Wednesday, July 28, 2010

re-Freedom of Information Act Project Number 3625-32000-086-05, Study of Atypical BSE UPDATE July 28, 2010

Sent: Wednesday, July 28, 2010 11:42 AM

Subject: re-Freedom of Information Act Project Number 3625-32000-086-05, Study of Atypical BSE UPDATE




Greetings again Ms Williams et al at FOIA USDA,


Thank You again for your kind reply on this important information. However, I am concerned that you may not be aware of new transmission studies. You (USDA et al) state Ma'am ;


================================================


The SCA with Italy was mainly to confirm our respective country’s diagnostic tests would detect the various atypical BSE cases as seen in each country), in the meantime, the Italians have published their transmissibility and pathogenesis work on their BASE cases in the following article:

Lombardi G, Casalone C, A DA, Gelmetti D, Torcoli G, Barbieri I, Corona C, Fasoli E, Farinazzo A, Fiorini M, Gelati M, Iulini B, Tagliavini F, Ferrari S, Caramelli M, Monaco S, Capucci L, Zanusso G (2008) Intraspecies transmission of BASE induces clinical dullness and amyotrophic changes. PLoS Pathog 4:e1000075

The above mentioned paper concludes, “In all experimentally infected animals, no PrP**TSE was detected in peripheral tissues, including cervical and mesenteric lymph nodes, spleen, thymus, liver, lung, peripheral nerves and forelimb and limb muscles, either by standard Western blot analysis or following phosphotungstic acid precipitation.“

It is not necessary to change SRM removal due to any different tissue infectivity distribution between classical BSE and atypical BSE. At this time, there is no scientific evidence to suggest a need for expanding the list of tissues included in the Specified Risk Material (SRM) ban as a result of published studies on atypical BSE.


snip...


Moreover, in the paper by Buschmann A, Groschup MH (2005,) Highly bovine spongiform encephalopathy-sensitive transgenic mice confirm the essential restriction of infectivity to the nervous system in clinically diseased cattle. J Infect Dis 192:934-942; the authors, when speaking about the classical BSE food-borne epidemic in Europe, concluded their “results provide further indication that the pathogenesis of BSE in cattle is fundamentally different from that in sheep and mice, due to an exclusive intraneuronal spread of infectivity from the gut to the central nervous system.”


end...

================================================


Again, in my opinion, the USDA is cherry picking the science they want to use, and in doing so, I believe they are putting human lives at risk.


I disagree for the following reasons. New studies indeed show that ;


July 10, 2010


Conclusions We report accumulation of L-type atypical BSE prions in peripheral nerve tissues sampled from intracerebrally challenged cattle. Our study demonstrated that almost all of the peripheral nerve tissues tested became PrPres positive in a time-dependent manner, whereas no PrPres was detectable in lymphoid tissues, even in cattle with fatal atypical BSE. Our results suggest the possibility that, like classical BSE prions, L-type BSE prions propagated in the central nervous system and were spread centrifugally by nerve pathways (11,12). In Italy, L-type BSE prions have been characterized in detail by using cattle challenged intracerebrally. However, PrPres was not detected in their peripheral tissues, including the peripheral nerves (13). The reason for the discrepancy in PrPres detection is unclear. In view of the similarities between the L-type and BSE/JP24 prion characteristics (9), this discrepancy may result from differences in the methods used for PrPres detection.



Please see ;



Volume 16, Number 7–July 2010

Dispatch

Accumulation of L-type Bovine Prions in Peripheral Nerve Tissues

Yoshifumi Iwamaru, Morikazu Imamura, Yuichi Matsuura, Kentaro Masujin, Yoshihisa Shimizu, Yujing Shu, Megumi Kurachi, Kazuo Kasai, Yuichi Murayama, Shigeo Fukuda, Sadao Onoe, Ken'ichi Hagiwara, Yoshio Yamakawa, Tetsutaro Sata, Shirou Mohri, Hiroyuki Okada, and Takashi Yokoyama Author affiliations: National Institute of Animal Health, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, Japan (Y. Iwamaru, M. Imamura, Y. Matsuura, K. Masujin, Y. Shimizu, Y. Shu, M. Kurachi, K. Kasai, Y. Murayama, S. Mohri, H. Okada, T. Yokoyama); Hokkaido Animal Research Center, Hokkaido, Japan (S. Fukuda, S. Onoe); and National Institute of Infectious Diseases, Tokyo, Japan (K. Hagiwara, Y. Yamakawa, T. Sata)

Suggested citation for this article

Abstract We recently reported the intraspecies transmission of L-type atypical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). To clarify the peripheral pathogenesis of L-type BSE, we studied prion distribution in nerve and lymphoid tissues obtained from experimentally challenged cattle. As with classical BSE prions, L-type BSE prions accumulated in central and peripheral nerve tissues.

Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is a fatal neurodegenerative disorder of cattle characterized by accumulation of a protease-resistant form of a normal cellular prion protein (PrPres) in the central nervous system. The scientific literature in general has assumed that BSE in cattle is caused by a uniform strain (classical BSE). However, different neuropathologic and molecular phenotypes of BSE (atypical BSEs) have recently been reported from various countries (1). Recent data from Western blot analyses of field cases of atypical BSEs are characterized by a higher (H-type BSE) or lower (L-type BSE) molecular mass of the unglycosylated form of PrPres than is classical BSE (2). The origins of atypical BSEs remain obscure; unlike classical BSE, atypical BSE has been detected mainly in aged cattle and suggested a as possible sporadic form of BSE (3).

Several lines of evidence demonstrate that classical BSE and a variant form of Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease are most likely caused by the same agent (4,5). Transmission of classical BSE to humans has been proposed to result from ingestion of contaminated food. Whether atypical BSEs are transmissible to humans remains uncertain; however, human susceptibility to L-type BSEs is suggested by recent experimental transmission in primates (6) and mice transgenic for human prion protein (PrP) (7) by using the most effective route of intracerebral inoculations of prions. The L-type BSE prion is much more virulent in primates and in humanized mice than is the classical BSE prion, which suggests the possibility of zoonotic risk associated with the L-type BSE prion. These findings emphasize the critical importance of understanding tissue distribution of L-type BSE prions in cattle because, among the current administrative measures for BSE controls, the specified risk materials removal policy plays a crucial role in consumer protection.

In Japan, atypical BSE was detected in an aged Japanese Black cow (BSE/JP24) (8). We recently reported the successful transmission of BSE/JP24 prions to cattle and showed that the characteristics of these prions closely resemble those of L-type BSE prions found in Italy (9). In this study, we report the peripheral distribution of L-type BSE prions in experimentally challenged cattle.

The Study

snip...

Conclusions We report accumulation of L-type atypical BSE prions in peripheral nerve tissues sampled from intracerebrally challenged cattle. Our study demonstrated that almost all of the peripheral nerve tissues tested became PrPres positive in a time-dependent manner, whereas no PrPres was detectable in lymphoid tissues, even in cattle with fatal atypical BSE. Our results suggest the possibility that, like classical BSE prions, L-type BSE prions propagated in the central nervous system and were spread centrifugally by nerve pathways (11,12). In Italy, L-type BSE prions have been characterized in detail by using cattle challenged intracerebrally. However, PrPres was not detected in their peripheral tissues, including the peripheral nerves (13). The reason for the discrepancy in PrPres detection is unclear. In view of the similarities between the L-type and BSE/JP24 prion characteristics (9), this discrepancy may result from differences in the methods used for PrPres detection.

We detected infectivity in the nerve tissue samples (including samples from the obex, sciatic nerve, adrenal gland, brachial nerve plexus, and vagus nerve) obtained 10, 12, and 16 mpi. On the basis of the incubation time of 223 ± 25 (mean ± SD) days in mice injected with a 1,000-fold dilution of the obex homogenate, infectious titers in peripheral nerve tissues appeared to be 1,000 × lower than those estimated in the obex during endpoint titration of infectivity.

