiles compared to classical BSE and are thought to arise
spontaneously. However, one case of H-type BSE was associated with a heritable
E211K mutation in the prion protein gene. The purpose of this study was to
describe transmission of this unique isolate of H-type BSE when inoculated into
a calf of the same genotype by the intracranial route. Electroretinograms were
used to demonstrate preclinical deficits in retinal function, and optical
coherence tomography was used to demonstrate an antemortem decrease in retinal
thickness. The calf rapidly progressed to clinical disease (9.4 months) and was
necropsied. Widespread distribution of abnormal prion protein was demonstrated
within neural tissues by western blot and immunohistochemistry. While this
isolate is categorized as BSE-H due to a higher molecular mass of the
unglycosylated PrPSc isoform, a strong labeling of all 3 PrPSc bands with
monoclonal antibodies 6H4 and P4, and a second unglycosylated band at
approximately 14 kDa when developed with antibodies that bind in the C-terminal
region, it is unique from other described cases of BSE-H because of an
additional band 23 kDa demonstrated on western blots of the cerebellum. This
work demonstrates that this isolate is transmissible, has a BSE-H phenotype when
transmitted to cattle with the K211 polymorphism, and has molecular features
that distinguish it from other cases of BSE-H described in the literature.
snip...
Most significantly it must be determined if the molecular phenotype of this
cattle TSE remains stable when transmitted to cattle without the E211K
polymorphism as several other isolates of atypical BSE have been shown to adopt
a molecular profile consistent with classical BSE after passage in transgenic
mice expressing bovine PrPC [40] or multiple passages in wild type mice [23].
Results of ongoing studies, namely passage of the E211K Htype isolate into
wild-type cattle, will lend further insight into what role, if any, genetic and
sporadic forms of BSE may have played in the origins of classical BSE. Atypical
cases presumably of spontaneous or, in the case of E211K BSE-H, genetic origins
highlight that it may not be possible to eradicate BSE entirely and that it
would be hazardous to remove disease control measures such as prohibiting the
feeding of meat and bone meal to ruminants.
Saturday, May 26, 2012
Are USDA assurances on mad cow case 'gross oversimplification'?
SNIP...
What irks many scientists is the USDA’s April 25 statement that the rare
disease is “not generally associated with an animal consuming infected
feed.”
The USDA’s conclusion is a “gross oversimplification,” said Dr. Paul Brown,
one of the world’s experts on this type of disease who retired recently from the
National Institutes of Health. "(The agency) has no foundation on which to base
that statement.”
“We can’t say it’s not feed related,” agreed Dr. Linda Detwiler, an
official with the USDA during the Clinton Administration now at Mississippi
State.
In the May 1 email to me, USDA’s Cole backed off a bit. “No one knows the
origins of atypical cases of BSE,” she said
The argument about feed is critical because if feed is the cause, not a
spontaneous mutation, the California cow could be part of a larger
outbreak.
SNIP...
P.9.21
Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada
Jianmin Yang1, Sandor Dudas2, Catherine Graham2, Markus Czub3, Tim
McAllister1, Stefanie Czub1 1Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre,
Canada; 2National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3University of
Calgary, Canada
Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been
identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein
associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been
detected in Canadian cattle.
Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16
Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated
PrPres. Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and
relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed
Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis.
Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type
and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and
changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under
mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the
atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal- specific antibodies
bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific
antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth
band in the Canadian H-type BSE.
Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular
characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases
from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE
contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada.
*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these
countries.
Monday, June 18, 2012
Johanns Introduces Legislation Banning EPA Aerial Surveillance on feedlots
just more BSe
PO-028: Oral transmission of L-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy
(L-BSE) in primate model Microcebus murinus
Nadine Mestre-Frances,1 Simon Nicot,2 Sylvie Rouland,1 Anne-Gaëlle
Biacabe,2 Isabelle Quadrio,3 Armand Perret-Liaudet,3 Thierry Baron,2 Jean-Michel
Verdier1 1IN SER M UM2; Montpellier, France; 2Anses; Lyon, France; 3Hopitaux
Civils de Lyon; Lyon, France
An atypical form of bovine spongiform encephalopathy has been identified in
cattle in Europe, North America and Japan and was designed as L-type BSE (L-BSE)
due to the lower apparent molecular mass of the unglycosylated,
protease-resistant prion protein (PrPres) detected by western blot compared with
classical BSE. Experimental evidences from studies in transgenic mice expressing
human PrP and in primate models suggest a higher risk of transmission to humans
of the L-BSE form than for classical BSE agent. However, a major unresolved
issue concerns the potential transmissibility of the L-BSE agent by oral route.
