Thursday, January 14, 2010

SAMPLE COLLECTION FROM CATTLE UNDER THE BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) ONGOING SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM FSIS NOTICE 05-10 1/12/10

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE WASHINGTON, DC

FSIS NOTICE

05-10 1/12/10

DISTRIBUTION: Electronic NOTICE EXPIRES: 2/1/11 OPI: OPPD

NOTE: THIS NOTICE REISSUES CONTENT FROM FSIS NOTICE 103-08

SAMPLE COLLECTION FROM CATTLE UNDER THE BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) ONGOING SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM

I. PURPOSE This notice provides the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) inspection program personnel with instructions regarding the collection of brain samples for the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service’s (APHIS) Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) ongoing surveillance plan.

II. DEFINITION OF NEW COLLECTION PROCEDURES

A. Approved Alternative Off-Site Sample Collection

1. APHIS will provide for the collection of brain (obex) samples from an allocated number of cattle 30 months and older condemned for any reason on ante-mortem inspection, and from cattle of any age displaying Central Nervous System (CNS) symptoms, at federally-inspected slaughter establishments that have agreements with APHIS under the approved alternative off-site sample collection program.

2. At such establishments, FSIS inspection program personnel will not collect brain samples. They will provide the following to plant management:

a. condemn tag (Z-tag) numbers (not the Z-tag itself); and

b. disposition information (i.e., the reason for condemnation under 9 CFR Part 309).

B. Brain Sample Collection of Cattle Displaying CNS Symptoms

1. At Federally-inspected establishments not under the approved alternative off-site sample collection program, FSIS Public Health Veterinarians (PHVs):

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a. will collect appropriate BSE samples from cattle of all ages that display CNS symptoms, or

b. will not collect the samples for BSE testing if the slaughter establishment has made or plans to make arrangements with APHIS, whereby the samples from cattle condemned for CNS symptoms will be collected at a location other than on the official plant premises.

2. Certain Alternative Off-Site Agreements that were in place during Enhanced Surveillance may no longer be in effect and establishments will need to initiate new agreements with APHIS and potential collectors.

III. FSIS PERSONNEL RESPONSIBILITIES

A. Upon receipt of this notice, the FSIS PHV is to hold an awareness meeting with the establishment. At this meeting, the FSIS PHV should ask the management whether:

1. it is under APHIS’ approved alternative off-site sample collection program for collecting allocated samples (paragraph II. A.); and

2. if not, whether:

a. FSIS is to collect brain samples from cattle displaying CNS symptoms (paragraph II. B. 1.a.); or

b. the establishment needs time to engage in making arrangements with APHIS for the off-site brain sample collection of such cattle (paragraph II. B. 1. b.).

B. If during the awareness meeting establishment management states that it plans to work with APHIS to begin off-site sampling, until APHIS approves that arrangement, or until FSIS is advised that an off-site agreement will not be forthcoming, FSIS PHVs are to:

1. identify all CNS animals condemned on ante-mortem with a "U. S. Condemned” tag;

2. contact the APHIS Area Veterinarian-In-Charge (AVIC) so the AVIC can collect the brain sample;

3. ensure that the animals are humanely euthanized, unless APHIS requests otherwise; and

4. not allow them to move off the premise of the establishment, unless APHIS requests otherwise.

C. In a memorandum of interview (MOI), the FSIS PHV is to document who was present at the awareness meeting, the date and time of the meeting, how the

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establishment plans to proceed based on the choices set out in A. above, and any documents shared with management.

D. If the establishment plans to work with APHIS to begin off-site sampling, the FSIS PHV is to update the MOI as to whether an agreement was reached and in general, what the agreement was.

E. The FSIS PHV is to maintain a copy of the memorandum of interview in the official government file, provide a copy to the plant management, and electronically mail a copy to the APHIS AVIC as changes occur.

IV. FSIS RESPONSIBILITIES RELATED TO APPROVED ALTERNATIVE OFF-SITE SAMPLE COLLECTION

A. The FSIS PHV is to complete the condemnation form, FSIS Form 6000-13 (Certification of Ante-mortem or Post-mortem Disposition of Tagged Animals) and FSIS Form 6150-1 (Identification Tag – Ante-mortem). The FSIS PHV should pay special attention when providing a full description of the reason for the condemnation on FSIS Form 6000-13 and fill out fully FSIS Form 6150-1.

B. Incoming animal identification, except the Z-tag, should be left on these animals since it will be needed at the approved alternative off-site collection location to fill out collection forms. Z-tags will be removed prior to any carcasses leaving the official establishment.

NOTE: Information supplied to plant management to take to the approved alternative off-site collection sites needs to be complete and accurate. FSIS PHVs need to provide a full description of the reason for the condemnation on FSIS Form 6000-13, APHIS will use this information to triage which condemned animals are sampled.

V. FSIS SAMPLE COLLECTION FOR CATTLE DISPLAYING CNS SYMPTOMS

A. If the establishment does not have an agreement with APHIS for off-site sampling of cattle with CNS symptoms, the FSIS PHV will collect the brain samples from cattle showing signs of CNS symptoms. The FSIS PHV is to make all final disposition decisions regarding whether to condemn cattle in accordance with 9 CFR part 309.

NOTE: FSIS PHVs can also find information regarding BSE sampling (e.g., forms, sampling supply information) at:

//Outlook Public Folders/All PublicFolders/ OPPD/PDD/BSE_Training_Info/

B. The FSIS PHV, or the establishment under the supervision of the FSIS PHV, should promptly remove the head in order to collect the brain sample. If the establishment does not arrange to remove the head, the FSIS PHV may need to collect the brain sample as a priority over other ante-mortem or post-mortem procedures.

C. The FSIS PHV should collect the brain sample either in the inedible area of the establishment or in another area set aside for such collection to prevent the creation of

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an insanitary condition. Establishment personnel and FSIS inspection program personnel are to take proper sanitary measures before returning to edible areas of the establishment after brain sample collection, in accordance with 9 CFR 416.5.

D. In situations where the FSIS PHV has missed the last FedEx pick-up for the day, or the FSIS PHV collected the sample on a day when FedEx does not pick up, the PHV is to refrigerate the samples until the next available FedEx pick-up day. Remember, the sample is not to pass through or to be stored in areas of the establishment where the establishment produces edible product. The FSIS PHV is to maintain the sample’s chain-of-custody.

E. The FSIS PHV is to verify the collection, documentation, and control of all animal identification associated with cattle condemned during ante-mortem inspection that are to be sampled by FSIS. The FSIS PHV is to attach the “U. S. Condemned” tag to cattle condemned during ante-mortem inspection in accordance with 9 CFR 309.13. This documentation will facilitate traceback in the event that the sample result is positive for BSE. The documentation should include records in accordance with 9 CFR 320.1.

F. The FSIS PHV is to verify that the presence of condemned cattle or parts does not create insanitary conditions (9 CFR part 416). The establishment is responsible for the disposal of the condemned cattle in accordance with 9 CFR part 314. The FSIS PHV also is to verify that the establishment maintains records regarding the disposal of the condemned cattle in accordance with 9 CFR 320.1.

G. Inspection program personnel may inform the establishment that it may choose to hold the carcass and parts until testing results are available. If the establishment chooses to dispose of any carcass or parts before it receives test results, inspection program personnel are to advise the establishment that it must dispose of the carcass in one of the following ways:

1. render it at a facility for non-animal feed use (e.g., biofuel or cement);

2. alkaline digestion;

3. incineration; or

4. lined land fills.

H. Documentation for Cattle Showing Signs of CNS Symptoms

1. For locations without high-speed internet connections, the FSIS PHV is to forward the completed BSE Surveillance Information System (BSE-SIS) sample collection sheets to the APHIS,VS office by FAX or by e-mail. The follow site lists the VS office FAX numbers and e-mail where available:

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/import_export/downloads/vsavic.pdf


2. The APHIS AVIC in each area office may assist with sample delivery verification and troubleshooting. The FSIS PHV can get copies of BSE-SIS forms by contacting the local APHIS office.

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3. The FSIS PHV is to enter the relevant information into the BSE-SIS at locations with high-speed connections and proceed as instructed in the training materials. FSIS PHVs may get the training from AgLearn or may contact the District Office if they need a copy of the BSE Surveillance Information System (BSE-SIS) training CD and for assistance in getting permission to have access to BSE-SIS.

VI. TEST RESULTS FOR FSIS SAMPLING FROM CATTLE SHOWING CNS SYMPTOMS

A. The FSIS PHV will receive, by e-mail, a report from the AVIC on the BSE test results. The AVIC will also send copies of the results to the District Office.

B. If the test is negative (reported as “not detected”), any carcasses and parts the establishment has held may be released for rendering or other disposal in accordance with 9 CFR 314.

C. If the test is inconclusive, the FSIS PHV will receive supervisory instruction on further actions.

D. For any sample confirmed positive for BSE, the FSIS PHV is to verify that the establishment disposes of the carcasses and parts in the proper manner as set out in paragraph V. G.