Our results demonstrate that L-type atypical BSE prions can be distributed in the peripheral nerve tissues of intracerebrally challenged cattle. These findings are useful for understanding L-type BSE pathogenesis and accurately assessing the risks associated with this disease. Investigations of prion distribution in cattle that have been orally challenged with L-type BSE prions are critical.

full text ;


http://www.cdc.gov/eid/content/16/7/pdfs/1151.pdf



http://www.cdc.gov/eid/content/16/7/1151.htm




*****URGENT NOTE HERE ABOUT OIE AND THEIR JUNK SCIENCE ABOUT ATYPICAL BSE*****


To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.


http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2



snip...


please see full text ;



Thursday, June 24, 2010

Accumulation of L-type Bovine Prions in Peripheral Nerve Tissues

Volume 16, Number 7–July 2010


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/06/accumulation-of-l-type-bovine-prions-in.html




ALSO, please note, atypical BSE-H strain is also transmissible in the humanized transgenic mice with distinct phenotype ;



P26

TRANSMISSION OF ATYPICAL BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN HUMANIZED MOUSE MODELS

Liuting Qing1, Fusong Chen1, Michael Payne1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5*, and Qingzhong Kong1 1Department of Pathology, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH 44106, USA; 2CEA, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Italy; 3Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Germany; 4National Veterinary Research Institute, Poland; 5Kansas State University, Diagnostic Medicine/Pathobiology Department, Manhattan, KS 66506, USA. *Previous address: USDA National Animal Disease Center, Ames, IA 50010, USA

Classical BSE is a world-wide prion disease in cattle, and the classical BSE strain (BSE-C) has led to over 200 cases of clinical human infection (variant CJD). Two atypical BSE strains, BSE-L (also named BASE) and BSE-H, have been discovered in three continents since 2004. The first case of naturally occurring BSE with mutated bovine PrP gene (termed BSE-M) was also found in 2006 in the USA. The transmissibility and phenotypes of these atypical BSE strains/isolates in humans were unknown. We have inoculated humanized transgenic mice with classical and atypical BSE strains (BSE-C, BSE-L, BSE-H) and the BSE-M isolate. We have found that the atypical BSE-L strain is much more virulent than the classical BSE-C. The atypical BSE-H strain is also transmissible in the humanized transgenic mice with distinct phenotype, but no transmission has been observed for the BSE-M isolate so far.

III International Symposium on THE NEW PRION BIOLOGY: BASIC SCIENCE, DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 2 - 4 APRIL 2009, VENEZIA (ITALY)


http://www.istitutoveneto.it/prion_09/Abstracts_09.pdf




BUT yet, USDA scientist even managed to change that science around too, by having the only cow known in the world to date that is familial BSE $ PLEASE NOTE, this so-called BSE with mutated bovine PrP gene (termed BSE-M) that was found in 2006 in the USA. a supposedly new strain of familial BSE ? takes me back to the infamous sporadic FFI, that's not familial ? they don't have a clue, in my opinion. but yet the USDA officials will blame it on anything and everything, but the most likely cause i.e. MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE. instead, we have another new strain of mad cow disease, only this is in the USA, and it is just a spontaneous old cow disease i.e. 'familial h-BSEalabama'.

''We hypothesize that the bovine Prnp E211K mutation most likely has caused BSE in “the approximately 10-year-old cow” carrying the E221K mutation.''

WHAT a hoot. They have now taken the same strain of mad cow disease (h-BSE), that Kong et al in 2009 showed was transmissible to humans via human TG mice, and termed it another new mad cow disease, termed ‘‘U.S. BSE Alabama’’ as being another spontaneous happening from nothing. I swear, this just get's better and better. what about IBNC BSE, no cases yet in the USA ? and just what is IBNC BSE ? (more on that later).


Wednesday, July 28, 2010

Atypical prion proteins and IBNC in cattle DEFRA project code SE1796 FOIA Final report


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/07/atypical-prion-proteins-and-ibnc-in.html




Wednesday, March 31, 2010

Atypical BSE in Cattle / position: Post Doctoral Fellow

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/03/atypical-bse-in-cattle-position-post.html



Wednesday, February 24, 2010

Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America 14th

ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -


http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2010/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html




Tuesday, July 27, 2010

Spontaneous generation of mammalian prions

http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2010/07/spontaneous-generation-of-mammalian.html





Saturday, June 12, 2010

PUBLICATION REQUEST AND FOIA REQUEST Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Study of Atypical Bse



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/06/publication-request-and-foia-request.html





Thank You Ms Williams, I hope you can understand my disgust. ...




Kind Regards,

Terry S. Singeltary SR.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA




----- Original Message -----
From: Williams, Monica
To: flounder9@verizon.net
Sent: Wednesday, July 28, 2010 9:26 AM
Subject: Freedom of Information Act


Mr. Terry Singeltary, Sr:



This is a follow up to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request with regard to our response to you on June 18, 2010, concerning the results of Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05, Study of Atypical BSE, and whether it is necessary to change SRM removal due to any different tissue infectivity distribution. Your request was assigned FOIA No. 10-93.



In speaking with our National Animal Disease Center (NADC), we are providing the following clarification responsive to your request:



The Italians submitted the manuscript which is still in review at the journal and we do not have an idea when the manuscript will be accepted or published. Our hope is later this calendar year. Also, the manuscript in review does not contain information relating to transmission or tissue distribution. The Italians have already published their work on the topic. Our animal studies at the National Animal Disease Center (NADC) only started in February and will take many years to complete. We have no way of predicting the time of onset of disease and it could be several years, if ever, before the cattle become diseased.



The SCA with Italy was mainly to confirm our respective country’s diagnostic tests would detect the various atypical BSE cases as seen in each country), in the meantime, the Italians have published their transmissibility and pathogenesis work on their BASE cases in the following article:



Lombardi G, Casalone C, A DA, Gelmetti D, Torcoli G, Barbieri I, Corona C, Fasoli E, Farinazzo A, Fiorini M, Gelati M, Iulini B, Tagliavini F, Ferrari S, Caramelli M, Monaco S, Capucci L, Zanusso G (2008) Intraspecies transmission of BASE induces clinical dullness and amyotrophic changes. PLoS Pathog 4:e1000075



The above mentioned paper concludes, “In all experimentally infected animals, no PrP**TSE was detected in peripheral tissues, including cervical and mesenteric lymph nodes, spleen, thymus, liver, lung, peripheral nerves and forelimb and limb muscles, either by standard Western blot analysis or following phosphotungstic acid precipitation.“



It is not necessary to change SRM removal due to any different tissue infectivity distribution between classical BSE and atypical BSE. At this time, there is no scientific evidence to suggest a need for expanding the list of tissues included in the Specified Risk Material (SRM) ban as a result of published studies on atypical BSE.



Moreover, in the paper by Buschmann A, Groschup MH (2005,) Highly bovine spongiform encephalopathy-sensitive transgenic mice confirm the essential restriction of infectivity to the nervous system in clinically diseased cattle. J Infect Dis 192:934-942; the authors, when speaking about the classical BSE food-borne epidemic in Europe, concluded their “results provide further indication that the pathogenesis of BSE in cattle is fundamentally different from that in sheep and mice, due to an exclusive intraneuronal spread of infectivity from the gut to the central nervous system.”





We hope this information is helpful.



Sincerely,





Monica Williams

FOIA Office, REE, USDA

5601 Sunnyside Avenue

Room 1-2248, Mail Stop 5128

Beltsville, MD 20705-5128

monica.williams@ars.usda.gov

Telephone: 301-504-1640




----- Original Message -----
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
To: BSE-L@LISTS.AEGEE.ORG
Sent: Friday, June 18, 2010 11:48 AM
Subject: Re: [BSE-L] Freedom of Information Act Project Number 3625-32000-086-05, Study of Atypical BSE


Greetings Ms Williams, ARS, USDA, ET AL,


Thank you for your kind reply and correction of the information in your data base on the Project Number 3625-32000-086-05, Study of Atypical BSE, and whether it is necessary to change SRM removal due to any different tissue infectivity distribution. Your request was logged in and assigned FOIA No. 10-93.


Ms Williams ARS USDA et al stated ;


>>>In searching for records responsive to your request, we discovered that our Agricultural Research Information System (ARIS) database contained incorrect information. The ARIS database incorrectly linked the same progress report to Project Numbers 3625-32000-086-05S and 3625-32000-086-04S, which resulted in inaccurate information being reported for the Study of Atypical BSE. This discrepancy was reported to the managing office and has been resolved. To view the progress report, click or copy and paste the URL into your browser window:


http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?ACCN_NO=408490&showpars=true&fy=2009



<<<> 3. Studies on transmissibility and tissue distribution of atypical BSE isolates in cattle and other species.



http://www.ushrl.saa.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?accn_no=408490





my FOIA, two questions still have not been answered. There have been 5 years gone by now


>>> Start Date: Sep 15, 2004 End Date: Sep 14, 2009


<<<> 3. Studies on transmissibility and tissue distribution of atypical BSE isolates in cattle and other species.