To address this question, we infected mouse lemurs (Microcebus murinus), a
non-human primate model, with L-BSE by intracerebral or oral route.
Four adult lemurs were intracerebrally (IC) inoculated with 5mg of L-BSE
infected brain homogenate of an atypical French BSE case (02-2528). Four young
and four adult animals were fed with 5 mg or 50 mg of infected brain. After
sacrifice, the brain tissues were biochemically and immunocytochemically
investigated for PrPres.
The 4 animals IC inoculated died at 19 and 22 months postinoculation (mpi).
They developed blindness, tremor, abnormal posture, incoordinated movements,
balance loss. Symptoms get worse according to the disease progression, until
severe ataxia. Severe spongiosis was evidenced into the thalamus, the striatum,
the mesencephalon, and the brainstem, whereas into the cortex the vacuolisation
was weaker. Strong deposits of PrPres were detected into the thalamus, the
striatum, and the hippocampus whereas in the cerebral cortex, PrPres was
prominently accumulated in plaques.
The orally inoculated animals showed similar clinical symptoms occurring
between 27 and 34 mpi. Disease was characterized by progressive prostration,
loss of appetite and poor appearance of the fur. Only one adult animal showed
disequilibrium. PrPres was strongly accumulated only in the striatum and
thalamus and weakly into the cortex. No plaques were evidenced. Two animals that
were orally challenged at the age of two years are still alive and healthy 34
months after inoculation. The western blot analysis showed uniform molecular
profiles, irrespective of the route or dose of infection, and included notably a
PrPres form with low apparent molecular mass (~19 kDa) similar to the PrPres in
the original cattle brain. However, the PrPres profile in lemurs was
characterized by a higher proportion of di- and mono-glycosylated species (up to
95% of the total signal) than in the bovine L-BSE inoculum (~80%). In addition,
small amounts of PrPres were detected by western blotting in the spleen of three
animals (one intra-cerebrally inoculated and two fed with 5 mg of cattle
brain).
Here, we demonstrate that the L-BSE agent can be transmitted by oral route
from cattle to young and adult mouse lemurs. In comparison to IC inoculated
animals, orally challenged lemurs were characterized by longer survival periods
as expected with this route of infection.
Wednesday, May 2, 2012
ARS FLIP FLOPS ON SRM REMOVAL FOR ATYPICAL L-TYPE BASE BSE RISK HUMAN AND
ANIMAL HEALTH
CDC 2012
Oral Transmission of L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in Primate
Model
Nadine Mestre-Francés, Simon Nicot, Sylvie Rouland, Anne-Gaëlle Biacabe,
Isabelle Quadrio, Armand Perret-Liaudet, Thierry Baron, and Jean-Michel Verdier
We report transmission of atypical L-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy
to mouse lemurs after oral or intracerebral inoculation with infected bovine
brain tissue. After neurologic symptoms appeared, transmissibility of the
disease by both inoculation routes was confirmed by detection of
disease-associated prion protein in samples of brain tissue.
snip...
Conclusions
We demonstrated that the agent of L-BSE can be transmitted by the oral
route from cattle to mouse lemurs. As expected, orally inoculated animals
survived longer than IC-inoculated animals. Orally inoculated lemurs had less
severe clinical signs and symptoms, with no evidence of motor dysfunction. It
was previously suggested that the agent of L-BSE might be involved in the
foodborne transmission of a prion disease in mink (11,12), a species in which
several outbreaks of transmissible mink encephalopathy had been identified,
notably in the United States (13).
Our study clearly confirms, experimentally, the potential risk for
interspecies oral transmission of the agent of L-BSE. In our model, this risk
appears higher than that for the agent of classical BSE, which could only be
transmitted to mouse lemurs after a first passage in macaques (14). We report
oral transmission of the L-BSE agent in young and adult primates. Transmission
by the IC route has also been reported in young macaques (6,7). A previous study
of L-BSE in transgenic mice expressing human PrP suggested an absence of any
transmission barrier between cattle and humans for this particular strain of the
agent of BSE, in contrast to findings for the agent of classical BSE (9). Thus,
it is imperative to maintain measures that prevent the entry of tissues from
cattle possibly infected with the agent of L-BSE into the food chain.
