Tuesday, August 19, 2008

Atypical BSE (BASE) Transmitted from Asymptomatic Aging Cattle to a Primate

Atypical BSE (BASE) Transmitted from Asymptomatic Aging Cattle to a Primate Emmanuel E. Comoy1*, Cristina Casalone2, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray1, Gianluigi Zanusso3, Sophie Freire1, Dominique Marcé1, Frédéric Auvré1, Marie-Magdeleine Ruchoux1, Sergio Ferrari3, Salvatore Monaco3, Nicole Salès4, Maria Caramelli2, Philippe Leboulch1,5, Paul Brown1, Corinne I. Lasmézas4, Jean-Philippe Deslys1

1 Institute of Emerging Diseases and Innovative Therapies, CEA, Fontenay-aux-Roses, France, 2 Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, Turin, Italy, 3 Policlinico G.B. Rossi, Verona, Italy, 4 Scripps Florida, Jupiter, Florida, United States of America, 5 Genetics Division, Brigham & Women's Hospital, Harvard Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America

Abstract Background Human variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD) results from foodborne transmission of prions from slaughtered cattle with classical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (cBSE). Atypical forms of BSE, which remain mostly asymptomatic in aging cattle, were recently identified at slaughterhouses throughout Europe and North America, raising a question about human susceptibility to these new prion strains.

Methodology/Principal Findings Brain homogenates from cattle with classical BSE and atypical (BASE) infections were inoculated intracerebrally into cynomolgus monkeys (Macacca fascicularis), a non-human primate model previously demonstrated to be susceptible to the original strain of cBSE. The resulting diseases were compared in terms of clinical signs, histology and biochemistry of the abnormal prion protein (PrPres). The single monkey infected with BASE had a shorter survival, and a different clinical evolution, histopathology, and prion protein (PrPres) pattern than was observed for either classical BSE or vCJD-inoculated animals. Also, the biochemical signature of PrPres in the BASE-inoculated animal was found to have a higher proteinase K sensitivity of the octa-repeat region. We found the same biochemical signature in three of four human patients with sporadic CJD and an MM type 2 PrP genotype who lived in the same country as the infected bovine.

Conclusion/Significance Our results point to a possibly higher degree of pathogenicity of BASE than classical BSE in primates and also raise a question about a possible link to one uncommon subset of cases of apparently sporadic CJD. Thus, despite the waning epidemic of classical BSE, the occurrence of atypical strains should temper the urge to relax measures currently in place to protect public health from accidental contamination by BSE-contaminated products.

Citation: Comoy EE, Casalone C, Lescoutra-Etchegaray N, Zanusso G, Freire S, et al. (2008) Atypical BSE (BASE) Transmitted from Asymptomatic Aging Cattle to a Primate. PLoS ONE 3(8): e3017. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0003017

Editor: Neil Mabbott, University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom

Received: April 24, 2008; Accepted: August 1, 2008; Published: August 20, 2008

Copyright: © 2008 Comoy et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

Funding: This work has been supported by the Network of Excellence NeuroPrion.

Competing interests: CEA owns a patent covering the BSE diagnostic tests commercialized by the company Bio-Rad.

* E-mail: mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000065/!x-usc:mailto:emmanuel.comoy@cea.fr

Introduction Classical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (cBSE), the first prion disease identified in cattle, was initially reported in 1986 in the UK. Food-borne transmission of cBSE to humans was observed ten years later as a variant form of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD) [1], leading to a major public health crisis.

This strain of cBSE is now rapidly disappearing as a result of appropriate containment measures. However, atypical forms of BSE have recently been identified in Europe and North America as a consequence of cBSE testing performed in these countries [2]–[4]. Because these cases are only found sporadically in older animals (=8 years) coming to slaughter with few or no signs of disease, it would be plausible to suppose that atypical forms of BSE may have a lower virulence than cBSE and be innocuous to humans. However, recent studies suggest that one of the two main forms of atypical BSE, initially discovered in Italy and referred to as the bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy (BASE), might be at the origin of the cBSE epidemic: inoculation of the BASE strain into transgenic and inbred mice showed an apparent natural evolution towards the typical BSE strain [5], [6]. Moreover, a possible link has been suggested between BASE and one subtype (MV2) of human sporadic CJD (sCJD) on the basis of biochemical similarities [2], [7]. In contrast to vCJD, sCJD is believed to occur de novo without food-borne transmission. However, specific contaminating events by ingestion are difficult to rule out because human prion diseases can have silent incubation periods exceeding 50 years, as demonstrated for kuru [8].

One strategy to evaluate the risk of BASE for humans consists in assessing the susceptibility to disease transmission and the degree of pathogenicity in a non-human primate model that has already been shown to have characteristic clinical signs, histopathological lesions and PrPres profiles following infections with either BSE or vCJD [9], [10]. We therefore inoculated cynomolgus macaque monkeys (Macacca fascicularis) intracerebrally with BASE, cBSE and vCJD prion strains. The BASE strain, prepared from brain extract of a 15-year-old asymptomatic cow induced a distinctive and more rapidly fatal disease than cBSE, and showed a biochemical signature similar to that of the MM2 cortical subtype of human sCJD.

Methods Cattle and human samples The BASE inoculum (mix of brainstem and thalamus) from an asymptomatic 15 year-old Italian Piemontese cow [2]: 250 µl of a 10% brain homogenate in 5% glucose were inoculated intracerebrally (i.c.) to a single macaque monkey. As controls, we used two macaques inoculated i.c. with cBSE (brainstem from infected UK cattle) and 4 macaques inoculated i.c. with human vCJD [9], [11]. Twenty-one subjects with a diagnosis of definite sCJD were referred to the Medical Center in Verona, Italy during the period 2000–2004. Tissues were processed 4–18 hours post-mortem according to established guidelines regarding safety and ethics. Brains were cut longitudinally into two halves. Hemi-brains were frozen and stored at -80°C until biochemical studies were performed. The patient group encompassed all of the different Western blot subtypes of sCJD described by Parchi et al [7]: MM1 (5 cases), MV1 (2), VV1 (1), MM2 (4), MV2 (6) and VV2 (3).

Non-human primate model Cynomolgus macaques (Macacca fascicularis), captive-bred from the Centre de Recherche en Primatologie (Mauritius), were checked for the absence of common primate pathogens before importation and handling in accordance to national guidelines. Animals were maintained in biological security level 3 animal facilities and clinical examinations were performed regularly. They were humanely euthanized at the terminal stage of the disease, and tissues were either fixed in Carnoy's fluid for histological examination or snap-frozen in liquid nitrogen and stored at -80°C for biochemical analyses.

Neuropathology and immunochemistry Neuropathology and immunochemical detection of proteinase-resistant prion protein (PrPres) and Glial fibrillary acidic protein (GFAP) was performed on brain sections as previously described [12].