THE STUDY objective specifically said ;



>>> 1a.Objectives (from AD-416) The objective of this cooperative research project with Dr. Maria Caramelli from the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory in Turin, Italy, is to conduct comparative studies with the U.S. bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) isolate and the atypical BSE isolates identified in Italy. The studies will cover the following areas: 1. Evaluation of present diagnostics tools used in the U.S. for the detection of atypical BSE cases. 2. Molecular comparison of the U.S. BSE isolate and other typical BSE isolates with atypical BSE cases. 3. Studies on transmissibility and tissue distribution of atypical BSE isolates in cattle and other species. <<<



>>> 3. Studies on transmissibility and tissue distribution of atypical BSE isolates in cattle and other species.




http://www.ushrl.saa.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?accn_no=408490





Ms Williams et al at ARS USDA, please tell me via FOIA or not, what the results of the tissue distribution and transmissibility of atypical BSE isolates and comparisons were as stated ;




>>> 3. Studies on transmissibility and tissue distribution of atypical BSE isolates in cattle and other species.




The study plainly stated that during the 5 years study in question, that Studies on transmissibility and tissue distribution of atypical BSE isolates in cattle and other species would be done ;



>>> Transmission studies are already underway using brain homogenates from atypical BSE cases into mice, cattle and sheep. It will be critical to see whether the atypical BSE isolates behave similarly to typical BSE isolates in terms of transmissibility and disease pathogenesis. If transmission occurs, tissue distribution comparisons will be made between cattle infected with the atypical BSE isolate and the U.S. BSE isolate. Differences in tissue distribution could require new regulations regarding specific risk material (SRM) removal. <<<



http://foiamadsheepmadrivervalley.blogspot.com/2010/02/final-report-of-testing-of-belgian.html



http://foiamadsheepmadrivervalley.blogspot.com/





Thank You, Kindly


still waiting


FOIA request answers Project Number 3625-32000-086-05, Study of Atypical BSE, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518 flounder9@verizon.net TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY UPDATE

June 16, 2010 J Clin Invest. doi:10.1172/JCI42051. Copyright © 2010, The American Society for Clinical Investigation.

Research Article A molecular switch controls interspecies prion disease transmission in mice

Christina J. Sigurdson1,2,3, K. Peter R. Nilsson3, Simone Hornemann4, Giuseppe Manco3, Natalia Fernández-Borges5, Petra Schwarz3, Joaquín Castilla5,6, Kurt Wüthrich4,7 and Adriano Aguzzi3 1Department of Pathology and Department of Medicine, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, California, USA. 2Department of Pathology, Immunology, and Microbiology, University of California, Davis, Davis, California, USA. 3UniversitätsSpital Zürich, Institute of Neuropathology, Zürich, Switzerland. 4Institut für Molekularbiologie und Biophysik, ETH Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland. 5CIC BioGUNE, Parque tecnológico de Bizkaia, Bizkaia, Spain. 6Ikerbasque, Basque Foundation for Science, Bizkaia, Spain. 7Department of Molecular Biology and Skaggs Institute for Chemical Biology, The Scripps Research Institute, La Jolla, California, USA. Address correspondence to: Adriano Aguzzi, UniversitätsSpital Zürich, Institute of Neuropathology, Department of Pathology, Schmelzbergstrasse 12, CH-8091 Zürich, Switzerland. Phone: 41.44.255.2107; Fax: 41.44.255.4402; E-mail: adriano.aguzzi@usz.ch. Or to: Christina Sigurdson, Department of Pathology, University of California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman Dr., La Jolla, California 92093, USA. Phone: 858.534.0978; Fax: 858.246.0523; E-mail: csigurdson@ucsd.edu. Published June 14, 2010 Received for publication December 15, 2009, and accepted in revised form April 28, 2010.


Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies are lethal neurodegenerative disorders that present with aggregated forms of the cellular prion protein (PrPC), which are known as PrPSc. Prions from different species vary considerably in their transmissibility to xenogeneic hosts. The variable transmission barriers depend on sequence differences between incoming PrPSc and host PrPC and additionally, on strain-dependent conformational properties of PrPSc. The ß2-a2 loop region within PrPC varies substantially between species, with its structure being influenced by the residue types in the 2 amino acid sequence positions 170 (most commonly S or N) and 174 (N or T). In this study, we inoculated prions from 5 different species into transgenic mice expressing either disordered-loop or rigid-loop PrPC variants. Similar ß2-a2 loop structures correlated with efficient transmission, whereas dissimilar loops correlated with strong transmission barriers. We then classified literature data on cross-species transmission according to the 170S/N polymorphism. Transmission barriers were generally low between species with the same amino acid residue in position 170 and high between those with different residues. These findings point to a triggering role of the local ß2-a2 loop structure for prion transmissibility between different species.


snip...


These observations suggest striking differences in the ß-sheet alignment of PrPSc aggregates between prion-infected 170S and 170N animals and may provide a plausible starting point for clarifying the structural basis of prion species barriers that are highly relevant to public health, including the potential transmissibility of bovine and cervid prions to humans. snip... As a possible exception to these observations, cattle may be susceptible to CWD from white-tailed deer (86). The latter finding suggests that specific prion strains can overrule the codon 170 homology requirement.


http://www.jci.org/articles/view/42051?key=456180f4a34aad821c6f#B87


see also ;


Monday, June 14, 2010


A molecular switch controls interspecies prion disease transmission in mice


http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2010/06/molecular-switch-controls-interspecies.html


Friday, May 14, 2010


Prion Strain Mutation Determined by Prion Protein Conformational Compatibility and Primary Structure Published Online May 13, 2010 Science DOI: 10.1126/science.1187107 Science Express Index


http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2010/05/prion-strain-mutation-determined-by.html


http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/


Saturday, June 5, 2010



Research Project: Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies: Identification of atypical scrapie in Canadian sheep


http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2010/06/research-project-transmissible.html


Saturday, June 12, 2010 PUBLICATION REQUEST AND FOIA REQUEST Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Study of Atypical Bse


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/06/publication-request-and-foia-request.html


Wednesday, June 16, 2010


Defining sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease strains and their transmission properties


http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/06/defining-sporadic-creutzfeldt-jakob.html


Tuesday, June 1, 2010


USA cases of dpCJD rising with 24 cases so far in 2010


http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/2010/06/usa-cases-of-dpcjd-rising-with-24-cases.html


Wednesday, June 02, 2010 CJD Annex H UPDATE AFTER DEATH PRECAUTIONS Published: 2 June 2003


Updated: May 2010


http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/06/cjd-annex-h-update-after-death.html


CJD TEXAS 38 YEAR OLD FEMALE WORKED SLAUGHTERING CATTLE EXPOSED TO BRAIN AND SPINAL CORD MATTER


>>>Up until about 6 years ago, the pt worked at Tyson foods where she worked on the assembly line, slaughtering cattle and preparing them for packaging. She was exposed to brain and spinal cord matter when she would euthanize the cattle. <<<



http://www.recordandoalinda.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19:cjd-english-info&catid=9:cjd-ingles&Itemid=8



>>>Up until about 6 years ago, the pt worked at Tyson foods where she worked on the assembly line, slaughtering cattle and preparing them for packaging. She was exposed to brain and spinal cord matter when she would euthanize the cattle. <<<


http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/03/irma-linda-andablo-cjd-victim-she-died.html



CJD TEXAS 38 YEAR OLD FEMALE WORKED SLAUGHTERING CATTLE EXPOSED TO BRAIN AND SPINAL CORD MATTER


http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/2010/03/cjd-texas-38-year-old-female-worked.html


Archive Number 20100405.1091 Published Date 05-APR-2010 Subject PRO/AH/EDR> Prion disease update 1010 (04)

snip...

[Terry S. Singeltary Sr. has added the following comment:

"According to the World Health Organisation, the future public health threat of vCJD in the UK and Europe and potentially the rest of the world is of concern and currently unquantifiable. However, the possibility of a significant and geographically diverse vCJD epidemic occurring over the next few decades cannot be dismissed.