VII. eADRS PROCEDURES FOR FSIS SAMPLING FROM CATTLE SHOWING CNS SYMPTOMS

A. After sampling cattle showing signs of CNS symptoms, the FSIS PHV (or designee) is to enter the relevant information for each sample into eADRS.

B. The FSIS PHV (or designee) is to enter each ante-mortem condemned animal in eADRS under the applicable pathological condition

C. For each relevant disease condition, in the “Add Daily Totals” window, the FSIS PHV is to select the “Update BSE Details” button if FSIS sampled one or more of the condemned animals for BSE. Selecting this button opens the “Update BSE Details” screen.

D. On the “Update BSE Details” screen, the FSIS PHV is to enter the number of animals sampled and the applicable “U.S. Condemned” Z-tag number for each sampled animal.

E. After entering the relevant information, the FSIS PHV is to click the “Save” button and proceed to the next disease condition.

F. For additional information on entering BSE sample information, refer to Section 7 of the eADRS User Guide.

VIII. RABIES

A. In a rare situation, such as when an animal is condemned by the FSIS PHV on ante-mortem for rabies, the FSIS PHV should contact their District Office, who will advise APHIS. In these cases, APHIS will see that the animal is tested for rabies. APHIS will work with the laboratory to get appropriate samples forwarded for BSE surveillance from rabies negative animals.

B. Rabies booster vaccination for PHVs collecting BSE samples is still highly recommended. PHVs can be reimbursed for rabies vaccinations or boosters. Rabies vaccinations are volunatry. Only PHVs who are actually involved with BSE sample collection will be eligible for reimbursement on the vaccination series. PHVs should make arrangements for the vaccinations with their private physician. PHVs should contact their Front-line supervisor for approval on reimbursement prior to beginning the three shot vaccination series.

Refer questions regarding this notice to the Policy Development Division through askFSIS at http://askfsis.custhelp.com or by telephone at 1-800-233-3935.

Assistant Administrator Office of Policy and Program Development

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/rdad/FSISNotices/05-10.pdf


REITERATION OF POLICY REGARDING THE REMOVAL OF LINGUAL AND PALATINE TONSILS FROM BEEF TONGUES AND BEEF MARKET HEADS FSIS NOTICE 04-10 1/12/10

FSIS NOTICE

04-10 1/12/10

DISTRIBUTION: Electronic

NOTICE EXPIRES: 2/1/11 OPI: OPPD

NOTE: THIS NOTICE REISSUES CONTENT FROM FSIS NOTICE 99-08

REITERATION OF POLICY REGARDING THE REMOVAL OF LINGUAL AND PALATINE TONSILS FROM BEEF TONGUES AND BEEF MARKET HEADS

This notice reminds inspection program personnel (IPP) that the tonsils from cattle of all ages are among the materials identified as specified risk materials (SRMs) under 9 CFR 310.22(a). Lingual and palatine tonsils must be removed from finished product per FSIS Directive 6100.4. See attachment 1 for related questions and answers.

IPP may review pictures and guidance materials on removal of lingual and palatine tonsils from tongues and beef market heads at the following link:

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/About_FSIS/Technical_Service_Center/index.asp#SRM


IPP are to continue to verify that establishments are properly addressing removal of SRMs, including lingual and palatine tonsils, as set out in FSIS Directive 6100.4, Verification Instructions Related to Specified Risk Materials. See attachment 2 of this notice or the above link to access a helpful tool for use when verifying the requirements of 9 CFR 310.22. To verify that the establishment has in place adequate head dressing procedures to remove the designated lingual and palatine tonsils from beef tongues and beef market heads, off-line IPP are to include direct observation of the plant’s tonsil removal procedures and finished product (processed beef tongues and market heads prior to packaging) on a regular and recurring basis whenever HACCP 01 and 02 procedures are scheduled. Off-line inspectors are to effect a regulatory control action in accordance with 9 CFR 500.2 if the establishment is observed not properly removing tonsils. The regulatory control action is to remain in place until the establishment has implemented effective corrective actions.

Refer questions regarding this notice to the Policy Development Division through askFSIS at http://askfsis.custhelp.com or by telephone at 1-800-233-3935.

Assistant Administrator Office of Policy and Program Development

SNIP...SEE FULL TEXT ;

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/rdad/FSISNotices/04-10.pdf


Audit Report

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program – Phase II

and

Food Safety and Inspection Service

Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III

Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006

Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle Still Remain

Our prior report identified a number of inherent problems in identifying and testing high-risk cattle. We reported that the challenges in identifying the universe of high-risk cattle, as well as the need to design procedures to obtain an appropriate representation of samples, was critical to the success of the BSE surveillance program. The surveillance program was designed to target nonambulatory cattle, cattle showing signs of CNS disease (including cattle testing negative for rabies), cattle showing signs not inconsistent with BSE, and dead cattle. Although APHIS designed procedures to ensure FSIS condemned cattle were sampled and made a concerted effort for outreach to obtain targeted samples, industry practices not considered in the design of the surveillance program reduced assurance that targeted animals were tested for BSE.

In our prior report, we recommended that APHIS work with public health and State diagnostic laboratories to develop and test rabies-negative samples for BSE. This target group is important for determining the prevalence of BSE in the United States because rabies cases exhibit clinical signs not inconsistent with BSE; a negative rabies test means the cause of the clinical signs has not been diagnosed.

APHIS agreed with our recommendation and initiated an outreach program with the American Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians, as well as State laboratories. APHIS also agreed to do ongoing monitoring to ensure samples were obtained from this target population.

Although APHIS increased the samples tested from this target group as compared to prior years, we found that conflicting APHIS instructions on the ages of cattle to test resulted in inconsistencies in what samples were submitted for BSE testing. Therefore, some laboratories did not refer their rabies negative samples to APHIS in order to maximize the number tested for this critical target population. In addition, APHIS did not monitor the number of submissions of rabies negative samples for BSE testing from specific laboratories.

snip...

An NVSL official stated that APHIS is not concerned with rabies negatives samples from cattle less than 30 months of age. This position, however, is contrary to APHIS’ published target population.

Our prior audit recognized the significant challenge for APHIS to obtain samples from some high-risk populations because of the inherent problems with obtaining voluntary compliance and transporting the carcasses for testing. USDA issued rules to prohibit nonambulatory animals (downers) from entering the food supply at inspected slaughterhouses. OIG recommended, and the International Review Subcommittee33 emphasized, that USDA should take additional steps to assure that facilitated pathways exist for dead and nonambulatory cattle to allow for the collection of samples and proper disposal of carcasses. Between June 1, 2004, and May 31, 2005, the APHIS database documents 27,617 samples were collected showing a reason for submission of nonambulatory and 325,225 samples were collected with reason of submission showing "dead."

APHIS made extensive outreach efforts to notify producers and private veterinarians of the need to submit and have tested animals from these target groups. They also entered into financial arrangements with 123 renderers and other collection sites to reimburse them for costs associated with storing, transporting, and collecting samples. However, as shown in exhibit F, APHIS was not always successful in establishing agreements with non-slaughter collection sites in some States. APHIS stated that agreements do not necessarily reflect the entire universe of collection sites and that the presentation in exhibit F was incomplete because there were many collection sites without a payment involved or without a formal agreement. We note that over 90 percent of the samples collected were obtained from the 123 collection sites with agreements and; therefore, we believe agreements offer the best source to increase targeted samples in underrepresented areas.

We found that APHIS did not consider industry practices in the design of its surveillance effort to provide reasonable assurance that cattle exhibiting possible clinical signs consistent with BSE were tested. Slaughter facilities do not always accept all cattle arriving for slaughter because of their business requirements. We found that, in one State visited, slaughter facilities pre-screened and rejected cattle (sick/down/dead/others not meeting business

Downers and Cattle that Died on the Farm standards) before presentation for slaughter in areas immediately adjacent or contiguous to the official slaughter establishment. These animals were not inspected and/or observed by either FSIS or APHIS officials located at the slaughter facilities.

FSIS procedures state that they have no authority to inspect cattle not presented for slaughter. Further, APHIS officials stated they did not believe that they had the authority to go into these sorting and/or screening areas and require that the rejected animals be provided to APHIS for BSE sampling. Neither APHIS nor FSIS had any process to assure that animals left on transport vehicles and/or rejected for slaughter arrived at a collection site for BSE testing. FSIS allows slaughter facilities to designate the area of their establishment where federal inspection is performed; this is designated as the official slaughter establishment.34

We observed animals that were down or dead in pens outside the official premises that were to be picked up by renderers. Animals that were rejected by plant personnel were transported off the premises on the same vehicles that brought them to the plant.35

A policy statement36 regarding BSE sampling of condemned cattle at slaughter plants provided that effective June 1, 2004, FSIS would collect BSE samples for testing: 1) from all cattle regardless of age condemned by FSIS upon ante mortem inspection for CNS impairment, and 2) from all cattle, with the exception of veal calves, condemned by FSIS upon ante mortem inspection for any other reason.