PrPres analysis Tissues were homogenized to 20% (w/v) final concentration in a 5% sterile glucose solution. PrPres was purified according to a protocol optimized for strain discrimination in ruminants [13], [14] (Discriminatory kit ref 3551177, BioRad, Marnes la Coquette, France). Briefly, brain homogenates were first subjected to proteolysis using either 0.4 µg (“low” concentration) or 4 µg (“high” concentration) of proteinase K/mg of brain (final concentration) in a special buffer that partially protects the N-terminal part of PrPres in order to increase strain discrimination, and then purified PrPres was concentrated by centrifugation. Purified, non-human primate and human samples were processed for Western blot analysis as previously described: briefly, samples were separated by electrophoresis on a 12% SDS polyacrylamide gel, blotted onto a nitrocellulose membrane and detected by two mouse monoclonal antibodies: the antibody from the BioRad Discriminatory kit, which targets the epitope WGQPHGGX within the N-Terminal octarepeat region at position 57–88, and 3F4, which targets the epitope MKHM in the hydrophobic core at position 109–112. The protein bands were visualized using a peroxidase-conjugated goat anti-mouse antibody and chemiluminescence.

Results Transmission characteristics of BASE and BSE Clinical features. The BASE-inoculated macaque developed clinical signs after a 21 months incubation period. Clinical signs evolved slowly during the first four months, being limited to mild tremor and myoclonus, without impairment in coordination or locomotion, and without anxiety or aggressiveness. In the last month, the clinical picture rapidly worsened with evidence of major spatial disorientation (the animal did not recognize its environment and seemed lost in its cage), cognitive troubles (no recall of food location and at intervals unaccountably stopped eating) and the appearance of incoordination and disequilibrium; however, appetite and general fitness were maintained. Euthanasia was performed at the terminal stage of illness at 26 months post inoculation (Table 1). The two cBSE-inoculated animals had longer incubations periods (37.5 months) and survivals (40 months) despite a presumably larger infecting dose (100 mg containing a 10-fold higher PrPres concentration). Moreover, the clinical presentation was very different: animals exhibited aggressiveness and anxiety in combination with incoordination, severe ataxic tremor, and loss of appetite to the point of near starvation. The four animals inoculated with human vCJD had a clinical evolution similar to that of animals inoculated with BSE, though with less prolonged survivals (25 to 37 months).

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Discussion We have shown that BASE, the first identified atypical strain of BSE [2], originating from asymptomatic cattle, is transmissible by i.c. inoculation to a species of non-human primate. Although this observation concerned only one animal, its survival was substantially shorter than for all the macaques inoculated with classical BSE as well as the majority of those inoculated with human vCJD. Moreover, in earlier experiments by others on a total of 6 macaques inoculated i.c. with 50 mg of cBSE brain, none had an incubation period of less than 30 months [17], and humanized transgenic mice have been found to be highly susceptible to infection with BASE, and completely resistant to infection with cBSE [18]. If BASE is more pathogenic than classical BSE for primates, it could indicate a more readily transmissible infection from cattle to humans than previously suspected. A preliminary trial of oral transmission is currently ongoing for alimentary risk assessment: 49 months after oral dosing there is no indication of transmission; however, the incubation period following similar oral challenge with cBSE in an already completed experiment was 60 months.

The disease induced by BASE was different in all respects from that induced by classical BSE. The clinical presentation was characterized by mild tremors and myoclonus, progressing to a marked cognitive disorder, including spatial disorientation but without anxiety, aggressiveness or loss of appetite. In contrast, cBSE presented signs of anxiety and aggressiveness together with progressive difficulties in locomotion as well as cerebellar signs (major ataxia), and severe decrease of appetite with concurrent weight loss. The widespread spongiform lesions and loss of pyramidal cells in the third and fifth layers of the frontal cortex together with the severe parietal lesions could explain the prominent cognitive signs and the spatial disorientation seen in the BASE-infected monkey, contrasting with the severity of lesions in the obex and cerebellum consistent with the incoordination seen in animals inoculated with cBSE. Amyloid plaques, the hallmark of BASE in cattle, are not produced in the Macaque monkey, and conversely, cBSE does not produce plaques in cattle, but does so in the Macaque [9], a clear indication that plaque deposition depends as much on the host as the prion strain.

At the molecular level, under conditions of high proteinase pre-treatment and detection using two antibodies reacting with either an epitope in the N terminal octapeptide repeat region or the core of PrP, BASE and cBSE were clearly distinguishable in primate. BASE was detectable only by the core antibody, whereas cBSE was detectable by both antibodies. We estimated that the proportion of octapeptide-resistant PrPres molecules in the BASE brain homogenate was only a small fraction (=1/10) of that of the cBSE brain homogenate. The difference in octapeptide sensitivity to PK between cBSE and vCJD in macaques on the one hand, and Type 1 sporadic CJD in humans on the other hand, is similar to what was observed between cBSE and classical scrapie in sheep. This method can now be used to test both ruminant and human samples to identify similarities and differences in their molecular protein signatures, and to implement the classification of ruminant and possibly human strains.

Although classical epidemiological studies have not found any link between scrapie in sheep and goats and human CJD, newer molecular biological studies now indicate that about half of all cases of scrapie are due to previously undetected atypical strains [19] that are experimentally transmissible to sheep and mice [20]. Their risk for humans is unknown and is the subject of current studies in experimental models, including primates. cBSE has been shown to be responsible for human cases of vCJD, but the comparative risk for humans of BASE and other atypical strains of BSE is still unknown, and its clarification will require many years of epidemiological surveillance and molecular biological testing of both bovine and human populations.

The first cases of BASE in cattle had PrPres electrophoretic profiles similar to the MV2 subtype of sporadic CJD patients [2] that, together with the presence of amyloid plaques in both the cattle and the patients, suggested a possible link between BASE and this subtype of sCJD. However, our PrPres typing technique has shown that, in the primate, PrPres of other MV2 sCJD patients exhibited a resistance to proteolysis different from the BASE-infected primate, whereas PrPres from vCJD-infected patients and primates behave similarly. This observation, together with the absence of amyloid plaques in the BASE-infected primate, weakens the likelihood of a direct link between BASE and MV2 subtype sCJD patients.

In contrast, the specific signature of PrPres in the BASE-infected primate was similar to that seen in three of four patients with the MM2 cortical subtype of sporadic CJD [7]. It is interesting that an important feature of the clinical-pathological syndrome in this BASE-infected macaque –the absence of cerebellar involvement – is also a common element in patients with the MM2 subtype of human sporadic CJD (Supplementary Figure S2). However, as illustrated by the clinical details of our four tested MM2 cases, there is considerable patient-to-patient variation, just as there can be variation among individual animals experimentally inoculated with a given strain of TSE. [21], [22].

It is not known whether atypical strains of BSE have been circulating for years, or represent new forms of disease, and continuing research is clearly needed to answer both this and the equally important question about a possible relationship to at least certain forms of what are presently regarded as sporadic cases of human disease (sCJD) [4], [23]. Moreover, the BASE strain has been described to evolve naturally towards BSE after successive transmissions in inbred mice [6]. The stability and pathogenicity of this strain in humans remains to be determined, and it is worth recalling that the stability of the cBSE/vCJD strain, which retains its specific molecular signature in different infected hosts, is the exception rather than the rule. As has been previously observed [24]–[26], one patient (Case No. 4, cf. figure 5 sample MM2#4) exhibited both types of PrP, i.e. type 2 typical of the MM2 subtype and type 1 observed in the MM1 subtype. On the one hand, this demonstrates the interest of such a simple biochemical test to refine PrP analysis, and on the other hand it raises a question about the existence of different PrPres signatures in the same patient, i.e., different prion strains linked to multiple infections or to variants selected by the host.