Saturday, November 6, 2010
TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the
EU Berne, 2010 TAFS
INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a
non-profit Swiss Foundation
in the url that follows, I have posted
SRM breaches first, as late as 2011.
then
MAD COW FEED BAN BREACHES AND TONNAGES OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE up until
2007, when they ceased posting them.
then,
MAD COW SURVEILLANCE BREACHES.
Friday, May 18, 2012
Update from APHIS Regarding a Detection of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
(BSE) in the United States Friday May 18, 2012
Wednesday, May 30, 2012
PO-028: Oral transmission of L-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy
(L-BSE) in primate model Microcebus murinus
Owens, Julie
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]
Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM
To: FSIS RegulationsComments
Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
Page 1 of 98
Response to Public Comments on the Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy Update
October 31, 2005
INTRODUCTION
The United States Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection
Service (FSIS) held a public meeting on July 25, 2006 in Washington, D.C. to
present findings from the Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy Update, October 31, 2005 (report and model located on the FSIS
website: http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Science/Risk_Assessments/index.asp).
Comments on technical aspects of the risk assessment were then submitted to
FSIS. Comments were received from Food and Water Watch, Food Animal Concerns
Trust (FACT), Farm Sanctuary, R-CALF USA, Linda A Detwiler, and Terry S.
Singeltary. This document provides itemized replies to the public comments
received on the 2005 updated Harvard BSE risk assessment. Please bear the
following points in mind:
03-025IFA 03-025IFA-2 Terry S. Singeltary
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net]
Sent: Thursday,
September 08, 2005 6:17 PM
To: fsis.regulationscomments@fsis.usda.gov
Subject: [Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified
Risk Materials for Human Food and Requirements for the Disposition of
Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle
THE SEVEN SCIENTIST REPORT ***
USDA/OIG-A/50601-10-KC
Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL
IMPORTS FROM CANADA
PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT HERE ;
Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL
IMPORTS FROM CANADA
Sunday, May 27, 2012
CANADA PLANS TO IMPRISON ANYONE SPEAKING ABOUT MAD COW or ANY OTHER DISEASE
OUTBREAK
CENSORSHIP IS A TERRIBLE THING
Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No.
05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93
Subject: Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No.
05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION
Date: August 24, 2005 at 2:47 pm PST August 24, 2005
Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1]
RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION
Greetings APHIS ET AL,
Docket APHIS-2006-0026 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy;
Animal Identification and Importation of Commodities Docket Type
Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0026-0001 Document Title Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions, Identification of
Ruminants and Processing and Importation of Commodities Public Submission
APHIS-2006-0026-0012 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S
Singletary
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy;
Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from
Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001
Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions;
Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission
APHIS-2006-0041-0028 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S
Singletary
Comment 2006-2007 USA AND OIE POISONING GLOBE WITH BSE MRR POLICY
THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with
human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species
to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in
deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that
sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie
documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which
have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a
frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life
around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my
opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long
and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the
facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9
years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know
to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans
of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the
globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from
all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a
multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and
rodents and other species.
MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border,
but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a
drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive
test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested.
all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning
when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were
doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly
what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. go figure. ...
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy;
Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from
Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document
APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy;
Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived
From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028.1 Public Submission
Title Attachment to Singletary comment
January 28, 2007
Greetings APHIS,
I would kindly like to submit the following to ;
BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES
[Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01
Sent: Friday, December 01, 2006 2:59 PM
Subject: Re: TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, 2006 [TSS
SUBMISSION
snip...
ONE FINAL COMMENT PLEASE, (i know this is long Dr. Freas but please bear
with me)
THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with
human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species
to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in
deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that
sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie
documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which
have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a
frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life
around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted blood from the USA, in my
opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long
and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone.
These are the facts as i have come to know through daily and extensive
research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the
answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of
transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only
this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless
exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless
deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies
with primates and rodents and other species. ...
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
snip... 48 pages...