FSIS Notice 28-04, dated May 20, 2004, informed FSIS personnel that, "FSIS will be collecting brain samples from cattle at federally-inspected establishments for the purpose of BSE testing." The notice further states that, "Cattle off-loaded from the transport vehicle onto the premises of the federally-inspected establishment (emphasis added), whether dead or alive, will be sampled by the FSIS Public Health Veterinarian (PHV) for BSE after the cattle have been condemned during ante mortem inspection. In addition, cattle passing ante mortem inspection but later found dead prior to slaughter will be condemned and be sampled by the FSIS PHV."

APHIS has the responsibility for sampling dead cattle off-loaded onto plant-owned property that is adjoining to, but not considered part of, the "official premises.37 FSIS procedures38 provide that "Dead cattle that are off-loaded to facilitate the off-loading of live animals, but that will be re-loaded onto the transport vehicle, are not subject to sampling by FSIS.

While performing our review in one State, we reviewed the circumstances at two slaughter facilities in the State that inspected and rejected unsuitable cattle before the animals entered the official receiving areas of the plants. This pre-screening activity was conducted in areas not designated by the facility as official premises of the establishment and not under the review or supervision of FSIS inspectors. The plant rejected all nonambulatory and dead/dying/sick animals delivered to the establishment. Plant personnel refused to offload any dead or downer animals to facilitate the offloading of ambulatory animals. Plant personnel said that the driver was responsible for ensuring nonambulatory animals were humanely euthanized and disposing of the carcasses of the dead animals. Plant personnel informed us that they did not want to jeopardize contracts with business partners by allowing unsuitable animals on their slaughter premises.

In the second case, one family member owned a slaughter facility while another operated a livestock sale barn adjacent to the slaughter facility. The slaughter facility was under FSIS’ supervision while the sale barn was not. Cattle sometimes arrived at the sale barn that were sick/down/dead or would die or go down while at the sale barn. According to personnel at the sale barn, these animals were left for the renderer to collect. The healthy ambulatory animals that remained were marketed to many buyers including the adjacent slaughter facility. When the slaughter facility was ready to accept the ambulatory animals for processing, the cattle would be moved from the sale barn to the slaughter facility where they were subject to FSIS’ inspection.

We requested the slaughter facilities to estimate the number of cattle rejected on a daily basis (there were no records to confirm the estimates). We visited a renderer in the area and found that the renderer had a contract with APHIS to collect samples for BSE testing. In this case, although we could not obtain assurance that all rejected cattle were sampled, the renderer processed a significant number of animals, as compared to the slaughter plants’ estimates of those rejected. Due to the close proximity (less than 5 miles) of the renderer to the slaughter facilities, and the premium it paid for dead cattle that were in good condition, there was a financial incentive for transport drivers to dispose of their dead animals at this renderer.

USDA/OIG-A/50601-10-KC Page 25

In our discussions with APHIS officials in Wisconsin and Iowa, they confirmed that there were plants in their States that also used pre-screening practices. On May 27, 2005, we requested APHIS and FSIS to provide a list of all slaughter facilities that pre-screened cattle for slaughter in locations away from the area designated as the official slaughter facility. Along with this request, we asked for information to demonstrate that either APHIS or FSIS confirmed there was a high likelihood that high-risk animals were sampled at other collection sites.

In response to our request, the APHIS BSE Program Manager stated that APHIS did not have information on slaughter plants that pre-screen or screen their animals for slaughter suitability off their official plant premises. To their knowledge, every company or producer that submits animals for slaughter pre-sorts or screens them for suitability at various locations away from the slaughter facility. For this reason, USDA focused its BSE sample collection efforts at other types of facilities such as renderers, pet food companies, landfills, and dead stock haulers. Further, in a letter to OIG on June 14, 2005, the administrators of APHIS and FSIS noted the following:

"…we believe that no specific actions are necessary or appropriate to obtain reasonable assurance that animals not presented for slaughter are being tested for BSE. There are several reasons for our position. First, we do not believe that the practice is in fact causing us to not test a significant enough number of animals in our enhanced surveillance program to invalidate the overall results. Second, OIG has concluded that because of the geographical proximity and business relationships of the various entities involved in the case investigated, there is reasonable assurance that a majority of the rejected cattle had been sampled. Third, it is also important to remember that the goal of the enhanced surveillance program is to test a sufficient number of animals to allow us to draw conclusions about the level of BSE (if any) in the American herd…We believe that the number we may be not testing because of the "pre-sorting" practice does not rise to a significant level. The number of animals tested to date has far exceeded expectations, so it is reasonable to infer that there are few of the animals in question, or that we are testing them at some other point in the process…APHIS estimated…there were approximately 446,000 high risk cattle…[and APHIS has]…tested over 375,000 animals in less than 1 year. This indicated that we are missing few animals in the high-risk population, including those that might be pre-sorted before entering a slaughter facility’s property."

snip...

APHIS notes that for the current surveillance program, it had established regional goals and APHIS was not trying to meet particular sampling levels in particular States. However, we believe that it would be advantageous for APHIS to monitor collection data and increase outreach when large geographical areas such as the above States do not provide samples in proportion to the numbers and types of cattle in the population.

We also disagree with APHIS/FSIS’ contention that because they have tested over 375,000 of their 446,000 estimate of high risk cattle, few in the high-risk population are being missed, including those that might be pre-screened before entering a slaughter facility’s property. In our prior audit, we reported that APHIS underestimated the high-risk population; we found that this estimate should have been closer to 1 million animals (see Finding 1). We recognize that BSE samples are provided on a voluntary basis; however, APHIS should consider industry practice in any further maintenance surveillance effort. Animals unsuitable for slaughter exhibiting symptoms not inconsistent with BSE should be sampled and their clinical signs recorded. However, this cited industry practice results in rejected animals not being made available to either APHIS or FSIS veterinarians for their observation and identification of clinical signs exhibited ante mortem. Although these animals may be sampled later at other collection sites, the animals are provided post mortem without information as to relevant clinical signs exhibited ante mortem. For these reasons, we believe APHIS needs to

USDA/OIG-A/50601-10-KC Page 27

observe these animals ante mortem when possible to assure the animals from the target population are ultimately sampled and the clinical signs evaluated.

snip...

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf


Subject: USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half (bogus BSE sampling FROM HEALTHY USDA CATTLE)

Date: June 21, 2007 at 2:49 pm PST

Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program

An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduledfor May 2007.

snip...

Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1 include:

soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS), implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),

snip...

The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are completed.

4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf


http://stanford.wellsphere.com/cjd-article/usda-certified-h-base-mad-cow-school-lunch-program/641216


http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/02/usda-certified-h-base-mad-cow-school.html


http://downercattle.blogspot.com/


Office of the United States Attorney District of Arizona

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE For Information Contact Public Affairs

February 16, 2007 WYN HORNBUCKLE Telephone: (602) 514-7625Cell: (602) 525-2681

CORPORATION AND ITS PRESIDENT PLEAD GUILTY TO DEFRAUDING GOVERNMENT’S MAD COW DISEASESURVEILLANCE PROGRAM

snip...

Evidence uncovered during the government’s investigation established that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population. Specifically, FarmFresh Meats and Farabee submitted, or caused to be submitted, obex samples from healthy, USDA inspected cattle, in order to steal government moneys.

Evidence collected also demonstrated that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee failed to maintain cattle carcasses and heads pending test results and falsified corporate books and records to conceal their malfeasance. Such actions, to the extent an obex sample tested positive (fortunately, none did), could have jeopardized the USDA’s ability to identify the diseased animal and pinpoint its place of origin.

snip...