In summary, we have transmitted one atypical form of BSE (BASE) to a cynomolgus macaque monkey that had a shorter incubation period than monkeys infected with classical BSE, with distinctive clinical, neuropathological, and biochemical features; and have shown that the molecular biological signature resembled that seen in a comparatively uncommon subtype of sporadic CJD. We cannot yet say whether BASE is more pathogenic for primates (including humans) than cBSE, nor can we predict whether its molecular biological features represent a clue to one cause of apparently sporadic human CJD. However, the evidence presented here and by others justifies concern about a potential human health hazard from undetected atypical forms of BSE, and despite the waning epizoonosis of classical BSE, it would be premature to abandon the precautionary measures that have been so successful in reversing the impact of cBSE. We would instead urge a gradual, staged reduction that takes into account the evolving knowledge about atypical ruminant diseases, and both a permanent ban on the use of bovine central nervous system tissue for either animal or human use, and its destruction so as to eliminate any risk of environmental contamination.

Supporting Information Figure S1. (2.51 MB TIF)

Resistance to proteolysis of different prion strains in sheep. PrPres from brain homogenates of sheep infected with classical scrapie, experimental cBSE, or atypical Nor-98 scrapie, and of an uninfected control sheep. Samples were purified using low (odd lanes) or high (even lanes) concentrations of proteinase K, and visualized with monoclonal antibodies that recognize either the core region (Panel A) or the octapeptide region (Panel B) of the protein. With the lower concentration of PK used in the purification step (in order to maximize test sensitivity) of one widely utilized BSE screening test [13], all three strains gave a positive result with both the anti-core and anti-octapeptide antibodies (odd lanes). Using a higher concentration of PK (even lanes) did not alter the positivity with either antibody for classical scrapie, but the cBSE strain no longer reacted with the anti-octapeptide antibody while Nor98 did not react with either antibody. Thus, by using the higher concentration of PK and two different antibodies, it is possible to discriminate between all three strains.

Figure S2. (1.52 MB TIF)

Lesion profiles in cBSE- and BASE-infected macaque, and in MM2 sporadic CJD patients. The lesions were scored from 0 to 4 (negative, light, mild, moderate, and severe) for the different following gray matter regions: frontal (FC), temporal (TC), parietal (PC) and occipital (OC) neocortices, hippocampus (HI), parasubiculum and entorhinal cortex (EC), neostriatum (ST) (nuclei caudatus and putamen), thalamus (TH), substantia nigra (SN), midbrain periventricular gray (PG), locus ceruleus (LC), medulla (ME) (periventricular gray and inferior olive) and cerebellum (CE). Scoring for MME sCJD patient was issued from Parchi et al. [7].

Acknowledgments We thank Sebastien Jacquin for careful maintenance of primates, and Aurore Jolit for her precious help for histological studies; we thank Richard Kascsak (New York State Institute for Basic Research in Developmental Disabilities), Jacques Grassi, Eric Quemeneur and their colleagues (CEA/DSV) who provided the anti-PrP antibodies. We thank Sylvie Benestad (National Veterinary Institute, Oslo, Norway) for Nor-98 sheep samples, and Danny Matthews (VLA, Weybridge, UK) for the sheep sample inoculated with experimental cBSE.

Author Contributions Conceived and designed the experiments: CC CIL. Performed the experiments: NLE SF DM FA. Analyzed the data: EEC NLE MMR SF JPD. Contributed reagents/materials/analysis tools: CC GZ MMR MC. Wrote the paper: EEC GZ PB JPD. Participated to the final reviewing of the manuscript: CC SM NS MC PL CIL.

References

snip...



http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0003017





>>>"the biochemical signature of PrPres in the BASE-inoculated animal was found to have a higher proteinase K sensitivity of the octa-repeat region. We found the same biochemical signature in three of four human patients with sporadic CJD and an MM type 2 PrP genotype who lived in the same country as the infected bovine."<<<


just another one of those sporadic CJD coincidences i suppose $$$ NOT to forget ;

Thursday, June 05, 2008

Review on the epidemiology and dynamics of BSE epidemics Vet. Res. (2008) 39:15 http://www.vetres.org/

DOI: 10.1051/vetres:2007053 c INRA, EDP Sciences, 2008 Review article

snip...

And last but not least, similarities of PrPres between Htype BSE and human prion diseases like CJD or GSS have been put forward [10], as well as between L-type BSE and CJD [17]. These findings raise questions about the origin and inter species transmission of these prion diseases that were discovered through the BSE active surveillance.

snip...

Cases of atypical BSE have only been found in countries having implemented large active surveillance programs. As of 1st September 2007, 36 cases (16 H, 20 L) have been described all over the world in cattle: Belgium (1 L) [23], Canada (1 H)15, Denmark (1 L)16, France (8 H, 6 L)17, Germany (1 H, 1 L) [13], Italy (3 L)18, Japan (1 L) [71], Netherlands (1 H, 2 L)19, Poland (1 H, 6 L)20, Sweden (1 H)21, United Kingdom (1 H)22, and USA (2 H)23. Another H-type case has been found in a 19 year old miniature zebu in a zoological park in Switzerland [56]. It is noteworthy that atypical cases have been found in countries that did not experience classical BSE so far, like Sweden, or in which only few cases of classical BSE have been found, like Canada or the USA.

And last but not least, similarities of PrPres between Htype BSE and human prion diseases like CJD or GSS have been put forward [10], as well as between L-type BSE and CJD [17]. These findings raise questions about the origin and inter species transmission of these prion diseases that were discovered through the BSE active surveillance.

full text 18 pages ;



http://www.vetres.org/index.php?option=article&access=standard&Itemid=129&url=/articles/vetres/pdf/2008/04/v07232.pdf



please see full text ;



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/06/review-on-epidemiology-and-dynamics-of.html



***Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.***

Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center
An Update from Stephen M. Sergay, MB, BCh & Pierluigi Gambetti, MD
April 3, 2008



http://www.aan.com/news/?event=read&article_id=4397&page=72.45.45



Sunday, March 16, 2008
MAD COW DISEASE terminology UK c-BSE (typical), atypical BSE H or L, and or Italian L-BASE



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/03/mad-cow-disease-terminology-uk-c-bse.html



HUMAN and ANIMAL TSE Classifications i.e. mad cow disease and the UKBSEnvCJD only theory JUNE 2008

snip...

Tissue infectivity and strain typing of the many variants Manuscript of the human and animal TSEs are paramount in all variants of all TSE. There must be a proper classification that will differentiate between all these human TSE in order to do this. With the CDI and other more sensitive testing coming about, I only hope that my proposal will some day be taken seriously. ...

snip...



http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/06/human-and-animal-tse-classifications-ie.html




NOT to forget the 5 cases of the NOR-98 atypical scrapie documented in the USA in 2007, in five different states. WHICH pathologically looks like some sub-types of sporadic CJD, of which Stanely Prusiner warns of a public health risk ;

***The pathology features of Nor98 in the cerebellum of the affected sheep showed similarities with those of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.



http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf



Here we report that both Nor98 and discordant cases, including three sheep homozygous for the resistant PrPARR allele (A136R154R171), efficiently transmitted the disease to transgenic mice expressing ovine PrP, and that they shared unique biological and biochemical features upon propagation in mice. These observations support the view that a truly infectious TSE agent, unrecognized until recently, infects sheep and goat flocks and may have important implications in terms of scrapie control and public health.