Friday, May 25, 2012
R-CALF USDA’s New BSE Rule Eliminates Important Protections Needed to
Prevent BSE Spread
Monday, June 18, 2012
R-CALF Submits Incomplete Comments Under Protest in Bizarre Rulemaking
“Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products”
Subject: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and
Bovine Products APHIS-2008-0010-0008 RIN:0579-AC68
Comment from Terry Singeltary Document ID: APHIS-2008-0010-0008 Document
Type: Public Submission This is comment on Proposed Rule: Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy; Importation of Bovines and Bovine Products Docket ID:
APHIS-2008-0010 RIN:0579-AC68
Topics: No Topics associated with this document
View Document: More Document Subtype: Public Comment Status: Posted
Received Date: March 22 2012, at 12:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time Date Posted:
March 22 2012, at 12:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time Comment Start Date: March 16
2012, at 12:00 AM Eastern Daylight Time Comment Due Date: May 15 2012, at 11:59
PM Eastern Daylight Time
Tracking Number: 80fdd617
First Name: Terry Middle Name: S. Last Name: Singeltary
City: Bacliff
Country: United States
State or Province: TX Organization
Name: CJD TSE PRION
Submitter's Representative: CONSUMERS
Comment: comment submission Document ID APHIS-2008-0010-0001
Greetings USDA,
OIE et al, what a difference it makes with science, from one day to the
next. i.e. that mad cow gold card the USA once held. up until that fateful day
in December of 2003, the science of BSE was NO IMPORTS TO USA FROM BSE COUNTRY.
what a difference a day makes$ now that the shoe is on the other foot, the USDA
via the OIE, wants to change science again, just for trade $ I implore the OIE
decision and policy makers, for the sake of the world, to refuse any status quo
of the USA BSE risk assessment. if at al, the USA BSE GBR should be raise to BSE
GBR IV, for the following reasons. North America is awash with many different
TSE Prion strains, in many different species, and they are mutating and
spreading. IF the OIE, and whatever policy makers, do anything but raise the
risk factor for BSE in North America, they I would regard that to be highly
suspicious. IN fact, it would be criminal in my opinion, because the OIE knows
this, and to knowingly expose the rest of the world to this dangerous pathogen,
would be ‘knowingly’ and ‘willfully’, just for the almighty dollar, once again.
I warned the OIE about all this, including the risk factors for CWD, and the
fact that the zoonosis potential was great, way back in 2002. THE OIE in
collaboration with the USDA, made the legal trading of the atypical Nor-98
Scrapie a legal global commodity. yes, thanks to the OIE and the USDA et al,
it’s now legal to trade the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie strain all around the globe.
IF you let them, they will do the same thing with atypical BSE and CWD (both
strains to date). This with science showing that indeed these TSE prion strains
are transmissible. I strenuously urge the OIE et al to refuse any weakening to
the USA trade protocols for the BSE TSE prion disease (all strains), and urge
them to reclassify the USA with BSE GBR IV risk factor.
SEE REFERENCE SOURCES IN ATTACHMENTS
PLEASE SEE Terry S. Singeltary Sr. _Attachment_ WORD FILE ;
Identification of a second bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy:
Molecular similarities with sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease
Cristina Casalone*†, Gianluigi Zanusso†‡, Pierluigi Acutis*, Sergio
Ferrari‡, Lorenzo Capucci§, Fabrizio Tagliavini¶, Salvatore Monaco‡ , and Maria
Caramelli* *Centro di Referenza Nazionale per le Encefalopatie Animali, Istituto
Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, Liguria e Valle d’Aosta, Via Bologna,
148, 10195 Turin, Italy; ‡Department of Neurological and Visual Science, Section
of Clinical Neurology, Policlinico G.B. Rossi, Piazzale L.A. Scuro, 10, 37134
Verona, Italy; §Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale della Lombardia ed Emilia
Romagna, Via Bianchi, 9, 25124 Brescia, Italy; and ¶Istituto Nazionale
Neurologico ‘‘Carlo Besta,’’ Via Celoria 11, 20133 Milan, Italy
Edited by Stanley B. Prusiner, University of California, San Francisco, CA,
and approved December 23, 2003 (received for review September 9, 2003)
Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), or prion diseases, are
mammalian neurodegenerative disorders characterized by a posttranslational
conversion and brain accumulation of an insoluble, protease-resistant isoform
(PrPSc) of the host-encoded cellular prion protein (PrPC). Human and animal TSE
agents exist as different phenotypes that can be biochemically differentiated on
the basis of the molecular mass of the protease-resistant PrPSc fragments and
the degree of glycosylation. Epidemiological, molecular, and transmission
studies strongly suggest that the single strain of agent responsible for bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) has infected humans, causing variant
Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease. The unprecedented biological properties of the BSE
agent, which circumvents the so-called ‘‘species barrier’’ between cattle and
humans and adapts to different mammalian species, has raised considerable
concern for human health. To date, it is unknown whether more than one strain
might be responsible for cattle TSE or whether the BSE agent undergoes
phenotypic variation after natural transmission. Here we provide evidence of a
second cattle TSE. The disorder was pathologically characterized by the presence
of PrP-immunopositive amyloid plaques, as opposed to the lack of amyloid
deposition in typical BSE cases, and by a different pattern of regional
distribution and topology of brain PrPSc accumulation. In addition, Western blot
analysis showed a PrPSc type with predominance of the low molecular mass
glycoform and a protease- resistant fragment of lower molecular mass than
BSE-PrPSc. Strikingly, the molecular signature of this previously undescribed
bovine PrPSc was similar to that encountered in a distinct subtype of sporadic
Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease.