Sentencing is set before Judge Earl H. Carroll on May 14, 2007. The investigation in this case was conducted by Assistant Special Agent in Charge Alejandro Quintero, United States Department ofAgriculture, Office of Inspector General. The prosecutionis being handled by Robert Long, Assistant U.S. Attorney, District ofArizona, Phoenix.CASE NUMBER: CR-07-00160-PHX-EHC RELEASE NUMBER: 2007-051(Farabee)# # #

http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/az/press_releases/2007/2007-051(Farabee).pdf


Thursday, June 26, 2008

Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/06/texas-firm-recalls-cattle-heads-that.html


Saturday, April 5, 2008

SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS KANSAS

http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/04/srm-mad-cow-recall-406-thousand-pounds.html


Tuesday, July 1, 2008

Missouri Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/07/missouri-firm-recalls-cattle-heads-that.html


Friday, August 8, 2008

Texas Firm Recalls Cattle Heads That Contain Prohibited Materials SRMs 941,271 pounds with tonsils not completely removed

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/08/texas-firm-recalls-cattle-heads-that.html


Thursday, October 15, 2009

Nebraska Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, Oct 15, 2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/10/nebraska-firm-recalls-beef-tongues-that.html


Sunday, October 18, 2009

Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, October 17, 2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/10/wisconsin-firm-recalls-beef-tongues.html


Friday, September 4, 2009

FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/09/foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html


Saturday, August 29, 2009

FOIA REQUEST FEED RECALL 2009 Product may have contained prohibited materials Bulk Whole Barley, Recall # V-256-2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/08/foia-request-feed-recall-2009-product.html


C O N F I R M E D

----- Original Message ----- From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." To: Sent: Thursday, November 05, 2009 9:25 PM Subject: [BSE-L] re-FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009 and Recall # V-256-2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/11/re-foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html


Thursday, November 12, 2009

BSE FEED RECALL Misbranding of product by partial label removal to hide original source of materials 2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-feed-recall-misbranding-of-product.html


Thursday, March 19, 2009

MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html


http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/


Sunday, September 6, 2009

MAD COW USA 1997 SECRET VIDEO

SEE ANOTHER VIDEO THAT SHOWED IN CANADA, BUT NOT USA, ABOUT ANOTHER USA TSE COVER-UP MORE BRAINS NOT TESTED PROPERLY, key brain parts missing. ...

http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2009/09/mad-cow-usa-1997-video.html


SEE THIS DAMNING VIDEO AT BOTTOM OF ;

Monday, July 27, 2009

U.S.A. HIDING MAD COW DISEASE VICTIMS AS SPORADIC CJD ?

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2009/07/usa-hiding-mad-cow-disease-victims-as.html


DAMNING TESTIMONY FROM STANLEY PRUSINER THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE WINNER ON PRIONS SPEAKING ABOUT ANN VENEMAN

''nobody has ever ask''

''they dont want our comment''

''they don't want to know, the don't care''

''i have tried repeatedly''

''level of absolute ignorance''

''Entire policy was driven...heard from mr. laycraft, so now, after time has passed, it's ok for Canada, cattle under 30 month, to the USA, THAT'S ALL THAT MATTERED!

PRUSINER ASKED : IF FROM YOUR TESTIMONY, A DEMONSTRATED THREAT TO PUBLIC HEATH ?

''yes, i think prions are bad to eat, and you can die from them''


http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/prusinerclip.html


2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html


Monday, October 19, 2009

Atypical BSE, BSE, and other human and animal TSE in North America Update October 19, 2009

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/10/atypical-bse-bse-and-other-human-and.html


Monday, November 23, 2009

BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS UPDATE NOVEMBER 23, 2009 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND O.I.E.

http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-gbr-risk-assessments-update.html


Monday, May 12, 2008 BSE YOUNGEST AGE STATISTICS UNDER 30 MONTHS

the myth that cattle under 30 months of age are free from BSE/TSE is just that, a myth, and it's a false myth !

Information released on 2 February 2005 Summary of information requested What statistics are available on cattle less than 30 months of age found to have BSE? Information released VLA has recorded approximately 100 cases of BSE in cattle of 30 months of age or under during the entire period of the BSE epidemic (1986 - 2005). The figure is approximate as for 51 of these the age is only estimated. This is because farmers did not have accurate documentation to confirm birth date. This was not a requirement at the time. We can confirm that of the 100 cases, 49 were under 30 months of age, of these the youngest case was 20 months old.

http://www.defra.gov.uk/vla/vla/vla_ati_020205.htm


Youngest confirmed case 20 Months, Oldest confirmed case 22 Years, Data valid to 01 April 2008

http://www.defra.gov.uk/vla/science/docs/sci_tse_stats_gen.pdf


BSE Youngest and oldest cases by year of onset - GB 20 months, 21 months, (8) 24 months, see complete list of younger than 30 month ;

http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/otmbsestatistics.pdf


BSE Youngest Japan 21 months, 23 months

http://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/ehpm/10/3/130/_pdf


The implications of the Swiss result for Britain, which has had the most BSE, are complex. Only cattle aged 30 months or younger are eaten in Britain, on the assumption, based on feeding trials, that cattle of that age, even if they were infected as calves, have not yet accumulated enough prions to be infectious. But the youngest cow to develop BSE on record in Britain was 20 months old, showing some are fast incubators. Models predict that 200-300 cattle under 30 months per year are infected with BSE and enter the food chain currently in Britain. Of these 3-5 could be fast incubators and carrying detectable quantities of prion.

http://www.sare.org/sanet-mg/archives/html-home/28-html/0359.html


FULL TEXT ;

http://flounder068.vox.com/library/post/bse-youngest-age-statistics-under-30-months.html


http://bseyoungestage.blogspot.com/


PLoS ONE. 2008; 3(8): e2969. Published online 2008 August 13. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0002969. PMCID: PMC2493038

Copyright This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Public Domain declaration which stipulates that, once placed in the public domain, this work may be freely reproduced, distributed, transmitted, modified, built upon, or otherwise used by anyone for any lawful purpose.


Prion Infected Meat-and-Bone Meal Is Still Infectious after Biodiesel Production


http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2493038/


SEE FULL TEXT ;

Monday, November 16, 2009

CANADA, USA, specified risk materials (SRMs), Environment, Fertilizer, AND Politics, just more BSe


http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2009/11/canada-usa-specified-risk-materials.html


The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.

http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf


Tuesday, July 14, 2009

U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary and BSE Red Book Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST

WHERE did we go wrong $$$

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/07/us-emergency-bovine-spongiform.html


Saturday, January 2, 2010

Human Prion Diseases in the United States January 1, 2010 ***FINAL***

http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/01/human-prion-diseases-in-united-states.html


my comments to PLosone here ;

http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action?inReplyTo=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fannotation%2F04ce2b24-613d-46e6-9802-4131e2bfa6fd&root=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fannotation%2F04ce2b24-613d-46e6-9802-4131e2bfa6fd


TSS

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Tuesday, December 15, 2009

Intraspecies transmission of L-type-like bovine spongiform encephalopathy detected in Japan

NOTE

Intraspecies transmission of L-type-like bovine spongiform encephalopathy detected in Japan

Shigeo Fukuda 1*, Yoshifumi Iwamaru 2*, Morikazu Imamura 2 , Kentarou Masujin 2 , Yoshihisa Shimizu 2 , Yuichi Matsuura 2 , Yujing Shu 2 , Megumi Kurachi 2 , Kazuo Kasai 2 , Yuichi Murayama 2 , Sadao Onoe 1 , Ken'ichi Hagiwara 3 , Tetsutaro Sata 4 , Shirou Mohri 2 , Takashi Yokoyama 2 and Hiroyuki Okada 2 1 Molecular Biotechnology Laboratory, Hokkaido Animal Research Center, Shintoku, Hokkaido 081-0038, Japan 2 Prion Disease Research Center, National Institute of Animal Health, 3-1-5 Kan-nondai, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-0856, Japan 3 Departments of Biochemistry and Cell Biology , and 4 Pathology, National Institute of Infectious Diseases, Toyama 1-23-1 Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo, 162-8640, Japan Correspondence Hiroyuki Okada, Prion Disease Research Center, National Institute of Animal Health, Kannonndai 3-1-5, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-0856, Japan. Tel & fax: +81-29-838-7757; email: okadahi@affrc.go.jp

*These authors contributed equally to this work.

Copyright © 2009 Japanese Society for Bacteriology, Japanese Society for Virology, Japanese Society for Host Defense Research, and Blackwell Publishing Asia Pty Ltd KEYWORDS atypical bovine spongiform encephalopathy • cattle • L-type-like • transmission

ABSTRACT

It has been assumed that the agent causing BSE in cattle is a uniform strain (classical BSE); however, different neuropathological and molecular phenotypes of BSE (atypical BSE) have been recently reported. We demonstrated the successful transmission of L-type-like atypical BSE detected in Japan (BSE/JP24 isolate) to cattle. Based on the incubation period, neuropathological hallmarks, and molecular properties of the abnormal host prion protein, the characteristics of BSE/JP24 prion were apparently distinguishable from the classical BSE prion and closely resemble those of bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy prion detected in Italy.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Received 7 May 2009; revised 2 August 2009; accepted 4 August 2009.

DIGITAL OBJECT IDENTIFIER (DOI) 10.1111/j.1348-0421.2009.00169.x About DOI


snip...


In Japan, two atypical BSE cases have been identified to date. The first case showed an L-type-like electrophoretic mobility of the unglycosylated PrPSc on western blot analysis (9). The second casewas identified in an aged beef cattle, Japanese Black (BSE/JP24), and showed PrP-positive amyloid plaques in histopathological examination of the brain and a distinct glycoformprofile (10). Although such properties seem to be similar to those reported in a BASE case (7), unlike with the BASE prion, shortening of the incubation periods was observed in bovinized mice serially passaged with the BSE/JP24 prion (11). Thus, it remains controversial whether the BSE/JP24 prion is identical to the BASE prion. These observations prompted us to characterize the phenotypes of the BSE/JP24 prion propagated in its natural host by comparison with those of the classical BSE prion. Hence, we have inoculated with brain homogenates from classical BSE and BSE/JP24 isolates into Holstein cattle and assessed their risk against cattle species.



snip...