Edited by Stanley B. Prusiner, University of California, San Francisco, CA, and approved September 12, 2005 (received for review March 21, 2005)



http://www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/0502296102v1



Tuesday, June 3, 2008 SCRAPIE USA UPDATE JUNE 2008 NOR-98 REPORTED PA



http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2008/06/scrapie-usa-update-june-2008-nor-98.html



NOR-98 ATYPICAL SCRAPIE 5 cases documented in USA in 5 different states USA 007



http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2008/04/seac-spongiform-encephalopathy-advisory.html



http://nor-98.blogspot.com/



SCRAPIE USA



http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/



Sunday, June 15, 2008

A descriptive study of the prevalence of atypical and classical scrapie in sheep in 20 European countries

Research article



http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2008/06/descriptive-study-of-prevalence-of.html



Thursday, April 24, 2008

RE-FOIA OF DECLARATION OF EXTRAORDINARY EMERGENCY BECAUSE OF AN ATYPICAL T.S.E. OF FOREIGN ORIGIN IN THE UNITED STATES [Docket No. 00-072-1]



http://foiamadsheepmadrivervalley.blogspot.com/2008/04/re-foia-of-declaration-of-extraordinary.html



another question, just how long have these atypical BSE TSEs been around in the bovine ???

let's look at another case of atypical BSE in Germany way back in 1992 ;

Subject: atypical BSE reported in 1992 and conviently slaughterd and incinerated and then swept under rug for about 12 years Date: April 26, 2007 at 1:08 pm PST 1992

NEW BRAIN DISORDER

3. WHAT ABOUT REPORTS OF NEW FORM OF BSE?

THE VETERINARY RECORD HAS PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE ON A NEW BRAIN DISORDER OF CATTLE DISCOVERED THROUGH OUR CONTROL MEASURES FOR BSE. ALTHOUGH IT PRESENTS SIMILAR CLINICAL SIGNS TO BSE THERE ARE MAJOR DIFFERENCES IN THE HISTOPATHOLOGY AND INCUBATION PERIODS BETWEEN THE TWO. MUST EMPHASISE THAT THIS IS NOT BSE.

4. IS THIS NEW BRAIN DISORDER A THREAT?

WE DO NOT EVEN KNOW WHETHER THE AGENT OF THIS DISEASE IS TRANSMISSIBLE. IN ANY CASE, CASES SO FAR IDENTIFIED HAD SHOWN SIMILAR SYMPTOMS TO THOSE OF BSE, AND THEREFORE HAVE BEEN SLAUGHTERED AND INCINERATED, SO THAT IF A TRANSMISSIBLE AGENT WERE INVOLVED IT WOULD HAVE BEEN ELIMINATED. .......



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1992/10/26001001.pdf



2. The Collinge/Will dispute appears to rumble on. Dr. Collinge had told Dr. Tyrrell that Dr. Will's response to his criticism about sharing material had been ''quite unacceptable'' (in spite of it's apparently conciliatory tone). Apparently Professor Allen was now going to try and arrange a meeting to resolve the dispute. No action here for MAFF, although Mr. Murray may be interested.

3. Dr. Tyrrell regretted that the Committee had not seen the article on BBD. However he felt that for the time being NO specific action was called for. The most important need was to consider the possibility that the condition might be transmissible. As we have discussed, I suggested that we might circulate a paper to the members of the committee giving our appreciation of this condition (and perhaps of other non-BSE neurological conditions that had been identified in negative cases) and of any necessary follow up action. IF any Committee member felt strongly about this, or if the issue CAME TO A HEAD, we would call an interim meeting. He was happy with this approach. I would be grateful if Mr. Maslin could, in discussion with CVL and veterinary colleagues draft such a note, which will presumably very largely follow what Mr. Bradley's briefing paper has already said, taking account of DOH comments, We can then clear a final version with DOH before circulating it to Committee members.



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1992/10/29005001.pdf



IN CONFIDENCE

This is a highly competitive field and it really will be a pity if we allow many of the key findings to be published by overseas groups while we are unable to pursue our research findings because of this disagreement, which I hope we can make every effort to solve.



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1992/10/26002001.pdf



COLLINGE THREATENS TO GO TO MEDIA



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1992/12/16005001.pdf



2. The discovery might indicate the existence of a different strain of BSE from that present in the general epidemic or an unusual response by an individual host.

3. If further atypical lesion distribution cases are revealed in this herd then implications of misdiagnosis of 'negative' cases in other herds may not be insignificant.

snip...

This minute is re-issued with a wider distribution. The information contained herein should NOT be disseminated further except on the basis of ''NEED TO KNOW''.

R Bradley



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1993/02/17001001.pdf



IN CONFIDENCE

BSE ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION



http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1993/03/14001001.pdf



In this context, a word is in order about the US testing program. After the discovery of the first (imported) cow in 2003, the magnitude of testing was much increased, reaching a level of >400,000 tests in 2005 (Figure 4). Neither of the 2 more recently indigenously infected older animals with nonspecific clinical features would have been detected without such testing, and neither would have been identified as atypical without confirmatory Western blots. Despite these facts, surveillance has now been decimated to 40,000 annual tests (USDA news release no. 0255.06, July 20, 2006) and invites the accusation that the United States will never know the true status of its involvement with BSE.

In short, a great deal of further work will need to be done before the phenotypic features and prevalence of atypical BSE are understood. More than a single strain may have been present from the beginning of the epidemic, but this possibility has been overlooked by virtue of the absence of widespread Western blot confirmatory testing of positive screening test results; or these new phenotypes may be found, at least in part, to result from infections at an older age by a typical BSE agent, rather than neonatal infections with new "strains" of BSE. Neither alternative has yet been investigated.



http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0965.htm



IF BSE is not in the USA (just not documented for many different reasons), and only atypical BSE is in the USA (plus CWD, plus, many strains of Scrapie, and Now the Nor-98 documented in 5 different states, plus TME, then why would human mad cow in the USA look like the UK nvCJD from UK BSE cows ? it was shown long ago in studies at Mission Texas that experimental transmission of USA Scrapie to USA Bovine, DID NOT LOOK LIKE UK BSE. so again, in short, why would human mad cow in the USA look like human mad cow in the UK i.e. the (nvCJD). however, I believe that BSE has been in the USA untested and undocumented for years. why on earth then does the USDA refuse to allow creekstone or anyone else test their product? simple, if you don't look/test, you don't find.

snip...