Phenotypic Similarities Between BASE and sCJD. The transmissibility of CJD
brains was initially demonstrated in primates (27), and classification of
atypical cases as CJD was based on this property (28). To date, no systematic
studies of strain typing in sCJD have been provided, and classification of
different subtypes is based on clinical, neuropathological, and molecular
features (the polymorphic PRNP codon 129 and the PrPSc glycotype) (8, 9, 15,
19). The importance of molecular PrPSc characterization in assessing the
identity of TSE strains is underscored by several studies, showing that the
stability of given disease-specific PrPSc types is maintained upon experimental
propagation of sCJD, familial CJD, and vCJD isolates in transgenic PrP-humanized
mice (8, 29). Similarly, biochemical properties of BSE- and vCJDassociated PrPSc
molecules remain stable after passage to mice expressing bovine PrP (30).
Recently, however, it has been reported that PrP-humanized mice inoculated with
BSE tissues may also propagate a distinctive PrPSc type, with a
‘‘monoglycosylated- dominant’’ pattern and electrophoretic mobility of the
unglycosylated fragment slower than that of vCJD and BSE (31). Strikingly, this
PrPSc type shares its molecular properties with the a PrPSc molecule found in
classical sCJD. This observation is at variance with the PrPSc type found in
M V2 sCJD cases and in cattle BASE, showing a monoglycosylated-dominant pattern
but faster electrophoretic mobility of the protease-resistant fragment as
compared with BSE. In addition to molecular properties of PrPSc, BASE and M V2
sCJD share a distinctive pattern of intracerebral PrP deposition, which occurs
as plaque-like and amyloid-kuru plaques. Differences were, however, observed in
the regional distribution of PrPSc. While inM V2 sCJD cases the largest amounts
of PrPSc were detected in the cerebellum, brainstem, and striatum, in cattle
BASE these areas were less involved and the highest levels of PrPSc were
recovered from the thalamus and olfactory regions.
In conclusion, decoding the biochemical PrPSc signature of individual human
and animal TSE strains may allow the identification of potential risk factors
for human disorders with unknown etiology, such as sCJD. However, although BASE
and sCJD share several characteristics, caution is dictated in assessing a link
between conditions affecting two different mammalian species, based on
convergent biochemical properties of diseaseassociated PrPSc types. Strains of
TSE agents may be better characterized upon passage to transgenic mice. In the
interim until this is accomplished, our present findings suggest a strict
epidemiological surveillance of cattle TSE and sCJD based on molecular criteria.
Employment Listings position: Post Doctoral Fellow | Atypical BSE in
Cattle
Closing date: December 24, 2009
Anticipated start date: January/February 2010
Employer: Canadian and OIE Reference Laboratories for BSE CFIA Lethbridge
Laboratory, Lethbridge/Alberta
The Canadian and OIE reference laboratories for BSE are extensively
involved in prion diseases diagnosis and research. With a recent increase in
research activities and funding, the laboratory is looking to fill two post
doctoral fellow positions. Both positions will be located at the Canadian Food
Inspection Agency (CFIA) Lethbridge Laboratory which offers biosaftey level 3
(BSL3) and BSL2 laboratory space and is well equipped for molecular and
morphologic prion research. The facility also has a BSL3 large animal housing
wing and a state of the art post mortem room certified for prion work.