In summary, we demonstrated the successful transmission of the BSE/JP24 prion to cattle. The BSE/JP24 prion-affected cattle sustained the molecular properties of PK-treated PrPSc as those of the original BSE/JP24 isolate. Although most brain regions except for the medulla oblongata of the original BSE/JP24 isolate were unable to be investigated due to inadequate specimen collection, in comparison to experimentally BSE/JP24 prion-affected cattle, both neuropathological features, such as severe vacuolation in the medulla oblongata at the obex level and the presence of PrPSc plaques, closely resembled each other. Based on molecular properties of PK-treated PrPSc and a detailed comparison of the immunohistochemical and neuropathological properties, the BSE/JP24 prion was distinguishable from those in the classical BSE prion, and appear to be rather similar to the BASE prion (8). Of interest, experimental transmission of the BSE/JP24 prion to cattle induced a shorter incubation period and more severe neuropathological changes compared to the classical BSE prion, suggesting that the BASE and BSE/JP24 prion might be more virulent in cattle species. However, such speculation conflicts with reports that atypical BSE field cases have been mainly found in adult and aged cattle (5). The reason for this discrepancy in incubation periods between experimentally and naturally affected cattle is unknown. These observations may imply that atypical BSE are sporadic forms of BSE. Alternatively, the route of infection and/or prion titer may be attributed to the relatively long incubation period in natural atypical cases. Further studies using orally BSE/JP24 prion-affected cattle will be needed to address this issue.



http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/122570969/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0





>>> These observations may imply that atypical BSE are sporadic forms of BSE.



PLEASE SEE BELOW "So far, there is no evidence for spontaneous PrPSc formation in any animal or human TSE."


Prions: Protein Aggregation and Infectious Diseases

ADRIANO AGUZZI AND ANNA MARIA CALELLA

Institute of Neuropathology, University Hospital of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland

snip...

3. Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease Approximately 85% of all human prion diseases are sporadic forms of CJD. For sCJD, there is no association with a mutant PRNP allele, nor is there any epidemiological evidence for exposure to a TSE agent through contact with people or animals infected with TSEs. sCJD cases are currently subclassified according to the methionine/valine polymorphism at codon 129 of the PRNP gene and the size and glycoform ratio of proteaseresistant prion protein identified on western blot (type 1 or type 2) (174). Heterozygosity (Met/Val) at PrP codon 129 appears to be associated with a lower risk (378) and/or prolonged incubation time (119, 387). The lack of routine laboratory testing for preclinical diagnosis makes the search for agent sources and other risk factors extremely difficult. At present, the means of acquisition of a TSE agent in these patients remains a mystery. So far, there is no evidence for spontaneous PrPSc formation in any animal or human TSE. In humans, the peak age incidence of sporadic CJD is 55–60 years. However, if spontaneous misfolding were the primary event, one might expect a continuously increasing incidence with age because more time would allow more opportunity for rare misfolding events.

snip...

Physiol Rev • VOL 89 • OCTOBER 2009 • www.prv.org


http://physrev.physiology.org/cgi/content/abstract/89/4/1105




O.11.2 Transmission of bovine-passaged TME prion strain to macaque Emmanuel Comoy1, Juergen Richt2, Valérie Durand1, Sophie Freire1, Evelyne Correia1, Amir Hamir2, Marie- Madeleine Ruchoux1, Paul Brown1, Jean-Philippe Deslys1 1Atomic Energy Commission, France; 2National Animal Disease Center, USA Background: The origin of Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy (TME) remains controversial, with historical evidence for either scrapie or BSE as the source of separate outbreaks. The case for BSE is supported by the experimental transmission of BSE from cattle to mink, whereas scrapie failed to transmit from sheep to mink. Transmission of TME from mink to cynomolgus macaque is inefficient, suggesting a low risk of TSE to human health. Because only typical and atypical BSE prion strains have been shown to be easily transmissible from non-primate to primate species, we have investigated transmissibility to monkeys of a cattle-passaged strain of TME. Objectives: To compare the transmissibility of cattle-passaged TME prions to the transmissibility of other cattle-passaged prions. Methods: Monkeys (cynomolgus macaques) were intra-cerebrally infected with classical BSE, atypical BSE strains (BASE and BSE H), and a cattle-passaged TME strain. Animals were regularly monitored for clinical signs, and extensive biochemical and immunohistochemical studies were performed on lymphoid and neural tissues of animals that have already died. Results and discussion: The animal infected with the cattlepassaged TME strain developed neurological clinical signs after a very short incubation period of 20 months, with a clinical picture that is clearly different from that of BSE/vCJD-infected animals, but similar to that of BASE (the animal is still alive at the time of this writing but post-mortem histopathological and immunohistochemical analyses will provide a more complete characterization of the disease). This new transmission reinforces the notion of human vulnerability to prion diseases passaged through cattle, perhaps due to a low species barrier.

Selected by the scientific committee from the submitted abstracts

O.11.3 Infectivity in skeletal muscle of BASE-infected cattle Silvia Suardi1, Chiara Vimercati1, Fabio Moda1, Ruggerone Margherita1, Ilaria Campagnani1, Guerino Lombardi2, Daniela Gelmetti2, Martin H. Groschup3, Anne Buschmann3, Cristina Casalone4, Maria Caramelli4, Salvatore Monaco5, Gianluigi Zanusso5, Fabrizio Tagliavini1 1Carlo Besta” Neurological Institute,Italy; 2IZS Brescia, Italy; 33FLI Insel Riems, D, Germany; 4CEA-IZS Torino, Italy; 5University of Verona, Italy Background: BASE is an atypical form of bovine spongiform encephalopathy caused by a prion strain distinct from that of BSE. Upon experimental transmission to cattle, BASE induces a previously unrecognized disease phenotype marked by mental dullness and progressive atrophy of hind limb musculature. Whether affected muscles contain infectivity is unknown. This is a critical issue since the BASE strain is readily transmissible to a variety of hosts including primates, suggesting that humans may be susceptible. Objectives: To investigate the distribution of infectivity in peripheral tissues of cattle experimentally infected with BASE. Methods: Groups of Tg mice expressing bovine PrP (Tgbov XV, n= 7-15/group) were inoculated both i.c. and i.p. with 10% homogenates of a variety of tissues including brain, spleen, cervical lymph node, kidney and skeletal muscle (m. longissimus dorsi) from cattle intracerebrally infected with BASE. No PrPres was detectable in the peripheral tissues used for inoculation either by immunohistochemistry or Western blot. Results: Mice inoculated with BASE-brain homogenates showed clinical signs of disease with incubation and survival times of 175±15 and 207±12 days. Five out of seven mice challenged with skeletal muscle developed a similar neurological disorder, with incubation and survival times of 380±11 and 410±12 days. At present (700 days after inoculation) mice challenged with the other peripheral tissues are still healthy. The neuropathological phenotype and PrPres type of the affected mice inoculated either with brain or muscle were indistinguishable and matched those of Tgbov XV mice infected with natural BASE. Discussion: Our data indicate that the skeletal muscle of cattle experimentally infected with BASE contains significant amount of infectivity, at variance with BSE-affected cattle, raising the issue of intraspecies transmission and the potential risk for humans. Experiments are in progress to assess the presence of infectivity in skeletal muscles of natural BASE.

Selected by the scientific committee from the submitted abstracts


P.9.21 Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada Jianmin Yang1, Sandor Dudas2, Catherine Graham2, Markus Czub3, Tim McAllister1, Stefanie Czub1 1Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre, Canada; 2National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3University of Calgary, Canada Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been detected in Canadian cattle. Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16 Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated PrPres. Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis. Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal- specific antibodies bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth band in the Canadian H-type BSE. Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada. It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.