The key word here is diverse. What does diverse mean? If USA scrapie transmitted to USA bovine does not produce pathology as the UK c-BSE, then why would CJD from there look like UK vCJD?"


http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:568933508083034::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,82101



Tuesday, June 1, 2010

USA cases of dpCJD rising with 24 cases so far in 2010


http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/2010/06/usa-cases-of-dpcjd-rising-with-24-cases.html



14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases H-type and L-type Atypical BSE January 2010 (special pre-congress edition)

18.173 page 189

Experimental Challenge of Cattle with H-type and L-type Atypical BSE

A. Buschmann1, U. Ziegler1, M. Keller1, R. Rogers2, B. Hills3, M.H. Groschup1. 1Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany, 2Health Canada, Bureau of Microbial Hazards, Health Products & Food Branch, Ottawa, Canada, 3Health Canada, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Secretariat, Ottawa, Canada

Background: After the detection of two novel BSE forms designated H-type and L-type atypical BSE the question of the pathogenesis and the agent distribution of these two types in cattle was fully open. From initial studies of the brain pathology, it was already known that the anatomical distribution of L-type BSE differs from that of the classical type where the obex region in the brainstem always displays the highest PrPSc concentrations. In contrast in L-type BSE cases, the thalamus and frontal cortex regions showed the highest levels of the pathological prion protein, while the obex region was only weakly involved.

Methods:We performed intracranial inoculations of cattle (five and six per group) using 10%brainstemhomogenates of the two German H- and L-type atypical BSE isolates. The animals were inoculated under narcosis and then kept in a free-ranging stable under appropriate biosafety conditions.At least one animal per group was killed and sectioned in the preclinical stage and the remaining animals were kept until they developed clinical symptoms. The animals were examined for behavioural changes every four weeks throughout the experiment following a protocol that had been established during earlier BSE pathogenesis studies with classical BSE.

Results and Discussion: All animals of both groups developed clinical symptoms and had to be euthanized within 16 months. The clinical picture differed from that of classical BSE, as the earliest signs of illness were loss of body weight and depression. However, the animals later developed hind limb ataxia and hyperesthesia predominantly and the head. Analysis of brain samples from these animals confirmed the BSE infection and the atypical Western blot profile was maintained in all animals. Samples from these animals are now being examined in order to be able to describe the pathogenesis and agent distribution for these novel BSE types. Conclusions: A pilot study using a commercially avaialble BSE rapid test ELISA revealed an essential restriction of PrPSc to the central nervous system for both atypical BSE forms. A much more detailed analysis for PrPSc and infectivity is still ongoing.


http://www.isid.org/14th_icid/



http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/IMED2009_AbstrAuth.pdf



http://www.isid.org/publications/ICID_Archive.shtml



14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -

Final Abstract Number: ISE.114

Session: International Scientific Exchange

Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America

update October 2009

T. Singeltary

Bacliff, TX, USA

Background:

An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.

Methods:

12 years independent research of available data

Results:

I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.

Conclusion:

I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.


http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/14th_ICID_ISE_Abstracts.pdf




To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.

http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2




please see full text ;

Wednesday, March 31, 2010

Atypical BSE in Cattle


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/03/atypical-bse-in-cattle-position-post.html





END...TSS




----- Original Message -----
From: Williams, Monica
To: flounder9@verizon.net
Cc: Williams, Monica
Sent: Friday, June 18, 2010 9:59 AM
Subject: Freedom of Information Act


Mr. Terry Singeltary, Sr.:



This is in response to your May 10, 2010, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request concerning the results of Project Number 3625-32000-086-05, Study of Atypical BSE, and whether it is necessary to change SRM removal due to any different tissue infectivity distribution. Your request was logged in and assigned FOIA No. 10-93.



In searching for records responsive to your request, we discovered that our Agricultural Research Information System (ARIS) database contained incorrect information. The ARIS database incorrectly linked the same progress report to Project Numbers 3625-32000-086-05S and 3625-32000-086-04S, which resulted in inaccurate information being reported for the Study of Atypical BSE. This discrepancy was reported to the managing office and has been resolved.



We are providing the link to our website for the correct progress report for Project Number 3625-32000-086-05, Study of Atypical BSE, which documents research conducted under a Specific Cooperative Agreement between the Agricultural Research Service and the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory. Additional details of research can be found in the report for the parent Project 3625-32000-086-00D, Transmission, Differentiation, and Pathobiology of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies.



To view the progress report, click or copy and paste the URL into your browser window:

http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?ACCN_NO=408490&showpars=true&fy=2009.




We hope this information is helpful. If you need further assistance, please contact me at 301-504-1640 or via e-mail at monica.williams@ars.usda.gov.



Sincerely,



Monica Williams

FOIA Office, REE USDA

5601 Sunnyside Avenue

Building 1-2248, Mail Stop #5128

Beltsville, MD 20705-5128
monica.williams@ars.usda.gov

Telephone: 301-504-1640

Facsimile: 301-504-1647

===============================================================




P.9.21

Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada

Jianmin Yang1, Sandor Dudas2, Catherine Graham2, Markus Czub3, Tim McAllister1, Stefanie Czub1 1Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre, Canada; 2National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3University of Calgary, Canada

Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been detected in Canadian cattle.

Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16 Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated PrPres. Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis.

Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal- specific antibodies bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth band in the Canadian H-type BSE.

Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. *It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.


http://www.prion2009.com/sites/default/files/Prion2009_Book_of_Abstracts.pdf






Thursday, November 18, 2010

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS GALEN J. NIEHUES FAKED MAD COW FEED TEST ON 92 BSE INSPECTION REPORTS FOR APPROXIMATELY 100 CATTLE OPERATIONS


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/united-states-of-america-vs-galen-j.html





Monday, November 22, 2010

Atypical transmissible spongiform encephalopathies in ruminants: a challenge for disease surveillance and control

REVIEW ARTICLES


http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2010/11/atypical-transmissible-spongiform.html





TSS

Labels: , , , ,

Thursday, January 14, 2010

SAMPLE COLLECTION FROM CATTLE UNDER THE BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) ONGOING SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM FSIS NOTICE 05-10 1/12/10

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE WASHINGTON, DC

FSIS NOTICE

05-10 1/12/10

DISTRIBUTION: Electronic NOTICE EXPIRES: 2/1/11 OPI: OPPD

NOTE: THIS NOTICE REISSUES CONTENT FROM FSIS NOTICE 103-08

SAMPLE COLLECTION FROM CATTLE UNDER THE BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) ONGOING SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM

I. PURPOSE This notice provides the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) inspection program personnel with instructions regarding the collection of brain samples for the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service’s (APHIS) Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) ongoing surveillance plan.

II. DEFINITION OF NEW COLLECTION PROCEDURES

A. Approved Alternative Off-Site Sample Collection

1. APHIS will provide for the collection of brain (obex) samples from an allocated number of cattle 30 months and older condemned for any reason on ante-mortem inspection, and from cattle of any age displaying Central Nervous System (CNS) symptoms, at federally-inspected slaughter establishments that have agreements with APHIS under the approved alternative off-site sample collection program.

2. At such establishments, FSIS inspection program personnel will not collect brain samples. They will provide the following to plant management:

a. condemn tag (Z-tag) numbers (not the Z-tag itself); and

b. disposition information (i.e., the reason for condemnation under 9 CFR Part 309).

B. Brain Sample Collection of Cattle Displaying CNS Symptoms

1. At Federally-inspected establishments not under the approved alternative off-site sample collection program, FSIS Public Health Veterinarians (PHVs):

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a. will collect appropriate BSE samples from cattle of all ages that display CNS symptoms, or

b. will not collect the samples for BSE testing if the slaughter establishment has made or plans to make arrangements with APHIS, whereby the samples from cattle condemned for CNS symptoms will be collected at a location other than on the official plant premises.

2. Certain Alternative Off-Site Agreements that were in place during Enhanced Surveillance may no longer be in effect and establishments will need to initiate new agreements with APHIS and potential collectors.

III. FSIS PERSONNEL RESPONSIBILITIES

A. Upon receipt of this notice, the FSIS PHV is to hold an awareness meeting with the establishment. At this meeting, the FSIS PHV should ask the management whether:

1. it is under APHIS’ approved alternative off-site sample collection program for collecting allocated samples (paragraph II. A.); and

2. if not, whether:

a. FSIS is to collect brain samples from cattle displaying CNS symptoms (paragraph II. B. 1.a.); or

b. the establishment needs time to engage in making arrangements with APHIS for the off-site brain sample collection of such cattle (paragraph II. B. 1. b.).