He added that because the CDC only provide information on diseases, they have no plans

to make a separate press release on the issue including the result of the investigation.

and that is the way they plan to keep it, all spontaneous, sporadic, no route, no source $$$

USDA, CDC, NIH, ET AL INVOKE THE UKBSEnvCJD ONLY RULE $$$

Virginia Woman Did not Die of vCJD

Updated Jun.17,2008 08:34 KST

The MBC news program "PD Diary" reported that Aretha Vinson died of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD) in early April when in an interview, Vinson's mother actually said, "The results had come in from the MRI and it appeared that our daughter could possibly have CJD," not vCJD.

please see full text ;



http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/06/portsmouth-woman-did-not-die-of-mad-cow.html



NEW SOLUTIONS: A Journal of Environmental and Occupational Health Policy

Issue: Volume 18, Number 2 / 2008 Pages: 145 - 156 URL: Linking Options

Mad Cows and Computer Models: The U.S. Response to BSE

Frank Ackerman and Wendy A. Johnecheck

Abstract:

The proportion of slaughtered cattle tested for BSE is much smaller in the U.S. than in Europe and Japan, leaving the U.S. heavily dependent on statistical models to estimate both the current prevalence and the spread of BSE. We examine the models relied on by USDA, finding that the prevalence model provides only a rough estimate, due to limited data availability. Reassuring forecasts from the model of the spread of BSE depend on the arbitrary constraint that worst-case values are assumed by only one of 17 key parameters at a time. In three of the six published scenarios with multiple worst-case parameter values, there is at least a 25% probability that BSE will spread rapidly. In public policy terms, reliance on potentially flawed models can be seen as a gamble that no serious BSE outbreak will occur. Statistical modeling at this level of abstraction, with its myriad, compound uncertainties, is no substitute for precautionary policies to protect public health against the threat of epidemics such as BSE.



http://baywood.metapress.com/app/home/contribution.asp?referrer=parent&backto=issue,5,18;journal,1,41;linkingpublicationresults,1:300327,1



Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program

PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT ;

Monday, June 16, 2008 Mad Cows and Computer Models: The U.S. Response to BSE



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/



Sunday, March 16, 2008 MAD COW DISEASE terminology UK c-BSE (typical), atypical BSE H or L, and or Italian L-BASE March 16, 2008



http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/03/mad-cow-disease-terminology-uk-c-bse.html




Sunday, August 10, 2008

Thursday, July 10, 2008 A Novel Human Disease with Abnormal Prion Protein Sensitive to Protease update July 10, 2008



http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/07/novel-human-disease-with-abnormal-prion.html



Thursday, July 10, 2008 A New Prionopathy update July 10, 2008



http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/07/new-prionopathy-update-july-10-2008.html



MY COMMENTS, for whatever they are worth ;

A New Prionopathy OR more of the same old BSe and sporadic CJD



http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/08/new-prionopathy-or-more-of-same-old-bse.html



Communicated by: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.

[In submitting these data, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. draws attention to the steady increase in the "type unknown" category, which, according to their definition, comprises cases in which vCJD could be excluded. The total of 26 cases for the current year (2007) is disturbing, possibly symptomatic of the circulation of novel agents. Characterization of these agents should be given a high priority. - Mod.CP]



http://pro-med.blogspot.com/2007/11/proahedr-prion-disease-update-2007-07.html



http://www.promedmail.org/pls/askus/f?p=2400:1001:6833194127530602005::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1010,39963



There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance collection.

He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.



http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm



http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf



JOURNAL OF NEUROLOGY

MARCH 26, 2003

RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob

disease in the United States

Email Terry S. Singeltary:

mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000065/!x-usc:mailto:flounder@wt.net

I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?



http://www.neurology.org/cgi/eletters/60/2/176#535



THE PATHOLOGICAL PROTEIN

Hardcover, 304 pages plus photos and illustrations. ISBN 0-387-95508-9

June 2003

BY Philip Yam

CHAPTER 14 LAYING ODDS

Answering critics like Terry Singeltary, who feels that the U.S. under- counts CJD, Schonberger conceded that the current surveillance system has errors but stated that most of the errors will be confined to the older population.



http://www.thepathologicalprotein.com/



Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14, 2001 JAMA

Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease

To the Editor: In their Research Letter, Dr Gibbons and colleagues1 reported that the annual US death rate due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has been stable since 1985. These estimates, however, are based only on reported cases, and do not include misdiagnosed or preclinical cases. It seems to me that misdiagnosis alone would drastically change these figures. An unknown number of persons with a diagnosis of Alzheimer disease in fact may have CJD, although only a small number of these patients receive the postmortem examination necessary to make this diagnosis. Furthermore, only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies should be reportable nationwide and internationally.

Terry S. Singeltary, Sr Bacliff, Tex

1. Gibbons RV, Holman RC, Belay ED, Schonberger LB. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States: 1979-1998. JAMA. 2000;284:2322-2323. FREE FULL TEXT



http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/extract/285/6/733?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=singeltary&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT



http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/285/6/733?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=singeltary&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT



2 January 2000

British Medical Journal U.S. Scientist should be concerned with a CJD epidemic in the U.S., as well



http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/320/7226/8/b#6117



15 November 1999

British Medical Journal vCJD in the USA * BSE in U.S.



http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/319/7220/1312/b#5406



Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease



http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/



http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/01/cjd-hgh-body-snatchers.html



http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/01/tubulovesicular-structures-are.html



http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/01/risk-factors-for-sporadic-creutzfeldt.html



http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/01/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-prion-protein.html



http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2007/12/risk-assessment-of-transmission-of.html



http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2007/12/risk-factors-for-sporadic-creutzfeldt.html



http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2006/11/on-question-of-sporadic-or-atypical.html



USA PRION UNIT BLOG



http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/



Sunday, April 20, 2008 Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center April 3, 2008

Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.

see full text ;



http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2008/04/progress-report-from-national-prion.html



CJD TEXAS (cjd clusters)



http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/



USA WRITTEN CJD QUESTIONNAIRE ???



http://cjdquestionnaire.blogspot.com/



The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.



http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html




to be continued. ...TSS

Labels: , , , , ,

Wednesday, July 16, 2008

Prevalence of the prion protein gene E211K variant in U.S. cattle

Research Project:

Haplotype Structure of the Bovine Prion Gene Complex and Association with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (Bse) Location: Animal Health Systems Research

Title: Prevalence of the prion gene E211K variant in U.S. cattle

Authors

Heaton, Michael Keele, John Harhay, Gregory Richt, Juergen Koohmaraie, Mohammad Wheeler, Tommy Shackelford, Steven Casas, Eduardo King, David Sonstegard, Tad Van Tassell, Curtis Neibergs, Holly - WASHINGTON STATE UNIV. Chase, Chadwick Kalbfleisch, Ted - UNIV. OF LOUISVILLE, KY Smith, Timothy Clawson, Michael Laegreid, William - FORMER ARS EMPLOYEE

Submitted to: BioMed Central (BMC) Veterinary Research Publication Type: Peer Reviewed Journal Publication Acceptance Date: June 10, 2008 Publication Date: July 14, 2008 Citation: Heaton, M.P., Keele, J.W., Harhay, G.P., Richt, J., Koohmaraie, M., Wheeler, T.L., Shackelford, S.D., Casas, E., King, D.A., Sonstegard, T.S., Van Tassell, C.P., Neibergs, H.L., Chase, C.C., Kalbfleisch, T.S., Smith, T.P., Clawson, M.L., Laegreid, W.W. 2008. Prevalence of the prion gene E211K variant in U.S. cattle. BioMed Central (BMC) Veterinary Research 4:25. (http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/4/25)