P.4.23 Transmission of atypical BSE in humanized mouse models Liuting Qing1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5, Qingzhong Kong1 1Case Western Reserve University, USA; 2Instituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Italy; 3Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Germany; 4National Veterinary Research Institute, Poland; 5Kansas State University (Previously at USDA National Animal Disease Center), USA Background: Classical BSE is a world-wide prion disease in cattle, and the classical BSE strain (BSE-C) has led to over 200 cases of clinical human infection (variant CJD). Atypical BSE cases have been discovered in three continents since 2004; they include the L-type (also named BASE), the H-type, and the first reported case of naturally occurring BSE with mutated bovine PRNP (termed BSE-M). The public health risks posed by atypical BSE were largely undefined. Objectives: To investigate these atypical BSE types in terms of their transmissibility and phenotypes in humanized mice. Methods: Transgenic mice expressing human PrP were inoculated with several classical (C-type) and atypical (L-, H-, or Mtype) BSE isolates, and the transmission rate, incubation time, characteristics and distribution of PrPSc, symptoms, and histopathology were or will be examined and compared. Results: Sixty percent of BASE-inoculated humanized mice became infected with minimal spongiosis and an average incubation time of 20-22 months, whereas only one of the C-type BSE-inoculated mice developed prion disease after more than 2 years. Protease-resistant PrPSc in BASE-infected humanized Tg mouse brains was biochemically different from bovine BASE or sCJD. PrPSc was also detected in the spleen of 22% of BASE-infected humanized mice, but not in those infected with sCJD. Secondary transmission of BASE in the humanized mice led to a small reduction in incubation time. The atypical BSE-H strain is also transmissible with distinct phenotypes in the humanized mice, but no BSE-M transmission has been observed so far. Discussion: Our results demonstrate that BASE is more virulent than classical BSE, has a lymphotropic phenotype, and displays a modest transmission barrier in our humanized mice. BSE-H is also transmissible in our humanized Tg mice. The possibility of more than two atypical BSE strains will be discussed. Supported by NINDS NS052319, NIA AG14359, and NIH AI 77774.




http://www.prion2009.com/sites/default/files/Prion2009_Book_of_Abstracts.pdf




Subject: Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION

Date: August 24, 2005 at 2:47 pm PST

August 24, 2005

Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION

Greetings APHIS ET AL,

My name is Terry S. Singeltary Sr.


http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006480086ebc&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw6





Monday, October 19, 2009

Atypical BSE, BSE, and other human and animal TSE in North America Update October 19, 2009


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/10/atypical-bse-bse-and-other-human-and.html




2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html



Thursday, November 05, 2009 9:25 PM

Subject: [BSE-L] re-FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009 and Recall # V-256-2009

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/11/re-foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html




Tuesday, November 17, 2009

SEAC NEW RESULTS ON IDIOPATHIC BRAINSTEM NEURONAL CHROMATOLYSIS (IBNC) FROM THE VETERINARY LABORATORIES AGENCY (VLA) SEAC 103/1


http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/11/seac-new-results-on-idiopathic.html




Saturday, December 01, 2007

Phenotypic Similarity of Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy in Cattle and L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in a Mouse Model Volume 13, Number 12–December 2007 Research


http://transmissible-mink-encephalopathy.blogspot.com/2007/12/phenotypic-similarity-of-transmissible.html




Monday, November 23, 2009

BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS UPDATE NOVEMBER 23, 2009 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND O.I.E.

http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-gbr-risk-assessments-update.html



Wednesday, November 18, 2009

R-CALF: 40 Groups Disagree With USDA's Latest BSE Court Submission

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/11/r-calf-40-groups-disagree-with-usdas.html



Saturday, December 05, 2009

Molecular Model of Prion Transmission to Humans

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2009/12/molecular-model-of-prion-transmission.html



Wednesday, September 9, 2009

Co-existence of scrapie prion protein types 1 and 2 in sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: its effect on the phenotype and prion-type characteristics.

http://cjdusa.blogspot.com/2009/09/co-existence-of-scrapie-prion-protein.html



Thursday, November 05, 2009

Incidence and spectrum of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease variants with mixed phenotype and co-occurrence of PrPSc types: an updated classification

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2009/11/incidence-and-spectrum-of-sporadic.html



Tuesday, August 11, 2009

Characteristics of Established and Proposed Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Variants

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2009/08/characteristics-of-established-and.html



Saturday, June 13, 2009

Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States 2003 revisited 2009

http://cjdusa.blogspot.com/2009/06/monitoring-occurrence-of-emerging-forms.html




TSS

Labels: , , , , ,

Wednesday, November 18, 2009

R-CALF: 40 Groups Disagree With USDA's Latest BSE Court Submission

R-CALF: 40 Groups Disagree With USDA's Latest BSE Court Submission

11/18/2009 03:50PM

Yes, the ball is still in play – although a distant memory for some – with regard to the litigation filed in 2007 by R-CALF USA and 10 other plaintiffs against the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA’s) decision to allow into the U.S. older Canadian cattle born after March 1, 1999, and beef from Canadian cattle of all ages. Canada continually has had a significant problem with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), also known as mad cow disease, and the agency’s latest legal notice suggests that ‘the people’s agency’ is about to kowtow to global interests instead of honoring its congressional mandate to protect U.S. citizens.

On July 3, 2008, a South Dakota federal judge essentially ordered USDA to go back to the drawing board on its over-30-month rule (OTM Rule) and instructed the agency to open a new public comment period on the matter. He then required USDA to report the developments to him on a quarterly basis.

USDA, in its Oct. 5, 2009, status submission to the court, reported that more than 4,800 pages of comments were received and that those comments are currently in “intra-departmental clearance,” and afterward will be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The agency estimates OMB will finish its review no later than Jan. 5, 2010, the date USDA’s next status report to the court is due.

On Nov. 17, 2009, R-CALF USA and 39 other groups sent a letter to Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack to express their serious concerns about the agency’s status submission.

One such concern is that USDA says it is preparing a docket to initiate rulemaking that would comprehensively amend the BSE regulations, and the criteria it will propose “would be closely aligned with those of the World Organization for Animal Health” (OIE). This new proposed rule is expected to be published in the Federal Register for comment late this year or early in 2010, according to USDA. The 40-member coalition states that such alignment with weaker OIE standards would not achieve the agency’s congressional mandate to protect against the introduction and spread of animal diseases, “particularly from such a pernicious animal disease as BSE that is invariably fatal and that also afflict humans.”

In its letter to Vilsack, the group points out that he has inherited the weakest, most ineffective and liberal BSE import policies when compared to every other major beef-consuming market in the world, and that as past Senators, President Obama and Vice President Biden – as parties to a Senate Resolution of Disapproval declaring that USDA’s OTM Rule shall have no force or effect – had objected to the very rules that exist now.

In fact, at the time when the Resolution of Disapproval passed, only four cases of BSE had been detected in Canadian-born cattle, and no post-feed ban BSE cases had been detected. Since then, 17 cases of BSE have been discovered in Canadian-born cattle. Eleven of these 17 BSE-infected cattle were born after Canada’s 1997 feed ban, and 10 of these 11 infected post-feed ban cattle were eligible, under USDA’s current rules, for export to the United States because they were born after March 1, 1999.

The letter states in part: “We respectfully request that you promulgate BSE rules that restore for U.S. livestock, livestock producers, and the people of the United States the highest possible level of protection against the introduction and spread of animal diseases. Valid science, consumer confidence, and sound economics require the BSE import rules to be tightened according to pre-outbreak norms. This departure from the past Administration’s destructive policies will improve consumer confidence in the beef supply, balance trade flows, remedy the severe financial destruction of the U.S. cattle industry, and substantially decrease the risk of livestock and human disease exposure.

Additionally, the group points out that: “The proper policy is to bring United States’ BSE regulations in line with past standards, which were more closely aligned to the current standards of our trading partners. Animal health, as well as food and product safety, should be held in higher regard by your Administration than trade facilitation. Public support for such a change is clear. The industry need is clear. Consumer confidence would increase. The United States’ current trade imbalances would become more balanced. Risks to animal and human health would be drastically reduced.”

“Current trade policy is losing support, in large part, because food and product safety standards are negated by government efforts to facilitate cross-border trade at all costs, and this trade-trumping-safety policy problem includes, but also goes beyond, cattle and beef,” said R-CALF USA CEO Bill Bullard. “Because of USDA’s past and current persistence in adopting unproven and inapt international standards – rather than continuing pre-BSE disease standards proven to protect consumers of U.S. beef and U.S. citizens, including U.S. cattle producers and their livestock – the U.S. cattle industry is unnecessarily burdened by a flood of unsafe imports. The result is a large trade deficit in cattle and beef that is forcing thousands upon thousands of independent cattle producers out of business each year.”

National organizations that signed on to the letter include: American Grassfed Association; Coalition for a Prosperous America; Consumer Federation of America; CJD (Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease) Foundation; Farm and Ranch Freedom Alliance; Food & Water Watch; Freedom21, Inc.; International Texas Longhorn Association; National Association of Farm Animal Welfare; National Farmers Union; Organic Consumers Association; Organization for Competitive Markets; R-CALF USA; Sovereignty International, Inc.; The Cornucopia Institute; Western Organization of Resource Councils.

State, regional and county organizations that signed on to the letter include: Buckeye Quality Beef Association (Ohio); Cattle Producers of Washington; Citizens for Private Property Rights, Missouri; Colorado Independent CattleGrower's Association; Independent Cattlemen of Nebraska; Independent Beef Association of North Dakota; Independent Cattlemen of Wyoming; Kansas Cattlemen’s Association; Kansas Farmers Union; Mississippi Livestock Markets Association; Missouri Farmers Union; Nebraska Farmers Union; Nevada Live Stock Association; New England Farmers Union; Northeast Organic Farming Association/Massachusetts Chapter, Inc.; Ohio Farmers Union; Oregon Livestock Producers Association; Ozarks Property Rights Congress, Missouri; PCC Natural Markets (Puget Consumers Co-Op); SmallHolders of Massachusetts; South Dakota Farmers Union; South Dakota Stockgrowers Association; Spokane County Cattlemen, Washington; and, the Stevens County Cattlemen, Washington.

http://www.cattlenetwork.com/R-CALF--40-Groups-Disagree-With-USDA-s-Latest-BSE-Court-Submission/2009-11-18/Article.aspx?oid=941864&fid=CN-LATEST_NEWS_



November 17, 2009

The Honorable Tom Vilsack Secretary of Agriculture U.S. Department of Agriculture 1400 Independence Ave., S.W. Washington, D.C. 20250

Re: Serious Concerns Regarding APHIS’ October 5, 2009 Status Report in R-CALF USA, et al. vs. USDA, et al.