B. If during the awareness meeting establishment management states that it plans to work with APHIS to begin off-site sampling, until APHIS approves that arrangement, or until FSIS is advised that an off-site agreement will not be forthcoming, FSIS PHVs are to:

1. identify all CNS animals condemned on ante-mortem with a "U. S. Condemned” tag;

2. contact the APHIS Area Veterinarian-In-Charge (AVIC) so the AVIC can collect the brain sample;

3. ensure that the animals are humanely euthanized, unless APHIS requests otherwise; and

4. not allow them to move off the premise of the establishment, unless APHIS requests otherwise.

C. In a memorandum of interview (MOI), the FSIS PHV is to document who was present at the awareness meeting, the date and time of the meeting, how the

3

establishment plans to proceed based on the choices set out in A. above, and any documents shared with management.

D. If the establishment plans to work with APHIS to begin off-site sampling, the FSIS PHV is to update the MOI as to whether an agreement was reached and in general, what the agreement was.

E. The FSIS PHV is to maintain a copy of the memorandum of interview in the official government file, provide a copy to the plant management, and electronically mail a copy to the APHIS AVIC as changes occur.

IV. FSIS RESPONSIBILITIES RELATED TO APPROVED ALTERNATIVE OFF-SITE SAMPLE COLLECTION

A. The FSIS PHV is to complete the condemnation form, FSIS Form 6000-13 (Certification of Ante-mortem or Post-mortem Disposition of Tagged Animals) and FSIS Form 6150-1 (Identification Tag – Ante-mortem). The FSIS PHV should pay special attention when providing a full description of the reason for the condemnation on FSIS Form 6000-13 and fill out fully FSIS Form 6150-1.

B. Incoming animal identification, except the Z-tag, should be left on these animals since it will be needed at the approved alternative off-site collection location to fill out collection forms. Z-tags will be removed prior to any carcasses leaving the official establishment.

NOTE: Information supplied to plant management to take to the approved alternative off-site collection sites needs to be complete and accurate. FSIS PHVs need to provide a full description of the reason for the condemnation on FSIS Form 6000-13, APHIS will use this information to triage which condemned animals are sampled.

V. FSIS SAMPLE COLLECTION FOR CATTLE DISPLAYING CNS SYMPTOMS

A. If the establishment does not have an agreement with APHIS for off-site sampling of cattle with CNS symptoms, the FSIS PHV will collect the brain samples from cattle showing signs of CNS symptoms. The FSIS PHV is to make all final disposition decisions regarding whether to condemn cattle in accordance with 9 CFR part 309.

NOTE: FSIS PHVs can also find information regarding BSE sampling (e.g., forms, sampling supply information) at:

//Outlook Public Folders/All PublicFolders/ OPPD/PDD/BSE_Training_Info/

B. The FSIS PHV, or the establishment under the supervision of the FSIS PHV, should promptly remove the head in order to collect the brain sample. If the establishment does not arrange to remove the head, the FSIS PHV may need to collect the brain sample as a priority over other ante-mortem or post-mortem procedures.

C. The FSIS PHV should collect the brain sample either in the inedible area of the establishment or in another area set aside for such collection to prevent the creation of

4

an insanitary condition. Establishment personnel and FSIS inspection program personnel are to take proper sanitary measures before returning to edible areas of the establishment after brain sample collection, in accordance with 9 CFR 416.5.

D. In situations where the FSIS PHV has missed the last FedEx pick-up for the day, or the FSIS PHV collected the sample on a day when FedEx does not pick up, the PHV is to refrigerate the samples until the next available FedEx pick-up day. Remember, the sample is not to pass through or to be stored in areas of the establishment where the establishment produces edible product. The FSIS PHV is to maintain the sample’s chain-of-custody.

E. The FSIS PHV is to verify the collection, documentation, and control of all animal identification associated with cattle condemned during ante-mortem inspection that are to be sampled by FSIS. The FSIS PHV is to attach the “U. S. Condemned” tag to cattle condemned during ante-mortem inspection in accordance with 9 CFR 309.13. This documentation will facilitate traceback in the event that the sample result is positive for BSE. The documentation should include records in accordance with 9 CFR 320.1.

F. The FSIS PHV is to verify that the presence of condemned cattle or parts does not create insanitary conditions (9 CFR part 416). The establishment is responsible for the disposal of the condemned cattle in accordance with 9 CFR part 314. The FSIS PHV also is to verify that the establishment maintains records regarding the disposal of the condemned cattle in accordance with 9 CFR 320.1.

G. Inspection program personnel may inform the establishment that it may choose to hold the carcass and parts until testing results are available. If the establishment chooses to dispose of any carcass or parts before it receives test results, inspection program personnel are to advise the establishment that it must dispose of the carcass in one of the following ways:

1. render it at a facility for non-animal feed use (e.g., biofuel or cement);

2. alkaline digestion;

3. incineration; or

4. lined land fills.

H. Documentation for Cattle Showing Signs of CNS Symptoms

1. For locations without high-speed internet connections, the FSIS PHV is to forward the completed BSE Surveillance Information System (BSE-SIS) sample collection sheets to the APHIS,VS office by FAX or by e-mail. The follow site lists the VS office FAX numbers and e-mail where available:

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/import_export/downloads/vsavic.pdf


2. The APHIS AVIC in each area office may assist with sample delivery verification and troubleshooting. The FSIS PHV can get copies of BSE-SIS forms by contacting the local APHIS office.

5

3. The FSIS PHV is to enter the relevant information into the BSE-SIS at locations with high-speed connections and proceed as instructed in the training materials. FSIS PHVs may get the training from AgLearn or may contact the District Office if they need a copy of the BSE Surveillance Information System (BSE-SIS) training CD and for assistance in getting permission to have access to BSE-SIS.

VI. TEST RESULTS FOR FSIS SAMPLING FROM CATTLE SHOWING CNS SYMPTOMS

A. The FSIS PHV will receive, by e-mail, a report from the AVIC on the BSE test results. The AVIC will also send copies of the results to the District Office.

B. If the test is negative (reported as “not detected”), any carcasses and parts the establishment has held may be released for rendering or other disposal in accordance with 9 CFR 314.

C. If the test is inconclusive, the FSIS PHV will receive supervisory instruction on further actions.

D. For any sample confirmed positive for BSE, the FSIS PHV is to verify that the establishment disposes of the carcasses and parts in the proper manner as set out in paragraph V. G.

VII. eADRS PROCEDURES FOR FSIS SAMPLING FROM CATTLE SHOWING CNS SYMPTOMS

A. After sampling cattle showing signs of CNS symptoms, the FSIS PHV (or designee) is to enter the relevant information for each sample into eADRS.

B. The FSIS PHV (or designee) is to enter each ante-mortem condemned animal in eADRS under the applicable pathological condition

C. For each relevant disease condition, in the “Add Daily Totals” window, the FSIS PHV is to select the “Update BSE Details” button if FSIS sampled one or more of the condemned animals for BSE. Selecting this button opens the “Update BSE Details” screen.

D. On the “Update BSE Details” screen, the FSIS PHV is to enter the number of animals sampled and the applicable “U.S. Condemned” Z-tag number for each sampled animal.

E. After entering the relevant information, the FSIS PHV is to click the “Save” button and proceed to the next disease condition.

F. For additional information on entering BSE sample information, refer to Section 7 of the eADRS User Guide.

VIII. RABIES

A. In a rare situation, such as when an animal is condemned by the FSIS PHV on ante-mortem for rabies, the FSIS PHV should contact their District Office, who will advise APHIS. In these cases, APHIS will see that the animal is tested for rabies. APHIS will work with the laboratory to get appropriate samples forwarded for BSE surveillance from rabies negative animals.

B. Rabies booster vaccination for PHVs collecting BSE samples is still highly recommended. PHVs can be reimbursed for rabies vaccinations or boosters. Rabies vaccinations are volunatry. Only PHVs who are actually involved with BSE sample collection will be eligible for reimbursement on the vaccination series. PHVs should make arrangements for the vaccinations with their private physician. PHVs should contact their Front-line supervisor for approval on reimbursement prior to beginning the three shot vaccination series.

Refer questions regarding this notice to the Policy Development Division through askFSIS at http://askfsis.custhelp.com or by telephone at 1-800-233-3935.