Interpretive Summary: Classical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is a transmissible fatal brain-wasting disease in cattle. Also known as "mad cow disease," it was first diagnosed in 1986, in the United Kingdom (UK). BSE has since been found in 24 countries including Japan, Canada, and the United States. Consumption of contaminated beef from BSE-affected animals in the UK has been implicated as the most likely cause of a similar disease in humans, variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD). However, after regulations were put in place to prevent BSE-contaminated tissues from entering the feed supply and active BSE surveillance was increased, the number of BSE cases dropped dramatically. This was followed by a corresponding reduction in human vCJD cases. A rare type of BSE in cattle, referred to as ¿atypical BSE,¿ has recently been identified and is of interest because it develops in older animals without apparent exposure to other BSE-contaminated material. Although only 30 atypical BSE cases have been identified worldwide, they are significant because of their possible link to other CJDs in humans (i.e., other than vCJD). In 2006, a U.S. case of atypical BSE was discovered in Alabama and later reported to have a mutation (E211K) in the bovine gene required for BSE (i.e., the prion gene). This bovine mutation is strikingly similar to the most commonly inherited defect in humans that causes a type of CJD to develop late in life. This may imply that older cattle with the E211K mutation may also develop atypical BSE late in life. To determine whether this DNA mutation is rare in U.S. cattle, an accurate test was developed and more than 5500 cattle from all parts of the beef and dairy industry were tested for the presence of the mutation. This represents the first prevalence estimate of a mutation that may cause atypical BSE in older animals without prior exposure to BSE-contaminated tissues. None of the cattle tested were found to have the E211K mutation. Thus, the mutation appears to be either exceedingly rare or non-existent among U.S. purebred, crossbred, beef, and dairy cattle.


Technical Abstract: Background: In 2006, an atypical U.S. case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) was discovered in Alabama and later reported to be polymorphic for glutamate (E) and lysine (K) codons at position 211 in the bovine prion gene (PRNP) coding sequence. A bovine E211K mutation is important because it is analogous to the most common pathogenic mutation in humans (E200K) which causes hereditary Creutzfeldt - Jakob disease, an autosomal dominant form of prion disease. The present report describes a high-throughput matrix-associated laser desorption/ionization-time-of-flight mass spectrometry assay for scoring the PRNP E211K variant and its use to determine an upper limit for the K211 allele prevalence in U.S. cattle. Results: The K211 allele was not detected in 5690 cattle, including those from five commercial beef processing plants in three states (3892 carcasses) and 1798 registered cattle from 33 breeds. Nearby polymorphisms in PRNP coding sequence of 1084 diverse purebred cattle (33 breeds) did not interfere with scoring E211 or K211 alleles. Based on these results, the prevalence of the E211K variant was estimated to be extremely low, less than 1 in 1900 cattle (Bayesian analysis based on 95% quantile of the posterior distribution with a uniform prior). Conclusion: No groups or breeds of U.S. cattle are presently known to harbor the PRNP K211 variant. Consequently, high-throughput DNA testing may be required to identify carriers and further evaluate this allele as a risk factor for atypical BSE.

http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publications.htm?SEQ_NO_115=223296


Prevalence of the prion protein gene E211K variant in U.S. cattle
Michael P Heaton , John W Keele , Gregory P Harhay , Jurgen A Richt , Mohammad Koohmaraie , Tommy L Wheeler , Steven D Shackelford , Eduardo Casas , D ANDY King , Tad S Sonstegard , Curtis P Van Tassell , Holly L Neibergs , Chad C Chase Jr. , Theodore S Kalbfleisch. , Timothy PL Smith , Michael L Clawson and William W Laegreid

BMC Veterinary Research 2008, 4:25doi:10.1186/1746-6148-4-25


Published: 14 July 2008


Abstract (provisional)
Background
In 2006, an atypical U.S. case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) was discovered in Alabama and later reported to be polymorphic for glutamate (E) and lysine (K) codons at position 211 in the bovine prion protein gene (Prnp) coding sequence. A bovine E211K mutation is important because it is analogous to the most common pathogenic mutation in humans (E200K) which causes hereditary Creutzfeldt - Jakob disease, an autosomal dominant form of prion disease. The present report describes a high-throughput matrix-associated laser desorption/ionization-time-of-flight mass spectrometry assay for scoring the Prnp E211K variant and its use to determine an upper limit for the K211 allele frequency in U.S. cattle.

Results
The K211 allele was not detected in 6062 cattle, including those from five commercial beef processing plants (3892 carcasses) and 2170 registered cattle from 42 breeds. Multiple nearby polymorphisms in Prnp coding sequence of 1456 diverse purebred cattle (42 breeds) did not interfere with scoring E211 or K211 alleles. Based on these results, the upper bounds for prevalence of the E211K variant was estimated to be extremely low, less than 1 in 2000 cattle (Bayesian analysis based on 95% quantile of the posterior distribution with a uniform prior).

Conclusion
No groups or breeds of U.S. cattle are presently known to harbor the Prnp K211 allele. Because a carrier was not detected, the number of additional atypical BSE cases with K211 will also be vanishingly low.



http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/4/25


http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1746-6148-4-25.pdf



> This represents the first prevalence estimate of a mutation that may cause atypical BSE in older animals without prior exposure to BSE-contaminated tissues.

i seriously doubt that statement. check out the tonnage of mad cow tainted feed in Alabama as late as 2006, IN COMMERCE.

this spontaneous atypical bse (THAT LOOKS LIKE HUMAN SPORADIC CJD) old cow theory is just more BSe. ...TSS



Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST

REASON Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons DISTRIBUTION AL

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 1,484 tons DISTRIBUTION TN and WV

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00968.html


______________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes, Recall # V-120-6

CODE
None

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm
initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and
bone meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

350 tons

DISTRIBUTION

AL and MS

______________________________


PRODUCT

a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet,
50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6;
b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet,
50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6;
c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower,
50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6;
d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD
Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6;
e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags,
Recall # V-125-6;
f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags,
Recall # V-126-6;
g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher,
50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6

CODE

All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit
on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006.
Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated
recall is ongoing.

REASON

Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based
protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

7,541-50 lb bags

DISTRIBUTION

AL, GA, MS, and TN

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006

###


http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2006/ENF00964.html


Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125
TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST

PRODUCT

a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;
b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated,
net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;
c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;
d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated,
Recall # V-103-6;
e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend,
Recall # V-104-6;
f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted,
Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;
g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020,
Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;
h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete
Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated,
Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs,
Recall # V-107-6;
i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying
Chickens, Recall # 108-6;
j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;
k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED,
net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;
l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs,
Recall # V-111-6;
m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs,
Recall # V-112-6

CODE

Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and
visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based
protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

125 tons

DISTRIBUTION

AL and FL


END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006

###


http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html



MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE

Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22

71.248.128.67


RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II

______________________________


PRODUCT


a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals,
Recall # V-079-6;
b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg),
Recall # V-080-6;
c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL
FEED, Recall # V-081-6;
d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6
CODE
a) Bulk
b) None
c) Bulk
d) Bulk

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and
by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone
meal.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

10,878.06 tons

DISTRIBUTION

Nationwide

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006

###



http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00960.html



Wednesday, July 16, 2008

Implementation of 2008 Feed Ban Enhancements Questions and Answers July 15, 2008

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/07/implementation-of-2008-feed-ban.html



Thursday, July 10, 2008
A Novel Human Disease with Abnormal Prion Protein Sensitive to Protease update July 10, 2008

http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/07/novel-human-disease-with-abnormal-prion.html