Dear Secretary Vilsack:

On Oct. 5, 2009, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) provided notice to the United States District Court, District of South Dakota, Northern Division, that states the agency is preparing a docket to initiate rulemaking to amend its bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) regulations regarding the importation of bovines and bovine products. The notice specifically states, “The proposed criteria for country classification and commodity import would be closely aligned with those of the World Organization for Animal Health.”1

We, the undersigned organizations, are deeply concerned with this proposed action and believe USDA is exhibiting a serious lack of judgment by attempting to align U.S. safety measures with the incessantly weak and demonstrably ineffective BSE standards established by the international World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). This proposed action would, if taken, abrogate your agency’s responsibility under the Animal Health Protection Act to protect U.S. livestock and the people of the United States from the introduction into and spread within the United States of animal diseases, particularly from such a pernicious animal disease as BSE that is invariably fatal and that also afflict humans.2 Your Administration must reverse, not perpetuate, the previous Administration’s dangerous policy of preempting sound animal health and human health protections to facilitate trade – a policy that not only has increased domestic health hazards, but also has caused serious economic harm to domestic industries.

USDA’s own risk assessment predicts, with a high level of certainty, that current regulations will cause the introduction and spread of fatal BSE within the United States. 3 The risk assessment further predicts that the people of the United States will be exposed to additional risk for the disease. These regulations, implemented by the prior Administration, defy USDA’s animal health protection mandate while stating, throughout their respective preambles, that the U.S. and Canada, as well as the rules themselves, are in conformity to OIE standards.4 The OIE standards cannot reasonably be expected to protect U.S. livestock and the people of the United States from the introduction and spread of BSE as required by the Animal Health Protection Act.

The OIE standards are not deemed credible. They have not been followed by any of the United States’ major export customers with which the United States maintains a positive trade balance. This situation has not changed in the past six years.5 Current trade policy is losing support, in large part, because food and product safety standards are negated by government

The Honorable Tom Vilsack November 17, 2009 Page 2

efforts to facilitate cross-border trade at all costs. The trade-trumping-safety policy problem includes, but also goes beyond, cattle and beef. Because of USDA’s past and current persistence in adopting unproven and inapt international standards – rather than continuing pre-BSE disease standards proven to protect consumers of U.S. beef and U.S. citizens, including U.S. cattle producers and their livestock – the U.S. cattle industry is unnecessarily burdened by a flood of unsafe imports. The result is a large trade deficit in cattle and beef that is forcing thousands upon thousands of independent cattle producers out of business each year.

The only countries that have scientifically demonstrated a reduction in the incidence of BSE are those that continue to require more BSE testing, stricter feed bans, and more stringent specified risk materials removal practices than the OIE requires.6 Canada, on the other hand, is the only BSE-affected country with multiple cases of BSE detected in animals born after a feed ban that does not require standards far more stringent than those established by the OIE. It is not surprising, therefore, that OIE reports show that Canada is the only BSE-affected country other than Portugal to have experienced an increased incidence of BSE between 2007 and 2008.7

President Barack Obama and Vice President Joseph Biden, Jr., have previously demonstrated their strong opposition to USDA’s final rule that reopened our borders to Canadian cattle and beef after BSE was detected in Canada. Then-Senators Obama and Biden voted in favor of a Senate Resolution of Disapproval declaring that USDA’s rule shall have no force or effect.8 The BSE problem in Canada has grown substantially worse since that Senate Resolution. At the time of their votes, only four cases of BSE had been detected in Canadian-born cattle, and no post-feed ban BSE cases were discovered. Since that time, seventeen (17) cases of BSE have been discovered in Canadian-born cattle. Eleven (11) of these seventeen (17) BSE-infected cattle were born after Canada’s 1997 feed ban. Ten (10) of these eleven (11) infected post-feed ban cattle were eligible, under USDA’s current rules, for export to the United States because they were born after March 1, 1999.9

The proper policy is to bring United States’ BSE regulations in line with past standards, which were more closely aligned to the current standards of our trading partners. Animal health, as well as food and product safety, should be held in higher regard by your Administration than trade facilitation. Public support for such a change is clear. The industry need is clear. Consumer confidence would increase. The United States’ current trade imbalances would become more balanced. Risks to animal and human health would be drastically reduced.

The U.S. is the largest beef consuming market in the world and the largest beef producing country in the world. 10 You have inherited the weakest, most ineffective and liberal BSE import policies when compared to every other major beef consuming market in the world. President Obama and Vice President Biden previously objected to the very rules that exist now. We respectfully request that you promulgate BSE rules that restore for U.S. livestock, livestock producers, and the people of the United States the highest possible level of protection against the introduction and spread of animal diseases. Valid science, consumer confidence, and sound economics require the BSE import rules to be tightened according to pre-outbreak norms. This departure from the past Administration’s destructive policies will improve consumer

The Honorable Tom Vilsack November 17, 2009 Page 3

confidence in the beef supply, balance trade flows, remedy the severe financial destruction of the U.S. cattle industry, and substantially decrease the risk of livestock and human disease exposure.

Sincerely,

National Organizations: American Grassfed Association Coalition for a Prosperous America Consumer Federation of America CJD Foundation Farm and Ranch Freedom Alliance Food & Water Watch Freedom21, Inc. International Texas Longhorn Association National Association of Farm Animal Welfare National Farmers Union Organic Consumers Association Organization for Competitive Markets R-CALF USA Sovereignty International, Inc. The Cornucopia Institute Western Organization of Resource Councils State, Regional and County Organizations: Buckeye Quality Beef Association (Ohio) Cattle Producers of Washington Citizens for Private Property Rights, Missouri Colorado Independent CattleGrower's Association Independent Cattlemen of Nebraska Independent Beef Association of North Dakota Independent Cattlemen of Wyoming Kansas Cattlemen’s Association Kansas Farmers Union Mississippi Livestock Markets Association Missouri Farmers Union Nebraska Farmers Union Nevada Live Stock Association New England Farmers Union Northeast Organic Farming Association/Massachusetts Chapter, Inc. Ohio Farmers Union Oregon Livestock Producers Association Ozarks Property Rights Congress, Missouri PCC Natural Markets (Puget Consumers Co-op) The Honorable Tom Vilsack November 17, 2009 Page 4 SmallHolders of Massachusetts South Dakota Farmers Union South Dakota Stockgrowers Association Spokane County Cattlemen, Washington Stevens County Cattlemen, Washington For More information or to contact individual organizations, please contact R-CALF USA at 406-252-2516 or r-calfusa@r-calfusa.com.

cc: Members of Congress

U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention State Animal Health Officials