Assistant Administrator Office of Policy and Program Development

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/rdad/FSISNotices/05-10.pdf


REITERATION OF POLICY REGARDING THE REMOVAL OF LINGUAL AND PALATINE TONSILS FROM BEEF TONGUES AND BEEF MARKET HEADS FSIS NOTICE 04-10 1/12/10

FSIS NOTICE

04-10 1/12/10

DISTRIBUTION: Electronic

NOTICE EXPIRES: 2/1/11 OPI: OPPD

NOTE: THIS NOTICE REISSUES CONTENT FROM FSIS NOTICE 99-08

REITERATION OF POLICY REGARDING THE REMOVAL OF LINGUAL AND PALATINE TONSILS FROM BEEF TONGUES AND BEEF MARKET HEADS

This notice reminds inspection program personnel (IPP) that the tonsils from cattle of all ages are among the materials identified as specified risk materials (SRMs) under 9 CFR 310.22(a). Lingual and palatine tonsils must be removed from finished product per FSIS Directive 6100.4. See attachment 1 for related questions and answers.

IPP may review pictures and guidance materials on removal of lingual and palatine tonsils from tongues and beef market heads at the following link:

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/About_FSIS/Technical_Service_Center/index.asp#SRM


IPP are to continue to verify that establishments are properly addressing removal of SRMs, including lingual and palatine tonsils, as set out in FSIS Directive 6100.4, Verification Instructions Related to Specified Risk Materials. See attachment 2 of this notice or the above link to access a helpful tool for use when verifying the requirements of 9 CFR 310.22. To verify that the establishment has in place adequate head dressing procedures to remove the designated lingual and palatine tonsils from beef tongues and beef market heads, off-line IPP are to include direct observation of the plant’s tonsil removal procedures and finished product (processed beef tongues and market heads prior to packaging) on a regular and recurring basis whenever HACCP 01 and 02 procedures are scheduled. Off-line inspectors are to effect a regulatory control action in accordance with 9 CFR 500.2 if the establishment is observed not properly removing tonsils. The regulatory control action is to remain in place until the establishment has implemented effective corrective actions.

Refer questions regarding this notice to the Policy Development Division through askFSIS at http://askfsis.custhelp.com or by telephone at 1-800-233-3935.

Assistant Administrator Office of Policy and Program Development

SNIP...SEE FULL TEXT ;

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/rdad/FSISNotices/04-10.pdf


Audit Report

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program – Phase II

and

Food Safety and Inspection Service

Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III

Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006

Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle Still Remain

Our prior report identified a number of inherent problems in identifying and testing high-risk cattle. We reported that the challenges in identifying the universe of high-risk cattle, as well as the need to design procedures to obtain an appropriate representation of samples, was critical to the success of the BSE surveillance program. The surveillance program was designed to target nonambulatory cattle, cattle showing signs of CNS disease (including cattle testing negative for rabies), cattle showing signs not inconsistent with BSE, and dead cattle. Although APHIS designed procedures to ensure FSIS condemned cattle were sampled and made a concerted effort for outreach to obtain targeted samples, industry practices not considered in the design of the surveillance program reduced assurance that targeted animals were tested for BSE.

In our prior report, we recommended that APHIS work with public health and State diagnostic laboratories to develop and test rabies-negative samples for BSE. This target group is important for determining the prevalence of BSE in the United States because rabies cases exhibit clinical signs not inconsistent with BSE; a negative rabies test means the cause of the clinical signs has not been diagnosed.

APHIS agreed with our recommendation and initiated an outreach program with the American Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians, as well as State laboratories. APHIS also agreed to do ongoing monitoring to ensure samples were obtained from this target population.

Although APHIS increased the samples tested from this target group as compared to prior years, we found that conflicting APHIS instructions on the ages of cattle to test resulted in inconsistencies in what samples were submitted for BSE testing. Therefore, some laboratories did not refer their rabies negative samples to APHIS in order to maximize the number tested for this critical target population. In addition, APHIS did not monitor the number of submissions of rabies negative samples for BSE testing from specific laboratories.

snip...

An NVSL official stated that APHIS is not concerned with rabies negatives samples from cattle less than 30 months of age. This position, however, is contrary to APHIS’ published target population.

Our prior audit recognized the significant challenge for APHIS to obtain samples from some high-risk populations because of the inherent problems with obtaining voluntary compliance and transporting the carcasses for testing. USDA issued rules to prohibit nonambulatory animals (downers) from entering the food supply at inspected slaughterhouses. OIG recommended, and the International Review Subcommittee33 emphasized, that USDA should take additional steps to assure that facilitated pathways exist for dead and nonambulatory cattle to allow for the collection of samples and proper disposal of carcasses. Between June 1, 2004, and May 31, 2005, the APHIS database documents 27,617 samples were collected showing a reason for submission of nonambulatory and 325,225 samples were collected with reason of submission showing "dead."

APHIS made extensive outreach efforts to notify producers and private veterinarians of the need to submit and have tested animals from these target groups. They also entered into financial arrangements with 123 renderers and other collection sites to reimburse them for costs associated with storing, transporting, and collecting samples. However, as shown in exhibit F, APHIS was not always successful in establishing agreements with non-slaughter collection sites in some States. APHIS stated that agreements do not necessarily reflect the entire universe of collection sites and that the presentation in exhibit F was incomplete because there were many collection sites without a payment involved or without a formal agreement. We note that over 90 percent of the samples collected were obtained from the 123 collection sites with agreements and; therefore, we believe agreements offer the best source to increase targeted samples in underrepresented areas.

We found that APHIS did not consider industry practices in the design of its surveillance effort to provide reasonable assurance that cattle exhibiting possible clinical signs consistent with BSE were tested. Slaughter facilities do not always accept all cattle arriving for slaughter because of their business requirements. We found that, in one State visited, slaughter facilities pre-screened and rejected cattle (sick/down/dead/others not meeting business

Downers and Cattle that Died on the Farm standards) before presentation for slaughter in areas immediately adjacent or contiguous to the official slaughter establishment. These animals were not inspected and/or observed by either FSIS or APHIS officials located at the slaughter facilities.

FSIS procedures state that they have no authority to inspect cattle not presented for slaughter. Further, APHIS officials stated they did not believe that they had the authority to go into these sorting and/or screening areas and require that the rejected animals be provided to APHIS for BSE sampling. Neither APHIS nor FSIS had any process to assure that animals left on transport vehicles and/or rejected for slaughter arrived at a collection site for BSE testing. FSIS allows slaughter facilities to designate the area of their establishment where federal inspection is performed; this is designated as the official slaughter establishment.34

We observed animals that were down or dead in pens outside the official premises that were to be picked up by renderers. Animals that were rejected by plant personnel were transported off the premises on the same vehicles that brought them to the plant.35

A policy statement36 regarding BSE sampling of condemned cattle at slaughter plants provided that effective June 1, 2004, FSIS would collect BSE samples for testing: 1) from all cattle regardless of age condemned by FSIS upon ante mortem inspection for CNS impairment, and 2) from all cattle, with the exception of veal calves, condemned by FSIS upon ante mortem inspection for any other reason.

FSIS Notice 28-04, dated May 20, 2004, informed FSIS personnel that, "FSIS will be collecting brain samples from cattle at federally-inspected establishments for the purpose of BSE testing." The notice further states that, "Cattle off-loaded from the transport vehicle onto the premises of the federally-inspected establishment (emphasis added), whether dead or alive, will be sampled by the FSIS Public Health Veterinarian (PHV) for BSE after the cattle have been condemned during ante mortem inspection. In addition, cattle passing ante mortem inspection but later found dead prior to slaughter will be condemned and be sampled by the FSIS PHV."

APHIS has the responsibility for sampling dead cattle off-loaded onto plant-owned property that is adjoining to, but not considered part of, the "official premises.37 FSIS procedures38 provide that "Dead cattle that are off-loaded to facilitate the off-loading of live animals, but that will be re-loaded onto the transport vehicle, are not subject to sampling by FSIS.