Thursday, July 10, 2008
A New Prionopathy update July 10, 2008

http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/07/new-prionopathy-update-july-10-2008.html



SEAC Draft minutes of the 100th meeting held on 25th April 2008

http://seac992007.blogspot.com/2008/07/seac-draft-minutes-of-100th-meeting.html



HUMAN and ANIMAL TSE Classifications i.e. mad cow disease and the UKBSEnvCJD only theory JUNE 2008

http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/06/human-and-animal-tse-classifications-ie.html




PEACE


Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Baycliff, Texas USA 77518

Labels: , , , , ,

Monday, June 16, 2008

Mad Cows and Computer Models: The U.S. Response to BSE

NEW SOLUTIONS: A Journal of Environmental and Occupational Health Policy

Issue: Volume 18, Number 2 / 2008 Pages: 145 - 156 URL: Linking Options

Mad Cows and Computer Models: The U.S. Response to BSE

Frank Ackerman and Wendy A. Johnecheck

Abstract:

The proportion of slaughtered cattle tested for BSE is much smaller in the U.S. than in Europe and Japan, leaving the U.S. heavily dependent on statistical models to estimate both the current prevalence and the spread of BSE. We examine the models relied on by USDA, finding that the prevalence model provides only a rough estimate, due to limited data availability. Reassuring forecasts from the model of the spread of BSE depend on the arbitrary constraint that worst-case values are assumed by only one of 17 key parameters at a time. In three of the six published scenarios with multiple worst-case parameter values, there is at least a 25% probability that BSE will spread rapidly. In public policy terms, reliance on potentially flawed models can be seen as a gamble that no serious BSE outbreak will occur. Statistical modeling at this level of abstraction, with its myriad, compound uncertainties, is no substitute for precautionary policies to protect public health against the threat of epidemics such as BSE.

http://baywood.metapress.com/app/home/contribution.asp?referrer=parent&backto=issue,5,18;journal,1,41;linkingpublicationresults,1:300327,1


Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program

An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.

snip...

Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1 include:

soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),

implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),

snip...

The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are completed.

4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half

http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf


-MORE Office of the United States Attorney District of Arizona FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE For Information Contact Public Affairs February 16, 2007 WYN HORNBUCKLE Telephone: (602) 514-7625 Cell: (602) 525-2681

CORPORATION AND ITS PRESIDENT PLEAD GUILTY TO DEFRAUDING GOVERNMENT’S MAD COW DISEASE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM

PHOENIX -- Farm Fresh Meats, Inc. and Roland Emerson Farabee, 55, of Maricopa, Arizona, pleaded guilty to stealing $390,000 in government funds, mail fraud and wire fraud, in federal district court in Phoenix. U.S. Attorney Daniel Knauss stated, “The integrity of the system that tests for mad cow disease relies upon the honest cooperation of enterprises like Farm Fresh Meats. Without that honest cooperation, consumers both in the U.S. and internationally are at risk. We want to thank the USDA’s Office of Inspector General for their continuing efforts to safeguard the public health and enforce the law.” Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee were charged by Information with theft of government funds, mail fraud and wire fraud. According to the Information, on June 7, 2004, Farabee, on behalf of Farm Fresh Meats, signed a contract with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (the “USDA Agreement”) to collect obex samples from cattle at high risk of mad cow disease (the “Targeted Cattle Population”). The Targeted Cattle Population consisted of the following cattle: cattle over thirty months of age; nonambulatory cattle; cattle exhibiting signs of central nervous system disorders; cattle exhibiting signs of mad cow disease; and dead cattle. Pursuant to the USDA Agreement, the USDA agreed to pay Farm Fresh Meats $150 per obex sample for collecting obex samples from cattle within the Targeted Cattle Population, and submitting the obex samples to a USDA laboratory for mad cow disease testing. Farm Fresh Meats further agreed to maintain in cold storage the sampled cattle carcasses and heads until the test results were received by Farm Fresh Meats.

Evidence uncovered during the government’s investigation established that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population. Specifically, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee submitted, or caused to be submitted, obex samples from healthy, USDA inspected cattle, in order to steal government moneys.

Evidence collected also demonstrated that Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee failed to maintain cattle carcasses and heads pending test results and falsified corporate books and records to conceal their malfeasance. Such actions, to the extent an obex sample tested positive (fortunately, none did), could have jeopardized the USDA’s ability to identify the diseased animal and pinpoint its place of origin. On Wednesday, February 14, 2007, Farm Fresh Meats and Farabee pleaded guilty to stealing government funds and using the mails and wires to effect the scheme. According to their guilty pleas:

(a) Farm Fresh Meats collected, and Farabee directed others to collect, obex samples from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population, which were not subject to payment by the USDA;

(b) Farm Fresh Meats 2 and Farabee caused to be submitted payment requests to the USDA knowing that the requests were based on obex samples that were not subject to payment under the USDA Agreement;

(c) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms to the USDA’s testing laboratory that were false and misleading;

(d) Farm Fresh Meats completed and submitted, and Farabee directed others to complete and submit, BSE Surveillance Submission Forms filed with the USDA that were false and misleading;

(e) Farm Fresh Meats falsified, and Farabee directed others to falsify, internal Farm Fresh Meats documents to conceal the fact that Farm Fresh Meats was seeking and obtaining payment from the USDA for obex samples obtained from cattle outside the Targeted Cattle Population; and

(f) Farm Fresh Meats failed to comply with, and Farabee directed others to fail to comply with, the USDA Agreement by discarding cattle carcasses and heads prior to receiving BSE test results. A conviction for theft of government funds carries a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. Mail fraud and wire fraud convictions carry a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. Convictions for the above referenced violations also carry a maximum fine of $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for organizations. In determining an actual sentence, Judge Earl H. Carroll will consult the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which provide appropriate sentencing ranges. The judge, however, is not bound by those guidelines in determining a sentence.

Sentencing is set before Judge Earl H. Carroll on May 14, 2007. The investigation in this case was conducted by Assistant Special Agent in Charge Alejandro Quintero, United States Department of Agriculture, Office of Inspector General. The prosecution is being handled by Robert Long, Assistant U.S. Attorney, District of Arizona, Phoenix. CASE NUMBER: CR-07-00160-PHX-EHC RELEASE NUMBER: 2007-051(Farabee) # # #

http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/az/press_releases/2007/2007-051(Farabee).pdf


Thu Dec 6, 2007 11:38

FDA IN CRISIS MODE, AMERICAN LIVES AT RISK

http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/fs/food-disease/news/dec0407fda.html


FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK

http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/07/briefing/2007-4329b_02_01_FDA%20Report%20on%20Science%20and%20Technology.pdf


In 2007, in one weekly enforcement report, the fda recalled 10,000,000+ pounds of BANNED MAD COW FEED, 'in commerce', and i can tell you that most of it was fed out ;

10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST REASON Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI

REASON Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976 lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html


Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST

snip... see listings and references of enormous amounts of banned mad cow protein 'in commerce' in 2006 and 2005 ;

see full text ;

Friday, April 25, 2008

Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed [Docket No. 2002N-0273] (Formerly Docket No. 02N-0273) RIN 0910-AF46

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/04/substances-prohibited-from-use-in.html


SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS

http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2008/02/specified-risk-materials-srm.html


SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS KANSAS

http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/04/srm-mad-cow-recall-406-thousand-pounds.html


MAD COW DISEASE terminology UK c-BSE (typical), atypical BSE H or L, and or Italian L-BASE

http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/03/mad-cow-disease-terminology-uk-c-bse.html


Please remember, the last two mad cows documented in the USA i.e. Alabama and Texas, both were of the 'atypical' BSE strain, and immediately after that, the USDA shut down the testing from 470,000 to 40,000 in the U.S. in 2007 out of about 35 million cattle slaughtered. also, science is showing that some of these atypical cases are more virulent to humans than the typical UK BSE strain ;

***Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.***

Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center

An Update from Stephen M. Sergay, MB, BCh & Pierluigi Gambetti, MD

April 3, 2008

http://www.aan.com/news/?event=read&article_id=4397&page=72.45.45


In this context, a word is in order about the US testing program. After the discovery of the first (imported) cow in 2003, the magnitude of testing was much increased, reaching a level of >400,000 tests in 2005 (Figure 4). Neither of the 2 more recently indigenously infected older animals with nonspecific clinical features would have been detected without such testing, and neither would have been identified as atypical without confirmatory Western blots. Despite these facts, surveillance has now been decimated to 40,000 annual tests (USDA news release no. 0255.06, July 20, 2006) and invites the accusation that the United States will never know the true status of its involvement with BSE.

In short, a great deal of further work will need to be done before the phenotypic features and prevalence of atypical BSE are understood. More than a single strain may have been present from the beginning of the epidemic, but this possibility has been overlooked by virtue of the absence of widespread Western blot confirmatory testing of positive screening test results; or these new phenotypes may be found, at least in part, to result from infections at an older age by a typical BSE agent, rather than neonatal infections with new "strains" of BSE. Neither alternative has yet been investigated.

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0965.htm


Cases of atypical BSE have only been found in countries having implemented large active surveillance programs. As of 1st September 2007, 36 cases (16 H, 20 L) have been described all over the world in cattle: Belgium (1 L) [23], Canada (1 H)15, Denmark (1 L)16, France (8 H, 6 L)17, Germany (1 H, 1 L) [13], Italy (3 L)18, Japan (1 L) [71], Netherlands (1 H, 2 L)19, Poland (1 H, 6 L)20, Sweden (1 H)21, United Kingdom (1 H)22, and USA (2 H)23. Another H-type case has been found in a 19 year old miniature zebu in a zoological park in Switzerland [56]. It is noteworthy that atypical cases have been found in countries that did not experience classical BSE so far, like Sweden, or in which only few cases of classical BSE have been found, like Canada or the USA.

And last but not least, similarities of PrPres between Htype BSE and human prion diseases like CJD or GSS have been put forward [10], as well as between L-type BSE and CJD [17]. These findings raise questions about the origin and inter species transmission of these prion diseases that were discovered through the BSE active surveillance.

full text 18 pages ;

http://www.vetres.org/index.php?option=article&access=standard&Itemid=129&url=/articles/vetres/pdf/2008/04/v07232.pdf


EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of the United States of America (USA)

Summary of the Scientific Report

The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.

The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties.

A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.

EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.

http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/science/tse_assessments/gbr_assessments/573.html


http://www.efsa.europa.eu/etc/medialib/efsa/science/tse_assessments/gbr_assessments/573.Par.0004.File.dat/sr03_biohaz02_usa_report_v2_en1.pdf


snip...see full text ;

June 12, 2008

FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF FOOD SAFETY

FDA Has Provided Few Details on the Resources and Strategies Needed to Implement its Food Protection Plan

What GAO Found

http://fdafailedus.blogspot.com/


http://fdafailedus.blogspot.com/2008/06/federal-oversight-of-food-safety-fda.html


Wednesday, June 11, 2008

OIE Recognition of the BSE Status of Members RESOLUTION No. XXI (Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 27 May 2008)

snip...

CONSIDERING THAT

1. Adoption of subsequent Resolutions* since the 67th General Session of the OIE International Committee has established a procedure for annually updating a list of Members, categorised by their BSE risk according to the provisions of theTerrestrial Code,

2. During the 70th General Session, the International Committee adopted Resolution No. XVIII asking Members applying for a BSE risk evaluation to meet part of the costs sustained by the OIE Central Bureau in the evaluation process,

3. During the 72nd General Session, the OIE adopted Resolution No. XXI requesting the Director General to inform Delegates of Members whose country or zones are recognised with regard to their BSE risk status should annually confirm during the month of November whether their risk status and the criteria by which their status was recognised have remained unchanged,

4. Information published by the OIE is derived from declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Members. The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of a Member disease status based on inaccurate information, changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to the Central Bureau, subsequent to the time of declaration of the BSE risk status.

THE COMMITTEE

RESOLVES THAT

1. The Director General publish the following list of Members recognised as having a negligible BSE risk in accordance with Chapter 2.3.13. of the Terrestrial Code:

Australia, Argentina, Finland, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Singapore, Sweden and Uruguay.

2. The Director General publish the following list of Members recognised as having a controlled BSE risk in accordance with Chapter 2.3.13. of the Terrestrial Code:

Austria Belgium Brazil Canada Chile Chinese Taipei Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Estonia France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lichtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Mexico Netherlands Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Slovenia Spain Switzerland United Kingdom United States of America

AND

3. The Delegates of these Members will immediately notify the Central Bureau if BSE occurs in their countries or their territories.

_________

(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 27 May 2008)

* 67th General Session (GS) Resolution No (Res) XVI and Res XI; 69th GS Res XV, and 71st GS Res XXII, 72nd GS Res XXIV and Res XXI..

http://www.oie.int/eng/info/en_statesb.htm?e1d6


IN A NUT SHELL ;

(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)

11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries. The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to the Central Bureau,

http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf


bought and paid for by your local cattle dealer $$$

IN my opinion the WOAH/OIE is nothing more than a organized bunch of lobbyist for the members Countries in support of there INDUSTRY, bound together as one, with the only purpose of open trade for there precious commodities and futures. Speaking only of BSE, they failed at every corner, and then just said to hell with it, well just trade all strains of TSE globally.

snip...

NOW, ask yourself why not one single mad cow has been documented in the USA since the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG did the end around Johanns, Dehaven et al ??? found two atypical BSE or BASE cases and they flat shut it down i tell you. IF the OIE gives a favorable rating, IF the OIE gives any other rating but the lowest, poorest possible BSE/TSE rating, the OIE will have sealed there fate once and for all, because most of the world knows the truth about the USA and there mad cows. THE OIE will then be able to stand side by side with the USA, and proudly claim to have sold there soul to the devil, all for a buck, commodities and futures, to hell with human health. A 'CONTROLLED' RATING IS EXACTLY what the OIE will get if that is what they classify the USA as a 'CONTROLLED RATING'. IT will be controlled by Johanns, Dehaven, and GW. IT WILL BE RIGGED in other words. but that is nothing new, it's been rigged for years. ...

snip...SEE FULL TEXT with facts and sources @ ;

http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2008/06/oie-recognition-of-bse-status-of.html


http://organicconsumers.org/forum/index.php?showtopic=1566


Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518

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