1 Defendant’s [USDA’s] Status Report, R-CALF USA et al. vs. USDA, et al., U.S. District Court, District of South Dakota, Northern Division, CIV-07-1023, Oct. 5, 2009. 2 See 7 U.S.C. § 8301 (1) (“the prevention, detection, control and eradication of diseases and pests of animals are essential to protect . . . animal health [and] the health and welfare of the people of the United States.”); see also 7 U.S.C. § 8303 (a) (1) (The Secretary of Agriculture “may prohibit or restrict . . . the importation or entry of any animal . . . if the Secretary determines that the prohibition or restriction is necessary to prevent the introduction into or dissemination within the United States of any pest or disease of livestock.”). 3 See 72 Fed. Reg., 1109, col. 2; 72 Fed. Reg., 53347, col. 1 (USDA’s risk modeling for its over-30-month rule (OTM Rule) predicts the U.S. would import between 19 and 105 BSE-infected cattle from Canada, which would subsequently produce BSE infections in 2 to 75 U.S.-born cattle over a 20-year period). 4 See, e.g., 72 Fed. Reg., 53331, col. 1 (USDA justifies a key decision in its rulemaking by stating it is “entirely consistent with the science and with OIE guidelines.”); see also id., 53341 (“Our proposed changes are consistent with the OIE guidelines for trade in live animals from a controlled risk region.”); see also id., 53342 (For the reasons discussed above, we disagree that this rule is inconsistent with OIE guidelines.”); see also 70 Fed. Reg., 510, col. 3 (“BSE incidence and surveillance in Canada are well within the OIE guidelines for BSE minimal Risk.”); see also id., 464, col. 2 (“our proposed standards for minimal-risk regions were based on the OIE guidelines for BSE minimal-risk regions, using those guidelines as a reference.”); see also, id., 476, col. 3 (“Canada again exceeds OIE guidelines. . .”); see also id., 471, col. 3 (“Although Canada does not precisely meet the OIE guideline for duration of a feed ban, its control measures in other areas (such as surveillance and import restrictions) more than compensate for this.”). 5 See Global Beef Trade: Effects of Animal Health, Sanitary, Food Safety, and Other Measures on U.S. Exports, U.S. International Trade Commission, USITC Publication No. 4033, September 2008, at 4-9 (Japan, with a 37.2% share of U.S. exports in 2003 disallows beef from cattle over 20 months and disallows ground beef; Korea, with a 21.2% share of U.S. exports in 2003 disallows beef from cattle over 30 months of age; Mexico, with a19.6% share of U.S. exports in 2003 disallows beef from cattle over 30 months of age.). 6 See, e.g., Appendix A – APHIS’ consideration of Japan in Light of the World Organization for Animal Health’s (OIE) Guidelines, Analysis of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk to the U.S. Cattle Population from Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan, Veterinary Services, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, at 5 (“Since October 2001, all cattle slaughtered in Japan undergo an ELISA screening test, followed by a confirmation test. . .”), (Japan prohibits ruminant derived meat-and-bone meal in animal feed and requires separate feed manufacturing production lines used exclusively for cattle feed.); see also id., at 16 (Japan implemented a complete ban on the use of mammalian protein, including blood products); see also Export Requirements for Japan, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture Food Safety and Inspection Service, JA-179, Oct. 23, 2009 (Japan requires the removal of the spinal cord and spinal column from animals less than 21 months of age.). 7 See Annual incidence rate of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in OIE Member Countries that have reported cases, excluding the United Kingdom, OIE, downloaded Oct. 28, 2009, available at http://www.oie.int/eng/info/en_esbincidence.htm. 8 With the help of now President Obama and Vice President Biden, the U.S. Senate in the 109th Congress passed S.J. Res. 4 by a vote of 52 to 46. The Senate Resolution provided for congressional disapproval of USDA’s final rule to The Honorable Tom Vilsack November 17, 2009 Page 5

designate Canada as a minimal-risk country and to allow imports of cattle and beef from cattle that originate in a BSE-affected country, namely Canada. 9 See BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy, or Mad Cow Disease), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/bse/index.htm. 10 See Livestock and Poultry: World Markets and Trade, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, Circular Series April 2009, at 7 (U.S. beef and veal production and U.S. beef and veal consumption far surpass any other country in the world, e.g., the U.S. produced over 12 million metric tons while second place Brazil produced less than 9.1 million metric tons in 2008, and the U.S. consumed over 12 million metric tons while second place EU- 27 consumed less than 8.5 million metric tons during the same year.).

http://www.r-calfusa.com/BSE/091117-40%20Organizations



Tuesday, November 17, 2009

SEAC EFFECT OF AGE ON THE PATHOGENESIS OF TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES SEAC 103/2 (USDA CERTIFIED DEAD STOCK DOWNER COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM)

http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2009/11/seac-effect-of-age-on-pathogenesis-of.html



Tuesday, November 17, 2009

SEAC NEW RESULTS ON IDIOPATHIC BRAINSTEM NEURONAL CHROMATOLYSIS (IBNC) FROM THE VETERINARY LABORATORIES AGENCY (VLA) SEAC 103/1

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/11/seac-new-results-on-idiopathic.html



2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html



Monday, October 19, 2009

Atypical BSE, BSE, and other human and animal TSE in North America Update October 2009

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/10/atypical-bse-bse-and-other-human-and.html



Tuesday, November 10, 2009

Surveillance On the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and rabies in Taiwan and USA

http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2009/11/surveillance-on-bovine-spongiform.html



Monday, November 16, 2009

CANADA, USA, specified risk materials (SRMs), Environment, Fertilizer, AND Politics, just more BSe

http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2009/11/canada-usa-specified-risk-materials.html



Thursday, November 05, 2009

Incidence and spectrum of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease variants with mixed phenotype and co-occurrence of PrPSc types: an updated classification

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2009/11/incidence-and-spectrum-of-sporadic.html



Sunday, August 10, 2008

A New Prionopathy OR more of the same old BSe and sporadic CJD

http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/08/new-prionopathy-or-more-of-same-old-bse.html



Monday, October 26, 2009

MAD COW DISEASE, AND U.S. BEEF TRADE

MAD COW DISEASE, CJD, TSE, SOUND SCIENCE, COMMERCE, AND SELLING YOUR SOUL TO THE DEVIL

http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2009/10/mad-cow-disease-and-us-beef-trade.html



IN A NUT SHELL ;

(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)

11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries. The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to the Central Bureau,

http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf



Docket APHIS-2006-0026 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Animal Identification and Importation of Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0026-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions, Identification of Ruminants and Processing and Importation of Commodities Public Submission APHIS-2006-0026-0012 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801e47e1



Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary

Comment 2006-2007 USA AND OIE POISONING GLOBE WITH BSE MRR POLICY

THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.

MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???

go figure. ...

http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8151



Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singletary comment

January 28, 2007

Greetings APHIS,

I would kindly like to submit the following to ;

BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01


http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8



Subject: Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION

Date: August 24, 2005 at 2:47 pm PST

August 24, 2005

Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION

Greetings APHIS ET AL,

My name is Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

I would kindly like to comment on [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 ;

PROPOSED RULES

Exportation and importation of animals and animal products:

Whole cuts of boneless beef from-

Japan,

48494-48500 [05-16422]


http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=0900006480086ebc&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw6



Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL IMPORTS FROM CANADA


https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/BSEcom.nsf/0/b78ba677e2b0c12185256dd300649f9d?OpenDocument&AutoFramed



PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT HERE ;

Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL IMPORTS FROM CANADA


http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/07/docket-no-03-080-1-usda-issues-proposed.html



Thursday, November 12, 2009

BSE FEED RECALL Misbranding of product by partial label removal to hide original source of materials 2009


http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-feed-recall-misbranding-of-product.html



Friday, September 4, 2009

FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009


http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/09/foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html



Saturday, August 29, 2009

FOIA REQUEST FEED RECALL 2009 Product may have contained prohibited materials Bulk Whole Barley, Recall # V-256-2009


http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/08/foia-request-feed-recall-2009-product.html



http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/



Saturday, October 24, 2009

SaBTO Advisory Committee on the Safety of Blood, Tissues and Organs 2nd Public Meeting 27 October 2009

http://seac992007.blogspot.com/2009/10/sabto-advisory-committee-on-safety-of.html



Wednesday, November 04, 2009

Detection of PrPsc in Blood from Sheep Infected with the Scrapie and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Agents


http://vcjdtransfusion.blogspot.com/2009/11/detection-of-prpsc-in-blood-from-sheep.html



HUMAN and ANIMAL TSE Classifications i.e. mad cow disease and the UKBSEnvCJD only theory

http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectId=090000648027c28e&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf




Wednesday, November 18, 2009

BSE RISK USA UPDATE NOVEMBER 2009

http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-risk-usa-update-november-2009.html


Sunday, April 12, 2009

BSE MAD COW TESTING USA 2009 FIGURES

Month Number of Tests

Feb 2009 -- 1,891

Jan 2009 -- 4,620

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/surveillance/ongoing_surv_results.shtml

http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/04/bse-mad-cow-testing-usa-2009-figures.html



PLEASE SEE MY FULL COMMENT SUBMISSION IN THE PDF ATTACHMENT, OR GO HERE

Thursday, April 9, 2009

Docket No. FDA2002N0031 (formerly Docket No. 2002N0273) RIN 0910AF46 Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed; Final Rule: Proposed


http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/04/docket-no-fda2002n0031-formerly-docket.html



http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/r-calf-and-usa-mad-cow-problem-dont.html#comments



Sunday, April 12, 2009 r-calf and the USA mad cow problem, don't look, don't find, and then blame Canada



http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/r-calf-and-usa-mad-cow-problem-dont.html



http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/cjd-foundation-sides-with-r-calfers-no.html#comments




MY comments/questions are as follows ; 1. SINCE the first Harvard BSE Risk Assessment was so flawed and fraught with error after the PEER REVIEW assessment assessed this fact, how do you plan on stopping this from happening again, will there be another peer review with top TSE Scientist, an impartial jury so-to-speak, to assess this new and updated Harvard BSE/TSE risk assessment and will this assessment include the Atypical TSE and SRM issues ?


*** Suppressed peer review of Harvard study October 31, 2002 ***


http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/topics/BSE_Peer_Review.pdf


***


http://www.scribd.com/doc/1490709/USDA-200600111


***


http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf


***


http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectId=090000648027c28e&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf


***


http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf


***

Response to Public Comments on the Harvard Risk Assessment of ... RESPONSE TO COMMENTS FROM TERRY S. SINGELTARY SR. Comment #1: SINCE the first Harvard BSE Risk Assessment was so flawed and fraught ...


http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf




TSS

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