While performing our review in one State, we reviewed the circumstances at two slaughter facilities in the State that inspected and rejected unsuitable cattle before the animals entered the official receiving areas of the plants. This pre-screening activity was conducted in areas not designated by the facility as official premises of the establishment and not under the review or supervision of FSIS inspectors. The plant rejected all nonambulatory and dead/dying/sick animals delivered to the establishment. Plant personnel refused to offload any dead or downer animals to facilitate the offloading of ambulatory animals. Plant personnel said that the driver was responsible for ensuring nonambulatory animals were humanely euthanized and disposing of the carcasses of the dead animals. Plant personnel informed us that they did not want to jeopardize contracts with business partners by allowing unsuitable animals on their slaughter premises.

In the second case, one family member owned a slaughter facility while another operated a livestock sale barn adjacent to the slaughter facility. The slaughter facility was under FSIS’ supervision while the sale barn was not. Cattle sometimes arrived at the sale barn that were sick/down/dead or would die or go down while at the sale barn. According to personnel at the sale barn, these animals were left for the renderer to collect. The healthy ambulatory animals that remained were marketed to many buyers including the adjacent slaughter facility. When the slaughter facility was ready to accept the ambulatory animals for processing, the cattle would be moved from the sale barn to the slaughter facility where they were subject to FSIS’ inspection.

We requested the slaughter facilities to estimate the number of cattle rejected on a daily basis (there were no records to confirm the estimates). We visited a renderer in the area and found that the renderer had a contract with APHIS to collect samples for BSE testing. In this case, although we could not obtain assurance that all rejected cattle were sampled, the renderer processed a significant number of animals, as compared to the slaughter plants’ estimates of those rejected. Due to the close proximity (less than 5 miles) of the renderer to the slaughter facilities, and the premium it paid for dead cattle that were in good condition, there was a financial incentive for transport drivers to dispose of their dead animals at this renderer.

USDA/OIG-A/50601-10-KC Page 25

In our discussions with APHIS officials in Wisconsin and Iowa, they confirmed that there were plants in their States that also used pre-screening practices. On May 27, 2005, we requested APHIS and FSIS to provide a list of all slaughter facilities that pre-screened cattle for slaughter in locations away from the area designated as the official slaughter facility. Along with this request, we asked for information to demonstrate that either APHIS or FSIS confirmed there was a high likelihood that high-risk animals were sampled at other collection sites.

In response to our request, the APHIS BSE Program Manager stated that APHIS did not have information on slaughter plants that pre-screen or screen their animals for slaughter suitability off their official plant premises. To their knowledge, every company or producer that submits animals for slaughter pre-sorts or screens them for suitability at various locations away from the slaughter facility. For this reason, USDA focused its BSE sample collection efforts at other types of facilities such as renderers, pet food companies, landfills, and dead stock haulers. Further, in a letter to OIG on June 14, 2005, the administrators of APHIS and FSIS noted the following:

"…we believe that no specific actions are necessary or appropriate to obtain reasonable assurance that animals not presented for slaughter are being tested for BSE. There are several reasons for our position. First, we do not believe that the practice is in fact causing us to not test a significant enough number of animals in our enhanced surveillance program to invalidate the overall results. Second, OIG has concluded that because of the geographical proximity and business relationships of the various entities involved in the case investigated, there is reasonable assurance that a majority of the rejected cattle had been sampled. Third, it is also important to remember that the goal of the enhanced surveillance program is to test a sufficient number of animals to allow us to draw conclusions about the level of BSE (if any) in the American herd…We believe that the number we may be not testing because of the "pre-sorting" practice does not rise to a significant level. The number of animals tested to date has far exceeded expectations, so it is reasonable to infer that there are few of the animals in question, or that we are testing them at some other point in the process…APHIS estimated…there were approximately 446,000 high risk cattle…[and APHIS has]…tested over 375,000 animals in less than 1 year. This indicated that we are missing few animals in the high-risk population, including those that might be pre-sorted before entering a slaughter facility’s property."

snip...

APHIS notes that for the current surveillance program, it had established regional goals and APHIS was not trying to meet particular sampling levels in particular States. However, we believe that it would be advantageous for APHIS to monitor collection data and increase outreach when large geographical areas such as the above States do not provide samples in proportion to the numbers and types of cattle in the population.

We also disagree with APHIS/FSIS’ contention that because they have tested over 375,000 of their 446,000 estimate of high risk cattle, few in the high-risk population are being missed, including those that might be pre-screened before entering a slaughter facility’s property. In our prior audit, we reported that APHIS underestimated the high-risk population; we found that this estimate should have been closer to 1 million animals (see Finding 1). We recognize that BSE samples are provided on a voluntary basis; however, APHIS should consider industry practice in any further maintenance surveillance effort. Animals unsuitable for slaughter exhibiting symptoms not inconsistent with BSE should be sampled and their clinical signs recorded. However, this cited industry practice results in rejected animals not being made available to either APHIS or FSIS veterinarians for their observation and identification of clinical signs exhibited ante mortem. Although these animals may be sampled later at other collection sites, the animals are provided post mortem without information as to relevant clinical signs exhibited ante mortem. For these reasons, we believe APHIS needs to

USDA/OIG-A/50601-10-KC Page 27

observe these animals ante mortem when possible to assure the animals from the target population are ultimately sampled and the clinical signs evaluated.

snip...

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf


Subject: USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half (bogus BSE sampling FROM HEALTHY USDA CATTLE)

Date: June 21, 2007 at 2:49 pm PST

Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program

An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduledfor May 2007.

snip...

Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1 include:

soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS), implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),

snip...

The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are completed.

4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf


http://stanford.wellsphere.com/cjd-article/usda-certified-h-base-mad-cow-school-lunch-program/641216


http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/02/usda-certified-h-base-mad-cow-school.html


http://downercattle.blogspot.com/


Office of the United States Attorney District of Arizona

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE For Information Contact Public Affairs

February 16, 2007 WYN HORNBUCKLE Telephone: (602) 514-7625Cell: (602) 525-2681

CORPORATION AND ITS PRESIDENT PLEAD GUILTY TO DEFRAUDING GOVERNMENT’S MAD COW DISEASESURVEILLANCE PROGRAM

snip...

Evidence uncovered during the government’s investigation established that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population. Specifically, FarmFresh Meats and Farabee submitted, or caused to be submitted, obex samples from healthy, USDA inspected cattle, in order to steal government moneys.

Evidence collected also demonstrated that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee failed to maintain cattle carcasses and heads pending test results and falsified corporate books and records to conceal their malfeasance. Such actions, to the extent an obex sample tested positive (fortunately, none did), could have jeopardized the USDA’s ability to identify the diseased animal and pinpoint its place of origin.

snip...

Sentencing is set before Judge Earl H. Carroll on May 14, 2007. The investigation in this case was conducted by Assistant Special Agent in Charge Alejandro Quintero, United States Department ofAgriculture, Office of Inspector General. The prosecutionis being handled by Robert Long, Assistant U.S. Attorney, District ofArizona, Phoenix.CASE NUMBER: CR-07-00160-PHX-EHC RELEASE NUMBER: 2007-051(Farabee)# # #

http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/az/press_releases/2007/2007-051(Farabee).pdf


Thursday, June 26, 2008

Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/06/texas-firm-recalls-cattle-heads-that.html


Saturday, April 5, 2008

SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS KANSAS

http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/04/srm-mad-cow-recall-406-thousand-pounds.html


Tuesday, July 1, 2008

Missouri Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/07/missouri-firm-recalls-cattle-heads-that.html


Friday, August 8, 2008

Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs 941,271 pounds with tonsils not completely removed

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/08/texas-firm-recalls-cattle-heads-that.html


Thursday, October 15, 2009

Nebraska Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, Oct 15, 2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/10/nebraska-firm-recalls-beef-tongues-that.html


Sunday, October 18, 2009

Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, October 17, 2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/10/wisconsin-firm-recalls-beef-tongues.html


Friday, September 4, 2009

FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/09/foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html


Saturday, August 29, 2009

FOIA REQUEST FEED RECALL 2009 Product may have contained prohibited materials Bulk Whole Barley, Recall # V-256-2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/08/foia-request-feed-recall-2009-product.html


C O N F I R M E D

----- Original Message ----- From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." To: Sent: Thursday, November 05, 2009 9:25 PM Subject: [BSE-L] re-FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009 and Recall # V-256-2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/11/re-foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html


Thursday, November 12, 2009

BSE FEED RECALL Misbranding of product by partial label removal to hide original source of materials 2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-feed-recall-misbranding-of-product.html


Thursday, March 19, 2009

MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html


http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/


Sunday, September 6, 2009

MAD COW USA 1997 SECRET VIDEO

SEE ANOTHER VIDEO THAT SHOWED IN CANADA, BUT NOT USA, ABOUT ANOTHER USA TSE COVER-UP MORE BRAINS NOT TESTED PROPERLY, key brain parts missing. ...

http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2009/09/mad-cow-usa-1997-video.html


SEE THIS DAMNING VIDEO AT BOTTOM OF ;

Monday, July 27, 2009

U.S.A. HIDING MAD COW DISEASE VICTIMS AS SPORADIC CJD ?