Successful candidates will have the opportunity to visit other laboratories to
cooperate in various aspects of the projects and to be trained in new techniques
and acquire new skills. With a recent increase in prion disease expertise and
research in Alberta and Canada, these positions will offer significant exposure
to cutting edge prion science via videoconferencing, meetings, workshops and
conferences. These interactions will also provide a valuable opportunity to
present research findings and discuss potential future work opportunities and
collaborations with other Canadian and international research groups.
Atypical BSE in Cattle
BSE has been linked to the human disease variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease
(vCJD). The known exposure pathways for humans contracting vCJD are through the
consumption of beef and beef products contaminated by the BSE agent and through
blood transfusions. However, recent scientific evidence suggests that the BSE
agent may play a role in the development of other forms of human prion diseases
as well. These studies suggest that classical type of BSE may cause type 2
sporadic CJD and that H-type atypical BSE is connected with a familial form of
CJD.
To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set
out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE
which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is
scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that
this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial
distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC)
signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and
H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and
spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains
of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type
mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because
they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type
BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian
hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or
a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human
primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an
approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to
C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be
assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as
C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.
This study will contribute to a correct definition of specified risk
material (SRM) in atypical BSE. The incumbent of this position will develop new
and transfer existing, ultra-sensitive methods for the detection of atypical BSE
in tissue of experimentally infected cattle.
Responsibilities include:
Driving research at the National and OIE BSE reference lab to ensure
project milestones are met successfully. Contributing to the preparation of
project progress reports. Directing technical staff working on the project.
Communicating and discussing results, progress and future direction with project
principle investigator(s). Communicating with collaborative project partners.
Qualifications:
Successful completion of a PhD degree in an area focusing on or related to
prion diseases. Extensive experience with molecular and/or morphologic
techniques used in studying prion diseases and/or other protein misfolding
disorders. Ability to think independently and contribute new ideas. Excellent
written and oral communication skills. Ability to multitask, prioritize, and
meet challenges in a timely manner. Proficiency with Microsoft Office,
especially Word, PowerPoint and Excel.
How to apply:
Please send your application and/or inquiry to: Dr. Stefanie Czub, DVM,
Ph.D. Head, National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory Canadian Food Inspection
Agency Lethbridge Laboratory P.O. Box 640, Township Road 9-1 Lethbridge, AB, T1J
3Z4 Canada
phone: +1-403-382-5500 +1-403-382-5500 ext. 5549 email:
mailto:stefanie.czub%40inspection.gc.ca
Contact Info:
Last Updated: 12/10/2009 1:35:18 PM
Thursday, August 12, 2010
Seven main threats for the future linked to prions
First threat
The TSE road map defining the evolution of European policy for protection
against prion diseases is based on a certain numbers of hypotheses some of which
may turn out to be erroneous. In particular, a form of BSE (called atypical
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), recently identified by systematic testing in
aged cattle without clinical signs, may be the origin of classical BSE and thus
potentially constitute a reservoir, which may be impossible to eradicate if a
sporadic origin is confirmed.
***Also, a link is suspected between atypical BSE and some apparently
sporadic cases of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans. These atypical BSE cases
constitute an unforeseen first threat that could sharply modify the European
approach to prion diseases.
Second threat
snip...
Sunday, June 3, 2012
A new neurological disease in primates inoculated with prion-infected blood
or blood components
Sunday, February 12, 2012
National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined1
(August 19, 2011) including Texas
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. on the Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Public Health
Crisis
full text with source references ;
price of prion poker goes up again $$$
Monday, June 11, 2012
Guidance for Industry Draft Guidance for Industry: Amendment to “Guidance
for Industry: Revised Preventive Measures to Reduce the Possible Risk of
Transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease and Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
by Blood and Blood Products”
bse be gone. I wish it was as easy as waving a magic wand. but some of us
know that’s not the case $$$
layperson
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
flounder9@verizon.net
posted by Terry S. Singeltary Sr. at
12:55 PM
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