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2009/07/usa-hiding-mad-cow-disease-victims-as.html


DAMNING TESTIMONY FROM STANLEY PRUSINER THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE WINNER ON PRIONS SPEAKING ABOUT ANN VENEMAN

''nobody has ever ask''

''they dont want our comment''

''they don't want to know, the don't care''

''i have tried repeatedly''

''level of absolute ignorance''

''Entire policy was driven...heard from mr. laycraft, so now, after time has passed, it's ok for Canada, cattle under 30 month, to the USA, THAT'S ALL THAT MATTERED!

PRUSINER ASKED : IF FROM YOUR TESTIMONY, A DEMONSTRATED THREAT TO PUBLIC HEATH ?

''yes, i think prions are bad to eat, and you can die from them''


http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/prusinerclip.html


2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html


Monday, October 19, 2009

Atypical BSE, BSE, and other human and animal TSE in North America Update October 19, 2009

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/10/atypical-bse-bse-and-other-human-and.html


Monday, November 23, 2009

BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS UPDATE NOVEMBER 23, 2009 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND O.I.E.

http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-gbr-risk-assessments-update.html


Monday, May 12, 2008 BSE YOUNGEST AGE STATISTICS UNDER 30 MONTHS

the myth that cattle under 30 months of age are free from BSE/TSE is just that, a myth, and it's a false myth !

Information released on 2 February 2005 Summary of information requested What statistics are available on cattle less than 30 months of age found to have BSE? Information released VLA has recorded approximately 100 cases of BSE in cattle of 30 months of age or under during the entire period of the BSE epidemic (1986 - 2005). The figure is approximate as for 51 of these the age is only estimated. This is because farmers did not have accurate documentation to confirm birth date. This was not a requirement at the time. We can confirm that of the 100 cases, 49 were under 30 months of age, of these the youngest case was 20 months old.

http://www.defra.gov.uk/vla/vla/vla_ati_020205.htm


Youngest confirmed case 20 Months, Oldest confirmed case 22 Years, Data valid to 01 April 2008

http://www.defra.gov.uk/vla/science/docs/sci_tse_stats_gen.pdf


BSE Youngest and oldest cases by year of onset - GB 20 months, 21 months, (8) 24 months, see complete list of younger than 30 month ;

http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/otmbsestatistics.pdf


BSE Youngest Japan 21 months, 23 months

http://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/ehpm/10/3/130/_pdf


The implications of the Swiss result for Britain, which has had the most BSE, are complex. Only cattle aged 30 months or younger are eaten in Britain, on the assumption, based on feeding trials, that cattle of that age, even if they were infected as calves, have not yet accumulated enough prions to be infectious. But the youngest cow to develop BSE on record in Britain was 20 months old, showing some are fast incubators. Models predict that 200-300 cattle under 30 months per year are infected with BSE and enter the food chain currently in Britain. Of these 3-5 could be fast incubators and carrying detectable quantities of prion.

http://www.sare.org/sanet-mg/archives/html-home/28-html/0359.html


FULL TEXT ;

http://flounder068.vox.com/library/post/bse-youngest-age-statistics-under-30-months.html


http://bseyoungestage.blogspot.com/


PLoS ONE. 2008; 3(8): e2969. Published online 2008 August 13. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0002969. PMCID: PMC2493038

Copyright This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Public Domain declaration which stipulates that, once placed in the public domain, this work may be freely reproduced, distributed, transmitted, modified, built upon, or otherwise used by anyone for any lawful purpose.


Prion Infected Meat-and-Bone Meal Is Still Infectious after Biodiesel Production


http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2493038/


SEE FULL TEXT ;

Monday, November 16, 2009

CANADA, USA, specified risk materials (SRMs), Environment, Fertilizer, AND Politics, just more BSe


http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2009/11/canada-usa-specified-risk-materials.html


The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.

http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf


Tuesday, July 14, 2009

U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary and BSE Red Book Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST

WHERE did we go wrong $$$

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/07/us-emergency-bovine-spongiform.html


Saturday, January 2, 2010

Human Prion Diseases in the United States January 1, 2010 ***FINAL***

http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/01/human-prion-diseases-in-united-states.html


my comments to PLosone here ;

http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action?inReplyTo=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fannotation%2F04ce2b24-613d-46e6-9802-4131e2bfa6fd&root=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fannotation%2F04ce2b24-613d-46e6-9802-4131e2bfa6fd


TSS

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Wednesday, January 28, 2009

TAFS1 Position Paper on Slaughter Practices and the Dangers of Carcase Contamination with BSE

TAFS POSITION PAPER ON SLAUGHTER PRACTICES AND THE DANGERS OF CARCASE CONTAMINATION WITH BSE (January 09, 2004)

The recognition of BSE in any country generates concerns about the safety of beef. The issues of concern are discussed in this position paper, and indicate that subject to appropriate risk reduction measures beef can be consumed safely in all countries. TAFS Position Paper - Slaughter Practices and the Dangers of Carcase Contaminationwith BSE (157 kB) ?????????BSE ????????? TAFS ?????????

TAFS

INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TSE AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation

(January 9, 2004)

TAFS1 Position Paper on Slaughter Practices and the Dangers of Carcase Contamination with BSE

This note focuses specifically on methods currently, or recently, used to slaughter cattle and then to subsequently dress the carcase in preparation for human consumption. It considers the likelihood that the processing can increase risk to consumers of exposure to the BSE agent through consumption of bovine products, and changes to working practices that have been introduced to remove or reduce that risk.

The text relates primarily to practices that are in place in Europe, but can be used for consideration of the risks arising from related procedures in other parts of the world.

Although the document deals with potential risks associated with BSE, there is a need for a balanced approach to the evaluation of risks and the implementation of protective measures in any particular country. The cost of implementation can be massive, and cause severe disruption to slaughterhouses and allied industries. Therefore the extent to which measures are introduced should take into account the real risk to consumers in that country, and the degree of risk reduction offered by the solution(s) chosen.

The note does not address the ethical issues surrounding individual methods. It deals only with BSE related issues, and only with cattle.


How are cattle stunned?



snip...

please see full text ;

http://www.tafsforum.org/position_papers/TAFS_POSITION_PAPER_ON%20SLAUGHTER_.pdf



course tam et al figured this out a long time ago ;

-------- Original Message -------- Subject: Docket #03-025IF -- Docket #03-038IF -- Docket #01-033DF -- SUBMISSIONS -- USDA ISSUES NEW REGULATIONS TO ADDRESS BSE Date: Thu, 08 Jan 2004 15:33:20 -0600 From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." To: fdadockets@oc.fda.gov CC: Freas@cber.FDA.gov

Greetings FDA,

I would kindly like to make a submission to Federal Docket Docket #03-025IF -- Docket #03-038IF and Docket #01-033DF -- TSS SUBMISSIONS -- USDA ISSUES NEW REGULATIONS TO ADDRESS BSE

Garland et al (1996). “Brain emboli in the lungs of cattle after stunning,” Lancet 348(9027), p. 610.).

end...tss

see full text ;


https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/regpublic.nsf/0/eff9eff1f7c5cf2b87256ecf000df08d?OpenDocument



The injection of air through the stun bolt has the potential to significantly increase the risk. Occasionally, samples of brain material, visible to the naked eye, have been identified lodged in tissues that receive blood after passing through the heart (usually lodged in lung or occasionally liver).(Garland, et al, 1996; Garland, 1996; Munro, 1997; Taylor, 1996).


http://www.tafsforum.org/position_papers/TAFS_POSITION_PAPER_ON%20SLAUGHTER_.pdf



Wednesday, January 28, 2009

TAFS1 Position Paper on Specified Risk Materials (January, 2009) TAFS INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation(January 2009)TAFS1 Position Paper on Specified Risk Materials


http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2009/01/tafs1-position-paper-on-specified-risk.html


TSS

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